




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HISTORY OF THE WAR

VOL. XIV.

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CHAPTER CCVIII.

THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE AND RETREAT, JULY, 1917.

POLITICAL AND MILITARY COMPLICATIONS—DEMANDS FOR AUTONOMY—POLISH PROBLEMS—RUSSIFICATION POLICY—THE UKRAINIAN MOVEMENT—CENTRAL RADA FORMED IN KIEFF—AUTONOMY GRANTED BY PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT—PRINCE LVOFF RESIGNS—EVE OF THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE—BRUSILOFF AS GENERALISSIMO—GENERAL GUTOR'S PLAN OF CAMPAIGN—ATTACK IN THE BRZESANY SECTOR—KORNILOFF'S ADVANCE—FALL OF HALICZ—INDISCIPLINE IN THE ARMY—THE RUSSIAN LINE BROKEN—THE RUSSIAN ARMY IN RETREAT—WORK OF BRITISH ARMoured CARS—DEATH PENALTY RESTORED—ENEMY TAKE TARNOPOL, STANISLAU, AND CZERNOWITZ—MUTINY IN THE BALTIC FLEET—M. KERENSKY AS PREMIER.

JULY, 1917, was destined to be a fateful month in the history of the Russian Revolution. Political and military complications followed each other with kaleidoscopic rapidity, forming an intricate maze which renders the task of the chronicler an exceptionally difficult one. Among these developments—which loomed menacingly above the chaos of disorganization and distress, described in the preceding chapter—were: first, the separatist tendencies of the Finns, the Little Russians (or Ukrainians, as they called themselves), and other nationalities, each of which had sought to take advantage of the country's weakness to secure a selfish, if fancied, profit; secondly, a shortlived victory in the field, followed by a shameful retreat of troops twice as numerous as the enemy, fleeing in the abandonment of cowardice at the instigation of traitors who had organized an armed uprising in the capital; thirdly, a serious crisis in the Cabinet, which led to the resignation of Prince Lvoff and the advent of M. Kerensky to the Premiership; lastly, another mutiny among the sailors of the Baltic Fleet, which, as a result of the profound disturbance to its efficiency and discipline, was to fail lamentably at a later date

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in its task of defending the country's shores from invasion.

Russia lost nearly all the territory she had occupied during the preceding year in Galicia and a magnificent harvest; she was saved from irretrievable military disaster by the energy of her Allies on the Western front, who pinned the main enemy hosts confronting them. The Revolutionary Government, led by the Socialists and dominated by the Soviets (Councils of Workmen, Soldiers and Peasants), had neither the independence nor the force and authority requisite for coping with indiscipline. Four of the Russian Armies involved in the disaster were extricated from a well-nigh hopeless position by the skill of General Korniloff, and turned to make a stand, thanks to the penalties for cowardice which he courageously imposed. On the other hand, M. Kerensky and his associates made concessions to the Ukrainian demands for autonomy—a product of Austro-German propaganda—which gravely imperilled the unity of the State and further weakened its armed defences, already impaired by revolutionary propaganda. Although only nominally a republic, Russia was suffering the consequences of a departure from the monarchical

form of government with which her greatness as an Empire had been bound up in the past. Symptoms of disruption obtruded themselves on every side. Autonomies were demanded by Siberia, Esthonia, Georgia, by the Lithuanians, the White Russians, the Letts, and also by the Germans and the Jews. Even the Asiatic dependencies of Khiva and Bokhara did not escape the general contagion. Schooled by the local Jews and committees the natives wrested constitutions from their rulers.

Amidst these self-seeking manifestations the Provisional Government found itself tied by the policy of "self-definition of nationalities," along with the theory of "no annexation, no indemnity," enunciated by M. Kerensky and



M. KERENSKY WITH GENERAL
ALEXEIEFF.

endorsed by the doctrinaire dreamers of the Soviet, seeking to conciliate the traitor-pacifists of Bolshevism. Indeed, there seemed to be little doubt that the "self-definition" clause had stimulated autonomy demands. Thus a course of action which was primarily intended to bring the Allies into line for the conclusion of a premature peace reacted in the first place upon Russia herself.

Moreover, the promises and pledges given by Russia to the Poles were used as a convenient precedent. Because the Poles were permitted to form regiments and divisions the Ukrainians

decided that they had the right to do the same. They further argued that the Ukrainians, being split up among the belligerent States, were also entitled to vindicate their cause by the intervention of legions under the blue and yellow flag, just as Ukrainian units had been enrolled in Austria-Hungary.

Carried away by the revolutionary current, M. Kerensky's followers did not notice, or disregarded, the perils of Ukrainian autonomy. They did not realize that under its alluring surface lay a minefield carefully sown by enemy hands; that autonomy for the Ukraine might eventually lead to a union of the Little Russians with their kinsmen, the Ruthenes of Galicia, into a separate State under Austro-Hungarian auspices, and the cutting-off of Russia from the Black Sea, with the loss to her of the southern provinces—her European granary. Such a consummation was, moreover, bound to press down the scales irrevocably on the side of the Central Powers. The cause of a just equilibrium and a stable peace would thereby suffer hopeless defeat, involving in its ruin the very principles which had been inscribed upon the Revolutionary banner.

The Polish question came under an entirely different category. United Poland would be at once a "buffer" State between Russia and Germany and a powerful antidote to Germanic world-power. By reiterated pledges Russia had bound herself to restore this unity. The Grand Duke Nicholas, as Commander-in-Chief of the Tsar's armies at the commencement of the Great War, had solemnly proclaimed this purpose; it had been reaffirmed and extended by a Declaration of the Premier before the Duma after the Russian retreat in 1915, when the words "Polish autonomy" were first uttered by a Russian Minister; it had been still further developed by the Revolutionary Government in its announcement to the people and to the Allied nations that it would "liberate Poland."

A brief review of the Polish situation, as it then presented itself, may conveniently be given at this point of the narrative. Austro-German policy during the war discounted all the possibilities of an Allied vindication of the Polish cause. The Poles in Galicia had long been the spoilt children of the Hapsburg régime. In Posen and Silesia they, on the contrary, had had to contend with an agrarian and cultural campaign of Prussification against which they had presented a united and unbreakable front,



GERMAN OFFICER DISGUISED AS AN AUSTRIAN BLIND BEGGAR, WITH A
PRETENDED WIFE AND CHILD.

comparing well with the resistance offered by their countrymen in the Vistula provinces to Russifying tendencies manifested shortsightedly by Tsardom. In this respect the administrators deputed by Nicholas II. continued to play the German game. Almost on the eve of war, General Zhilinsky, on taking charge of the Warsaw Governor-Generalship, had proclaimed his unconditional adherence to the policy of Russification that had been followed with varying intensity by his predecessors. This attitude revealed an utter incapacity to estimate the causes and consequences of German aggression. But the Poles themselves, taught in the school of bitter experience, knew how to differentiate between the hard, calculating domination of the Germans and the imitative but comparatively innocuous rule of the Russian bureaucracy; they also realized that a genuine solution of their national hopes could be assured only by the Powers of the Entente. Later they were to be sorely tempted to make terms with their German masters, but they—or at least a majority of them—held out in the face of almost desperate provocation and distress, remaining staunch in their

belief that the Allies alone were capable of assuring to them a free and independent existence.

Early in the war the Poles had intimated to the Russian High Command their desire to form themselves into units for the defence of their country. A similar movement had been initiated in Galicia. Pan Pilsudski, a representative of the so-called Austrian Orientation, had raised a small force of Polish Sokoly to fight against the Russians, believing that the liberation of Poland could never be acceptable to the autocracy. Later, when the Austro-Germans were in possession, and a tame Council of State (*Rada Państwowa*) had been instituted at Warsaw to encourage Polish hopes of independence, this same Pilsudski gradually lost his belief in the possibility of salvation under Germanic auspices, resigned from the Council, and declined to use his legion on the Russian front. Meanwhile, the Grand Duke, domineered by the Court and the bureaucracy, had had to discourage the Polish volunteer movement. There were over half a million Poles serving under the Russian colours, and they, like their countrymen in the German and Austro-

Hungarian units, were unconsciously shedding each other's blood, not knowing that their bullets or bayonets were being directed against Polish breasts.

Had Russia then accepted and encouraged the idea of a Polish Army, which was to reach the incipient stage of realization three years



GENERAL LECHITSKY,
Who resigned command of the South-Western Front.

later,* the course of the Great War might have been much modified. When Polish units did finally make their appearance on Russia's side they were too small to make the desired impression. Moreover, the Germanic control over Polish lands had asserted itself in such a fashion and the Revolution had so weakened the Russian Army that the prospects of Russia being able to exert an influence over the destinies of Poland had become more remote. On the other hand, all the provinces conquered by the Austro-Germans had been endowed with an appearance of self-government, and there was much German talk of a revival of United Poland, of course without Posen and without a sea-port at Dantzig. It was notorious,

* A Congress of Polish soldiers, assembled in Petrograd, decided (May, 1917) in favour of the formation of a Polish Army. But the movement encountered some opposition in their own ranks and was approved half-heartedly by the Provisional Government. This Congress elected General Pilsudski honorary commander-in-chief of the new army, a proceeding which afterwards afforded the Germans a pretext for ordering his arrest.

however, that the produce of Polish lands had been diverted for German use and profit. As an offset to this system of spoliation, which entailed famine to the urban population, the conquerors had everywhere—for selfish purposes—safeguarded and developed rural property. Farming was carried on with the aid of improved German implements and machinery and half the profits handed over to the owner of the land or deposited to his credit at the banks if he had sought refuge in Russia, the other half being taken over by the Germanic treasuries. While the Russian armies in their retreat had destroyed Polish farms and estates the Germans were taking every care of them and even paying the owners a share of the revenue. This was a clever move on their part. It had an undoubted influence upon the many thousands of Poles who had been driven from their homes, to flee before the German invasion.

Without dealing further with the development of the Polish problem at this stage, it was to be noted that the leaven of race prejudice engendered between the Poles and the descendants of the Little Russians (Cossacks† or Ukrainians, as they were styled at different places and periods), whom they had dominated in the days when Poland claimed the overlordship of the dominions from the Baltic to the Black Sea, had been perpetuated during the centuries, because many of the fair lands of the Ukraina (Borderland) had become the birthright of Polish nobles. It had been part of Stolypin's policy to favour the Ukrainian peasant to the detriment of the Polish landlord. In introducing elective Zemstvos in Little Russia during his Premiership he had belittled the influence of the Poles. Therein he was guided by consideration for strengthening the unity of the Empire as well as the promotion of peasant farming—his dominant aim—but, as the experience of the war and the Revolution was to show, these objects did not serve their intended purpose. Racial feeling, thus stimulated, lent itself to the Germanic design of an autonomous Ukraino-Galicia, and in agrarian matters brought about a situation more critical in the southern than in the other provinces of European Russia.

There existed another incentive to Ukrainian separatism—the economic and cultural questions. People of one race and one language

† The Kuban and Terek Cossack armies were composed of migrants belonging to the Setch or Zaporozhian Army of the Little Russian Republic.

(the Little Russians and the Ruthenes) had naturally sought a development of commercial and intellectual relations. These had been, however, much hampered by custom-house duties and police restrictions. Moreover, on the Russian side the Ukrainians saw with envy their kinsfolk beyond the border enjoying certain cultural rights which were denied to them—the right of tuition in their native tongue and its official status. And although a closer inspection would have revealed the hollowness of the Ruthene liberties, dominated as the people were in their daily lives by Jewish officials and land agents and even by the Poles, the poverty of the Ruthene peasants bedecked under the gay colours of their national dress, and the speciousness of their religious freedom under a Church adopting the Greek rites but recognizing the authority of Rome and its Hapsburg supporters—although there was no sound motive for envy, especially after the

overthrow of the autocratic *régime*—the catch-word “Ukraina for the Ukrainians” was successfully promulgated by a small group of literary men, inspired by Austrian influences, who took advantage of the ignorance and passivity of the masses and the weakness of the Provisional Government.

The errors of the Old *Régime* had led to much needless harrying of the Ruthenes inhabiting the districts of Kholm and Lublin and professing the Greek-Catholic or United faith. Russification had there taken the form of forcible conversion to Orthodoxy and later to a separation of these districts from the kingdom of Poland as defined by international treaty. But Russian Neo-Slavophilism had dictated a conciliatory attitude towards the Ruthenes of Galicia. Indeed, its leaders, while accepting in principle a reconciliation with the Poles, persistently reproached them for “oppressing the Galicians.” When the



MEN OF THE POLISH LEGION IN THE RUSSIAN ARMY.

victorious hosts of Russia swept westward to Cracow during the first year of the Great War, they were met with open arms by the natives, who had been ignorant or were oblivious of the treatment that had been meted out to their co-religionaries in Kholm and Lublin. Very soon,



GEN. ALEXEIEFF AND A DEPUTATION OF SOLDIERS.

however, they were disillusioned. In the wake of the Russian legions came trainloads of the Orthodox clergy and administrators imbued with the ideas of unifying the Ruthenes under the Russian sceptre by means of spiritual "conversion." The experiment ended in failure, for the Ruthenes were an obstinate race with the proverbial obstinacy of their Little Russian kinsmen; nothing could shake their allegiance to their priests, to the Greek-Catholic Church, and to the Pope. The missionaries went away, disappointed. But the attempt to hustle Galicians into unity with Russian ways and beliefs left an aftermath of bitterness which grew during the winter and the spring of 1915 and killed any inclination on the part of the natives to seek Russia's protection. They hailed with joy the return of the Austrian and even the German armies. A short taste of Russian rule had more than sufficed. Even gratitude for 300 million

roubles expended by the Russians on relief work and seeding their fields was forgotten.

Having thus described some of the circumstances which had prefaced the demand for Ukrainian autonomy, let us briefly follow the course of events that had been transpiring in Russia during the Revolution—events that were destined soon to reach a climax in Kieff.

While the consolidation of the German occupation of Courland and the virtual separation of Finland from Russia, proclaimed by the Social Democrats in the Diet (with the approval and support of the Russian soldiers and sailors), were undermining the edifice built by Peter the Great on the shores of the Baltic, and threatening to close his "window into Europe," an artificially stimulated movement had arisen in the Ukraina menacing the integrity of the dominions acquired to the south of Muscovy by the Tsar Alexis Mikhailovitch and on the Black Sea by Catherine the Great. The blue and yellow flag of Ukraina had been substituted for the red flag of Revolution, symbolizing thereby a tendency to break away from Revolutionary Russia. The local Soviet, the Military Delegates, and the students of the University naturally opposed the movement, as also did the Jews and Poles. That was not surprising, for the leaders of the movement had proclaimed the watchword "Down with Muscovites, Poles and Jews."

For several months the Provisional Government closed its eyes to the possibilities of the movement, although its leader, Professor M. Grushevsky (formerly of Lemberg University), had declared in written and oral utterances that nothing less than the whole of Southern Russia, including Siedlce and Voronezh, Koursk and Novorossisk, with all the seaboard and Eastern Galicia and Bukovina, were under his plan to be evolved into a separate State with a population of 37 million souls. Grushevsky had been propagating this idea before the war. He was the inventor of the name Ukraina, which was to be given to the new State. Austrian and German money had been secretly spent to foster the scheme. A *Bund zur Befreiung der Ukraina* had been founded in Vienna under the presidency of Doroshenko. Propaganda was carried on by Biberovitch and Stepankowski, who edited newspapers in Vienna and Lausanne. The Bund or Soyuz organized a legion of Ukrainskii Sichovii Striltsi (riflemen) with the help of funds obtained partly from Ukrainians in America.

Directly after the outbreak of the Revolution, and, the disappearance of all restrictions, Grushevsky and a coterie of literary men, Ukrainians, formed a so-called Central Rada or Council in Kieff, which arrogated to itself the right to speak in the name of the Ukrainian nation. In April the Rada announced its intention to call a Constituent to decide the future form of government for Ukraina. A Congress of Socialists sitting in Kieff and the Soviet manifested alarm, but Grushevsky reassured them. He was, so he claimed, acting in agreement with the Provisional Government. Soon a Congress of Ukrainian representatives (self-constituted, like the Soviet) proclaimed itself for "autonomy in a federal Russian republic," which, moreover, was to be immediately organized by the Rada, strengthened by the nomination of additional members: a Social Democrat and poet named Vinnichenko and a journalist named Efremoff being chosen as Vice-Presidents. The movement was then extended to Poltava, Kharkoff, and Odessa. A series of Ukrainian demonstrations was initiated in Kieff, often developing into street conflicts with the students. Sermons were preached in the churches for the first time in the native tongue. Among the soldiers a minority sought to enrol themselves into separate Ukrainian regiments, but at first the Soviet offered resistance.

The arrival of Count Szeptycki, the Greek Catholic Metropolitan of Lemberg, gave rise to fresh manifestations. He had been imprisoned under the old *régime* for alleged conspiracy against the Russians in Galicia. His visit led to a revival of Romish tendencies, buried since the days of Catherine. At the end of May M. Kerensky came to Kieff, visited the Rada, and lightheartedly promised the fulfilment of their wishes by the Russian Constituent Assembly. The Ukrainians were not disposed to wait till then. Negotiations were carried to Petrograd, where a special commission reported in favour of local self-government, not venturing to use the word autonomy. But the Ukrainian delegates were evidently aiming high. They demanded an expression of sympathy with the idea of Ukrainian autonomy, the immediate acceptance of representation at the Peace Conference "in connexion with the fate of Galicia and the Ukrainian territories occupied by the Germans," the appointment of a High Commissioner for Ukrainian affairs, the drafting of Ukrainians into Ukrainian regiments,

official recognition of their language, and a grant of funds for administrative purposes.

Then began a game of cross-purposes between the Provisional Government and the Rada; the former endeavouring to save appearances by means of nominal concessions, the latter



MAJOR-GENERAL POLOVTSOFF,
Commander-in-Chief of the Petrograd District;
dismissed by Kerensky.

calmly and coolly insisting upon and getting its way. In vain the Soviets upheld the Provisional Government. So-called All-Ukrainian Peasants' and Soldiers' Congresses were assembled and clamoured for more than the Rada had asked, whereby the latter appeared in the light of a moderate assembly, endeavouring to contain popular aspirations. Constant disturbances were occurring in Kieff between the Ukrainians and other nationalities. Finally, under the guise of "saving the Ukraina from the anarchy to which the national movement would lead if its aspirations were not satisfied," the Rada drew up a Manifesto called the "Universal," in which, after upbraiding the Provisional Government "for refusing to comply

with Ukrainian demands," it announced that "the Ukrainian people would proceed to manage their own affairs." Soldiers were dispatched to various cities to read and explain this document, and incidentally to levy a land tax of a penny per acre for the Rada's expenses. The promulgation of the Universal in Kieff was attended by a grand open-air meeting amid the ringing of church and cathedral bells (June 26). Prince Lvoff issued a counter-manifesto on the danger of changing the form of administration in the country and in the army in war-time.

This body proceeded to address the population of the Ukraina as the responsible Government of an autonomous State. The writ of the Provisional Government was no longer recognized in Ukraina. Its administrative prerogatives were suspended. It had to deal with the Rada or repudiate the Revolutionary theory of "self-definition" and invite an open revolt. Protests by loyal Little Russian troops in the army at the front against Separatist tendencies, their denunciation of the Rada as "a self-appointed group of bourgeois and pro-Germans



MEN OF THE BRITISH ARMoured CAR SECTION TEACHING COSSACKS
THE USE OF MACHINE GUNS.

His arguments were two-edged; they fell unheeded upon the Rada. Within a few days the new Ukrainian Government had been formed under the modest name of General Secretariat. The following is a list of the Ministers:

President of the General Secretariat and General Secretary for Interior Affairs: V. K. Vinnichenko.
Director of General Affairs of the Secretariat: P. Khristuk.
General Secretary of Finance: Kh. A. Baranovsky.
General Secretary of International Affairs: S. A. Etremoff.
General Secretary of Provisioning Affairs: M. M. Stasuk.
General Secretary of Agricultural Affairs: B. Martos.
General Secretary of War Affairs: S. V. Petlura.
General Secretary of Justice: V. Sadovsky.

who want to usurp authority in order to place us under a yoke," resolutions passed by the Soviets, the military delegates in Kieff, and the students approving "decentralization and broad autonomy" in principle but reserving the settlement of such matters to the Constituent Assembly failed to make the slightest impression. The Rada could claim to represent the opinion of the ignorant Ukrainian masses just as much as the Soviets represented the Russian nation—no more and no less. How feeble was the connecting link may be gathered from the personal experiences of *The Times* Petrograd Corre-

spondent. In July, 1917, he was assured by peasants resident within a few miles of Kieff that they knew nothing about the Rada and had never heard of any elections to such a body.

The commencement of the Russian offensive west of Tarnopol (July 1) which was to free Galicia and Poland from the Germanic yoke and qualify the Revolutionary Government for a predominant part in the Allies' counsels did not for an instant deter the Rada from its work of disintegration. On July 11 M. Kerensky and his associates, MM. Tseretelli (a Georgian) and Tereshchenko (a Little Russian), came to Kieff to confer with the members of the General Secretariat and with the Soviet. The Military Secretary had ordered a parade of Ukrainian soldiers in honour of the occasion. The commander-in-chief, of the district forbade it. Nevertheless the parade was held. MM. Grushevsky, Petlura and the other Ukrainian "Ministers" went out to take the salute, while M. Kerensky and his Ministers discreetly abstained from appearing. That two rival authorities—the Russian and the Ukrainian—were in open conflict became self-evident. A temporary solution based upon a virtual surrender by the Provisional Government was reached some days later. M. Kerensky had tried to appeal to sentiments of patriotism. At a meeting of political organizations in Kieff (July 13) he described how he had seen "under a terrible storm of deadly fire, our comrades and brothers rush forward bearing the red ensigns of the Revolution with cries of 'Long live freedom! Land and liberty!'" He admonished his audience not to compromise the great task of defending their freedom. "To create a special national army in time of war was absolutely unallowable," but "there would be no objection to forming certain units entirely of Ukrainian soldiers, if circumstances allowed." As a matter of fact the Ukrainians had done so already. M. Kerensky left again for the Front, commissioning his associates to conclude an arrangement. Negotiations reduced themselves to bargaining for a larger number of non-Ukrainian members of the Rada. The Ukrainians offered a quarter, the Provisional Government asked for at least a half, on the very justifiable ground that Russians, Poles, and Jews formed the larger portion of the population. Moreover, the non-Ukrainians would be useful allies in the Rada, insisting that it should act as an organ of the Provisional Government,



A UKRAINIAN TYPE.

whereas the Ukrainians were inclined to treat the Provisional Government with indifference.

An agreement was concluded with the Rada by MM. Tseretelli and Tereshchenko (July 14), without the previous assent or knowledge of non-Socialist Ministers in Petrograd. (This led to a serious Cabinet crisis on the eve of a fateful Bolshevik uprising, which will be described further on.)

The agreement was as follows:

For unifying the revolutionary democracy and the nationalities of the Ukraina there must be created a territorial organ, the composition of which will be defined by agreement with the Ukrainian Rada. Its ranks will be filled up by representatives of the revolutionary democracy and of the nationalities which have hitherto not been represented, who will enter it in the proper numbers to give them a just representation. The establishment of the reformed Rada as a territorial organ requires the ratification of the Provisional Government. After ratification this organ will be regarded as a juridical organ of the administration, receiving its power from the Provisional Government. The proposed territorial organ will be given wide rights for the Government of the Ukraina, as is the case in the Caucasus.* In regard to the army, the Government gives the Ukrainians those rights which Kerensky outlined in his speech and the right of raising separate military units in so far as that does not interfere with the principle of the unity of the army. Also the right to have a representative of the Ukrainian Military Committee with the Minister of War, with the Generalissimo, and with army commanders.

One highly important point had been omitted, viz., a definition of the status of the

* The administration of the Caucasus, like that of Turkestan, had been a separate entity under the Empire for military and racial reasons, like the British rule in India. It offered scant analogy with the Ukraina.



GEN. IRMANOFF, OF THE THIRD CAUCASIAN CORPS, AND GEN. BAGRATION-MOUKHRANSKY, OF THE SAVAGE DIVISION.

(General Irmanoff resigned and re-entered the Army as a private soldier.)

General Secretariat. The Rada had flatly declined to admit that the Secretariat should be in any way responsible to or dependent on the Provisional Government. The Ministers had been obliged to give way. It was a crucial factor in the controversy. Its tacit acceptance implied Home Rule for Ukraina and all the logical consequences thereof. The Provisional Government, dominated by its Socialist elements, approved the agreement. All the Cadets in the Lvoff Cabinet and the Prime Minister himself, who had been playing the game of opportunism *à outrance* ever since he took office in March, 1917, resigned. The Rada, having scored an undoubted victory, resolved to

humour its erstwhile opponents by issuing another "Universal," in which it repudiated separatist aims and alleged its willingness to await the decision of the Constituent, taking comfort from the assurance that it would be difficult to cancel an accomplished fact.

We come now to the great Russian offensive which began on July 1, and thanks to General Korniloff's remarkable successes gave the Russians Halicz and the line of the Lomnica, seriously threatening the enemy position at Lemberg, until treachery and indiscipline in the Army on July 19 turned the Russian victories into defeat. This offensive and its resulting developments constituted a turning point in the course of the Russian Revolution. Hitherto its activities had been purely destructive. It had been engaged almost entirely in removing all traces of the old *régime*, upsetting the good with the bad, and as it had fallen into the hands of extreme Socialists, with no conception of practical statesmanship and often imbued by alien sympathies, who were in some cases the paid agents of Germany, the good was more often sacrificed than the bad. Such men as Kerensky and Tseretelli understood that the Revolution would soon have to initiate a constructive policy or Russia would perish in the great international struggle then proceeding. Sir George Buchanan had called the attention of our Russian Allies to certain elementary facts which were being too long ignored. In a speech delivered in Petrograd (June, 1917) he recalled how under the old *régime* he had tried to impress on the ex-Tsar that in the twentieth century an irresponsible autocracy was an anachronism which could not endure. Russia, Sir George said, had captured the Bastille of autocracy by assault, and had won her full liberties in a single week. She must consolidate her newly won freedom if she would keep it.

Through the war (he continued) you have won freedom, and in order that you might safely reap the harvest of your great revolution the democracies of France and Great Britain have been holding and driving back the main forces of the Germans and shedding their blood, not only in defence of their national patrimony, but to safeguard the newborn liberties of Russia. Had they not done so, had the Germans not transferred westwards large numbers of the troops concentrated on your front, it might have gone hard with Free Russia. We look to you now to help to relieve the constant pressure on our front by yourselves taking the offensive and thus to bring the war to a speedy end and secure to the world the blessings of permanent peace.

Fraternizing with German troops between the front trenches will not bring you peace, but will help to

prolong the war. The Germans encourage it in order to demoralize your Army. The German treatment of your comrades who have returned from captivity will show you what value to attach to German professions of brotherly sentiments. Fraternize rather in spirit with your French and British comrades who are fighting your battles for you in the West. Do not, moreover, believe the tales with which German agents would poison your minds against your Allies. Do you suppose that if we were fighting for capitalistic or Imperialistic aims five million men of British race would have volunteered for active service and that millions of working men and women would be working overtime in factories to keep the British and Russian Armies supplied with shells and guns?

Our first task, however, must be to beat the enemy, for if we fail to do that we shall not have a voice in the final settlement and shall have to accept such terms of peace as Germany is pleased to impose, including the incorporation of Russian territory in the German Empire.

The Germans had indulged other views. They regarded Russia as hopelessly embogged in the revolutionary morass. Their Press had hailed the Revolution "as a blessing for Germany, like Elizabeth's death in the Seven Years' War." While cooperating with the

Tageblatt: "Buchanan has misled the Russian soldiers regarding Germany's attitude," it complained. The *Frankfurter Zeitung* voiced the same theory.


Once more the Germans had failed to understand the soul of a nation. They had interpreted Russia's weakness from a superficial, purely materialistic angle, holding, in their superior self-sufficient wisdom, that the activities of the Soviet and the resultant loss of discipline and authority in the army and in the country had quenched the spirit of the Russian people. They had forgotten the patient, self-sacrificing heroism of the Russian soldier, displayed on many a stricken field in Galicia and Poland during two years of alternate victory and reverse under circumstances that would have soon extinguished the ardour of other troops—without rifles, without shells, and without technical equipment of observation or transport.



M. KERENSKY AT THE FRONT ADDRESSING TROOPS.

Bolsheviks through Lenin, Grimm, and the Jews in the Soviet to intensify the process of internal disorganization, they studiously avoided any activity on the Eastern Front and encouraged "fraternization" and overtures directed to the conclusion of a separate peace. The *Hamburger Nachrichten* (June 26) confidently declared that a "Russian offensive" would be "impossible." Some days later, when the impossible became a fact, the *Neue Freie Presse* plaintively remarked: "The Russian offensive is the strongest possible condemnation of the principles of the Revolution." Its characteristically German tone of injured innocence was re-echoed in the *Berliner*

The Revolution had, it is true, disastrously undermined the moral and the discipline of the army and had sown a fatal distrust among the men towards their officers. It had deprived the soldiers of all human incentive to go on fighting. But under the embers of their loyalty and their faith slumbered the old indomitable spirit which had made of them a great nation. Only a little encouragement was required to induce the flame to arise afresh. This incentive came from the lips of M. Kerensky, who, under the circumstances described in Chapter CCVII., issued a stirring appeal to the army calling upon the soldiers to



THE RUSSIAN BATTLE-LINE.

The black line shows the position of the Russian Armies on July 19, when the South-western Front attained its furthest advance towards Lemberg. The arrows indicate the abortive offensives on the Western or Central Front, at Smorgon and Lake Naroch (July 20), and on the Rumanian front, some days later.

Commencing at Brzezany on July 1, the Russian offensive attained its fullest development further south at Kalusz (July 12). The front was treacherously opened (July 19) at Zwierzyn (between Zloczow and Zalozce, see map on page 14), whence the enemy was able to drive a wedge south eastward to Tremboulka and Husiatyn (July 28). The Russians retreated 100 miles in ten days, as shown by the dotted line.

fight for, and in so doing to vindicate, the principles of the Revolution. The summons

called forth an immediate response. M. Kerensky's visits to the Front were marked by scenes of indescribable enthusiasm. Even the Soviets were carried away. All Russia, postponing party interests and considerations, awaited the issue with revived hope. The disorders and disappointments caused by the Revolution were forgotten, and when the first bulletins of victory reached Petrograd and Moscow in the early days of July all classes united in heartfelt joy and praise, only measurable by the despair which followed three weeks later when these same armies, after having inflicted sanguinary defeats upon the country's foes, mutinously deserted and fled in panic almost without resistance before an enemy far inferior in numbers, and even in guns, abandoning positions of great strength, leaving behind them a vast quantity of arms and supplies, a whole network of railways that had been laboriously constructed at great cost, and a fertile country with wheat already harvested in the fields.

It was not the Russian nation that incurred disaster in the sun-baked hills and valleys of Galicia and Bukovina and in the northern and southern sections of the far-flung battle-line from the Baltic to the Black Sea; it was Socialism and its dominant partner, the Bolshevik committeeman.

Faithful to the call of their obligations as Allies, seeking manfully to justify the Revolution, unheeding the clamour and threats of Bolshevik agitators and German agents whom they were powerless to bridle or subdue, the Provisional Government gladly adopted M. Kerensky's views as to the possibility of a general offensive. A conference at headquarters between Ministers and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General Brusiloff, who had been transferred from the South-Western front to succeed General Alexeieff, did not yield so much promise. It was ascertained that a simultaneous offensive on all the fronts would necessitate indefinite delay. The Northern Front had suffered such ravages from the proximity of Petrograd and its demoralizing influences that scarcely any hope could be entertained of its reviving before the season had matured too much for effective operations. The Western or Central Front, recently commanded by General Gurko, was better off, as the Bolshevik strongholds, Petrograd and Kronstadt, were farther away. But it was badly infected, and nothing could be done

much before the end of July. The South-Western Front looked more promising. With careful nursing it might be counted upon to deliver a blow some time in June. In Rumania things were less cheerful. The Rumanian army had revived marvellously under French auspices. It was splendidly led, well disciplined and equipped. Its officers and men were inspired by patriotism and eager to drive the invaders beyond their borders. Not so the Russian armies under the King's nominal command. The fact that Russian troops were serving under royalty had attracted the fiercest propaganda of revolutionary agitators. Whatever hope there could be of success in this theatre lay almost entirely with the Rumanians themselves, but would they be able to draw the Russian armies with them? No one could venture to give an assurance on this point. It was finally decided to deliver the first and most important blow in Galicia and Bukovina, following up the South-Western offensive with a second in the direction of Vilna and a third in Rumania, as soon as the respective fronts could move. This plan was carried out with some modifications. General Gutor's attack (South-West Front) was twice postponed, because of delays in the concentration of reserves and artillery, due to disorganization

of the railways, and also largely because agitators were constantly getting at the troops. Then the South-Western offensive had to be delivered in two phases—Brzezany-Zloczow and Stanislau, instead of simultaneously, a circumstance which greatly added to the difficulties of the enterprise.

There seems to be no doubt that the Army Committees and the Commissaries representing the Government did much to counteract pacifist propaganda. Although the committee system was destined to break down utterly as a substitute for discipline based upon the undivided authority of the officers—just as the Soviet system had failed to afford a substitute for the undivided authority of government—the good will and patriotism of individuals had to be recognized and appreciated. *The Times* Petrograd Correspondent, who was with the South-Western armies throughout the ensuing operations, referred repeatedly to the services rendered by committeemen, some of whom were officers, some privates. They not only went about stimulating their comrades before the attack, but were foremost in the fight, and many of these devoted men fell at the head of the attacking waves of infantry. But these bright examples only serve to emphasize the hopeless absur-



M. KERENSKY REVIEWING TROOPS.



THE AREA OF THE RUSSIAN RETREAT.
Showing the positions of the respective Armies on July 1, 1917.

dity of the committees as a system of army management.

General Gutor had been an excellent corps commander. He was not of the calibre that is required from the leader of a group of armies. The strategy and tactics adopted by him bear witness to his deficiencies. Had he borne in mind the peculiar conditions of the case he would have, above all, avoided frontal attacks against positions of exceptional strength and difficulty; he would have shunned forest sectors, wherein a loosely disciplined force would be easily shaken and dispersed. Yet this was precisely what he failed to do. In one respect his dispositions were well taken; he singled out Austro-Hungarian divisions as the main objects of attention, rightly appreciating their inferior stability. But he seems to have been guided in the selection of one of the main points of his offensive by the fact that his old corps was stationed in the vicinity.


The plan was briefly as follows: First, the Eleventh Army, Gen. Erdelli (west of Tarnopol), was to operate along an 11-mile front, Presowce (opposite Zborow) to Byszki (opposite Tseniow), and strike north-westward, attacking the 32nd and 19th Austro-Hungarian divisions. Objectives: Zloczow and Gliniany along the railway to Lemberg. The left flank, on reaching Pomorzany, was to push towards Brzezany, around the woods and make for the other railway leading thence to Lemberg, getting into immediate touch with the right flank of the Seventh Army.

Second, the Seventh Army, Gen. Belkovich (south-west of Tarnopol), was to operate along a ten-mile front, Kuropatniki ($1\frac{1}{2}$ mile south of Byszki) to Mieczyczow (situated south-westward), get well astride of the Zlota Lipa and strike also north-westward, attacking the 54th and 55th Austro-Hungarian divisions and part of the 20th Turkish division. Objectives: Brzezany-Bohrka-Lemberg. The right flank was to get into touch with the Corps on Erdelli's left. The left flank was to make a strong diversion against Ottoman troops and endeavour to reach Rohatyn, flanking the railway.

Third, the Eighth Army, Gen. Korniloff (east of Stanislaw), was to operate along a twelve-mile front, Jezupol-Stanislaw-Lysiec, west and northward, attacking the 15th Austro-Hungarian and the 2nd Austro-Hungarian cavalry divisions. Objectives: the

Stanislaw-Dolina-Bolidow railway. It was to exert strong pressure northward to reach the Halicz-Lemberg railway.

General: A combined enveloping movement was to be carried out by the Seventh and



STREET IN STANISLAU.

Eighth Armies against the 19th and 20th Turkish, 38th Austro-Hungarian, 24th German, 75th German Reserve, 55th German and 34th Landwehr divisions, and two German regiments (241 and 242), all of which were to be strongly held by energetic demonstrations of three corps belonging to the Seventh Army.

General Korniloff carried out his appointed task in more than the full measure. Had his army been entrusted with a more important mission and had suitable reserves been forthcoming, he might easily have reached Rohatyn from Halicz, turned the strong Brzezany position and, following up his successes at Kalusz, reached Dolina, south of Lemberg, thereby severing the enemy's communications and isolating some of his forces. The topography of the battle region was such that a succession of ridges, deep river valleys formed by some of the northern tributaries of the Dniester, and the dense forests around Brzezany rendered the central section of the Russian thrust (athwart the Zlota Lipa and its affluents) a particularly difficult one to negotiate; whereas if General Gutor had disposed his group so as to throw its weight on the flanks (Halicz and Zloczow), he would have obviated at once the danger of frontal attacks (Brzezany and Koniuchy) which were bound to suffer delay, if not disaster, before strongly fortified woods, and have secured the advantage of operating in fairly open country (the Dniester and its tributaries,



THE BRITISH ARMOURD CARS AWAITING THE ORDER TO ADVANCE: JULY 1, 1917.

the Gnila Lipa and the Strypas). And although in the light of all subsequent information it was obvious that the Russian Army could not be counted upon for a sustained offensive, it may have been reasonably considered that a successful and rapid advance, without too heavy losses, would have so heartened the men that Bolshevik appeals to desert might have been less heeded, and perhaps the shameful opening of the front with consequent panic and disaster would then have been avoided.

Criticism of General Gutor's strategy was freely indulged in by Russian experts at the time. There could be no motive for passing it over in this review of the Galician operations of 1917. On the other hand, the considerations just cited afford a necessary explanation of the heavy losses that were sustained in the Russian attacks, notably at Brzezany, which certainly contributed to the disastrous success of Bol-

shevik propaganda. These criticisms were sanctioned by the dismissal of General Gutor before the final disaster.* It may be added that he was a brave and gallant soldier who had never sought a higher command and accepted his promotion obediently, with much personal misgiving. The difficulties encountered at Brzezany were, moreover, visited upon General Belkovitch, commanding the Seventh Army. He was succeeded on the eve of the retreat by General Selivatcheff, whose corps, including a Czecho-Slovak brigade that bore the main brunt of the fighting, had done well on the right flank, opposite Zborow on the road to Zloczow. There appeared to be no sound reason for this change in the high command. General Belkovitch could not be held responsible either

* The immediate cause of Gen. Gutor's removal was ascribed to the explosion of a huge ammunition dump near Brzezany by an enemy's shell.



BRITISH ARMOURD CAR MESS.

- (1) *The Times* Petrograd Correspondent. (2) Capt. Hand, M.C. (3) Lieut.-Commander Wells-Hood, R.N.V.R. (4) Mr. Mewes (*Daily Mirror*). (5) Commander Belt, R.N.V.R. (6) Capt. Gayden. (7) Lieut. Hanna, R.N.V.R. (8) Commander O. Locker-Lampson.

for the defective strategy of his superior or for the loss of discipline among his men.

Never had the Russian Army been so well equipped. Artillery of all calibres, trench mortars, machine guns, had been provided in abundance with plenty of ammunition. There were armoured cars, including British and Belgian contingents, posted with every active corps. The roads and railways—a heritage of Austrian dominion—ensured easy and rapid intercommunication. The Russians had repaired them and had laid down field railways to their heavy batteries. As regards numbers, the Russians had a superiority of nearly two to one. Only in aeroplanes were they deficient. A good many British and French machines had been provided, but they were not sufficient to cope with the Germans. However, what they lacked in numbers they made up in daring. Splendid work was done by the Russian airmen, and they were exceedingly well supplemented by balloon observers in large numbers, who ran hourly risk of death from the constant onslaughts of enemy aircraft. The positions of hostile batteries were almost invariably detected and counter-battery work organized in approved style. But, however well they were equipped and however well they handled their guns, the Russian artillery could do little with the enemy's strong points in the wooded areas. This was an additional reason why a plan of attack in the open should have been adopted.

The enemy lines were thinly held—about one division per seven miles, not counting reserves. Confronting the Eleventh and Seventh Armies—a stretch of 100 miles—stood altogether about 30 divisions (14 German, 13½ Austro-Hungarian, and 2 Turkish). Of this total 14 were in the first line, 16 in reserve. The Russians had assembled 54 divisions, of which 37 were in the first line, and 17 in reserve. Prince Leopold of Bavaria was in general command of the enemy forces under the directions of Field-Marshal von Hindenburg, while the northern group, comprising the Bug army,* IV. Austro-Hungarian (von Krobatin) and II. Austro-Hungarian (Boehm-Ermolli), was under the orders of General von Linsingen. The *ordre de bataille* of the enemy's divisions at the time the Russian offensive began was approximately as follows:

Opposite the XI. (General Erdelli's) Army (counting from north to south) were the 4th

Austro-Hungarian, 27th Austro-Hungarian, 12th German Landwehr, 33rd Austro-Hungarian, 197th German, 32nd and 19th Austro-Hungarian, seven divisions in all, with 12½ divisions in reserve. Opposite the VII. (General Belkovitch's) Army was the German Southern Army (von Bothmer), represented by 54th and 55th Austro-Hungarian, 20th Turk, 19th



[Elliott and Fry, Photo.]

**COMMANDER O. LOCKER-LAMPSON,
M.P., R.N.V.R., C.M.G.,**

Commanded the British Armoured Car Squadrons
in the Caucasus, in Rumania, and in Galicia.

Turk, 24th German, 75th German Reserve, 38th Austro-Hungarian (Honved) divisions, in all seven divisions with three in reserve.

From this distribution of their reserves it is evident that the German Staff had prepared for a movement directed principally on the northern sector (Zloczow), and that General Gutor's preference for the Brzezany direction was unexpected by them, as indeed it might have been for the tactical considerations set forth above. It is interesting also as an indication that Field-Marshal von Hindenburg did really believe in the possibility of a Russian offensive, and that, notwithstanding "fraternization," German propaganda and the cheap bluster of the German Press, the enemy's High Command had not made up its mind to regard Russia as a negligible quantity. Moreover, with the help of their excellent railway system the enemy

* The Bug Army (von Bernhardt) faced the Russian Special Army to the north of Brody.

could easily transfer their reserves from one sector to another.

Opposite the VIII. (General Korniloff's) Army, which included only about eight divisions, stood the 58th German, a German brigade, 34th German (Grenadier), 2nd Austro-Hungarian Cavalry, 15th and 36th Austro-Hungarian, 42nd Austro-Hungarian (Honved), in all five infantry and one cavalry divisions, forming the III. Austro-Hungarian Army (von Tersztyansky), with no reserves to speak of. The Archduke Josef, in command of the group which, farther south, included the VII. (von Kőwess), and the I. (von Rohr) Austro-Hungarian Armies, apparently felt the utmost confidence in the inability of the Russians to dislodge him from the Dniester valley.


The tremendous havoc wrought in the enemy's ranks by the Russian offensive, which promptly led to wholesale surrender of Austro-Hungarian regiments, evidently caused the utmost confusion among the enemy staffs. Divisions, hurriedly brought up from reserve, were as hurriedly flung about from one sector to another. For instance, the hapless 15th

German Reserve Division was battered at Brzezany and then smashed by Korniloff's troops. More than five German and one Austrian divisions (the 53rd Reserve, 24th Reserve, 15th Reserve, 241st (new), 4th Ersatz and a Bavarian Landwehr brigade and also the 11th Austro-Hungarian) were brought up to Brzezany to take the places of German and Austrian divisions that had been wiped out or surrendered. On the Stanislaw sector, also, five German and one Austrian divisions (the 83rd, 20th, 15th Reserve, 8th Bavarian Reserve, Jaeger Guards and the 16th and 5th Austro-Hungarian) came into first line. Out of the total of 15 divisions known to be in reserve along this front the enemy had thus used up 12. They had thus only three divisions to draw upon on a front of 100 miles.

These facts and figures are sufficiently eloquent. The Russian Army had done wonders. True, it had a superiority in numbers, but this superiority was partly discounted by the above-mentioned errors of strategy and tactics and, above all, by the demoralizing influence of indiscipline and unceasing propaganda. Suffi-



OFFICERS OF THE BRITISH MACHINE-GUN SECTION IN THE TRENCHES IN GALICIA, JULY 1, 1917.



BRZYZANY: JULY 1, 1917.

6,000 Austrians surrendered in the wood which encircles the ridge on which the shells are bursting.

cient has been said to justify the assumption that, had the Russian High Command been in a position to take the necessary measures for restoring discipline, the Austro-German hosts would have sustained a signal defeat and Lemberg would soon have been in Russian hands. A Russian victory then would have altered the whole subsequent course of events on all the Allied fronts. It must ever remain a blot upon the Revolutionary Democracy of Russia that it should have deprived the High Command of the necessary power to put an end to the activity of extremists; that it should have espoused doctrines which enabled traitors to subvert the army and have done nothing itself to checkmate their devices.

The Russian offensive began at 9 o'clock on the morning of Sunday, July 1. After fierce bombardment and under cover of their barrage the infantry attacked according to plan, as above indicated. General Korniloff's movement was started a week later. German official *communiqués* had announced the commencement of the attack a day before it began, near Koniuchy, between the Złota Lipa and the Strypa and had prematurely boasted of its failure. The offensive was, of course, ascribed to "increasing pressure of the other Entente Powers." Later the Germans recorded "a strong destructive Russian fire over our positions from the Lemberg-Brody railway as far as the heights south of Brzezany," and an increase of "firing activity to the north and north-west of Lutsk," but repeated the claim

that "all attacks had been repulsed." These versions were so obviously "doctored" that neither the German nor the Austrian *communiqués* could afford any idea of what was really happening. The first authentic account came to hand on July 2. The Russian Headquarters Staff reported:

GALICIA.—In the direction of Złoczów, after a two days' artillery preparation, our troops attacked Austro-German positions on the Koniuchy-Byszki front [north-east of Brzezany], and after a severe engagement occupied three lines of trenches and the fortified village of Koniuchy, and advanced as far as the Koniuchy stream to the south of the village of the same name.

As a result of the engagement on July 1, so far 164 officers and 8,400 soldiers have been registered as prisoners. The captures also include seven guns and seven machine-guns. Prisoners are continuing to come in.

To the south-west of Brzezany [on the Złota Lipa], after artillery preparations, our troops attacked the strongly fortified positions of the enemy, and after stubborn fighting have occupied them in places.

The Germans and the Turks are making counter-attacks, and formidable positions are constantly changing hands.


On July 1 we captured on this front 9 officers and 1,700 Germans, Austrians and Turks. Some of our detachments have sustained severe losses, especially in officers.

Altogether on July 1 we took prisoners 173 officers and more than 10,000 soldiers. We also captured seven guns and seven machine-guns.

The German report read:

FRONT OF PRINCE LEOPOLD OF BAVARIA.—The Russian attacks on July 1 between the Upper Strypa and the Eastern bank of the Narajówka led to heavy fighting. The pressure of the Russians was directed chiefly against the Koniuchy sector and the height lines to the east and south of Brzezany.

An exceedingly strong artillery preparation, which lasted two days, turned our positions into a crater field, against which the enemy regiments stormed throughout



THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE OF JULY, 1917: SIBERIAN TROOPS ADVANCING, AND TAKING COVER IN SHELL HOLES.

the day. The village of Koniuchy was lost. The Russian mass attack was caught up in a prepared barring position. A fresh attack against this barring position was frustrated.

The fighting was especially bitter on both sides of Brzezany. Sixteen Russian divisions, constantly employing fresh troops, assaulted our positions there, which were completely maintained or recaptured by counter-attacks by Saxon, Rhineland and Ottoman divisions, in brave defence after a swaying battle.

The Russian losses surpass any measure hitherto known. Some units have been entirely dispersed.

Much heart-burning had been endured by the Russian Commanders before the advance. Individual units were constantly developing sporadic weakness. Several mutinies broke out. The Bolsheviks were extremely busy. Loyal committeemen had no rest day or night, scouring the front in motor cars to enliven the low-spirited or to talk over the cowards. The gunners did their utmost during the artillery preparation to inflict visible ravages upon the enemy's trenches so as to hearten the infantry for the assault. One of the Corps Commanders prayed silently during the fateful minutes preceding the appointed time. Would his men go over the top? He hoped so, but could not feel sure. When, punctually at nine a.m. the troops swarmed over and the attacking waves rolled onward this General devoutly crossed himself.

Much heavy fighting lay before the Russians before they could hope to take Brzezany. This place, situated 50 miles from Lemberg—the nearest Russian position to the Galician capital—was protected by a lake, the deep defiles of the Złota Lipa, and the high hills, reaching an elevation of 1,300 ft., on the east and south. When Count Bothmer fell back there in the summer of 1916 after his stubborn defence of the Strypa line, he established himself on all the higher ground, where he could command the Russian positions. At Koniuchy the Russians still had many of these higher positions before them before they could reach the Złota Lipa, which is itself a formidable barrier, as the stream is in a deep cleft of the hills, like most of the tributaries of the Dniester in this part of Galicia. After the Austrian breakdown in 1916 the Germans reconstituted their armies in Galicia, and entrusted these key positions largely to their own troops and to the Turks, who had held them since. Almost the last success of General Brusiloff's great offensive was won at this point before events in Rumania turned attention to new battles in another field.

On July 2, about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, after a severe and stubborn battle, the Zaraisky

Regiment occupied the village of Presowce, while the gallant troops of the Fourth Finland Division and of the Czecho-Slovak Brigade occupied the strongly fortified enemy positions at Mogila on the heights to the west and south-west of the village of Zborow, and the fortified village of Korszyłow. Three lines of enemy trenches were penetrated. The enemy then retired across the Little Strypa. The Czecho-Slovak Brigade captured 62 officers and 3,150 soldiers, 15 guns, and many machine-guns. Many of the captured guns were turned against the enemy. Enemy positions to the west of Josefowka (north of Koniuchy) were also taken. Altogether in the battle of July 2, in the neighbourhood of Zloczow, the Russians took 6,300 prisoners (officers and soldiers), 21 guns, 16 machine-guns, and several bomb-throwers.

To the south-east of Brzezany the battle continued with less intensity. In the battle of July 1 in this region the Russians took 53 officers and 2,200 soldiers, mostly Germans.

The success at Koniuchy had been compromised by an untoward incident. In their precipitate flight or surrender the enemy had left much store of wine and spirits behind them. The Russian soldiers, disobeying their officers, plundered these stores. The men of a whole division which had fought bravely, became drunk and might have fallen an easy prey had the enemy counter-attacked. Another division was sent forward, but was checked by the German machine-guns placed in the trees of the adjacent forest.

Meanwhile the gallant fighting at Brzezany had been marred by indiscipline and even mutiny on the part of some units. The key of this position lay in the triangle formed by the confluence of the Złota and the Tseniow. Its slopes descended precipitously, clothed on the northern side by Brzezany and Lysona woods. This triangle was known as the Flat-Iron (Utiug). Here many thousands of Russians fell, and in helping them with Maxims, Hotchkiss and armoured cars five British soldiers were killed. Here also whole regiments of Austrians and Germans were wiped out. The plan of attack consisted in a flanking movement over the western slope of the ridge so as to turn the woods. Unfortunately the right flank advanced too rapidly and was caught in a cross-fire from the heights, and when orders were given to a division posted in reserve to relieve the pressure on their comrades they flatly refused to budge, alleging that they had

not agreed to fight on the first day of the offensive. The advantage that might have been gained on the first day could not be recovered. Several lines of enemy trenches were taken, literally filled with their dead. Some of these lines remained in the hands of the Russians till the day of panic and disaster.

During the fighting of July 1 and 2 the total number of prisoners had risen to 300 officers, 18,000 men, 29 guns, 33 machine-guns.

Instead of improving, the men were growing daily less reliable. Divisions refused to remain more than 24 hours in the front line, and that only on the condition that they would be strictly on the defensive. The Corps of Guards, oblivious of its glorious traditions, was no exception to this degrading rule. One of the regiments (the Grenadiers) had elected a Bolshevik officer named Dzevaltovsky, and would take no orders. M. Kerensky himself tried to persuade them, but they threatened violence and he had to leave. Finally, this regiment was surrounded by cavalry, armoured cars and artillery. It then surrendered Dzevaltovsky, who was removed for trial—not involving the death penalty. Half the men were distributed in other units, where they spread the Bolshevik contagion. Some of the Guards divisions after that did some fighting. One of them on being sent (July 5) to relieve a line division near Dziuke Lany, which had been the scene of gallant fighting by a Siberian Corps, was mis-directed in the dark into the enemy's trenches—a piece of almost incredible treachery. The astonishing part of this adventure was that the guardsmen took the trench, and then went on to capture the next enemy's position. Everything pointed to a coming crisis which the gallantry of individual units could not forestall.

Simultaneously the right flank moved again, as the official report of July 7 describes:

In the direction of Zloczow [on the Lemberg-Tarnopol railway], in the region of Batkow-Manajow, after artillery preparation, our infantry attacked the strongly fortified positions of the enemy and occupied three lines of trenches, but towards evening the enemy succeeded, by a series of counter-attacks, in pressing back our detachments.

On the sector of the heights north of Presowce, Lawrykowce, Trawotloki, Hodow [all near Zborow and north of Brzezany], and the wood to the west of Koniuchy, our detachments conducted an offensive and engaged in a stubborn battle throughout the day of July 6. Fortified positions constantly changed hands. The enemy, bringing up fresh reserves, executed a series of counter-attacks. The more formidable of these counter-attacks came from the direction of the village Urlow and the woods to the west of Koniuchy, where in certain places

the enemy succeeded in pressing back our attacking detachments.

Towards the evening there remained in our hands the heights to the north-west of Presowce, the villages of Lawrykowce and Trawotloki, and the heights to the east of Hodow.

In the battle of July 6 we captured 17 officers and 672 men.

Later it was reported:

In the direction of Zloczow during the night of July 6-7 the enemy launched energetic counter-attacks on the front of Hodow and in the wood to the west of Koniuchy, attempting to dislodge our troops from the positions which they captured in the battle on July 6. All these attacks were repelled. Attacks by dense enemy columns supported by armoured motor-cars west of Byszeki, were also repelled.

Now came the news that General Korniloff had moved:

In the direction of Dolina, in the region to the north-west of Stanislaw, after artillery preparation, our advanced detachments pressed back the enemy on the Jamnica-Pasieczna sector and occupied his trenches.

To the south of Bohorodczany [which is south-west of Stanislaw] our advanced detachments defeated an advanced post of the enemy, and moved forward in the direction of Liakhowce-Dzwiniacz, having occupied the latter place. The enemy counter-attacks were repulsed. An enemy advanced post in the Jablonka-Porohy region was also overcome.

Altogether in the engagement of July 6 in the direction of Dolina we took 360 prisoners.

This bulletin of victory was supplemented next day:

DIRECTION OF DOLINA.—On July 8, about midday, after artillery preparation, the troops of Gen. Korniloff's army attacked the fortified positions of the enemy to the west of Stanislaw, on the Jamnica front, and, having pierced the foremost and most important position of the enemy, our troops advanced and captured in battle the small town of Jezupol [on the Bystrzyca] and the villages of Ciesow, Paweleze, Rybno, and Stary Lysiec [all west of or on the same river].

Our cavalry, giving immediate pursuit to the retreating enemy, reached the River Lukwa [about eight miles behind the enemy first line].

During the course of the day 131 officers and 7,000 rank and file were taken prisoners; 48 guns (including 12 heavy guns) and numerous machine-guns were also captured.

On July 10 the following report was given out:

DIRECTION OF DOLINA.—Yesterday the troops of Gen. Korniloff continued the offensive in the region west of Stanislaw. The Austro-Germans offered an energetic resistance, launching desperate counter-attacks.

Fighting of a most stubborn and sanguinary character took place on the roads leading to Halez in the vicinity of the villages of Huciska, Pacykow and Paweleze. In the streets of the last-named village hand-to-hand fighting occurred, which ended in the complete defeat of the enemy.

Towards evening our troops reached the River Lukowica, after we had occupied the villages of Wiktorow, Majdan, Huciska and Pacykow. The enemy retreated towards the River Lomnica.

In yesterday's fighting we captured more than 1,000 Austro-German prisoners, three field guns, and a large quantity of trench engines, machine-guns and engineering and war material.

The gallant conduct of our troops was beyond praise and the officers were everywhere in the forefront.



THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE OF JULY, 1917.

The second wave of the attack awaiting the order to advance. This Siberian force captured Dzike-Lany, a fortified summit south-west of Brzezany.

Thus, as the result of the two days' offensive west of Stanislau, we broke through the enemy's positions on a front of 13½ miles to a depth of 4 to 10 versts [about three to seven miles.]

Next day General Tcheremisoff's corps, which had achieved these remarkable successes, crossed the Lomnica and advanced slightly on its left flank (Bohorodczany-Solotwina) capturing another 2,000 prisoners and 30 guns, bringing up the total to 10,000 prisoners and 80 guns.

On a wide front General Korniloff's army was now going forward south of the Dniester. The Russians were retracing their steps taken in the retreat of 1915, when General von Linsingen's cavalry swept forward across the country



BRITISH OFFICERS INSTRUCTING RUSSIAN TROOPS IN THE USE OF THE BRITISH TRENCH MORTAR.

south of the Dniester to Halicz, and thereby turned the main Russian front north of the river. In three days the Russians had gone forward 15 miles west of Stanislau; they had at two points crossed the Lomnica, had taken Halicz, to which the enemy had retired, and were pushing on westward along the road to Dolina and Stry. The country before them was less adapted to defence than that north of the Dniester, where the deep-cut channels of the tributaries flowing

south to that river were a formidable obstacle to an advancing army.

Halicz, by reason of its bridgehead position, was a place of the first strategic importance, and both combatants had made strenuous efforts for its capture since the war began. General Brusiloff reached the river bank opposite the town in the summer of 1916, and seemed about to take it, when the Rumanian campaign, which had just begun, diverted Russian efforts elsewhere.

The remarkable success of General Korniloff's movement had brought a tardy recognition of the value of the Halicz-Dolina direction. A neighbouring corps was added to his right flank and reinforcements hurried up. But they came too late to do much good. The two flanking corps on the right and left of General Tcheremisoff advanced very slowly owing to the difficulties of the terrain, but his troops continued their progress, and during the night of July 11-12 they forced their way into Kalusz. Here, as at Koniuchy, scenes of debauchery were enacted, and the drunken soldiery committed nameless acts of violence. A Cossack cavalry regiment came up in time to repulse a German counter-attack.

The *Times* Petrograd correspondent was in Kalusz on the morning after its capture. He wrote:

On all sides there was evidence of the precipitate flight of the Headquarters of the Third Austrian Army, situated in the suburbs on the banks of the Lomnica. Gen. von Tersztyansky evidently considered himself safe from attack.

During the day we strengthened and extended our position on the west bank of the Lomnica in preparation for the arrival of the enemy's reserves. That evening heavy rain began, necessitating the suspension of the advance. The Lomnica was transformed into a boiling torrent and all the bridges were swept away. The Germans brought up six batteries and shelled our communications, but the following day our guns silenced them and covered our positions across the river. Rain continuing, it became necessary to withdraw the bulk of our forces, a move which was safely carried out on the night of July 15.

Meanwhile we have extended our lines in the valley of the Lomnica, which will be useful for the eventual resumption of the offensive. Our present line includes the whole of the Lomnica from the Dniester to its sources, so that the enemy is confined to the hills.

According to the statements of prisoners the enemy has transferred hither the Jäger Reserve Division from Vilna, the remnants of the German 75th Reserve Division from Brzezany, and the Austrian 5th Division from the Carpathians. During our attacks on July 8, 9 and 10 the Austrian 15th Division lost 80 per cent., the German 33rd Division 40 per cent., and the Austrian 16th Division 50 per cent., and the Austrian 36th Division lost 30 per cent., while the Austrian 2nd Cavalry Division lost little. The enemy had altogether 44 battalions with 32,000 bayonets, of which they lost over 13,000, including 12,000 prisoners. Our losses are about one-third. We have taken over 100 guns.

Our further successes will depend on the measures that may be taken to restore a proper spirit of subordination among the men at the front and the reserves. This question is bound up with the whole political situation of Russia. The Army has done better than was expected, but the present committee system has failed.

The warning note struck in the concluding paragraph was to be almost immediately justified by events. The next Russian *communiqué* stated:

West of Halicz the detachments occupying the village of Bludniki retired, whereupon the enemy, profiting by this movement, occupied the place. The effort to win back this village was unsuccessful.

According to supplementary reports received, on July 17 about 7 o'clock in the evening, when the enemy took the offensive and seized the height to the south of the village of Nowica (south of Kalusz), one of our regiments began to leave.

Maj.-Gen. Prince Gagarin, commanding the Caucasian Native Horse Division, seeing the critical situation, at once moved forward a battalion of the Ukhnoff Regiment, placing himself at its head and disposing three of his regiments—the Daghestanians on the right, the Circassians and the Kabardians on the left. With a furious onslaught the Ukhnoff Regiment and the horsemen rushed forward, bearing also with them the Russian regiment which had retired.

The general onslaught soon changed the situation in our favour. The advancing enemy fled in disorderly fashion, and our former position was restored. The brilliant work of the artillery of this command contributed decisively to the success.

All unknown to the brave "Kornilovtsy" (volunteers who bore the name of their leader on their sleeves) and the "shock battalions," who had won victory west of Stanislaw, a dread catastrophe was being enacted in General Erdelli's Army. It was not altogether unexpected. In the following laconic sentences the Russian Headquarters Staff recorded the defection of its troops:

NORTH-EAST GALICIA.—After strong artillery preparation, the enemy persistently attacked our detachments on the Pieniaki-Harbusow front [on both sides of the headwaters of the Sereth and 20 miles south of Brody]. At first all these attacks were repelled.

At 10 o'clock, July 19, the 607th Mlynoff Regiment, situated between Batkow and Manajow (in the same region), left their trenches voluntarily and retired, with the result that the neighbouring units had to retire also. This gave the enemy the opportunity for developing his success.

Our failure is explained to a considerable degree by the fact that under the influence of the extremists (Bolsheviks) several detachments, having received the command to support the attacked detachments, held meetings and discussed the advisability of obeying the order, whereupon some of the regiments refused to obey the military command. The efforts of the commanders and committees to arouse the men to the fulfilment of the commands were fruitless.

A vivid account of the retreat as he saw it was sent by *The Times* Petrograd correspondent. Telegraphing from Headquarters South-Western Front (July 26), he wrote:

From the words of an officer captured near Brzezany a fortnight ago we understood that the Germans were

preparing an artful stroke in conjunction with their agents in Petrograd and in our Armies. "You will see that your troops will run away when the time comes, and we shall have a walk over," he declared.

Events have fully borne out this prophecy. Lenin and his crew have well earned their pay. The disturbances in Petrograd, organized on the 16th inst., were obviously directed from Berlin so as to coincide with the German plan. The thunderbolt fell almost on the day when the high command on this front changed hands, and the harvest in Eastern Galicia and Bukovina had almost been gathered.



GENERAL KORNILOFF.

A whole day before the news of the crisis in Petrograd reached us, Lenin's agents were acquainted with it through traitors in the wireless service. They spread a report among the troops that the Bolsheviks were in control of the Government, and that the war was at an end. The execution of the German plan became ridiculously easy.

The enemy entered at our most sensitive point near Zborow, in the direction of Trembowla. The wedge thus driven in would sever the Tarnopol-Buczacz railway and the highways, disuniting the Eleventh and Seventh Armies and exposing the right flank of the latter to serious peril.

Our line was opened on the morning of the 19th inst. at Zwyzyn, north of Zborow. The 6th Grenadier Division deserted wholesale, and fled. On the 18th General Brusiloff, who had come to Tarnopol, summoned General Korniloff and ordered him to take over the command from General Gutor. The rupture was represented to be a slight affair, as we had eight divisions in reserve. The Staffs of the neighbouring Armies were left in the dark. General Korniloff, however, realized that the danger was great. But he had to go to Stanislaw in order to transfer his command of the Eighth Army to General Tcheremisoff. Much precious time had to be wasted in journeys.

Having rejoined the British Armoured Car Headquarters on the 17th inst., I left again for Stanislaw on the afternoon of the 20th inst. Nothing was then known of the rupture of the front at a point only 25 miles distant on the previous morning, and the first report of it reached Commander Locker-Lampson late on the 20th. At Stanislaw rumours began to circulate during the afternoon of the 22nd that Tarnopol was in danger, but nothing positive was known at the Staff.

General Tcheremisoff assumed command of the Eighth Army that morning. I saw him at noon. He was disquieted by the defections among his own men, but said not a word of the rupture in the front of the

Eleventh Army. On the morning of the 23rd the Staff had information that left no doubt as to the magnitude of the catastrophe.

My first thought was to rejoin the British section, whose position was extremely perilous. Abandoning all impedimenta, I jumped into the first car going to Buczacz in the hope of meeting the British contingent as it fell back through Podhajce.

At Buczacz I came across our transport and Colonel Valentine * of the British Air Service. From them I heard the full story of the disaster. The officers had safely removed the aeroplanes and the aeronautical stores from the zone of the Eleventh Army under the full blast of the Russian panic.

We were destined to witness some strange scenes on the road from Buczacz eastward, although the



LIEUT.-COLONEL JAMES VALENTINE,
R.F.C., D.S.O.

enemy was still 30 miles distant. A man on a white horse dashed through the town yelling: "German cavalry are behind, save yourselves." He was afterwards arrested, and proved to be a German spy. Indescribable confusion ensued. A multitude of deserters and transport cars, lorries, and ambulances headed eastward at top speed. The roadway was littered with impedimenta. Through this inferno, through burning dust, and under a scorching sun, we literally fought our way, using our sticks and fists, and brandishing revolvers at the deserters who repeatedly tried to storm our cars, until we had got ahead of the rout. Then placing our lorries across the road we dammed the tide of panic.

Leaving Buczacz at 5 p.m., we reached Proskurow in Russia only at 8 o'clock the following morning.

M. Lembitch telegraphed from Kamenets-Podolsk on the evening of July 21 to the *Russkoe Slovo* a harrowing tale of disaster:

Every hour there comes more and more alarming news from the field of battle.

The retirement of our troops yesterday in the direction of Tarnopol was like a panic-stricken flight.

* Lieut.-Colonel James Valentine, R.F.C., D.S.O., died soon afterwards in Kieff of heart failure, brought on by the hardships he had endured during the retreat. He was only 29 years old. He had been one of the foremost competitors in aviation contests in England, and had served in France. For the best part of a year he had been in Russia, in charge of instruction in British aeroplanes. For his signal gallantry during the Retreat he was recommended by General Korniloff for the Order of St. George.

The catastrophe took place so unexpectedly that a man had to be made of iron not to lose his head through all the hellish madness and confusion which had been created in the army by a treacherous and venal mob of rascals and traitors, turning units that were once the best into crowds of revolted slaves, flying like sparrows at the first round of the enemy's guns. Let the Russian public know to what an appalling pass the Leninites have brought the Russian Army by their heinous agitation, and it will quickly say the word of power.

I have only just heard from the most certain source particulars of the catastrophe. Only a short time ago I witnessed the elemental enthusiasm with which the revolutionary troops hurled themselves against the defences of the enemy, throwing every obstacle from their path. And there are no words to express the feeling of immense gladness that filled us then. We all, journalists and generals, officers and soldiers, doctors and dressers, in a word, all the representatives of the Staff and organizing forces of the army, as we looked at the hurricane attack on the Brzezany heights, congratulated one another with tears in our eyes on the marvellous resurrection of the restored Russian Army.

Alas! the sweet dream was shortlived. The first impulse over, the best and most honourable fighters for freedom laid low by the bullets and shells of the enemy, and the hydra of confusion, work of German hirelings—Bolsheviks and mere good-for-nothings keeping company with them—raised its head anew. Enthusiasm for victory turned out to be too little by itself. Absence of discipline and, consequently, of steadiness made us give back to the enemy almost without a fight all that had been won by whole thousands of fallen heroes. . . . The piercing of our front was caused by sheer treachery of whole units of troops on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the absence of discipline and steadiness in the present army. It is now established that the piercing of the lines at Zwyzen, between the Graberk and Sereth, developed in the course of a day into a great catastrophe, was carried out by the Germans with most inadequate and purely local forces, without the help of the great reserves stationed near Brzezany. The Germans, it is evident, only intended to make a big demonstration with the intention of diverting our forces from the Stanislaw front. But when units of the 6th Grenadier Division, which was not long before in a state of revolt after it had been brought up to strength with men from Petrograd, treacherously left their positions and went away, the Germans rushed in without opposition through the breach that had been made and began to advance deep into our positions.

The line had been pierced on a comparatively small section and the harm done might have been retrieved by steadiness and discipline on the part of the troops. The high command at once gave orders to move perfectly adequate forces to the place where the breach had been made, with the design of getting the Germans, who, it appears, were rushing forward, in a vice and to cut them off from retreat on two sides. But then it was that took place that horrible thing that has now been given in the army the name of "Meeting strategy." The majority of the troops ordered to the breach either did not leave their quarters or began to assemble meetings to decide the question whether they should go to the positions indicated or not by means of voting. Two regiments, who had been given a more responsible task than others, considered the question until late at night, and the men, not being able to come to a decision, separated. During this time the Germans, not encountering any serious resistance, penetrated 12 versts [8 miles] to the rear of our lines, began to capture batteries and a number of prisoners, and to outflank Jezierna, the headquarters of the Staff.

In the evening of this unhappy day panic began to spread in the army, deliberately encouraged by certain suspicious characters, Bolsheviks in uniform, who flooded the army in the days of the Revolution. The rumour

was circulated that the Germans had pierced our front at two points and that the way of retreat to Tarnopol was cut off. One after the other the divisions sent to encounter the Germans refused to attack, or, on the first encounter with the enemy, began to desert without any sense of responsibility, breaking up in disorder, creating great uproar and confusion. The cavalry and artillery alone rose to the height of their duty and with the greatest steadfastness supported the few heroic units of infantry who covered the retreat. Yesterday one valiant Cossack regiment saved the position in an exceptional way, and, in horse and foot formation, repelled all the violent attacks of the Germans.

Yesterday at 10 in the evening the breach in the lines was already 30 versts [20 miles] in length, from the banks of the Graberk to the region south of Zborow. Our units by this time had retreated to the positions of last year, Gliadki-Worobiewka. In the course of a day the enemy had penetrated 25 versts [17 miles] into the rear, inflicting on us immense loss. Commanders of units, officers and army committees made desperate efforts to bring the units who had forgotten their duty to their senses, and to stop those who were fleeing. Military commissioners of the army and the front came post-haste to the scene of the catastrophe with the same purpose.

The only hope is in the firmness of General Korniloff.

In a second dispatch, telegraphed two hours later, the correspondent continued his account of the rout:

The German light and heavy artillery is bombarding Tarnopol. There is unimaginable panic in the town. The whole night the organizations stationed there have been evacuating the place. Trains are leaving overflowing with passengers—persons serving in the Red Cross, members of the Zemstvo Union, and of various public and military organizations. Most people are fleeing on foot or in carts.

The retreat of our army continues with the same rapidity. Immense bands of deserters are breaking into shops and private houses in the towns and villages. The misery caused by the retreat is colossal.

Units, faithful to their duty to the Fatherland, are performing miracles of valour, trying to withstand the pressure of the enemy and to give our infantry the chance of successfully getting away from it. A few traitorous units have given themselves up as prisoners to the enemy. There only remain 200 men of the traitorous 8th Grenadier Division. The rest have either given themselves up as prisoners or deserted, spreading panic where they go.

The following telegram appeared in the *Russkoe Slovo* of the same date:

Active Army, July 8 (21).—To-day two regiments were disbanded at night. An armed force was employed in the work of disbanding. The revolted regiments, which were in reserve, were surrounded by Cossacks and two batteries. When it finally became clear that the regiments would not voluntarily give up their arms and their leaders, they were told to settle the question in the space of three bugle-calls. The first was played, then the second, then the third. After this Kalinin, Commissary of the Front, gave the order to open artillery fire on the insubordinate regiments. About a hundred projectiles were fired. The firing did its work and the regiments laid down their arms.

Evidence of the indiscipline of the army was given in the candid official bulletins of July 22 and 23, the latter dealing with the northern move:

July 9 (22).—Our troops, having manifested absolute disobedience to the commanders, continued to retreat to the River Sereth, part giving themselves up as prisoners. Only the 155th infantry division in the district of Dolzanka-Domamoriez, and the armoured cars which fired on the German cavalry on the Tarnopol road, put up any opposition to the enemy. With immense superiority in forces and technique on our side in the sections attacked the retreat continued almost without a break. This was due to the absolute instability of our troops and discussions as to whether to obey or not to obey orders of commanders, and to the criminal propaganda of the Bolsheviks.



RUSSIAN SOLDIERS IN RETREAT—AT KOZOWA, JULY 21.
Heading for Podhajce two days before the arrival of the enemy.

July 10 (23).—In the Vilna direction, on the section Krewa-Sewernie, our troops attacked the enemy and occupied part of his positions in the Cari-Bogusze, piercing the enemy's positions for three versts and taking more than 1,000 Germans prisoner. On the development of a further success the unsteadiness and moral weakness of a few units began to be remarked. The valiant behaviour of the officers, who perished in great numbers in the performance of their duty, is to be noted.

The correspondents of the *Russkoe Slovo* established the fact that the Germans and Hungarians were attacking with insignificant forces, and that the great disaster was the work of only two German and one Austro-Hungarian divisions. Twelve divisions were

from Tarnopol was crowded with thousands of carriages and carts and motor-cars, moving westward in clouds of dust. Deserters pillaged the shops of the town. Officers were unable to conserve order among the troops there and many killed themselves in despair. Tarnopol was occupied by the enemy on July 22. A Battalion of Death, composed of cadets, reduced the rioting soldiers in Tarnopol to order, not hesitating to shoot them when necessary, superintended the work of evacuation, and set fire to stores it was not possible to remove. After the cadets had left, soldiers began a pogrom, which was stopped by shooting 14 of the men who



DESERTERS.

ordered to oppose them, but the attempt failed through the behaviour of the soldiers. An attempt to attack the enemy's salient from the flanks was made, but the troops did not choose to obey orders. Use had to be made of machine-gun fire to restrain marauders and deserters, who threatened the houses and shops of peaceful inhabitants. There was no time for the evacuation of Kozowa, an important strategical base for supplies of food and ammunition. It was occupied by the Austrians on July 23. The Russians had left there more than 600 railway wagons, a sanitary train, railway engines, and an immense quantity of ammunition and other stores. The road

were caught red-handed. Fleeing bands of marauders sacked houses on their way. There were cases of families being bayoneted and women and children violated.

A detailed report of the work done by British and Belgian armoured cars during the retreat was telegraphed (August 1) from the Headquarters of the Seventh Army by *The Times* Petrograd correspondent. In the opinion of the Russian commanders the allied cooperation had contributed greatly towards extricating their armies from a plight that at first appeared to be hopeless.

Commander Locker-Lampson, whose headquarters were then at Kozowa, near Brzezany, learned on the

evening of July 20 that Jezierna had fallen. He was summoned to the Corps Staff and asked to withdraw the whole of his force from their positions and hold the right flank. The enemy had advanced, forming a salient, and the Staff hoped to be able to attack along the line Kuropatniki-Taurow-Jezierna, and to use our cars to turn them back.

All our armoured cars were collected at Kozowa that night, and none of us had any sleep, as we were sent early next day to be attached to a Cossack regiment. Three squadrons of our cars, operating together, were spread fanwise across the front from Kuropatniki to the Tarnopol road. Rumours had already spread that the Russians were deserting their trenches and fleeing, and certainly their *moral* was bad on our arrival. We reported ourselves to the Headquarters of a Cossack division, but nobody there could give any detailed instructions. The corps commander believed that our force might keep the infantry from running away.

An exactly similar state of affairs occurred with the other squadrons, which checked the Austrians and managed to keep the advancing infantry back until their artillery arrived, rendering further resistance impossible. The Russian retreat became a rout, and though we went into action time and again during the day, the effect produced was only local. A panic ensued at Kozowa. Everybody ran away. We did our best to stop the runaways.

All our stores were removed the following night. The enemy began shelling Kozowa, some of our men were wounded by shrapnel, and the Staff ordered us to retire. Great craters filled the road from Kozowa to Krzywe, impeding the retreat to Podhajce, where we arrived safely. The only regiment that did good work that day was one of the Finland Division. The cars covered our retreat. Every car that went into action fired over 3,000 rounds.

By the evening of the 22nd our force was transferred



TARNOPOL.

Occupied by the Enemy July 22.

Lieutenant-Commander Smiles took the right-hand sector north of the Tarnopol road and dashed ahead through the villages of Halenkow and Olesin (due north of Kozowa) very successfully. The cars outdistanced the Russian infantry by many hundred yards. The cars under his command got within close range of the advancing Germans and Austrians. They delayed the advance for several hours, fighting incessantly, then fell back as the German and Austrian artillery came up.

The Russians remained in their trenches as long as the armoured cars stayed with them, but as the Austrians advanced and the Germans were crying out "Hurrah!" the Russians of their own accord flung down their rifles and ran for their lives. Despite this shocking defection we attempted to keep the enemy back in order to stem the retreat, but it was impossible. We had to give way, and the fleeing Russians crowded our cars, breaking them down, so that we lost three, which we had to abandon.

to an aerodrome some miles from Podhajce on the road to Monasterzyska. The doctor and the English nurses, who had been doing splendid work in the hospital at Podhajce, left with our column.

The same day the Staff of the corps to which our force was attached had been transferred to Bialokernica, a few miles east of Podhajce. We were ordered to reconnoitre and destroy any remaining stores. One heavy car reached Teliacze without sighting the enemy. It found that the stores had been destroyed by Russian gunners. Kozowa was burning, but was apparently unoccupied. The Austrian advance was incredibly slow, and both these places, within a few miles of the enemy's original lines, were still unoccupied on July 22. Other cars went north along the road to Krzywe, also without meeting the enemy. There had been a delay near Podhajce by a shocking panic among the troops and transport. On the afternoon of the 22nd our transport column and damaged cars

proceeded south to Buczacz, which was also in a state of panic.


The next day our cars were transferred to another corps belonging to the same army and ordered to operate along the Buczacz-Tarnopol road. A section went into action with four cars. The situation was desperate. There were great gaps in the front corps caused by the flight of whole divisions. The corps commander had no information of the whereabouts of the enemy or of his own troops. Our cars were able to give him invaluable information, and besides they kept the enemy at bay. The hottest fighting occurred at the villages of Pantalicha and Darachow, about 10 miles west of Trembowla. At Darachow we ambushed the enemy in the houses and courtyards, destroying them wholesale. During that night, thanks to the respite which we had been able to afford them, the Russians rallied, entrenched themselves, and even drove out the enemy from some of their positions.

On the 24th our cars operated on the high road from Darachow to Buczacz. At 4 o'clock that morning the corps commander summoned Commander Locker-Lampson to the village of Laskowce and told him that

two divisions had bolted, leaving a gap of 15 miles north of Laskowce as far as Trembowla. Our cars were entrusted with the task of protecting this huge space.

Working along the road between Chmielow and Darachow, they did great execution among the advancing infantry, mainly Austrians. Lieutenant-Commander Smiles came up later with two cars which had been repaired. Commander Locker-Lampson himself went into action. One of our officers spotted an Austrian standing on a knoll, drove his car in that direction, and came plump into a large force of the enemy at a range of 50 yards. Opening fire, he mowed them down and got out safe. The cars eventually left Chmielow owing to severe shell fire. The enemy did not venture to make a direct attack on Chmielow, but, making a detour over fields where the cars were unable to operate, tried to surround the village. The attempt was unsuccessful.

Our cars were invincible on the road, and fought a series of rearguard actions the whole of the rest of the day, frequently under a fierce fire from the enemy's field guns. One car had its engine completely blown out by a direct hit and had to be abandoned. The crew



A "BATTALION OF DEATH."

This photograph shows all that was left of the 2nd Orenburg Shock or Storming Battalion, composed of volunteers from the Urals, who went straight into action on their arrival at the front, when the armies were in full retreat. The men fought for three days without food, losing half their numbers killed. They were withdrawn to refit and refill. But none of the reserves at the front would join them. Their commander, Colonel A. N. Bleish, stands in the foreground.

He had fought with the utmost gallantry at Brzezany.



A LOYAL RUSSIAN SOLDIER STOPPING DESERTERS.

removed the guns and material and withdrew in safety. Another car was struck by a shell which smashed a plate, wounding all the crew, including Sub-Lieutenant Wallace. Driver Swan, although badly wounded, drove the car out of action. Another car got on fire, but was safely removed. A car with Commander Locker-Lampson had its dynamo damaged by a splinter. All the squadrons re-formed that evening at Buczacz.

The whole of the 25th was given to patrol work within the triangle Buczacz-Czortkow-Trembowla.

On the 26th, at the village of Kobylowloki, half-way between Czortkow and Trembowla, the cars got into action for the first time with German cavalry, which all immediately decamped.

Some of our men were for 20 hours in their seats in the armoured cars. The corps commander said we had given him a respite of 21 hours by filling a gap which otherwise would have enabled the enemy's cavalry, motors, and mounted infantry a chance to cut our line of retreat. The extraordinary feature about these operations was that the British armoured car division practically held up the Germans on the whole army front. This exploit was rendered possible by excellent judgment in selecting such a splendid road for operations as the highway between Buczacz and Tarnopol. Our cars were repeatedly under artillery fire at a range not exceeding 2,000 yards.

On July 27 Lieut.-Commander Smiles with two light and one heavy cars held the German cavalry for a considerable time on the Trembowla road, north of Husiatyn. The village of Shvilkowce had to be evacuated at 4 p.m., and rearguard actions were fought by our armoured cars, permitting the infantry to retire. An alarm compelled a further retirement during the night, wherein one car was lost. On the 28th continuous rearguard actions by Smiles were fought by the same squadron along the road to Suchadol from early morning till 2.30 p.m. In Husiatyn the Russian infantry had thrown down their rifles and machine-guns, and a provocateur who had spread panic had been killed and crucified. By 3 o'clock all the troops had crossed the river Zbrucz, and our cars were the last things on wheels to cross. Five minutes later the bridge was blown up, and 15 minutes later some German cavalry reached the bridge by another route. Soldiers and

villagers on this side of the Husiatyn cheered the armoured cars as they went past.

The 29th was a day of rest for the cars as the enemy had not crossed the river. Pillaging went on. Three of our officers attacked with their fists 300 pillagers and put them to flight. Some German prisoners who had been brought to our base got into conversation with one of our men. One of them spoke English. He stated that the British armoured cars seemed to be everywhere along the front, and one day alone had killed over 600.

On the 30th Lieut.-Commander Wells-Hood and his cars were continuously in action on the outskirts of Husiatyn. Very good work was done by Sub-Lieutenant Benson in a heavy armoured car with a three-pounder gun. The enemy had mounted maxims on the church surmounting ridge east of Husiatyn, and in the absence of Russian artillery these could not be dislodged. Our car destroyed the emplacements in the belfry after 15 minutes' firing at a distance of 2,000 yards. Four times consecutively during the morning our cars went into action. The Russian divisional commander was loud in their praise. The best targets so far secured in the war were obtained against German infantry on this occasion. In the evening, using a Lewis gun, Petty Officer Rogers in one of Lieut.-Commander Wells-Hood's cars, brought down an enemy aeroplane which was sniping our reserves. On the 31st Lieut.-Commander Ruston and his cars were in action against the enemy continuously throughout the day. Sub-Lieutenant Southam, who already had had one car blown up under him, took great risks, as opportunities for advancing against the enemy were small in view of their heavy artillery, which had been brought up and was pounding the road.

General Korniloff before leaving sent his thanks to Commander Locker-Lampson and crosses to the men. Our casualties in wounded represented 20 per cent. of the fighting force.

By the 25th July it had been made clear that the defection of the army was not confined to the Galician front, but was ravaging other parts of the Russian forces. "On the Dvinsk front," says that day's *communiqué*,



OFFICERS HOLDING UP THE RETREAT.

"whole divisions without attack by the enemy left their trenches. Some sections refused to obey commands." The central front had failed.

Although, as explained in Chapter CCVII., Kerensky had abolished the death penalty, General Korniloff took the law into his own hands, and sent the following telegram to army commanders and commissioners :

I consider the voluntary retreat of units from their positions as equivalent to treason and treachery. Therefore I categorically require all commanders in such cases should, without hesitation, turn the fire of machine-guns and artillery against the traitors. I take all responsibility for the victims on myself. Inaction and hesitation on the part of commanders I shall count as neglect of duty, and such officers I shall at once deprive of their command and commit to trial.

He also sent a telegram to the Provisional Government stating the position with the utmost frankness, and insisted on the necessity of exceptional measures, including the death penalty, to restore order, "otherwise the whole responsibility will fall on those who think they can rule with words in these fields, where reign death and confusion, treason, cowardice and selfishness." General Brusiloff, to whom the text of the telegram had been sent, supported Korniloff's demand in an urgent message to the Government. The following day Korniloff received a reply from the Provisional Government permitting him to employ whatever means were necessary to deal with the




A MOTOR LORRY FULL OF DESERTERS STOPPED BY BRITISH OFFICERS.

castastrophe, and a formal ukaz, signed by Kerensky, by Efremoff, Minister of Justice, and by General Yakubovitch, restoring the death penalty in the army during the war was issued on July 25. In this ukaz the military crimes for which death was the penalty were set forth, and the composition of the military-revolutionary courts to deal with the most serious offences was laid down. They were to consist of three officers and three soldiers chosen by lot. The verdict was decided by a majority of votes; if the voting were equal the verdict was to be in favour of the prisoner.

In Rumania the forward movement began still later, and at first, thanks to the ardour and the dash of the Rumanian Army, it yielded substantial results in captured positions, guns and prisoners; but soon, owing to the defection of the Russians, the tide of battle turned in favour of the enemy, and some of the forces under the command of the King and of General Shcherbacheff found themselves hemmed in, and were extricated with great difficulty.

The Austro-German accounts of their "victory" in Galicia and Bukovina afforded cheerful reading for the unenlightened public



BRITISH ARMOURD CAR COVERING THE REMOVAL OF A BIG GUN.

Tarnopol fell on July 21, Stanislaw was evacuated on July 25, Kolomea (recently General Korniloff's headquarters) on July 27. Czernowicz, the capital of the Bukovina, had to be abandoned a day or so later. General Korniloff was marshalling his armies eastward, Kamieniec was prepared for evacuation. But thanks to General Korniloff's firmness and skill the Russian armies made a stand on the Zbrucz. The Germans could not secure a footing across the river.

Between Krewo and Smorgon the central group of armies began its offensive on July 20. They took some positions and 1,000 prisoners, then they declined to do any more fighting. Farther north, at Lake Narocz, the attempt to advance was even less effective. The troops of the central and northern fronts were more subject to Bolshevik influences than their comrades in the south.

at home. Counter-attacks on the Russian flanks (at Zwyzyn, on the upper reaches of the Dniester, and at Nowica, south-east of Kalusz), which had prefaced but had not caused the rupture of the Russian front, were represented in the light of manifestations of German skill and superior valour. Thenceforward, the course of the Russian retreat was persistently depicted as being a succession of hard-won battles. For the first time in history an enemy's war bulletins were magnifying the courage and valour of a panicstricken foe. The motive was easy to understand. It was less flattering to appraise the foe at his just value; moreover, the Germans did not want the Russians to think that their armies needed reforming, and there was also an abiding hope that by impressing them with the idea that Russian troops had fought well the covert scheme of a separate peace on "honourable"



SCENE DURING THE RUSSIAN RETREAT.

terms might be furthered. But while German military critics indulged in dithyrambs about the invincible prowess of the Austro-German forces in Galicia and Bukovina and the stanch resistance offered to them by the Russians, the German General Staff prudently refrained from publishing the usual official summary of the operations, or from stating the number of prisoners taken.

Events in Petrograd, to which reference has been made above, had resumed a two-fold character. The Socialist surrender to Ukrainian demands for complete autonomy had led to a serious Cabinet crisis. All the Cadet Ministers resigned (July 15). Meanwhile the Bolsheviks, enraged by bulletins of victory (the capture of Halicz and Kalusz), and unsatisfied by the nefarious propaganda of their agents at the front, had planned an uprising in Petrograd. The garrison was to seize the members of the Provisional Government; the Baltic Fleet was to come to Kronstadt, and acting in conjunction with the disaffected seamen and soldiers of that fortress, to reinforce their accomplices in Petrograd. Then, having taken possession of the capital and usurped the reins of power, they proposed under Lenin's direc-

tion to conclude peace. This plan was all but carried out. Although it failed, the Bolsheviks were able to bring about an irretrievable disaster by misrepresenting the actual state of affairs to the ignorant soldiery.

M. Kerensky, assuming the Premiership at the head of a temporary coalition, bestirred himself to clear up the misunderstanding. He openly accused the Bolsheviks of conspiring with Germany to betray the Russian Revolution. A portion of the garrison desisted from their traitorous aid to the Bolsheviks. The Soviet had been thrown into abject fright. Its Jewish delegates and reporters cowered within the Tauris Palace. It was really the Cossacks—a mere handful—who saved them and the Government from capture and the city from the horrors of civil war. The movement began on July 16 and culminated next day. Many hundreds were killed, including Cossacks who had been ambushed by the Bolsheviks. M. Kerensky personally attended the funeral of the Cossacks.

The public indignation against the Bolsheviks enabled the Government to arrest several of their leaders, including Stekloff, Kameneff and Trotsky. Lenin ostensibly disappeared. The

soldiers arrested Tchernoff and others. All these persons were, however, released soon afterwards.

It is interesting to cite the proclamation issued immediately after the outbreak by the Central Committee of the Cadet Party :

The streets of the capital have been painted red with the blood of many hundreds of citizens who have suffered, not in the fight against the enemy, but at the hands of their own fellow-citizens. The Central Committee of the Bolsheviks has issued on this occasion an appeal in which it declares that the object of the demonstration has been achieved, and that the watchwords of the advance guards of the labouring classes and the army have been demonstrated impressively and with dignity. The authors of the crime are manifest. They have confessed themselves. Henceforth all Russia knows that the hour of the heroic offensive of our army has been chosen deliberately with a view to arousing the courage of our enemies and inflicting a blow upon the cause of the Revolution by making sanguinary confusion in the rear. Gradually the secret springs of the new crime are being revealed. Publicly the dishonouring accusation has been thrown into the face of the leaders of the party, which has chosen for its mission the overthrow of the Government and the disorganization of the war, that this mission

reliable forces and that the population of the capital should no longer be exposed to menace on the part of those who have been entrusted with its protection.

It demands that the civil liberties and the life itself of the citizens should not depend upon a handful of criminals, who hide under revolutionary watchwords, that the regular activity of the courts of law should be guaranteed, that it should not be replaced or stopped by any inquiries on the part of any party or other organizations.

The Cadet Party again insists upon the necessity of an undivided and firm authority capable of leading peacefully the country towards the Constituent Assembly, and declares that only such an authority, guided by such objects, can regain the national support without which the cause of the great Russian Revolution will be threatened by a final collapse.

The investigation asked for was subsequently undertaken, but led to nothing. Lenin could not be found, and his accomplices all denied any connexion with Germany.

General Polovtsoff was made the official scapegoat. He resigned his post. He had done everything that was possible for a soldier to do under the invertebrate system of govern-



FUNERAL OF COSSACKS WHO DIED IN DEFENCE OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT.

The Head of the Procession.

has been undertaken by them in order to render a selfish service to the interests of Germany. Such an accusation cannot remain uninvestigated. Russia expects that the impartial judicial authorities will expose all the threats of the enemies' skill and will convict the authors of the incident which has just occurred. The Government has taken the first steps to suppress the criminal revolt. Public opinion, excited and indignant, does not even admit the idea that the Government could manifest in this any hesitation or indecision.

The Cadet Party demands the immediate arrest of Lenin and his friends in order to protect the liberty and safety of Russia from new attempts against them.

The Cadet Party demands that the conquests of the Revolution should be placed under the protection of

ment that had prevailed while he was in command.

The circumstances of the latest Baltic Fleet mutiny were particularly disgraceful. Several battleships and light cruisers were to be detached from the squadrons stationed at Helsingfors, and while the battleships threatened the capital with their guns, the lighter vessels were to go up the river and to convey the members of the Provisional Government as prisoners to Kronstadt. M.



LIEUT.-COMMANDER SMILES, R.N.V.R.,
D.S.O., KNIGHT OF ST. GEORGE,
Who played a conspicuous part in the operations
of the British armoured cars.

Kerensky telegraphed to Admiral Verdevsky to dispatch submarines with orders to blow up any of the warships that might attempt to proceed to Kronstadt. These instructions were intercepted by the Bolsheviks and communicated to the ships' com-

mittees. In order to avoid a worse mutiny, the admiral had to take all the Fleet into his confidence, and to announce that he would not carry out the orders. For this he was afterwards arrested by M. Kerensky, and was to have been court-martialled when suddenly he was offered the post of Minister of Marine, which had been held for some weeks by a certain Lebedeff, a young Russian revolutionary, who had served in the French Army, and wore the French uniform of a subaltern. The Baltic units came to Kronstadt, but too late, and were afterwards turned back. M. Kerensky issued the following Order of the Day on this subject (July 21):

The traitorous activity of a number of individuals obliged the Provisional Government to order the immediate arrest of the leaders and the deputation from the Baltic Fleet which arrived in Petrograd. In view of what has happened I order:

(1) The immediate dissolution of the central committee of the Baltic Fleet and the election of a new committee

(2) The issue of a notification to all detachments and ships of the Baltic Fleet that I desire them to remove at once all persons suspected of inciting to insubordination against the Provisional Government and against our offensive, and to send these individuals to Petrograd for trial.

(3) The detachments of Kronstadt and the battleships Petropavlovsk, Republic, and Slava, the names of which have been disgraced by the actions of the counter-revolutionaries, shall arrest within 24 hours the ring-leaders and send them to Petrograd for trial.

I hereby notify the Kronstadt detachments and the crews of these ships that if this order is not carried out they will be branded as traitors to the country and the Revolution and the most rigorous measures will be taken against them.

As shown in another part of this Chapter, General Korniloff saved the armies tardily placed under his command by introducing the death penalty. He did so on his own initiative and was supported by the Government commissaries and by the Cabinet under M. Kerensky's influence. From this act resulted a whole series of events which were destined profoundly to modify the situation in Russia.



CHAPTER CCIX.

THE AISNE BATTLES : CRAONNE, APRIL—MAY, 1917.

SITUATION IN THE WEST AFTER THE "HINDENBURG" RETREAT—BRITISH AND FRENCH PLANS—THE FRENCH LINE BETWEEN SOISSONS AND REIMS—GENERAL NIVELLE AND HIS OBJECTIVES—THE FRENCH OFFENSIVE ON APRIL 16—FRENCH "TANKS" IN ACTION—ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATIONS—RESULTS APRIL 16-28—THE FRENCH COMMAND—NIVELLE, PÉTAIN AND FOCH—THE KAISER'S SPEECH.

THE month of April, 1917, showed a considerable increase of activity on the part of the British and French Armies with the purpose of continuing the pressure on the German forces from Verdun to Ypres. The battle of Vimy-Arras, April 9-16, to be described in a subsequent chapter, was the first move in the great offensive. It was followed by a succession of blows directed against that portion of the enemy's lines which more immediately faced the French front of operations.

The ruthless devastation of the country over which the Germans had retreated left a region from the south of Arras across the Somme and the Oise to the northern bank of the Ailette across which operations were bound to be difficult and slow, because the destruction of the roads and bridges hindered the movements of troops and made it hard to bring up the numbers of guns and masses of ammunition needed for the demolition of the enemy's works before a frontal attack on any large scale was possible. But north and south of this sector the conditions were easier and invited a better field of attack.

It must not be forgotten that practically along the whole front from Verdun to the North Sea there extended one continuous line
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of fortifications, which afforded no scope for flank attack. This must always be the case when nations devote their whole manhood to a struggle which breaks out between them. The stretch of country over which their forces come into collision is necessarily very vast because it is otherwise impossible to bring the whole armed strength into action. This has profoundly modified strategy. It is no longer possible to make an initial concentration of a large proportion of the available force on one flank without the danger of leaving other portions of the line so poorly defended as to invite attack. Such a movement takes too long a time to effect and would certainly now be discovered by aerial reconnaissance. When General von Kluck found a gap existed between himself and the right of the German main body he was obliged to close to his left to fill it. The French force under Maunoury was not sufficiently strong to enable it to inflict a decisive blow on Kluck's right, but the concentration of what numbers of French and British it was possible to bring together on this part of the theatre of war was so dangerous to the Germans as to make their retreat from the Marne necessary. On the Aisne they turned to bay again and from that time onward with varying fortunes of no great importance the



THE GERMAN LINE AT THE OPENING OF THE FRENCH OFFENSIVE ON THE AISNE.

Germans faced the Allies, nor was it till 1916 that the latter were able to press back the right centre of their opponents. But they never penetrated their line. The fighting was a mere matter of hammer and tongs which gave no opportunity for a decisive action. For decisive action means the rending apart of hostile line of battle and the ability to press back and act against the flanks of the divided forces. Obviously this is most difficult in the centre of the enemy's line, because the penetrating force would be in danger of the riven parts closing back and inflicting a severe defeat on it, for they would necessarily for a time be greater in force than any penetrating body. But this is not the case if the point of penetration be so near to the end of the enemy's line that the portion cut off nearest to the extremity is not sufficiently large to enable it to withstand the superior strength the penetrating force will certainly be able to concentrate against it.

On the western front it was plain that the German right flank was easier to treat in this fashion than their left, for, once it was cut

through, the isolated part would have no line of communications left and must surrender or be destroyed. If a similar attempt were made from the neighbourhood of Verdun, so many lines of retreat were open to the Germans that they could not be cut off.

An advance against the extreme German left flank in Alsace offered no chance of striking success. The French would not have sufficient manœuvring space and would be liable to counter-attack over the Rhine from Neuf Breisach to Strassburg.

Similarly, an advance from Nancy would also have to be guarded from attack on both flanks and would find a formidable line of fortifications on its front and its left flank and the Rhine with its numerous passages available to the Germans for flank attack.

The object of the Allies was to beat the Kaiser's field armies, and plainly this, with the existing position, could be done best by attacking their right flank in Belgium. Once they were driven back and the sea coast freed the enemy would lose his bases for submarine and destroyer warfare and find his prestige damaged by the severity of the defeat thereby involved, and by the vast material losses it would inflict on him.

But before this could be done two things were necessary. One was to occupy ground to the south of the springing-off point which could be held while the main manœuvre was taking place; the other was to kill and disable as many Germans as possible and thereby diminish the force available for any attacks they might wish to make.

The English were, in the early days of April, pursuing the enemy retiring on the line Cambrai—St. Quentin, and the French were advancing between the Somme and the Oise and south of the Oise. Haig had thrown Horne's and Allenby's armies against the Vimy Ridge and the German positions on both sides of the Scarpe, east of Arras. By April 15 Horne's troops north of the ridge were entering the northern, western and southern suburbs of Lens; his right and Allenby's left wing had driven the enemy from the ridge into the Douai plain; while Allenby's centre and right wing had thrust back the Germans from Arras down both banks of the Scarpe, captured the dominant points on the heights south of that river and at Monchy-le-Preux breached the German second line, which ran from Mericourt, south-east of Lens, over the Scarpe to Bullecourt. The

southern end of this and the Drocourt-Quéant or Wotan line behind it were being attacked; Gough's divisions were approaching the Scheldt south of Cambrai; and the right wing of Rawlinson had already reached the outskirts of St. Quentin, on which was converging the left wing of the French forces moving between the Somme and the Oise.

South of the Oise our Allies by April 15 had crossed the Lower Ailette and they were entering the south-western borders of the great mass of hilly forest-land (*Forêt de St. Gobain, Basse and Haute Forêts de Coucy*) filling in the northern angle formed by the confluence of the Ailette and Oise. They were, therefore, threatening on the west the extraordinarily strong position of the Germans north of the Aisne between the hills north of Soissons and Craonne barring an advance from the Aisne into the Upper Ailette and the Plain of Laon. The reader will recollect that it was to this position and to the now abandoned district west of it that Kluck had retreated after the Battle of the Marne. The strength of the heights north of the Aisne had been learned by the armies of Maunoury, French and Franchet d'Esperey in September, 1914, at the Battle of the Aisne. The British and French had crossed the

Aisne at and west and east of Soissons, but had been unable to reach the valley of the Ailette or to debouch east of Craonne into the Laon Plain. In January, 1915, Maunoury, from Soissons, had vainly endeavoured to storm the hills between which run the Soissons-Laon road and railroad. He had been counter-attacked by Kluck and driven back to the south bank of the Aisne. From January, 1915, to the commencement of Hindenburg's retreat our Allies had practically marked time in the Aisne district.

Between the Aisne and the Argonne the only great battle delivered by the French since the Battle of the Aisne had been that of the Champagne Pouilleuse in September, 1915, when Pétain in places had penetrated to some distance the German positions from Auberive, on the Suippe, some 20 miles east of Reims, to Ville-sur-Tourbe, 30 miles west of Verdun, on the Argonne's western borders. From the Argonne to Belfort, with the exception of the gigantic Battle of Verdun in 1916, there had been in 1915 and 1916 no operations on an extended scale. The French had turned out the enemy from Les Eparges on the heights of the Meuse; they had failed to expel him from the St. Mihiel salient between Les Eparges and



[French official photograph.]

SHELLS FOR THE BIG GUNS ON THE AISNE SECTOR.

Toul; they had made a slight advance in Lorraine and they had secured the heads of several valleys leading into the Plain of Alsace.

Unless Nivelle used his troops to support the British offensive, he evidently had to fight somewhere between the Somme and the Argonne. For reasons which were not fully disclosed he decided on April 16 to assault the German positions from the hills north of Soissons to Bétheny, north-east of Reims, and on the 17th to throw General Anthoine's army, forming the left wing of General Pétain's central group of armies, against the enemy in Auberive and on the Moronvilliers heights west of that village. From the Ailette to the Aisne in the region of Missy-sur-Aisne the French front measured some eight miles; along the Aisne to the crossing of the river east of Chavonne was about the same distance, and thence to Bétheny 25 miles. The front still further east in the Battle of Moronvilliers, which will be described in the next chapter, was roughly 10 miles. The French offensive was, therefore, to be executed on a line of over 50 miles, double that of the Allies at the opening of the Battle of the Somme.

Since the Battle of the Marne—or, at all events, since the "race to the sea" which ended in the Battles of the Yser and Ypres—there had been in the west of Europe no encounter on a wider front.

On April 15 the French line extended from just west of La Fère on the Oise through the western and southern edges of the Gobain and Coucy forests to the north bank of the Ailette, which it crossed north-east of Vauxaillon. It passed east of Vauxaillon and west of Laffaux and Margival, striking then south-south-east over the southern end of the Vregny plateau and descending into the valley of the Aisne near Missy-sur-Aisne. The Aisne was crossed about 5 miles, as the crow flies, east of Soissons. The Germans held the south bank of the river from Missy-sur-Aisne to a mile or so east of Chavonne, and the French front from near Missy-sur-Aisne followed this German salient, rejoining the north bank where the valley widens. From the Aisne it ran north-eastwards by Soupir across the Oise-Aisne Canal and ascended to the Chemin-des-Dames plateau north of Troyon. Immediately afterwards it left the plateau and went eastwards below it to Craonnelle and the marshy ground south of Craonne. Next it struck south-eastwards west of Ville-aux-Bois and


recrossed the Aisne east of Berry-au-Bac. From the region of Berry-au-Bac it was continued also south-eastwards, by Bétheny, covering Reims. Finally, south of the Nogent l'Abbesse heights, it curved eastwards and at the foot of the Moronvilliers ridge touched the Suippe just south of Auberive.

On both sides of La Fère the Germans had barred the way by flooding the Oise valley for a distance of about 11 miles, from the region of Berthenicourt down to the marshes near Tergnier and Servais.*

Nor was an offensive practicable between the flooded valley of the Oise and the Ailette in the vicinity of Vauxaillon. The hilly forests of St. Gobain and Coucy, the entrenchments and dug-outs in which could not be detected by the French aeroplane observers, barred an advance on this side to the Plain of Laon. On the other hand, Hindenburg's devastations in front of it negatived the probability of a German counter-offensive from the wooded region, and so the French troops deployed between Vauxaillon and Soissons could safely attack the enemy's position from the Ailette to the Aisne. Let us now consider the natural features of the German positions which Gen. Nivelle proposed to carry.

The valley of the Aisne south of the line Vauxaillon—Craonne consists of a flat-bottomed depression from half a mile to two miles broad, through which flows the river, an unfordable stream some 170 ft. wide. Between Missy-sur-Aisne and Vailly the enemy held the low ground south of the river to left and right of the Vesle, which enters the Aisne two miles north-east of Missy. To dislodge him from this enclave would be difficult so long as he retained his hold of the heights north of the Aisne. Those heights are from 350 to 400 ft. above the bottom of the valley and consist of a number of sloping spurs attached at their northern end to a hog's back, 14 miles in length, along the summit of which ran the Chemin-des-Dames. These spurs where they abutted on the valley presented a succession of steep rounded cliffs, still in places wooded. Their summits were usually considerably higher than the summits of the similar spurs south of the river in the occupation of the French. Though our Allies retained the sugar mill above Troyon on the hog's back captured by Haig's troops at the Battle of the Aisne, the

* See Perris, *Daily Chronicle*, May 21, 1917.



Micheler.

Pétain.

Montdésir.


FRENCH GENERALS IN CONSULTATION.

whole of the remainder of the Chemin-des-Dames Plateau was in the possession of the Germans, who also held its four western spurs—from the one just north-east of Missy-sur-Aisne to that above Chavonne.

On the top of the southern end of the westernmost spur was the Fort de Condé, which overlooked most of the Aisne and the opening of the Vesle valleys. The Fort de Condé spur ascended northwards and was

merged in the Chemin-des-Dames Plateau two miles west of the Fort de la Malmaison. Both of these works, like so many others on the northern frontier of France, had become obsolete before the war, and were chiefly useful as observatories.

West of the Fort de Condé spur and the Fort de la Malmaison end of the Chemin-des-Dames Plateau was, across a deep ravine, another and narrower spur, at the southernmost point of



THE PLATEAU OF THE CHEMIN-DES-DAMES.

which was the village of Chivres, at the northernmost end that of Nanteuil-la-Fosse.

A ravine separated the Chivres-Nanteuil-la-Fosse spur from the wide and high Vregny Plateau which, with slight depressions in it, extended northwards from the valley of the Aisne to the valley of the Ailette east of Vauxaillon. The southern end of the plateau had been seized by the French between Crouy and Vregny, but the rest of the plateau as far as the Ailette was occupied by the Germans, who, beyond a ravine to its west, were entrenched in the village of Laffaux. North of Laffaux a spur descended westwards from the plateau, and was crossed by the Soissons-Laon railroad.

Aisne, Vailly and Chavonne, on the north bank of the Aisne, and those of Sancy, Jouy, Aizy and Ostel, nearer the crest of the hog's back, and the sides and summits of the four spurs, had been elaborately fortified by the Germans.

East, however, of Chavonne, where the French line recrossed to the north bank of the Aisne, the French were in a more favourable position for assaulting the Chemin-des-Dames Plateau. They held Soupir and Moussy-sur-Aisne and they could attack from the south and east the end of the Chavonne spur. By advancing up the narrow valley east of that spur they could reach the plateau above Bray-en-Laonnois, where the



FRENCH TROOPS PREPARING TO RECEIVE A COUNTER-ATTACK.

Up this spur the French could approach the Soissons-Laon chaussée running along the summit of the plateau. The latter road at the mill of Laffaux—a mile east of the village—turned almost due east, then descended into the ravine separating the Vregny from the Chemin-des-Dames Plateau, mounted the western end of that hog's back, and, after meeting the Chemin-des-Dames, dipped down into the valley of the Upper Ailette. Thus from Hill 157 east of Vauxaillon to the Aisne at Missy-sur-Aisne the enemy held a strong position covering on the west the Fort de Condé spur and one end of the Chemin-des-Dames Plateau. The Aisne itself protected the western portion of the hog's back from a southern attack. The villages of Condé-sur-Aisne, Celles-sur-


Oise-Aisne Canal passed under the plateau in a long tunnel. At Troyon they were just below and, at the sugar mill, actually on the crest of the hog's back.

The Chemin-des-Dames Plateau, its four spurs west of Soupir, and the Vregny Plateau could accordingly be attacked from the east as well as from the west. But, as from Laffaux to Troyon is a distance of 12 miles, the reduction of the German salient, the southern face of which was across the Aisne, would be necessarily a long operation. For two years and a half the enemy's engineers had been meticulously studying the terrain. North of Chivy (just south-west of Troyon) the enemy had constructed a tunnel beneath the hog's back. The four spurs had not been entirely denuded

of their woods and their faces were steep. The entrances to and the sides of the valleys and ravines had been covered with barbed-wire entanglements of great width. Above all, innumerable natural caves—*creutes*—afforded shelter from even the heaviest shells, and these, with quarries, deep dug-outs and the new concrete forts, were certain to be desperately defended by troops amply provided with machine-guns and grenades. To assault this salient under the fire of the hundreds of guns on or behind the Chemin-des-Dames Plateau was, then, a very formidable problem.

high. The capture of the section between the Troyon sugar mill and the Plateau de Californie would, therefore, somewhat facilitate the operations against the Laffaux-Vailly-Troyon salient.

To the north the Chemin-des-Dames Plateau descended steeply into the valley of the Upper Ailette. The slopes—especially those east of the Hurtebise Farm—were densely wooded (Forêt de Vaublanc), and the villages on them from west to east—Pargny, Filain, Courtecon, Cerny, Ailles—could be utilized by the Germans as points of departure for counter-attacks.




LAON.

From above Troyon to its eastern end above Craonne, the Chemin-des-Dames Plateau varies greatly in width. It was narrowest—only about 100 yards wide—at the Hurtebise Farm, under which ran another tunnel occupied by the enemy. On the plateau west of the farm Napoleon had fought the Battle of Craonne in 1814. Above Craonnelle the hog's back was fairly wide, contracting again at the Plateau des Casemates and Plateau de Californie, the latter of which formed the eastern extremity of the hog's back. The highest point on the Chemin-des-Dames Plateau was near the Hurtebise Farm, where it was over 650 feet

The Chemin-des-Dames Plateau was, moreover, not the sole natural obstacle between the Aisne and the marshy plain south of Laon. North of the Ailette was a broader plateau which at its eastern end was about as high, but at other points considerably lower than the Chemin-des-Dames ridge. This plateau sloped steeply to the Laon Plain.

Finally, Laon—on its long 350 ft. high hill, at the foot of which Napoleon fought the last great battle of 1814—formed a supporting point for the Germans if the French captured or turned from the east the district between the Aisne valley and the plain.



EVACUATION OF CIVILIANS FROM REIMS: A GROUP OF REFUGEES.

Very different was the position of the enemy from the Plateau de Californie to the east of Reims. Nestling nearly 100 ft. below the south-eastern edge of the plateau were the ruins of Craonne strongly garrisoned by the Germans. Craonne was on high ground, but to the east extended the vast plain of the Champagne traversed by the Aisne. Immediately south of Craonne the ground was wooded and marshy. The French trenches were here 700 yards away from the German. To the south-east in the plain two hummocks and as many battered woods marked the position of Ville-aux-Bois.

Ville-aux-Bois was a bastion, as it were, in the barrier between Craonne and the Aisne east of Berry-au-Bac constructed by the enemy to bar the entry of the French into the Laon Plain. From Ville-aux-Bois a road ran across the Reims-Laon chaussée to Juvincourt on the Miette, a northern tributary of the Aisne. The rear of the French trenches in front of Ville-aux-Bois and of those south-east of it to the region of Berry-au-Bac were commanded by the German fire on the eastern end of the Chemin-des-Dames Plateau.


If the French intended to break out between Craonne and the Aisne it was imperative that the hog's back should be attacked east of Troyon.

South of the river the plain, save for a hillock here and there, stretched east to the Suippe and south-east to the heights of Brimont and Fresne. Those heights had been powerfully

fortified by the enemy. To turn them from the west it would be necessary for the French to take Berméricourt on the Reims-Laon railway, and Loivre south of it on the Aisne-Marne canal. The French were across the canal two miles north-west of Loivre near Le Godat. The canal south of the Brimont heights and north of Courcy was held by the Germans. Bétheny is south-south-east of Courcy a few thousand yards from the chaussée which connects Reims with Rethél.

The plan of General Nivelle was to storm from the west, south, and south-east the Chemin-des-Dames ridge with one force and with another from the west to burst into the plain between Craonne and the Brimont heights, turn the latter from the north and the Fresne heights, both of which were simultaneously to be attacked from the south between Courcy and Bétheny. No attempt was to be made to carry the cluster of hills east of Reims in the region of Nogent l'Abbesse, but on April 17 General Anthoine was to assault the Moronvilliers ridges farther east and also Auberive-sur-Suippe.

The highest point in the Nogent l'Abbesse hills is 870 ft. high, about 30 ft. higher than any point on the Moronvilliers ridges, and some 100 ft. higher than any on the hog's back. As from Craonne across the Aisne to the Brimont heights is but a distance of 12 miles, and the German guns in the Nogent l'Abbesse hills commanded the country from Fort Brimont to Bétheny, the difficulties of the



[From a German photograph.]

A CHARGE BY GERMAN SHOCK TROOPS ON THE CHEMIN-DES-DAMES.

French army attacking between Craonne and Béthény will be apparent. Those which Gen. Anthoine's army were to encounter in the Moronvilliers district will be fully described in the next chapter; the difficulty of dealing with them may be estimated from the fact that Mt. Cornillet, the western end of the Moronvilliers ridge, was attacked on April 17 but its summit was not captured till May 20.

The German Crown Prince and his Staff had allocated 13 Divisions, or—calculating a German division at this date to have been 10,000 infantry strong—over 130,000 troops to defend the lines from the Ailette to Béthény. Six more divisions, or an additional 60,000 troops, reinforced them during the course of the battle. The numbers of Germans massed in the Nogent l'Abbesse and Moronvilliers hills, behind them and in the depression between have been fixed as high as 16 divisions, or about 160,000 infantry. We shall probably then be not far wrong if we suppose that 350,000 German soldiers, provided with thousands of machine-guns and supported by a huge artillery, awaited the French infantry offensive. "The orders," runs an instruction dated March 18, 1917, of General von Schussler, commanding the 183rd Division north of the Aisne, in which he expresses his surprise that officers did not understand the necessity of holding the front line, "are that the first line must be defended at any cost, and that if it be lost the struggle must continue till it is recovered. *Our principal fighting line is our*

first line."* The words in italics were underlined in the original.

For the purpose of the counter-attacks here indicated there was now attached to each army corps a battalion of *Stosstruppen* (shock troops). It was formed of picked youths, bachelors, or childless married men including often the wilder spirits of the companies from which they were drawn. The battalion was not as a rule kept together for action, but parcelled out among the ordinary infantry in small groups. The duty of these was to serve as guides to the troops when assaulting difficult places; in fact, they were a reproduction of the grenadier companies of a hundred years ago—a *corps d'élite*.† A specimen shock-troop battalion organized in March, 1917, contained four "assault companies," each 100 men strong, led by three officers, a machine-gun company with six mitrailleuses, a company of bombers with mine-throwers, a company with flame projectors, and a battery of assault. The whole was commanded by a captain and lieutenant. When rapid movement was necessary they were conveyed in motor cars.


* This order is to be found in the *Morning Post* of May 2.

† The grenadier companies which existed in all European countries during the eighteenth and early years of the nineteenth centuries, were originally intended, as their name implies, to hurl grenades. They carried their muskets slung and were also armed with an axe for cutting down palisades or similar obstacles. The grenade soon disappeared from field-warfare; but the grenadier companies remained and were formed of the biggest and most reliable men of the regiments. They were often taken from the latter and united into special battalions.

The battle which opened on April 16 was not, it would seem, like the Battle of Vimy-Arras, delivered by the French commander with a limited objective. It appears to have been a genuine attempt by General Nivelle to break through the German lines. "Prolonged as it has been," he had written the year before to the writer Nordmann, "the trench warfare which we have been waging on the same ground for two years is only one of the numerous forms of war—a form which cannot last for ever, because it cannot bring a decision. Be sure," he had added, "that the essential principles of war, those of Napoleonic strategy,

were, however, to prove that General Nivelle's project was premature, and it may plausibly be argued that he should have confined himself to the reduction of the German strongholds in the Nogent l'Abbesse and Moronvilliers hills before commencing an offensive in the plain between Craonne and the Brimont heights, and that he should also have avoided infantry operations in the hilly country north of the Aisne until he had turned on the east the Chemin-des-Dames Plateau.

General Nivelle, who had succeeded Joffre in the command of the front operations, was considerably younger than the victor of the





FRENCH TANK IN COURSE OF PREPARATION FOR A RUN.

have lost none of their value. Some day or other they will be fully vindicated. . . . It is because we misunderstood them that we were beaten in 1870. . . . The moment approaches when the decisive blow will be struck by the stronger and the more resolute."

The French were now provided with a fleet of "Tanks," and in the Plain between Craonne and Reims there would be ample opportunities for using them. General Nivelle's magnificent victory at Verdun may well have inspired him with the hope that the moment had at last come when it would be possible to seek a decision. A decisive victory in France would, too, react on the Russian front and largely prevent the enemy from exploiting for his benefit the Russian Revolution. Events

Marne, being in 1916 but 60 years of age. His mother was an English lady and he had been partly educated in England. He obtained his commission in the artillery from the Ecole Polytechnique, though he had previously spent some time at St. Cyr, and was thus grounded for a career in either the infantry or the artillery. At the same time he became a horseman of distinction, winning prizes in open competitions. Transferred later to the staff, he showed great capacity as a linguist. Under General Voyron he took part (1900) in the campaign in China against the Boxers. Afterwards he was sent by Voyron on a special mission to Corea. Before the Great War he had also been employed in Algiers.

On the opening of hostilities, Nivelle, like



REIMS CATHEDRAL: GERMAN SHELLS BURSTING ON THE BUILDING.

Pétain, was only a colonel. From Besançon his regiment of field artillery (the 5th) was moved up to the frontier and took part in the invasion of Alsace. The first German guns captured in the war were the fruit of the skilful handling of the pieces directed by him. In the fighting on the Ourcq under Maunoury he exhibited coolness and intrepidity. At the Battle of the Aisne, on September 16, his decision and promptness saved a portion of the 7th Corps from destruction. By a violent counter-attack two regiments of Kluck's troops had driven the French infantry back across the river and were following on in close pursuit. Placing himself at the head of his batteries, Nivelle had stopped the pursuit by their fire, which was so potent that the enemy melted away, and but few of them managed to rejoin their comrades on the north bank. Promoted

General of Brigade in October, 1914, Nivelle remained on the Aisne. At the Battle of Soissons he largely contributed to check Kluck's offensive. As a reward for his activities he was entrusted on February 19, 1915, with a division, and he commanded under Castelnau at the important and successful action of Quennevières (June, 1915) in the Forêt de 'Aigle between the Oise and Aisne. In April, 1916, he was given the command of the 3rd Corps at the Battle of Verdun, where, under Pétain, he largely helped to foil the German plans. Later in the year he had succeeded Pétain as Commander of the Verdun army and had won a striking victory over the Germans, recovering much of the ground lost in the early part of the year. Imperturbable, taciturn, daring, and somewhat of a fatalist, Nivelle had focused on himself the attention of his countrymen, and when a successor to Joffre was sought he had been preferred to Pétain and Foch. Like those generals, he had speedily perceived that artillery would decide the war. "Strive," he had written, "to give us an inexhaustible supply of guns and projectiles. We must pour on the enemy tons of iron and steel." His special knowledge of the country north of the Aisne and the great success which he had gained

over the Germans at Verdun with his artillery led him to believe that it was possible to attack successfully the German lines north of the river. On January 10, 1917, he had assured the Mayor of Deal, his "mother's native town," that he "did not for a moment doubt that, with the assistance of the magnificent British Army and of its distinguished chief, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig," the Allies would "soon obtain a complete victory over the detested enemy."

From April 6 onwards a gigantic French bombardment, qualified by the enemy as "unprecedented in duration, mass and intensity," had been proceeding against the German positions, from the east of Vauxaillon to the north of Reims. On April 10, as will be related in the next chapter, a similar bombardment of the Moronvilliers hills and Auberive had commenced. To these bombardments the enemy's artillery replied with energy. Reims was once more furiously shelled. On April 10 it was decided to evacuate the civil population of the city, already reduced from 117,000 to 17,000 heads. Naturally the battered cathedral was again a target for the German guns. Although of no military value it was a cherished moni-

ment of the French nation, and therefore an object of hate to, and meet for destruction by, the Germans. On the 19th a French officer, writing to *L'Illustration*, stated that a German battery had under his eyes bombarded systematically and *exclusively* this chef d'œuvre of Gothic architecture. "I have seen," he said, "three shells fall on the apse and on the south tower, hitherto intact." The photographs furnished by him to *L'Illustration* and reproduced on p. 48 afford further evidence, if any were necessary, of this act of wanton barbarism.

Unfortunately vile weather interfered with the French artillery preparation. Throughout the night of April 15-16 rain and snow fell, and, on the morning of the 16th the sky, which for an hour or two had become clear, again clouded over and, though the rain held off, the low degree of visibility made the work of the gunners and airmen extremely difficult. This accidental circumstance may have had much to do in spoiling Nivelle's plan for breaking the German lines.


At length, at 6 a.m. on Monday, April 16, the infantry battle opened. During the day the French north of the Ailette progressed a little towards the Upper Cœucy Forest. This may



FRENCH TROOPS LEAVING THE TRENCHES FOR AN ATTACK.

have been a feint to draw the enemy's reserves north of the stream. South of it a Colonial corps was launched against Laffaux and the German positions on the Vregny Plateau beyond that village. Laffaux and the farm of Moisy east of Vauxaillon on the edge of Hill 157 were surrounded. But in the afternoon, after a series of desperate struggles, the Colonials were driven back.

On the 16th the main battle raged from Chavonne to Bétheny. In a work of the



PLAN OF THE DEFENCES OF CHAVONNE.

present dimensions it is impossible to describe every detail and we must perforce limit ourselves to particular incidents which occurred in the prolonged struggle, a struggle ending in the French gaining Craonne and the dominant heights north of the Aisne, Ville-aux-Bois, the first and second lines of the enemy thence to the Aisne, and certain positions of tactical importance south of the river.

On April 16 the advance was not simultaneous at every point. The hours for the attacks had been so fixed as to puzzle the enemy and to induce him to send his reserves to points which were not to be assaulted seriously till later in the day. Thus in the Chavonne-Craonne sector the attack on the left and right began at 6 a.m., that in the centre at 9 a.m.*

It will be recollected that the German salient south of the Aisne extended from a little south-east of Missy-sur-Aisne across the Vesle to the bank of the river opposite Vailly, four miles west of Soupir. On the 16th the aim of the French was, postponing an attack on the southern face of the salient, to capture the village of Chavonne on the north bank of the Aisne between Vailly and Soupir and also the

wooded spur behind it on the eastern edge of which were the ruins of a farm, La Cour de Soupir. The village of Soupir, held by our Allies, lay just below the river end of the western of the three buttress-cliffs of the spur protruding into the valley of the Aisne, here considerably wider than it was in most places. The buttress-cliffs, like the western and eastern faces of the spur, had, before the war, been thickly wooded; but most of the wood was now swept away by the artillery fire. The spur and its sides contained numerous natural and artificial caves of great depth; the summits of the buttress-cliffs rose sharply above the river bed. The easternmost of these projections was called the "Bois des Gouttes d'Or" and its edge "Le Balcon"; the western was named "Les Grinons"; the intermediate one Mt. Sapin. A road from Chavonne ascended Mt. Sapin, skirted on the west the farm of La Cour de Soupir and, by "La Croix sans Tête" and the Froidmont Farm, joined the Chemin-des-Dames. It was crossed a few hundred yards from the Chemin-des-Dames at the Froidmont Farm by the road which from Vailly ran up the ravine between the Chavonne and Vailly spurs and, through Ostel at the head of the ravine, went over the neck of the Chavonne spur and descended to Braye-en-Laonnois at the top of the ravine east of the Chavonne spur. The plateau of the Chavonne spur, in places 620 feet high, was higher than many points on the hog's back off which it branched. To reach the Grinons the French had to cross the Aisne and to break through the two lines of entrenchments on its northern bank. Their left flank would be exposed to attacks from the direction of Vailly and to rifle and machine-gun fire from the Vailly spur. Chavonne, on the edge of the river, was a mass of ruins strongly garrisoned. Behind it on the southern and precipitous slopes of the Grinons and Mt. Sapin ran a trench called "Deutsche Friede" joining on to the rearmost of the trenches extending to Vailly. Two other trenches, linked to the western defences of Chavonne, the Tirpitz Trench and the Werther Trench—(see plan)—were in front of the "Deutsche Friede," which continued north-eastwards at the foot of the Balcon and the Bois des Gouttes d'Or over the Oise-Aisne Canal north of Moussy-sur-Aisne, which village with its northern environs was held by the French. Above, from La Cour de Soupir to Braye-en-Laonnois,

* *Morning Post*, April 18.

the enemy had constructed a network of entrenchments commanding an advance from Moussy-sur-Aisne up the ravine. The Treyon sugar-mill being the only point held by the French on the Chemin-des-Dames Plateau, the German batteries on that plateau could without hindrance from infantry fire deluge the Braye-en-Laonnois valley with shells. Wire entanglements were extended across it. In the Metz farm a mile or so south of Braye and in Braye itself machine guns were posted raking the approaches up the valley.

For days the French artillery had been cutting lines through the entanglements,

Gouttes d'Or two divisions had been detailed. At 6 a.m. on the 16th the advance began. Crossing the Aisne, the French attempted throughout the day to carry the Grinons. By noon they were still at its foot exposed to a terrible fire. Meanwhile a battalion had entered the ruins of Chavonne and bombed and bayoneted its way towards the Deutsche Friede trench. If our Allies could have carried the latter obstacle the attack on the Grinons would probably have succeeded. The enemy promptly counter-attacked, and in the afternoon ferocious fighting ensued in the north of the village near the cemetery. At nightfall a



[French official photograph.]

RESULTS OF BOMBARDMENT IN THE MONT SAPIN DISTRICT.

obliterating trenches, and reducing the woods to litter, but the German positions here still remained immensely strong. Some of the caves had been penetrated by howitzer shells and their occupants killed and wounded by shrapnel or poisoned by gas-shells subsequently discharged into the holes made by the high-explosive shells. Still many of the caverns and quarries had remained intact, and in these and in the tunnel of the Oise-Aisne Canal thousands of Germans were ensconced ready to counter-attack the assaulting troops. Moreover, every movement of the French was under the direct observation of the enemy.

For the attack on the Grinons, Chavonne, Mt Sapin, the Balcon, and the Bois des

few French companies with their backs to the river were still clinging to the southern half of the ruins.

The Germans had not been dislodged from either the Grinons or Chavonne, but to the right a battalion of chasseurs, following close behind the barrage at 6 a.m., had successfully assaulted the Tirpitz and Werther trenches. With magnificent courage they had then made their way across the Deutsche Friede trench and commenced the escalade of Mt. Sapin; but the French guns could not protect them while clambering up the cliff-buttress. Firing grenades from their rifles and flinging bombs before them, they slowly ascended, skilfully turning a fort masking some old quarries. Four hundred prisoners, including 10 officers,



FRENCH 75s ON THE CHEMIN-DES-DAMES.

with 22 mitrailleuses and 19 bomb-throwers were captured, and the survivors of the assaulting force fought their way up to the northern fringe of the wood, the young firs of which resembled a miniature Alpine forest. Still advancing they deployed towards the Grinons on their left and on their right towards the ruins of the farm of La Cour de Soupir, from the subterranean shelters of which the Germans poured streams of machine-gun and rifle bullets.

As the Grinons and the northern half of Chavonne had not been captured and their ammunition was running short, the chasseurs halted and waited for the counter-attacks which were certain to come. At 9 p.m. the first of these was delivered only to be repulsed. The chasseurs defended themselves mostly with grenades discovered in the enemy's lines. At 4.30 a.m. on the 17th a second German attack by fresh troops met the same fate. Though one company of the chasseurs had lost all of its commissioned officers and was commanded by a sergeant, and the remaining companies had suffered heavy losses, they gallantly clung to the position they had gained. The enemy was beaten back into the copses and the open uncultivated ground towards the north-west.

While the chasseurs were storming Mt. Sapin, a similar operation had been proceeding on the flanks of the most westerly of the cliff buttresses. A regiment of infantry had taken Le Balcon and pushed in the direction of the Cour de Soupir farm, thus protecting the right of the chasseurs. Simultaneously a second regiment had attacked the Bois des Gouttes d'Or from the west, but had been held up by the Germans in the undergrowth which had not been sufficiently cleared away by the French guns. A third regiment advancing up the side of the Oise-Aisne Canal on Braye-en-Laonnois was stopped by machine-gun fire from the village and the Metz Farm south of it. The advance here was now suspended while the French artillery concentrated its fire on the enemy's machine guns. In the evening two French battalions entered the Bois de la Bovette, behind the Bois des Gouttes d'Or, where they were screened from German batteries.

When night fell on April 16 the French held the western and southern slopes of the Grinons, the southern half of Chavonne, the summit of Mt. Sapin, Le Balcon, &c., the approaches to

La Cour de Soupir and the Bois de la Bovette.

Other French successes had also been obtained. At 9 a.m., after a terrific bombardment from the "75s" and guns of medium calibre, French troops had moved on to the little spur between Braye-en-Laonnois and Chivy, while from Vendresse and Troyon Moroccan troops, with their right flank protected by the garrison in the Troyon sugar-mill, had swarmed on to the Chemin-des-



FRENCH TANK CHARGING A TREE.

Dames Plateau and, marching westwards, had cut the communications of the garrison in Chivy with the plateau. Under the summit above Chivy the enemy had driven a long tunnel leading to the valley of the Ailette. Into this tunnel some of the Germans from Chivy bolted, but the Moroccans, throwing grenades at the southern entrance, crossed the plateau and caught the fugitives, two hundred of whom were taken prisoners, at the northern end.

Three hours before the attack on Chivy, at 6 a.m., two whole corps had eastwards been hurled against the hog's back. The Hurtebise Farm was stormed by Colonial troops, but fighting went on in the tunnel through the ridge beneath it. At many points the French were bloodily repulsed. They captured, however, a trench between Craonnelle and Craonne, and by this avenue kept touch with the brave men who had in the morning crossed the marshy ground and established themselves in one of the houses on the outskirts of Craonne.

In general terms the troops operating between Soupir and Craonne had, as the French *communiqué* issued on the evening of the 17th

said, "secured all the first German positions." The results obtained on the 16th by the army advancing eastwards between the marshes south of Craonne and the vineyards north-east of Reims were summed up by the French Staff as follows: "To the east of Craonne our troops carried the second enemy positions to the south of Juvincourt. Violent German attacks launched several times to the north of Ville-aux-Bois were broken with considerable losses to the enemy. Further to the south we carried our line as far as the western outskirts of Berméricourt, and as far as the Aisne Canal between Loivre and Courey."


It was in the thrust towards Juvincourt that the French "Tanks" made their first appearance on a battlefield. They were styled *artillerie d'assaut* by General Nivelle in his Order of April 20. The heroic Commandant Bossut, who was killed in the charge, directed the group employed north of the Aisne.

A French Tank differed in several respects from a British "Tank." It was more elegant to view; the caterpillar mechanism lay below and parallel with the body of the car; the wheels working that mechanism were not hidden as in the British Tanks, but exposed.

The object of the French designer seems to have been to sacrifice security for pace, and if the enemy's entrenchments could but have been passed these machines, which to some extent combined the qualities of artillery and cavalry, would doubtless have been invaluable. On April 16 they headed the attack on the second German position before Juvincourt, but not reaching the open country their efficacy could not be fully demonstrated. If the Germans are to be believed, twenty-six of them were put out of action.

While the "Tanks" and infantry south of Ville-aux-Bois penetrated into the German second position, the troops between Craonne and Ville-aux-Bois made no headway. The guns on the hog's back and the mitrailleuses in Craonne and in Corbeny, to the north-east of Craonne, checked an advance against the western front of Juvincourt. On the other hand, violent counter-attacks delivered with the object of relieving the pressure on the Bois des Buttes and the Bois des Boches, the twin hills of Ville-aux-Bois, were repulsed.

As mentioned, these hills formed a bastion in the German line from Craonne to the Aisne. West of the ruined village the two



FRENCH TANK.



FRENCH IN THE TRENCHES AT JUVINCOURT.

summits, some 300 ft. high, stuck out into the French lines. The word "Bois" was now a misnomer. Bare stumps and tree trunks alone indicated that woods had once crowned the eminences. As these humps commanded the entrance to the plains north of the Aisne the German engineers had lavished all their skill on rendering them, as they fondly hoped, impregnable. The fortress, which bristled with machine guns, was surrounded by barbed-wire entanglements, its garrison of two Bavarian battalions was distributed in dug-outs over 60 ft. deep, in subterranean galleries furnished with single-line railways, in concrete block-houses and observatories almost flush with the ground and of great thickness. On this agglomeration of obstacles the French artillery since April 6 had been pouring high-explosive shells, shrapnel, and trench-mortar bombs.


After nightfall on the 15th the 31st Regiment of Infantry, which had been in face of the Bois des Buttes since February, mustered in the front French trenches. It was a regiment recruited in and around Paris. One battalion plus a company was to attack the salient from south to north; another battalion was to assault the western face, and to try to work round the north of the eminences and to attack Ville-aux-Bois by the road from Craonne.

At 6 a.m. on April 16, following the barrage,

the French went over the parapets. The first German trench was rapidly crossed and then round the block-houses spouting jets of bullets and at the entrances to the dug-outs and tunnels a succession of fierce and bloody combats ensued. The Bavarian commander's post, a vast subterranean chamber on the north of the Bois des Buttes, garrisoned by two companies, was surrounded and stormed by 2nd Lieut. Dubois with his section. Incendiary bombs rendered dug-out after dug-out untenable. By noon 800 grimy and exhausted prisoners had been secured, and the Bois des Buttes had passed into French hands.

The Parisians next crossed the summits and descended on Ville-aux-Bois, crowded with flying fugitives, yet the innumerable machine guns forced them to halt and to take cover. Again and again the enemy, reinforced by his reserves, counter-attacked from the west and south of the village. But the Parisians were not to be overcome, and when day dawned on Tuesday, April 17, the Bois des Buttes was still theirs. Thanks largely to the "Tanks," the first and second German lines from the Bois des Buttes to the Aisne had been stormed and the French were working behind Ville-aux-Bois along the stream of the Miette towards Juvincourt. The Bavarians still in the ruins and in the Bois des Boches were in danger of being turned from the south-east. North of Ville-aux-Bois, however, the French

were at a standstill. Not until Craonne and the eastern end of the Chemin-des-Dames Plateau had been stormed would it be possible to advance successfully from the west on Juvin-court



THE ATTACK ON LOIVRE AND BERMÉRICOURT.

Between the south bank of the Aisne east of Berry-au-Bac and the Reims-Rethel chaussée the right wing of the second of the French forces engaged in the battle all through Monday, April 16, struggled in the direction of the lower Suippe. The Aisne-Marne canal from Berry-au-Bac to the southern environs of Le Godat was behind the French lines. Thence to the south of Courcy, where a Russian brigade was stationed, it barred

an advance; north of the canal across the Reims-Neufchatel-sur-Aisne road extended the heights on whose summit was Fort de Brimont. West of the Brimont Hill was the village of Loivre astride the canal, and north of it, in the plain, that of Berméricourt. If Loivre and Berméricourt could be carried the Brimont heights and Fort de Fresne might be turned from the west. As these were the dominant positions in the plain south of the Aisne, west of the Reims-Rethel road, the struggle for them and Loivre and Berméricourt naturally assumed the fiercest character.

Between the canal and the Brimont heights ran the embankment of the Reims-Laon railway over six feet high, passing just west of Berméricourt, and east of Loivre. It had been strongly organized by the enemy as his second line of defence. The French deployed in the trenches from the north of Le Godat to the west of Loivre were ordered to break through the first German line north of the canal, clear the enemy from the Bois de Séchamps and the wood of the Champ du Seigneur, carry the railway embankment, and evict the foe from the ruins of Berméricourt, south of the canal. A regiment was to dislodge the Germans from their trenches, traverse the canal and, marching down the east bank, seize the edge of Loivre on that side and the railway embankment beyond it; while another regiment was to master the German positions in



RUSSIANS BRINGING A MACHINE-GUN INTO POSITION.



RUSSIANS ENTRENCHED ON THE AISNE SECTOR.

front of Loivre and to storm the rest of the village, which was mostly on the west bank of the canal. Meantime, to distract the enemy on the Brimont heights and south of it the Russian brigade, with French troops on their left and right, were from the south, between Loivre and Bétheny, to move on the canal and the Brimont-Fresnes ridges.

At 6 a.m. on the 16th the execution of this plan commenced. The French from the region of Le Godat rapidly secured the first German line, captured the Bois de Séchamp, and at 6.35 a.m. moved on against the wood of Champ du Seigneur. At 6.50 a.m. one company attacked the northern horn of that wood, a second its centre, and a third its southern end. The wood, after savage fighting, was cleared of the enemy, who fled by his communication trenches towards the railway embankment. At 7.50 a.m., preceded by a powerful bombardment, the French made for the embankment. Other troops on the right joined up and this obstacle was overrun, and a regiment was directed on Berméricourt, while the embankment was secured almost as far as Loivre. The ruins of Berméricourt, with 400 prisoners, were rapidly captured, and the survivors of the garrison fled up the western side of the Brimont heights. The division engaged in the action dug itself in, and during the rest of the day was bombarded and counter-attacked from the heights and north of them. By

nightfall, however, the enemy had succeeded in recovering Berméricourt.

The two regiments directed to seize the eastern bank of the canal and Loivre had also met with success. Between 6 a.m. and 7.30 a.m. one of them forced its way to the canal. Two battalions drove the enemy from the western bank; the third battalion crossed to the eastern and at 8.50 a.m. entered the houses of Loivre on that side. The second regiment, with its left protected by the first, marched on Loivre. One battalion in front with the first regiment descended on Loivre along the western edge of the canal. At 8 a.m. it had reached the cemetery but could not advance because of the fire from the enemy's machine guns in the cemetery itself and the ruins of the mill. The other two battalions, which had marched straight on Loivre, carried at 6.30 a.m. the first German trench. At 8 a.m. they, too, were in front of the village. As the enemy offered a stubborn resistance it was decided to halt and let the "75" guns complete their work, and so for a couple of hours shells by the hundred descended on the ruins. At 10.30 a.m. a trumpet rang out the charge and the whole regiment dashed forward. Loivre was won. One French battalion alone had captured 825 prisoners.

From Loivre through Courcy to Bétheny similar encounters took place. The Russian Brigade in front of Courcy was com-

manded by General Lochwitsky. These troops formed part of the contingent transported from Russia to France by the Trans-Siberian railway in 1916. They were, at the outset, burning to inspire by their conduct their liberated countrymen and to show what Russians could achieve when properly disciplined and led. Their immediate objective was the village and chateau of Courcy and the portion of the Aisne-Marne Canal south of Brimont Hill. A few minutes to 6 a.m. the first wave, preceded by an ever-advancing barrage, moved forward. Rockets at once went up from the German lines, and the German artillery, in answer to the signalling, opened fire. So impetuous, however, was the charge that the enemy's shells fell behind instead of in front of Lochwitsky's men, obscured, as they were, by the heavy mist. A second wave of Russians was not so fortunate and had to make its way through the German barrage. Losing heavily, it swept onward and reinforced the first, which was carrying the German first and second line trenches. The mist lifted and the sun began to shine. Through their glasses the Russian officers in the background perceived


that Courcy and its chateau were being attacked. All day the struggle for these important points, and on the left for the banks of the canal, proceeded. By nightfall the Russians had overpowered the enemy and Courcy and its chateau were firmly held. But the German artillery on the Brimont, Fresnes and Nogent l'Abbesse Hills prevented any important gains being won by the French in this sector.

In the course of the battle of the 16th some 11,000 German prisoners had been taken, together with much war material of every description.

On Tuesday, April 17, the day also of the opening of the Battle of Moronvilliers, the weather became still more atrocious. The wind blew in violent gusts; it rained in torrents and even snowed. Nevertheless at 5.30 p.m. in a snowstorm French infantry and Senegalese on the heights above the Aisne assaulted the Grinons. The summit was taken. It was recovered by the enemy. A second assault was delivered and it was finally captured. With the Grinons and Mt. Sapin in French hands the German garrison in Chavonne below was



EMPTY SHELLS OF 75mm. GUNS FIRED BY RUSSIAN ARTILLERYMEN AT THE BATTLE OF COURCY.



RUSSIANS EXPLORING CAPTURED GERMAN POSITIONS AT COURCY.

doomed. So was the enemy hidden in the caves beneath La Cour de Soupir. At 5.30 p.m. the French re-entered the Bois des Gouttes d'Or, reached the plateau north of it and advanced on the summit of the Chavonne spur to the Croix-sans-Tête. Elsewhere the French were content on the 17th to remain on the defensive. They repulsed heavy counter-attacks against their new positions on the hog's back—notably at Hurtebise Farm, in the Ville-aux-Bois region, and between Loivre and Courcy. The Russians near Courcy rendered a good account of themselves. Away to the east General Anthoine's army at points reached the southern crest of the Moronvilliers ridge and began to isolate Auberive-sur-Suippe.

In the night of the 17th-18th and on the day of the 18th the offensive was again resumed on a great scale. Between Laffaux and Margival the French infantry—covered on the south by divisional cavalry—broke through the German lines, crossed the Vregny plateau, descended into the ravine to its west, climbed up the slopes of the Chivres plateau and stormed Nanteuil-la-Fosse. Simultaneously the salient between Missy-sur-Aisne and Vailly was assaulted by a corps which had fought in the Battles of the Marne, Yser, Verdun and the Somme. The Aisne was crossed near Celles and south of Vailly. The columns on the left having effected their passage moved eastward along the north bank



of the river; those on the right entered the southern suburb of Vailly, where they were met by their comrades. After sharp fighting Vailly was entered and two Saxon regiments retreating up the spur were overtaken near the Rouge Maison Farm on its edge and forced to surrender. This brilliant feat had been facilitated by the capture of Chavonne during the preceding night, and by the descent on the morning of the 18th of the troops on the summit of the Chavonne spur to Ostel. That

village was taken and the garrison driven up to the Chemin-des-Dames plateau.

Meanwhile the enemy had been expelled from the Metz Farm and from Bray-en-Laonnois; and, further, the plateau above Bray-en-Laonnois and the northern side of it up to the edge of Courtecon had been gained. On the night of the 17th-18th the Germans in Chivy had all been killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. Some 19 guns, including five howitzers, had been captured. The surprise of the

it was perhaps not unnatural that a panic should have set in here among the Germans.

On the west the Vregny spur had been secured by the French, and also the narrow Chivres spur beyond it. On the east our Allies were at Ostel on the edge of the wide spur behind Vailly, and the plateau of the Chemin-des-Dames from above Bray-en-Laonnois to above Troyon was in their possession. A German attack in the region of Courtecon was stopped dead by machine-gun



GERMANS CAPTURED BY THE RUSSIANS AT COURCY.

enemy, who had believed that his positions were impregnable or could only be reduced after weeks of fighting, was complete. On the plateau of the Chavonne spur and in Ostel, guns and howitzers had been abandoned, and their horses and trains had been killed or destroyed by the French artillery. In or near Vailly tables were found spread with unconsumed food; important documents, letters just received and classified for distribution, and others about to be sent off were discovered. Confusion reigned everywhere. Officers and men had abandoned their posts without warning the neighbouring garrisons. Considering the rapidity of the unexpected French advance,

fire, and a very violent assault from the Ailette Valley on the Vauciere plateau at 6 p.m. was bloodily repulsed. From Nanteuil-la-Fosse to Ostel is but a distance of five miles. The Germans defending the Fort de Condé spur, the Vailly spur, and the spur between them were in danger of being surrounded. On the evening of April 18 the French were already well north of Ostel and Vailly.

On the front from Craonne to Bétheny also there had been stubborn fighting. In the night of the 17th-18th a French detachment had set out to turn Ville-aux-Bois by the south-east and two battalions completed the encirclement of the position. Soon after


6 a.m. on the 18th the village was attacked, and by 8 a.m. it and the Bois des Boches were captured. Later in the morning the French reached the Reims-Laon chaussée.

In the three days' struggle 1,500 prisoners, including 34 officers, 6 guns, 15 bomb-throwers 50 mitrailleuses, and immense material of war had been taken by the French 31st Regiment. That regiment well deserved the appellation of a "regiment of élite, of the highest offensive power," subsequently bestowed on it in an Order of the Day.

The loss of the Bois des Buttes, the Bois des Boches, and Ville-aux-Bois, coupled with the penetration of the enemy's first and second lines south of Juvincourt caused the German Crown Prince to undertake a powerful counter-offensive between Juvincourt and the Aisne. About 4.30 p.m. two whole divisions were flung against the French lines south of Juvincourt. The attack was a complete failure. The advancing battalions were mowed down by barrage and machine-gun fire. At no point were the French positions reached. South of the Aisne in the course of the day the Russians east of Courcy captured a strong point and took some prisoners.

The next day, Thursday, April 19, the French continued their successful operations against the western and eastern faces of the salient which, till the day before, had protruded south of the Aisne. The village of


Laffaux was at last captured, while Fort de Condé, wrecked by the French shells, was with its guns and casemates blown up by its garrison, which endeavoured to effect a tardy escape up the spur to Sancy. Pursued by



THE ATTACK ON VILLE-AUX-BOIS.

a hail of shells from the "75s" very few Germans arrived there safe and sound.

At last the valley of the Aisne from its junction with the Oise eastwards to Berry-au-Bac was relieved of the presence of the enemy with the exception of a detachment surrounded near Celles-sur-Aisne. The Germans were in full retreat to the Chemin-des-Dames plateau north-west of Ostel. In hot pursuit the French during the day occupied Aizy and Jouy—between Sancy and Ostel—situated in the ravine south of the



GENERAL PALITZIN REVIEWING RUSSIAN TROOPS AFTER THE BATTLE OF COURCY.

western end of the plateau. Near Hurtebise Farm, 500 prisoners and two 4-in. guns were captured the same day. In the region of Berméricourt some progress was made in the direction of the ground north of the Brimont heights.

On April 20 the French progressed slowly



CHURCH OF ST. ANDRÉ, REIMS.
Wrecked by German Artillery Fire.

in the region of Laffaux, and also on the Vauclerc plateau, capturing some prisoners. To the east of Loivre a well-executed operation enabled them to gain ground and to take 250 prisoners. South-east of Courcy several trenches were carried by bombing parties. North of the Aisne later in the day Sancy was occupied. At 6 p.m., after a very violent bombardment, many columns of the enemy attacked the French on the plateau between Troyon and Craonne. The attack, shattered by artillery and machine-gun fire, was completely repulsed.

Up to April 20* the two French armies engaged in the battle of Craonne-Reims had captured between them 16,495 prisoners. The following are the statistics of the prisoners taken by the three French armies between April 16 and 20, with particulars of the enemy divisions concerned:

One army took 11,965 prisoners, belonging to 19 different divisions or a front of a few kilometres. The German divisions that suffered the most severely were the Ninth Bavarian Reserve Division with 2,383 prisoners, the Twenty-first with 2,319 prisoners, and the Fifth with 1,929 prisoners, while the Forty-third Reserve Division lost 1,374 prisoners.

As for the regiments, the Fourteenth Bavarian Reserve Regiment lost 985 prisoners, the Third Regiment of the Bavarian Ersatz Reserve lost 979 prisoners, the Eighteenth Regiment of the Twenty-first Division 972 prisoners, and the Tenth Bavarian Reserve Regiment 831 prisoners.

Taking the figures of another French army on the same front and between the same dates, we find that it captured 5,430 prisoners, including 94 officers. These prisoners were composed as follows: The 19th Reserve Division, 925 men and 13 officers; the 16th, 1,111 men and 23 officers; the 183rd Division, 2,100 men and 39 officers; the 25th Landwehr Division, 516 men and eight officers; the 222nd Division, 339 men and four officers; the 45th Reserve Division, 187 men and one officer; various divisions, 158 men and six officers, including 42 prisoners from the 1st and 3rd Divisions of the Guard.

The prisoners from the Sixteenth Reserve Division consisted of 358 men and six officers of the Sixty-eighth Regiment, 722 men and 17 officers of the Twenty-ninth Regiment, and 31 men of the Thirtieth Regiment. The prisoners of the 183rd Division consisted of 967 men and 20 officers of the 184th Regiment, 621 men and 13 officers of the 418th Regiment, and 512 men and six officers of the 440th Regiment.




INTERIOR OF CHURCH OF ST. ANDRÉ
Showing the Crucifix still standing.

A third army took 3,197 prisoners, 202 from the 113th Infantry, 481 from the 105th, 205 from the 106th, 361 from the Fiftieth Reserve, 352 from the 358th Infantry, 211 from the 363rd, 174 from the Eighth, and about a thousand from eight other regiments.

The French *communiqué* of April 20 claimed 19,000 prisoners. In point of fact 20,000 would have been an under-estimate, since various isolated sections captured of men belonging to special arms are not included in the foregoing figures.*

On Saturday, April 21, the weather improved and the sun shone on the battlefield. From Sancy the French progressed to the neck of the Fort de Condé spur, where it branches down

* *Morning Post* of May 9.



ON THE CHEMIN-DES-DAMES: FRENCH TROOPS ORGANIZING A CAPTURED TRENCH.

from the Chemin-des-Dames plateau. Four attempts of the enemy to advance from his trenches north of Braye-en-Laonnois were foiled by the French artillery. Ground was gained by our Allies in the Hurtebise sector, also south of Juvincourt and near Courcy.

At this date the Kaiser despatched to the Crown Prince the following telegram, which betrays the anxiety felt by the German Higher Command, and which, as usual, is a complete travesty of fact:

The troops of all the German peoples under your command, with steel-hard determination and strongly led, have brought to failure the great French attempt to break through on the Aisne and in Champagne. There the infantry again had to bear the brunt and, thanks to the indefatigable assistance of the artillery and other arms, has accomplished great things in death-defying perseverance and irresistible attack. Convey my and the Fatherland's thanks to the leaders and men.

The battle on the Aisne and in Champagne is not yet over, but all who fight and bleed there will know that the whole of Germany will remember their deeds, and is at one with them to carry through the fight for existence to a victorious end. God grant it.

During the next few days the French were busily engaged in consolidating their positions, constructing narrow-gauge light railways, and bringing their heavy artillery nearer to the Chemin-des-Dames ridge. The weather impeded the operations, but some gains were made north of Sancy and south of Juvincourt. Almost ceaseless artillery duels, accompanied by combats in the air and expeditions of bombing aircraft, proved that the battle was not yet over. On Reims continued to descend a pitiless rain of shells, the object of which could be only due to a devilish spirit of destruction. German attacks north of Vauxaillon, in the Hurtebise region, and on the Vaclerc plateau on the 25th were repulsed with heavy loss.

These attacks were renewed in the evening when on a front of a mile and a quarter west of Cerny two charges were beaten off. A German offensive between Reims and the left of General Anthoine's army in the region of La Pompelle effected nothing.

On Saturday, April 28, General Nivelle published, as it were, his balance sheet. Since April 16 the French between the Ailette and the Suippe had captured 20,780 prisoners, 175 heavy guns and field guns, 119 trench mortars and 412 machine guns. Satisfactory as these results were, they did not, however, fulfil the expectations of the French Ministry. The losses entailed seemed disproportionate to the achievements. The Germans had, it is true, been driven from the banks of the Aisne between Missy-sur-Aisne and Soupir, and the French had expelled them from the spurs running down to the river from the Chemin-des-Dames plateau, sections of which plateau had been stormed. Nevertheless, the enemy still retained the western and eastern ends and the village of Craonne. In the plain below, the Bois des Buttes, Ville-aux-Bois, and the Bois des Boches had been carried, but the French had been repulsed between Craonne and Ville-aux-Bois. From Ville-aux-Bois to the Aisne they had broken through the first and second lines of the enemy and were south of Juvincourt, but south of the Aisne they had been unable to turn from the north the Brimont heights. Finally, though General Anthoine's army had stormed Auberive and eaten into the German defences of the Moronvilliers height, the Germans had not as yet been dislodged from the dominating summits. Moreover, the "Tanks," on which great hopes had

been built, had not proved a complete success.

Since August, 1914, our Ally had had to bear the greater part of the fighting on the western front, and a large portion of her army had been diverted to Salonika. The drain on the man-power of the nation, the population of which before the war had been slightly diminishing, had been enormous. Events in Russia pointed to the probability that the Teutonic Powers would be able to concentrate by far the greater bulk of their forces in France and on the Italian frontier. Until the American armies arrived on French soil, the French and the British would have to bear the brunt of the enemy's desperate efforts to gain a favourable decision, but once these came on the field the result would be certain. Time was therefore on the side of the Allies. The economic condition of France had, also, to be considered. After her heavy losses, and with her industries in the north and east ruined she would require on the conclusion of peace to have as many sound wealth-producers as possible. To use up man-power in pitched battles seemed undesirable now that Russia for some time would exercise no serious pressure on Germany and Austria-Hungary. To inflict an immediate "knock-out" blow was hardly to be regarded

as possible. For Hindenburg had still in France 10 intact divisions of his strategic reserve and, with over 6,000,000 German troops at his disposal, it was improbable that the Allies could in 1917 break through the mesh of fortifications between the North Sea and Switzerland.

For these reasons it seemed more politic to the French Government to adopt less rigorous methods and to revert to Joffre's plan of "nibbling" the enemy. The British, after the Battle of Loos, had adopted the plan of wearing down the Germans by gaining victories with limited objectives, and this was thought on the whole to be, for a time at any rate, the sounder method to employ.

The chief advocate in France of this strategy was General Pétain. On the evening of April 28 M. Ribot, the Premier, had a long conversation with General Nivelle, and the next day it was announced that "on the proposition of the Minister of War the Council of Ministers had decided to re-establish the post of 'Chef d'état-major general de l'armée au Ministère de la guerre' and to confide it to General Pétain. He only held the post to May 13, when he was superseded by Foch and reverted once more to the general command on the north-western frontier, where Nivelle still controlled a group



[French official photograph.]

FRENCH MACHINE GUNNERS REORGANIZING A CAPTURED POSITION.



GENERALS PÉTAIN (left), NIVELLE (centre), and ANTHOINE (right).

of forces. The duties of the Chief of the Great General Staff were defined as follows. He was to act in the capacity of technical adviser of the Minister of War on the general conduct of the war and the cooperation of the Allied armies; on the general plans of operation drawn up by the Commanders-in-Chief, who were to be entrusted with their execution; on programmes of construction, material, artillery, railways, aviation, etc.; on the distribution of the country's resources in manpower and material between the different theatres of operation; on the use of transport as regards the movement of troops and war material; and, in general, on all questions submitted to his examination by the Minister of War. He was the central authority for questions affecting general officers; he had authority over military missions and French Military Attachés abroad.*

General Pétain was born on April 26 of 1856 at Couchy-la-Tour in the Pas-de-Calais. Unlike Joffre, he had taken no part in the war


of 1870-1. He belonged to a generation which associated the name of Napoleon with Leipzig, Waterloo, and Sedan. Educated at the College of Saint Cyr and the "Ecole de guerre," he had entered the Chasseurs Alpins. Service in this special corps naturally develops initiative. Having served on the staff of the 15th Corps and under the military governor of Paris, he resumed his duties with the chasseurs, where he met the future General Gouraud, "the lion of the Argonne," a man much younger than himself.

In 1902 Pétain was appointed a professor at the "Ecole normale de tir" of the Camp of Châlons. While there he had ample opportunities of studying the terrain of the Aisne Valley and the Champagne Pouilleuse. In 1902 the French authorities favoured the theory that rapidity of movement was more important than superiority in fire tactics. Against this theory Pétain raised his voice. He insisted on the preponderating part which would be played by guns and rifles in the battles of the future. The authorities looked askance at an officer, who, without experience in the field,

* Foreign military missions in France had a representative on the General Staff of the Army.

ventured to dissent from the current doctrine. He had to leave Châlons, but soon afterwards he became supplementary professor in the infantry course of studies at the "Ecole de guerre," then superintended by General Bouval,

At the "Ecole de guerre" Pétain soon won distinction. He did not treat war as an occult science, and he regarded military in the same way that practical engineers regard mechanical problems. His lectures on the Battle of



GENERAL PÉTAÏN.

a devoted student of Napoleonic strategy. General Lanrezac—the commander at the Battle of Charleroi in August, 1914—was then director of military studies. Foch—then a colonel—was teaching tactics, and Fayolle, then a commandant, lectured on artillery. Fayolle, whose exploits at the Battle of the Somme will be remembered, in May 1917 succeeded Pétain in the command of the central group of armies.

Auerstedt, the victory over the Prussians won by Davout, the ablest of Napoleon's marshals, on the day of Jena, drew attention to him.* On quitting the "Ecole de guerre" he was

*That Napoleon thought very highly of Davout is shown not only by his detachment on the right of the French Army on this occasion, but also by the fact that in 1809 he commanded the French left near Ratisbon, that he commanded the containing force in Prussia in 1810-11 and the large force under him in 1812 when invading Russia. In 1815 he was Minister of War.



FRENCH TROOPS ADVANCING IN EXTENDED ORDER.

entrusted with the command of the 33rd Regiment, stationed at Arras. In 1914 Pétain was still a colonel and about to be put on half-pay: but he was saved from this by the outbreak of hostilities and was destined to turn his knowledge of the locality to account in the battles in Artois.


It was at the Battle of Charleroi that he first saw fire. With his brigade he held back von Haussen's troops, who had crossed the Meuse at Dinant and were threatening the right and rear of Lanrezac's army battling on the Sambre with the army of von Bülow. At the end of August Pétain was entrusted with the command of the 6th Division, which had suffered heavily in the Battles of Charleroi and Guise. He restored its *moral*, and at the Battle of the Marne he handled this division with great skill, putting into practice his theory that fire was all-important and, when his troops hesitated to advance, placing himself at their head. In the Battle of the Aisne it was he who preserved the bridge-head of Le Godat on the Aisne-Marne canal during the counter-offensive of the enemy. On October 20, 1914, he succeeded General D'Urbal in the command of the 33rd Corps deployed from the west of the ridge of Notre Dame de Lorette to Arras. During the winter of 1914-15 and the spring of 1915 he prepared for the Battle of Artois, teaching his

officers that it was "artillery which gained positions, and infantry which occupied and kept them." While on May 9, 1915, the French, like the British offensive on the same day, was generally a failure, Pétain's corps broke into the enemy's lines, took Carency, and captured 10,000 prisoners. This was the first great French success in the trench warfare stage of the war.

Joffre at once recognized Pétain's great talents and confided to him the command of the 2nd Army and the preparations for the impending Battle of the Champagne Pouilleuse. It was thanks to Pétain's minute attention to detail that the French in September-October, 1915, were able to advance between the Snippe and the Argonne.

Thus far Pétain's talents had been tested as an organizer of victory. On February 25, 1916, when it seemed that the German Crown Prince was almost certain to capture Verdun, Pétain was suddenly summoned to save the situation. In earlier chapters the dramatic tale has been told of the way in which Pétain snatched victory from the Crown Prince's grasp. On May 1, 1916, when he handed over his command to General Nivelle and took that of the central group of armies, the enemy's first offensive had failed. In 1917, as commander of the central group of armies, he had superintended the

preparations of General Anthoine for the Battle of Moronvilliers. With his experience of practical warfare which he had had in this great war, the silent, reflecting soldier of sixty-two years of age seemed to personify the New Tactics. A renewal of the battle on the scale



CRAONNE AND THE EASTERN END OF THE CHEMIN-DES-DAMES.


of that of April 16, 17 and 18 was therefore not to be expected. The aim of Pétain was to finish it by enlarging and securing the positions already captured.

On April 30 the Battle of Moronvilliers was renewed with success, and on Friday, May 4,

the French south of the Aisne attacked between Berry-au-Bac and the Brimont heights, and north of the Aisne stormed Craonne. In the former sector two and a half miles of the enemy's first-line trenches was carried. A couple of fresh divisions of the enemy counter-attacked from the direction of Condé-sur-Suippe, where the Suippe joins the Aisne, and from Aguilcourt, also on the Suippe, to the east. They were met with a terrific fire and driven back, leaving 700 prisoners in the hands of the French. Meanwhile two companies of the latter followed their barrage into the ruins of Craonne, and debouching from them ascended the steep cliff which marks the eastern end of the Chemin-des-Dames plateau. In face of machine-gun fire from the caves hollowed out by the Germans they reached the edge of the California plateau. Under heavy shell fire they maintained themselves there till nightfall, and during the night prepared to take part in the attack to be delivered the next day between Vauxaillon and Craonne.

At dawn (Saturday, May 5) after a tremendous bombardment the attack was delivered. East of Vauxaillon our Allies drove the enemy from his positions on Hill 157, and thence to the Mill of Laffaux.

This position and its environs had by now become the point of the German salient south of the Ailette. If the French succeeded in



THE VILLAGE OF CRAONNE BEFORE THE BOMBARDMENT.



CRAONNELLE.

carrying the enemy's lines in front of and to the north and east of the Mill, they would be able to turn the Chemin-des-Dames plateau and Fort de Malmaison from the west.

Naturally the German engineers had bestowed particular attention on the defence of this important bastion in their front. Three lines of trenches had been constructed. The mill at the cross roads, strongly fortified, was behind the one nearest to the French, being called by them the Trenchée du Rouge-Gorge, Trenchée du Mole, Trenchée du Mousse, Trenchée de la Rade. Communication trenches, known as the Ibis, Lorient, Cheval, ran upwards to the second line, which embraced the Fruty quarries a thousand yards or so east of the Mill on the edge of the chaussée to Laon. These quarries contained a numerous garrison, out of reach of the fire of the French guns, the hollowed rock providing admirable cover. Further back a third trench, attached to the centre one by several communication trenches, covered Hill 170 and the similar quarries at the head of the ravine in which lay the village of Allemant and the Wood and Château de la Motte above the western side of the village. The whole of the fortified zone had been sown with concrete "pill-boxes" and pitted with deep dug-outs. It was certain that the Germans would put up a desperate

resistance, and that the region, if captured, would at once become a target for the hundreds of guns on the western end of the Chemin-des-Dames and beyond it in the valley of the Ailette.

The assault was entrusted to a body of troops of élite. The 4th, 9th and 11th regiments of dismounted Cuirassiers, composed of young, robust and energetic men, chiefly recruited from districts invaded by the enemy, had been temporarily united and formed into a provisional division. They were supported by a detachment of Tanks. On May 5, at 4.45 a.m., the Cuirassiers went over the parapet and followed the barrage, which enveloped the plateau before them in clouds of thick smoke. Meillon's battalion of the 4th was on the left, Vaucresson's battalion of the 9th in the centre, and Duthu's battalion of the 11th Cuirassiers on the right. Vaucresson's battalion and the Tanks were to storm the Mill and the Allemant quarries, the ultimate objectives of Meillon's and Duthu's battalions were respectively the Wood and Château de la Motte and Hill 170.

The Tanks of the troops under Commandant carried the Rouge-Gorge trench, north of Hill, but were delayed by machine-gun fire and bombers in the communication trenches leading to the second

trench, and it was not till 10 a.m. that the Cuirassiers on the left were ready to attack the last obstacles between them and the Wood and Château de la Motte. Meanwhile, round the Mill of Laffaux a desperate struggle had gone on. With the aid of the Tanks the Mill was at last taken and Vaucresson's battalion attacked and took the second trench. As soon as the Tanks appeared, the German anti-tank guns concentrated their fire on them while machine-guns vainly endeavoured to pierce their sides by pouring jets of bullets at the same spot. Struck by a shell, one Tank burst into flames. Its crew managed in time to open the door, and joined the Cuirassiers. To the right of Vaucresson's battalion the Germans in the Mousse trench held up for long a squadron of the 11th; another squadron with grenades reduced the Fruty quarries.

By 10 a.m. the greater part of the central trench, from the Fruty quarries to the west of the Château de la Motte, was in the possession of our Allies. Reinforcements hurried up, helping to reduce isolated strong points, but the Rade trench on the extreme right continued to resist the French.

About 11 a.m. a further advance was made. The third trench was stormed and a detachment of Meillon's battalion entered the Wood and surrounded the Château de la Motte. A

German company with its officers was captured, but Commandant Meillon, gallantly leading his men to the assault, was killed. In the centre Vaucresson's battalion and the Tanks, elated by their successes, moved on the Allemant quarries. The third trench was passed, but the garrison, supported by the troops in the ravine, were not dislodged from their rocky refuges. Nor was Duthu's battalion, advancing from the Fruty quarries, able to seize Hill 170. Its flanks were exposed to the machine-guns in the Rade trench and on the western end of the Chemin-des-Dames ridge.

Meanwhile other French troops from Nan-teuil-la-Fosse had climbed up to the plateau east of the Mill, and from Sancy they pushed along the summit of the Fort de Condé spur towards its junction south-west of Fort de Malmaison with the Chemin-des-Dames plateau. Further east the hog's back was cleared of the enemy from above Froid-mont Farm to the La Creute quarries above Braye-en-Laonnois. Between Cerny and Craonne the remainder of the plateau was carried, though the Germans still retained a hold on the summit of the spur above Cerny. In one of the enemy's tunnels the corpses of 350 Prussian Guards were discovered, who had probably lost their lives from gas shells.



GERMAN GUNS ABANDONED AT CRAONNE.


On Sunday, May 6, the French moved out from Craonne and gained the village of Chevreux to its north-east.

North of Braye-en-Laonnois some progress was also made, and at 4 p.m., after elaborate artillery preparation, the Cuirassiers in front of Laffaux Mill and the division on their right north of Nanteuil-la-Fosse again attacked. On the left a squadron of the 4th Cuirassiers stormed the Château de la Motte, and details of the 9th Cuirassiers entered the Allemant quarries and commenced to clear the enemy out of them. But the division on the right not having reached its objectives, forced the Cuirassiers to halt. Under a terrific shell fire they dug themselves in. It was decided at nightfall to evacuate the Château and quarries, as the French troops there were too isolated. During the night several violent counter-attacks were repulsed, and the French retained hold of the Mill of Laffaux and the heights beyond it; but Hill 170 remained in German hands.

Over 6,000 prisoners (including some 150 officers) and 7 guns had been taken in the operations of May 4, 5, and 6.

The capture of the Mill of Laffaux and the centre and eastern end of the Chemin-des-Dames ridge was an important step towards turning the Hindenburg line at its southern extremity. The seizure of Craonne, Chevreux, the Bois des Buttes, Ville aux Bois and the Bois des Boches opened a way to the Plain of Laon, while south of the Aisne the storming of Loivre and the German positions north of that village had jeopardized the enemy's hold on the position of Brimont, threatened from the south by the Russian advance to Courcy. Taken in conjunction with the contemporary victories of Moronvilliers and Vimy-Arras, the Battle of Craonne-Reims, though it did not fulfil the expectations of the French public, was a great defeat for the Germans. To understand its significance we must try to place ourselves in the position of the Germans in April, 1917.

In the preceding year, at a vast expense of men and munitions, Falkenhayn had vainly endeavoured to take Verdun. One by one the gains of the Germans at the Battle of Verdun had been torn from their grasp; and at the Battle of the Somme the invaders of France had been expelled from their elaborate entrenchments. So far from recovering the lost ground, when Hindenburg had succeeded Falkenhayn,



TUNNEL CONTAINING THE BODIES OF 350 PRUSSIAN GUARDSMEN.

they had been obliged in March 1917 to evacuate a large slice of the French territory held by them since the autumn of 1914. The victor of Tannenberg, it was alleged, had two aims in view. One was to delay the Allied offensive until the submarine campaign had brought Great Britain to her knees and removed all danger of the United States throwing its weight into the scale against Germany. The other alleged aim was to force the Allies to engage in manoeuvre battles, when the superior leading of the German armies would be certain to secure victory for the Teutonic cause. The well-known German military writer, Major Moraht, told the readers of the *Berliner Tageblatt* that three months would be needed by the Anglo-French before they could commence an offensive. Almost at the moment when he was writing the guns of the French were opening the Battle of Craonne-Reims, those of the British were executing the preliminary preparation which ushered in the Battle of Vimy-Arras. On April 9 the British assaulted the Vimy ridge and the heights east of Arras; on the 16th the French, as related in the present chapter, began their great offensive between Vauxaillon

and Reims, and the next day their offensive on both banks of the Suippe.

Considering the hold which the Kaiser's Government had over the German Press, it is obvious that both battles were much of a surprise to the German leaders. Otherwise they would, doubtless, have prepared the public mind for the coming battles. The first of the alleged aims was in all probability to a certain extent one of Hindenburg's. It had, however, been baffled by Nivelle and Haig, who, instead of concentrating all their reserves of men and artillery on the Somme, had before April prepared for battles on the Aisne and Scarpe. That Hindenburg expected the submarine campaign of the Germans to be overwhelmingly successful before the Allies resumed their offensive is another question. So sagacious a calculator is not likely to have been so grotesquely out of his reckoning.

The retreat of Hindenburg had not appreciably delayed the Allied offensive. Had it resulted in manœuvre battles ending in German victories? To this question no German who had taken part in the Battles of Craonne-Reims, Moronvilliers or Vimy-Arras, could reply in the affirmative. The best that could be said by the German directors of public opinion was that the Allies had not broken through the German lines. On May 22, 1917, the Kaiser himself, "near Arras"—or, rather, "near Douai," or "near Cambrai"—was reported by the *Cologne Gazette* to have delivered the following speech to his soldiers:—

Our adversary has now attempted to execute his intention, prepared with enormous resources during the whole winter, on the basis of his experiences in the Somme battle, finally this spring to break the German resistance along the whole line. A supply of munitions hitherto unknown in the history of warfare inaugurated the battle.

One can well imagine that in the case of our French adversaries the hope of delivering their country from the victorious enemy, who forced his way into it in justified self-defence, has spurred them to the utmost sacrifice—a motive which a noble adversary will in every way recognise.

The Englishman, on the other hand, has no such motive. He is merely fighting, stubborn and tenacious as he is, to increase his might at our expense.

We stand firm, faithful to our task and to the fulfilment of our duty. There is no doubt on which side lies the right. Therefore this conflict has become a holy conflict. For this cause those at home, whence I come to you, the whole people stand unanimous together to contribute to you every help, so long as the conflict lasts.

How long that may be lies in God's hand; it is not our business to ask questions about it. We must do our duty, and leave the rest to Him.

I come to-day to express to you, in the name of our

people, my thanks, my admiring thanks, the thanks of the people at home, for your heroism in tough resistance so long as it may be necessary. We at home are ready to share every danger and privation with you. It is not the Prussian or the German way to praise oneself. You know what you have accomplished, and I tell you that I thank you for it.

So I leave you once more at the front. It is now a matter of holding out, however long it lasts.

Meanwhile your comrades on the sea are making it their business to cut to pieces, bit by bit, the vital arteries of the enemy, who conceived the base plan of delivering up a whole nation, our women and children, to starvation.

On April 15 the French held a small post on the Chemin-des-Dames Ridge; the Germans a considerable section of the southern bank of the Aisne between Soissons and Berry-au-Bac. Three weeks later most of the Chemin-des-Dames hog's back was in the possession of the French, and the Germans were nowhere near the Aisne to the west of Berry-au-Bac. Moreover, there was not a single point from the region of Vauxaillon to Béthény where the Germans during the same period had made the slightest advance.

It was therefore patent that manœuvring battles, culminating in German successes, had not been the immediate outcome of Hindenburg's strategy. It might be argued, however, that the shortness of the front of battle in the Moronvilliers and Vimy-Arras struggles had not given the German leader any such opportunity. This argument, it was clear, had no validity when applied to the Battle of Craonne-Reims. Holding, as he did, the ridges from the east of Vauxaillon to Craonne, possessed of a wide bridgehead on the Aisne between Soissons and Berry-au-Bac, with all the heights from Fort Brimont to the Suippe at Auberive in his possession, the German Crown Prince had excellent opportunities of attacking Nivelle on the very long and tortuous line of battle. One French army was fighting with its back to the unfordable Aisne. Before it could consolidate its position it might surely have been driven back across the river and attacked from the German salient on the south bank. The hollowness of the story that Hindenburg was preparing by his retreat for manœuvre battles was strikingly exhibited by the Battle of Craonne-Reims, and is further shown by the fact that all the time the Germans were engaged in constructing further defensive works in readiness to receive in a defensive attitude the further attacks of the Allies.



CHAPTER CCX.

THE AISNE BATTLES : MORON-VILLIERS, APRIL-MAY, 1917.

THE BATTLE OF APRIL 16—THE FRENCH OBJECTIVES—THE GERMAN TRENCH SYSTEM—GENERAL ANTHOINE—HIS FORCES—DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGHTING—RESULTS OBTAINED APRIL 16-30—NEW FRENCH OFFENSIVE OF MAY 20—THE MONT CORNILLET TUNNEL—FRENCH MAN-POWER AND POLITICS—GERMAN COUNTER-ATTACKS—FAILURE OF THE CROWN PRINCE—GERMAN BRAVADO AND GERMAN MORAL.

As mentioned in the last chapter, twenty-four hours or so after the opening of the Battle of Craonne-Reims, on April 16, 1917, another battle began on both sides of the Suippe at Auberive.

Immediately west of the Suippe was a group of hills which before the war were densely wooded. They were called by the French the Moronvilliers *massif*,* from the village of that name in the hollow below the northern crest of the main ridge. The position, against which General Nivelle instructed General Pétain to throw, on April 17, 1917, the army commanded by General Anthoine, consisted of an outlying peak, the Mont Sans Nom or Nameless Hill, some 700 ft. high, divided by a wide hollow from a long ridge to its north-west, the loftiest spot on which, the western summit of Mont Haut, was 140 ft. higher than the Mont Sans Nom.


Between the extreme right of the French at the Battle of Craonne-Reims and the extreme left of Anthoine's army lay, west of the ridge, a considerable tract of low-lying land forming a basin some seven miles wide between the Moronvilliers *massif* and the Nogent l'Abbesse *massif*, east of Reims. From the latter the

Germans were bombarding the city. In this intermediate basin lies the village of Beine, whence a road runs eastwards to Nauroy, and from Nauroy is continued through Moronvilliers to St. Martin l'Heureux on the Suippe.


The Moronvilliers *massif* lies south of the Nauroy-St. Martin l'Heureux road. Its eastern slopes reach almost to the banks of the Suippe between St. Martin-l'Heureux and Auberive; its southern slopes south of the Reims-St. Hilaire le Grand-St. Ménéhould-Verdun chaussée descend and die away into the Plain of Châlons. Since Mont Haut, the topmost point of the *massif*, is only about 30 ft. lower than Vigie de Berru (870 ft.), the highest of the hills overlooking Reims from the east, the French, if they secured Mont Sans Nom and the Moronvilliers ridge, would have taken a long step towards reducing the German works in the Beine basin and on the eminences of the Nogent l'Abbesse *massif*. The fall of these would probably entail for the enemy the loss of both the Fresne and Brimont heights, which on April 16 had been approached from the west and south by French and Russian troops. If Fort Brimont were carried, the hold of the enemy on the plain south of the Aisne from Berméricourt north-westwards to the mouth of the Suippe would become precarious.

The reduction of the huge fortress con-


* *Massif* is the term which the French apply to a group of hills forming a connected feature of ground.
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PLAN OF THE CORNILLET TUNNELS.



SECTION SHOWING VENTILATING SHAFT.



CROSS SECTION.

structed by the Germans on the edge of the Châlons Plain above Aubérive was, therefore, a preliminary to an advance into the Beine basin and, later, the assault from the east of the Nogent l'Abbesse *massif*. Assuming that the operation was successful, there would be other courses of action open to Generals Nivelle and Pétain. Marching down the northern slopes, Anthoine's army would be able to move

on the Suippe between St. Martin l'Heureux and Warmeriville to its north-west, turn the Nogent l'Abbesse *massif* from the north and cut the important Bazancourt-Warmeriville, Somme-Py-Apremont railway, the main railroad south of the Aisne behind the German lines from Aubérive to and across the Argonne. This railway, it will be remembered, had been threatened, but not reached, by General Pétain's armies in the Battle of the Champagne-Pouilleuse (Sept., 1915). Doubtless, owing to the creation of new railroads, it was in April, 1917, of diminished value to the enemy, but the seizure by the French of any large section of it would greatly embarrass the Crown Prince's forces east of the Suippe and west of the Upper Aisne.

When, moreover, Mont Cornillet, Mont Blond, Mont Haut, Mont Perthois, and Le Casque with the two eastern summits—Le Téton and, south of it, Mont Sans Nom—had passed into French hands, the German lines from the Suippe to the Argonne would be turned on the west. The reader who refers to Vol. VI., p. 333, will see that at the Battle of the Champagne-Pouilleuse the German artillery on the Moronvilliers heights had held up the extreme left of Pétain's forces. The capture of the Moronvilliers heights would, therefore, enable a second battle of the Champagne-Pouilleuse to be fought with the chances greatly in favour of the French.

From another standpoint the hill fortress which General Anthoine was about to attack was of the utmost importance. It looked down on the vast plain of Châlons, and from the summits of the hills the Germans had an uninterrupted view of most of the movements of the French between Reims and the Argonne. If Hindenburg still contemplated an offensive, it might well be launched from the direction Nogent l'Abbesse and Moronvilliers. The natural obstacles in his way would there be less than at almost any other point in the Western Theatre of War.

The operation for which Pétain and Anthoine had been long preparing promised good results; for, if successful, a natural barrier would be placed between the Germans and the Châlons Plain.

Apart from its strategic potentialities the battle of Moronvilliers deserves to be treated in very considerable detail. It was the last of the battles directed by Pétain before he became Generalissimo, and from it can be learnt

his conception of the appropriate tactics for worsting the Germans. It is also instructive to compare the map on p. 76 of the German positions assaulted with that on pp. 340 and 341 of Vol. VI., which shows the enemy's front in the battle of the Champagne-Pouilleuse. It will be noted how much more complicated were the German entrenchments in April, 1917, than they were in September, 1915. At the earlier date the enemy considered two lines a sufficient defence for a position by nature much weaker than the Moronvilliers

possessed many fire-positions from which machine-gunners could rake troops moving on Le Casque and Le Téton and several exits from which the Germans could come for supporting purposes or for counter-attack.

Unlike their comrades who, on April 16, had advanced against the German position north of the Aisne, the troops of Anthoine's army were forced to deliver a frontal assault unsupported by flank attacks. The French line was just north of the Reims-St. Hilaire le Grand-St. Ménéhould-Verdun



[French official photograph.]


A TUNNELED ROAD.

one. Now there were three and, in places, four or even five lines, while the communication trenches had increased greatly in number. Trenches and dug-outs were far deeper. The quantity of concrete employed was immeasurably greater. Two long tunnels with several branches—each capable of containing one or more battalions—had been driven, one into the northern slope of Mont Cornillet, the other into the north-east flank of Mont Perthois.

A plan of the Cornillet tunnel which played so important a part in the battle will be seen on the opposite page. It consisted of three galleries, along the floor of two of which ran Décauville railways. A transverse tunnel connected all three, and air-shafts ran up to the summit of the hill. No such extensive tunnels had been made by the enemy when preparing his positions for the battle of the Champagne-Pouilleuse. That driven into Mont Perthois was smaller and less elaborate, but it

chaussée, and ran opposite to and parallel with the 10 miles long objective. On an average Anthoine's trenches were 400 ft. below the summit of Mont Haut. To reach that summit our Allies would have to move for two miles or so up a succession of steep inclines. The ridge of the *massif* from Mont Cornillet on the west curved slightly north-eastwards, ascended by Mont Blond to Mont Haut, and then descended by Le Casque to Le Téton. A few hundred yards in front of Mont Haut was Mont Perthois, on about the same level as Mont Cornillet. Troops advancing from south to north on Mont Blond and Mont Haut would be enfiladed by the Germans on Mont Cornillet and Mont Perthois.

Nearer the French lines, a mile and a half south-south-east of Le Téton, was Mont Sans Nom, of the same height as Mont Blond, with Hill 181 as its southern bastion. So long as Mont Perthois and Mont Sans Nom remained in the



MAP OF THE PRINCIPAL GERMAN LINES ON

possession of the enemy the French moving on Le Casque and Le Téton would also be enfiladed from left to right and from right to left.


The bare, shell-pitted and, where not coated with snow, ochre-coloured hills on the edge of the green plain of Châlons could, indeed, be turned from west to east. But before this could be accomplished the network of German entrenchments on both sides of the Thuizy-Nauroy road, and the similar network between Mont Sans Nom and the Suippe would have to be carried. The main feature in the former obstacle was the shattered Bois de la Grille, south-west of Mont Cornillet and west of the Thuizy-Nauroy road. To turn the group of hills from the east would be also an arduous undertaking. The entrenchments from Mont Sans Nom to the Suippe ran south-eastwards round Aubérive-sur-Suippe, on the left bank of the river. North of Aubérive on the same bank was the strongly fortified village of Vaudesincourt on the road to St. Martin-l'Heureux.

In anticipation of turning movements a succession of trenches had been cut from north to south on the western and eastern faces

of the hills. The trenches on the west ran well to the north and west of Nauroy. In front of Nauroy they were crossed by a trench, the end of which was attached to the defences on the summit of Mont Cornillet. On the Suippe side of the hill-group a trench system followed the ridge above the Suippe as far as St. Martin-l'Heureux. Higher up the slopes another entered the Grand Bois de la Côte 179 and partly covered Le Téton from an attack from the north-east. Finally an advance down the right bank of the Suippe on Dorntrien and St. Martin-l'Heureux and the Bazancourt-Somme-Py-Apremont railway was barred by a labyrinth of trenches east of Aubérive and the strongly fortified Bois de la Côte 152.

The first German line defending on the south this extraordinarily strong position consisted of a series of parallel trenches connected by numerous communication trenches. Both were freely furnished with secure dug-outs, and the fighting positions were strengthened with numerous concrete redoubts and strongly organized supporting points.

The second line higher up the ridge was joined to the first by many fortified approaches. It went from the north of the Bois de la Grille




THE HEIGHTS OF MORONVILLIERS IN APRIL, 1917.

to the Thuizy-Nauroy road—this section was called the Leopoldshöhe Trench. Thence it was continued eastwards below the summits of Mont Cornillet, Mont Blond, Mont Haut, and Mont Perthois by the "Erfurt Trench." South of Le Casque and Le Téton it proceeded, under the names of "Trench du Bois du Chien," "Landtag Trench" and "Landsturm Trench" to the works on the eastern face of the hill-group. It ran below and covered Hill 181 and Mont Sans Nom.

Even when the second German line had been gained still greater difficulties were before the French before the ridge could be completely mastered. All the hilltops had been prepared for defence, and had been turned into what were virtually circular forts which were connected together by strong trenches. The crests of the hills were generally protected on the south and north by fortifications, while into the northern side of Mont Cornillet and the north-eastern side of Mont Perthois had been driven, as has been said, the tunnels already described. From these tunnels, the entrances of which could not be detected by aerial observers, the French could be counter-attacked and, in the case of Mont Cornillet,

charged in the rear if they crossed the summit and attacked the fortifications on the northern slope. Having regard to the enormous losses sustained by the Japanese army under Nogi in its assault on the comparatively weak fortifications of the hills round Port Arthur, we have some idea of the stupendous nature of the task set to Anthoine's army. Every movement of the French had to be made across ground open to direct observation by the Germans in their trenches, but the ridge from Mont Cornillet to Le Téton and the woods to its west and east concealed all behind it, and allowed the enemy freely to march his men to aid any threatened point, and such movements could only be detected by the French aviators.

By the beginning of April the German Higher Command had come to the conclusion that a French offensive between the Ailette and Reims was to be expected, and the prodigious bombardment which began on April 6 had confirmed this view. The comparative inaction for some days of the French artillery east of Reims led them, however, to believe that no serious operations would be undertaken by the French against Nogent l'Abbesse or



SHOWING HOW THE 16-IN. GUNS ARE FIRED FROM A RAILWAY.

Moronvilliers. In Easter Week, it appears, the general commanding the 214th Division, which formed part of the garrison of the Moronvilliers section, informed his officers that between Reims and Aubérive he had sure evidence that Anthoine would confine himself to mere artillery demonstrations. General de Beaulieu, commanding the German 14th Corps, agreed with him. The garrison at this date was composed from west to east of the 29th, the above-mentioned 214th, the 58th and 30th Divisions. The 29th was originally part of the 14th Baden Corps, the 58th was a Saxon division. Both were of excellent quality. But the 214th was a new division, and the troops in it were not accustomed to work together. The 30th Division contained but one good regiment.

Not all the superior officers were of the same way of thinking as General de Beaulieu. General von Gersdorf, commanding the 58th Division, maintained the contrary opinion. The difference in opinion between him and Beaulieu ended in his resignation being offered and accepted. That von Gersdorf was right and De Beaulieu wrong events were, however, speedily to prove. On April 10 and the succeeding days the guns of Anthoine woke into such activity that Beaulieu's confidence was shaken, and the troops on this part of the German position were ordered to make every preparation against an immediate attack, while at the same time the 32nd Division from the region of St. Quentin, the 23rd Division from the region of Sedan, and the 5th and 6th Divisions in Alsace were warned to be ready for transportation to the Moronvilliers area, into which units of other divisions were also brought. The 32nd Division began to move on the 15th. Simultaneously the German

artillery, which on April 1 consisted of some one hundred and fifty batteries, was gradually reinforced until there were between two hundred and two hundred and fifty batteries in the district.

The numbers of the German garrison and its reserves on April 16 may be roughly estimated.

It was calculated that at this date the composition of a German division was as follows :

	Approximate Total.
<i>Infantry</i> —4 regiments, each consisting of 3 battalions, the battalion containing from 600 to 750 men...	7,500
<i>Machine-gun Section</i>	500
<i>Cavalry</i>	200
<i>Pioneers</i>	800
<i>Artillery</i>	2,000
	11,000

The guns of a battery, as a rule, numbered four.

If these figures are substantially correct, the garrison of the Moronvilliers *massif* and its western and eastern approaches amounted to 44,000 soldiers, supported by about the same number held in reserve. The infantry were furnished with innumerable machine-guns and automatic rifles, with plenty of large bomb throwers and flame projectors, and were amply provided with hand-bombs and gas cylinders. Roughly about 1,000 guns of all calibres were at hand to pour their fire of shrapnel and high explosives on Anthoine's troops. The range of every spot on the ground was carefully registered by the gunners, and their fire was certain to be directed with mathematical accuracy. Remembering the deadly execution wrought at Mons by the 75,000 British troops firing from hastily dug trenches and by the 250 guns

accompanying them, Pétain's and Anthoine's project of attacking the hill positions which the enemy's engineers had had more years to entrench than the British at Mons had had days, becomes more than ever amazing for its audacity; but the great results which would be obtained if successful justified the undertaking, and Anthoine was a capable leader quite equal to the task.

Unlike Pétain and Nivelle, he had before the war held important posts in the French Army. Born in Lorraine on February 28, 1860, he was 57 years old. When a child he had seen his native province, which for a century had been united to France, annexed against the will of its inhabitants, to form a threatening salient for the formidable empire created by Bismarck. As was the case with so many Lorrainers and Alsatians, the annexation had stimulated every fibre of his character and intelligence. Superior artillery had enabled the hated Prussian, as Napoleon III. said, to strike France to the ground at Wörth, Gravelotte and Sedan; France, even during the war of 1870-71, had set to work to improve her guns, and Anthoine, not unnaturally, determined to be a gunner.*

*The "Canon Reffye," which fired fixed ammunition, was used to some extent during the latter part of the operations. It was a great improvement on the old muzzle-loading guns, and was afterwards introduced on a large scale into the French Army.

In 1879 he entered the Polytechnic School. From the Polytechnic School he passed into the Fontainebleau "Ecole d'application," gaining there the first place at the final examination. In 1884 the Emperor of Annam consented to the French establishing a protectorate over Tonkin. The Peking Government protested, but, after some negotiations, promised to withdraw the Chinese troops from that outlying portion of the Chinese Empire. The promise was not kept, and a French detachment attacked them. China refused to pay an indemnity, and a war broke out, in which Joffre first saw active service. In the ensuing campaigns Anthoine, then a lieutenant, took part. Returning to France in 1893, he entered the "Ecole de la Guerre," and was first in the list of candidates at the leaving examination. In 1901 he was given the command of the artillery attached to the 4th Cavalry Division. Six years later (1907) Anthoine, now a Lieut.-Colonel, received the command of the guns of the 15th Cavalry Division. He was next at the head of the 48th Regiment of Artillery. In August, 1911, during the Agadir crisis, he was summoned to the committee of the *Etat-major*, and so entered the inner ring of the French military hierarchy. With the prospect of a gigantic war in the immediate future. Anthoine, first as chief of



GERMAN FIELD GUN IN ACTION.


[From a German Photograph.]

the staff of General Pau and then as chief of the staff of General de Castelnau, laboured incessantly at the organization of the French Army. In addition he directed the course of the *Hautes Etudes militaires*. Among Joffre's collaborateurs Anthoine was unquestionably one of the most eminent, and it was largely due to him that France in August, 1914, was able at once to put in the field the large army which at the Marne and in the "race to the sea" rendered nugatory the plans prepared by the elder Moltke and perfected by Schlieffen.

At the opening of the war the qualities of Anthoine, still de Castelnau's chief of the staff, were immediately tested under the most searching conditions. After the bloody reverse suffered by de Castelnau at the Battle of Morhange, the pursuing army of the Crown Prince of Bavaria, supported on its left by the army of Heeringen, sought to make its way by the Gap of Nancy between the fortified lines Verdun-Toul and Epinal-Belfort. Had Prince Rupprecht succeeded, the right wing of the French Army at the Battle of the Marne would have been taken in reverse. Thanks to the skill of de Castelnau, Anthoine, and Dubail and their

coadjutors, the German armies were kept at bay until Kluck began his retreat to the Aisne. The German hosts from Lorraine and Alsace under the eyes of the Kaiser were simultaneously forced to retreat. The Battle of the Aisne commenced, and soon degenerated into a stalemate. The bulk of the German forces east and south of Verdun were brought into the region between the Aisne and Oise and west and north of the latter river. On September 18, 1914, de Castelnau's army was railed or motored to meet the turning movement of the enemy west of Compiègne. Anthoine, as de Castelnau's chief of the staff, was responsible for the orders involved in this elaborate movement, which resembled that soon afterwards undertaken by Sir John French when he shifted the British Expeditionary Force from the Aisne to Flanders.

The transference of de Castelnau's army was accomplished in the nick of time. As the troops arrived they had to be thrown across the path of the German forces endeavouring to resume the march on Paris. At the great Battle of Lassigny-Roye, September-October, 1914, which, though it is far less known, was as important as the Battles of Arras and Flanders,



[French official photograph.]

FRENCH HEAVY GUNS ON THEIR WAY TO THE FRONT.

One of them is towing a motor-cyclist who has run out of petrol.

Anthoine assisted Castelnau to make his dispositions. If that battle had been lost by the French, they, with the British and Belgians, would have been severed from the main French army. On October 8 Anthoine left his chief, having been appointed to command the 20th



[French official photograph.]

GENERAL ANTHOINE,

Commanded the French 4th Army in the attack on the Moronvilliers Heights.

Division, which, under de Maud'huy, saved Arras from falling into the enemy's hands.

In June of the next year Anthoine was given the command of the 10th Corps, and from September, 1915, to June, 1916, he defended and consolidated the French positions in the Wood of La Grurie in the Argonne, baffling all the efforts of the Crown Prince to dislodge the French from the forest hills and turn the flanks of the French armies in the Champagne-Pouilleuse and round Verdun. At the Battle of Verdun, which began in February, 1916, Anthoine's business was to safeguard the left wing of Pétain, who commanded there. The Battle of the Somme relieved the pressure on Verdun, and Anthoine left the Argonne to assist in the operations of the 10th Army south of the above-named river. He there fully justified his now great reputation. When Hindenburg ordered the retreat on Cambrai and St. Quentin, Anthoine, under Franchet d'Esperey, directed the pursuit of the enemy between the Somme and the Oise, retaking, among other places, Roye. On March 23 Anthoine was appointed by Nivelle

to command the 4th Army, forming the left wing of the group of armies directed by Pétain. He was destined to remain in the Moronvilliers region till June 4, when he was sent to lead the 1st Army working with the British in the fighting in the Ypres region.

It will be seen from this brief record that Anthoine's career entitled him to the confidence of his chiefs and to the respect of his soldiers. He had been the right-hand man of some of the most illustrious French leaders of the twentieth century. As a former chief of the staff, he understood the complicated mechanism needed to move a modern army; while, since the Battle of the Gap of Nancy (or Trouée de Charmes) he had been constantly engaged in victorious offensives or defenses. As an artilleryman he was not likely to underrate the importance of adequately preparing by bombardment for the advance of infantry in the coming battle. His recent experiences in



[French official photograph.]

A FORT ON THE MORONVILLIERS HEIGHTS.

the Argonne and on the Somme had impressed on him the necessity of "hastening slowly." A man of powerful physique and great vitality, with the most up-to-date knowledge of German methods, he had ample time to study the problem of how to eject, expeditiously and at the least cost, the enemy from the hill fortress of the Moronvilliers *massif*.

The army of Anthoine was divided into two

sections. The one on the left was commanded by General Hély d'Oïssel, who, it will be remembered, had distinguished himself in Flanders during the campaign of 1915. It was composed of two divisions plus one regiment ;



GENERAL HÉLY D'OISSEL,

Commanded the left wing of Anthoine's Army.


the other under General J. B. Dumas consisted of three divisions and some additional troops. Only about 75,000 French infantry at the most were to be launched against the enemy between the wood of La Grille and the east of Aubérive, but this apparently inadequate force was supported by a prodigious artillery, the emplacements for which had been quietly prepared before the guns and munitions had been brought up. The old railways behind the French front had received additional lines or had been prolonged to the Moronvilliers sector. A web of light railways had been constructed in the rear of Anthoine's trenches. The roads in the vicinity had been repaired and enlarged so that motor traction might be facilitated.

All these preparatory measures could not, in their entirety, be concealed from the German observers looking down on the Châlons Plain, but, as similar activity was being displayed at many other points between the North Sea and Switzerland, it was not until the guns began to arrive by the hundred that the German leaders could be certain that a French offensive at this spot was about to commence. Even the presence of an abnormal number of guns was not conclusive evidence of Pétain's intentions. The quantity of the guns and munitions of the Allies had by now become so enormous that even a thousand pieces and the expenditure of

millions of shells might be employed for a mere feint or demonstration.

On April 10, as mentioned, the French bombardment opened. It was of the greatest violence, and was directed against the enemy's first, second and third lines on the southern side of the crest of the ridge. The German works on the northern slope of the crest being hidden from terrestrial observation, the guns were directed entirely by the observation of the French aviators. The whole region occupied by the Germans was deluged with a continuous rain of fire. Villages, woods, roads and railroads ; the cantonments and bivouacs ; batteries and ammunition dumps, were all alike treated in this drastic fashion. Up to the dawn of Tuesday, April 17, an almost ceaseless deluge of shells and bombs descended on the Germans.

The bad weather interfered with observation from the sky, but by the nightfall of Monday, April 16, the photographs taken from the air, supplemented by the notes of observers on the ground and by the confessions of prisoners and deserters, showed that with regard to the German first line, wide lanes had been cut through the barbed wire entanglements where they were still standing, and that the enemy's trenches and subsidiary defensive works had—especially south of Mont Sans Nom—been



[French official photograph.]

A GERMAN GUN POSITION ON THE AISNE.

obliterated or demolished. To all intents and purposes the German front line except in the Grille Wood and Aubérive districts was non-existent.

The second line half way up the slopes of the

massif had been wrecked from the south of Mont Perthois to the banks of the Suippe, and, though the barbed wire in the wooded region north-east of Mont Sans Nom had been cut only in patches, the attack on this latter point and on the enemy's position on the ridges above the Suippe no longer presented insuperable difficulties.

On the west from the Bois de la Grille to the Trench du Bois du Chien the situation was different. The La Grille Wood works, and the Leopoldshöhe trench behind it, with the Erfurt trench to its east, were still capable of affording

but the dug-outs sheltering the enemy's commanders and the telephone wires by which the latter conveyed their orders had in many cases escaped injury. The entrenchments on the northern slopes of the Mont Cornillet-Le Téton ridge were, moreover, practically intact, as were the Mont Cornillet and Mont Perthois tunnels, the existence of which was as yet unknown to the French gunners. The camps to the north below the ridge had been bombarded but had not been destroyed; the roads leading from Nauroy, Mont Haut and Moronvilliers



GERMAN BARBED-WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS ON THE AISNE.

in places protection to the German garrisons, and, south of Mont Haut, the Constanzlager Redoubt with its row of dug-outs extending up the southern slopes of Mont Perthois had escaped serious damage. Consequently, the advance west of the foot of Mont Perthois was bound to be arduous, and in spite of the fact that most of the trenches and works on the southern crests of Mont Cornillet, Mont Blond, Mont Haut and Mont Perthois had been badly damaged, before the summits of those hills could be reached, numerous strong points, especially machine-gun emplacements, had yet to be dealt with. Most of the German observatories, particularly those on Mont Cornillet, Mont Haut and Le Téton, had been destroyed,

back to St. Masmès, Pont Faverges and Bétheniville, and the Suippe valley north-west of St. Hilaire-le-Petit were here and there rendered impassable by shell craters.

Such were the results of the artillery preparation west, south, and north of the Moronvilliers *massif*. So long as the enemy held on to the Bois de la Grille and the Leopoldshöhe trench, both of which, as related, had not been rendered untenable by the shell fire, it could not be turned from the west. A turning-movement from the east would, despite the French bombardment, be still a very difficult operation. The trench system known as Le Golfe, prolonging the German line to Aubérive, the steel cupolas, concreted dug-outs, trenches,



[French official photograph.]

A GERMAN POSITION WRECKED BY FRENCH GUNS.

and tunnels of that village, Vaudesincourt, north of it and the maze of trenches on the right bank of the Suippe had, it is true, been badly damaged, but so thick were the barbed-wire entanglements in this region that the troops when attacking had frequently to resort to the use of wire-cutters before they could penetrate through it. Many of the cupolas, concrete forts and earthen redoubts still remained intact and, before the Moronvilliers *massif* could be turned from the east, a long and bloody struggle in Le Golfe, Aubérive, Baudesincourt and east of the Suippe was plainly foreshadowed.

The plan of Pétain and Anthoine was to storm the La Grille Wood and the Leopoldshöhe trench and the whole of the southern face of the Moronvilliers *massif*, drive the enemy from the Golfe and encircle Aubérive from the west and east. When Aubérive had fallen, and the enemy had been cleared from the Golfe, Vaudesincourt was to be reduced, and the right wing, joining up with the centre which was to take Hill 181 and Mont Sans Nom, would then, if Le Téton was still uncaptured, drive the Germans from the Bois

of Hill 144 and attack the hill from the east.

A brief order informed the troops that the battle would begin at 4.45 a.m. on Tuesday, April 17. "Each soldier," it concluded, "will think of what France and what he himself through his relations, friends and comrades has suffered. Our avenging hands will be inspired by righteous hatred against the barbarous enemy!" At the Battle of the Marne the French had fought to save, now they were fighting to avenge, their Mother Country.

The troops directed by General Hely d'Oissel had for their objective the La Grille Wood, Mont Cornillet, and Mont Blond; those under General J. B. Dumas were to move on Mont Haut, Mont Perthois, Le Casque, Le Téton, Mont Sans Nom, the Golfe, Aubérive and its defences east of the Suippe.

During the night of April 16-17 rain and melted snow fell in torrents and it was pitch black and not, as had been expected, daylight when, at 4.45 a.m. on Tuesday, April 17, the infantry burst over the parapets. The weather was far too gusty for observation balloons and aeroplanes to be utilized. Nevertheless,

so perfectly had the operation been prepared and so thoroughly had the soldiers been taught the lie of the ground, that the darkness in which the advance was made served, on the whole, to favour the assailants. Everywhere the infantry went forward behind a terrific barrage of shells, which, as occasion demanded, advanced or receded.

The German divisions were, it is believed, disposed in the following order: The 29th formed the wing facing the French left, the 214th and 58th were in the centre, and the 30th, astride the Suippe, confronted the French right wing. On the *massif* a battalion of each regiment was in the front line; behind it, half-way up the slopes, was the second battalion. The third in reserve rested on the southern and northern crests in dug-outs and tunnels.

Cornillet and Mont Blond and descended to Nauroy. To this division was attached the field artillery of Riberpray's Division. With these three divisions and the guns General Hely d'Oissel was expected to capture the La Grille Wood and Leopoldshöhe trench, the summits of Mont Cornillet and Mont Blond, the Flensburg trench and the one behind it connecting the defences of those summits.

Beyond the Prosnes-Nauroy track was Naulin's Division, the left wing of the forces placed at the disposal of General J. B. Dumas. The objectives of this division were the two summits of Mont Haut, Mont Perthois in front of them, and the trenches linking Mont Haut to Le Casque. To the right of Naulin's Division was Eon's Division, whose business was to storm Le Casque with its projecting



A CAPTURED OBSERVATION POST.

Companies of the *Sturmtruppen* held in the background were ready to stiffen the counter-attacks.

Anthoine's army was arranged from left to right as follows:

West of the Thuizy-Nauroy road was Le Gallais's Division. Then came Lobit's, disposed between the last-named road and the track which from just north of Prosnes ran up the slopes, crossed the ridge between Mont

wood resembling the peak of a helmet, and Le Téton, so called because the summit stuck up like the teat of a recumbent breast. Between the Eon's Division and the Suippe was the Moroccan Division, which included a regiment of the Foreign Legion and General Guerin's 185th Territorial Brigade. The Moroccan Division, supported by the Territorials, south of Auberive, was to storm the Mont Sans Nom, the Golfe entrenchments, the Vaudesincourt

and Aubérive redoubts and the village of Aubérive. East of the Suippe, on the extreme right of the command of General Dumas, four and a half battalions of Mordacq's Division were to attack the houses of Aubérive on the right bank of the river and the maze of trenches beyond as far as those on the western edge of the Bois des Abatis.

We shall now describe the progress of the troops under Generals Hely d'Oissel and J. B. Dumas on the day of the opening and the succeeding days of the battle, which died down about April 22, reopened on April 30, and ended, after a long interval of comparative calm, on May 20, 1917. The hours of most battles in previous wars were in the present great war represented by days or even weeks, and it will be more convenient to follow the fortunes of each division on several days in the first part of the battle than to narrate day by day what happened in the course of the long struggle. On the 17th Le Gallais's Division failed to make good their advance, being held up at La Grille Wood; Lobit's Division reached the southern crest of Mont Cornillet and the summit of Mont Blond; Naulin's and Eon's Divisions were brought to a standstill halfway up the slopes. The Moroccan Division captured Mont

Sans Nom and broke into the Golfe works, and the Territorials and battalions of Mordacq's Division made appreciable progress round Aubérive. The 18th was for the French, generally speaking, a day spent in consolidating the captured positions, but Naulin's Division pushed up to the southern edge of Mont Haut. On the 19th Eon's Division captured Le Téton and Aubérive passed into French hands. The next day Eon's Division established itself on or near the summit of Le Casque; on the 22nd Naulin's secured the eastern and lower summit of Mont Haut.

A detailed account of these operations will now be given.

To the division commanded by General Le Gallais, which had particularly distinguished itself at the battle of Verdun, was, as has been said, entrusted the attack on the extreme left west of the Thuizy-Nauroy road. Le Gallais was ordered to capture La Grille Wood and the Leopoldshöhe trench. Having gained its objectives the division was to face west and north so as to protect the rear of General Lobit's Division engaged in storming Mont Cornillet and Mont Blond. At first sight the task set General Le Gallais seemed easier than



THE MEN OF MOROCCO IN CAMP.

[French official photograph.]

those set to his colleague. His troops had not to advance either up such steep inclines or quite so far as the regiments of General Lobit. These considerations were, however, of less importance than they had been in previous wars. A slight incline was in 1917 more dangerous to the assailant than a steep one, because it afforded little or no dead ground. The great question for the assailant was whether the artillery preparation had or had not been adequate and, as already mentioned, by some mischance west of the Thuizy-Nauroy road it had not been sufficient. The trees in La Grille Wood had not been all levelled to the ground, and the main redoubt in it was intact, while the Leopoldshöhe trench above it was in places untouched. Nevertheless, such was the magnificent spirit of the 95th Regiment, which was on the left, that when it advanced on April 17 it at once broke through the wood and soon entered the Leopoldshöhe trench. The two regiments on its right, however, were stopped by the German machine-guns in the Wahn trench, which ran from the Thuizy-Nauroy road through the southern end of La Grille Wood.

It was by now broad daylight. The enemy, perceiving that the 95th was in the air, at 9 a.m. counter-attacked. Driven from the Leopoldshöhe trench, the French, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Seupel, retired into the Grille Wood. There, until their grenades gave out, they maintained their position. By noon however, they were forced to evacuate the wood and take refuge in the shell-holes which marked the obliterated first German trenches. During the afternoon and evening the companies on the left made some progress westwards. Meanwhile the centre and right regiments had secured the Wahn trench, but were prevented by furious counter-attacks from advancing farther.

On April 18 Le Gallais's Division kept on the defensive. The next day (the 19th), while the French guns concentrated on the redoubt in the wood, the Prussian 145th Regiment, which had just arrived on the battlefield, endeavoured to drive the 95th from the western edges of the wood. The French, with bombs, rifles, machine-guns and the bayonet, held their own. Another German attack on the 20th was repulsed, but it was then decided to suspend the advance.

Le Gallais's Division had failed to secure La Grille Wood and the Leopoldshöhe trench,

but General Hely d'Oissel's other division, commanded by General Lobit, had east of the Thuizy-Nauroy Wood almost accomplished the complete conquest of Mont Cornillet and Mont Blond—i.e., the western end of the Moronvilliers *massif*. This division, which was recruited in Gascony and the Pyrenees, fought with superb courage. Its left, owing to



[French official photograph.]


THE FLAG OF THE FOREIGN LEGION.

General Le Gallais's failure, was throughout the advance exposed, and the resistance of the Constanzlager redoubt, south-south-east of Mont Blond, prevented its right from being supported by the left wing of General J. B. Dumas.

At 4.45 a.m. on the 16th the fiery Southerners of the 83rd and 59th regiments of Lobit's Division rushed forward in the darkness. An hour later they could be dimly perceived threading their way up the heights, bombing the dug-outs and bayoneting Germans in the open. By 6.45 a.m. part of the Erfurt trench and the communication trenches leading up to it were captured; but the enemy was not dislodged from the western end of the Erfurt trench.

The advance was again resumed, the 83rd moving on Mont Cornillet and the 59th on Mont Blond. Just previously an heroic action

had been performed by Sergeant Laborie, a bomber of the 59th. Perceiving a group of Germans bringing a battery of machine-guns into action on the summit of Mont Blond, he of his own initiative mounted with his grenadiers, killed or put to flight the whole of the detachment and returned through the French barrage, dragging the German machine-guns with them. The 83rd Regiment after considerable losses reached the summit of Mont Cornillet, but the German mitrailleuses on the



CAPTURED GERMAN 77mm.

ridge between Mont Cornillet and Mont Blond retarded the advance. The left of the 59th was stopped by the enemy in the Flensburg trench, which connected the German defences of Mont Cornillet with those of Mont Blond and lost touch with the 83rd.

It was time for both regiments to halt. Le Gallais's Division was struggling away to the left below in the Wahn trench and the La Grille Wood. The Western end of the Erfurt trench also, had not yet been carried, while the left of the Naulin Division behind them on the right was vainly endeavouring to storm the Constanzlager redoubt. The available battalions of the two other regiments, directed by General Lobit, were brought up to guard the exposed western flank between the Erfurt trench and Mont Cornillet and also to fill the gap between the 83rd and 59th regiments. Some companies were directed to turn the Constanzlager redoubt from the west. Batteries from Riberpray's Division galloped up the slopes of Mont Cornillet despite the enemy's fire to render assistance and were greeted with loud cheers by the infantrymen they had come up to support.

As Lobit's Division had both its flanks exposed, the enemy tried to crumple it up by a crushing bombardment and counter-attacks. At 2.30 p.m. the Germans, reinforced from their tunnel, broke into the French position on Mont Cornillet. Up to 5.30 p.m. the 2nd battalion of the 83rd was, however, still holding on to the northern trench. But its ammunition had almost run out, and it was consequently thought prudent to withdraw the survivors behind the crest. To cover the movement the grenadiers and voltigeurs of the 7th Company advanced and, under cover of this local offensive, the remnants of the battalion retired to the southern trench, where at midnight they beat off a fierce attack.

Meantime the counter-attacks delivered against the 59th Regiment from the neck between Mont Cornillet and Mont Blond and from Mont Haut had been repulsed by machine-gun and automatic-rifle fire and by bombing. At 5 p.m. its Commander, Lieut.-Colonel Meyer, was wounded by the fragment of a shell. Commandant Louveau replaced him. At night-fall the enemy delivered fresh counter-attacks. Except on the left, where the German infantry crossed bayonets for a few minutes with the French, the barrage put up by the "75's" and heavy guns kept off the enemy. At 1 a.m. on April 18 another counter-attack was repulsed.

On the morning of Wednesday, April 18, the rear battalions of Lobit's Division occupied a part of the southern end of the Düsseldorf communication trench and the whole of the Offenbourg trench, but the Germans still retained the Hoenig trench. Higher up the French were in possession of the trench descending from the summit and of the southern crest of Mont Cornillet, of the eastern end of the Flensburg trench and of the summit of Mont Blond. The division had captured 432 private, 52 non-commissioned and 7 commissioned officers, two "77" guns, 8 mine throwers, and 18 mitrailleuses. On the 18th, while on their right Naulin's Division was clearing the enemy from the Constanzlager redoubt and dug-outs, Lobit's Division organized its defences. The 83rd was replaced on Mont Cornillet now or soon after by the 88th Regiment, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Bonviolle.

The next day, Thursday, April 19, the Germans made another effort to drive the French down the southern slopes of Mont Cornillet and of Mont Blond. Large bodies of the enemy mustered in the wooded zone between Nauroy



A FRENCH BOMBER HOLDS A TRENCH

After all his fellows had fallen: an incident of the fighting in the Aisne Sector.

and Moronvilliers. Preceded by violent barrages, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. wave after wave of Germans ascended the northern slopes of the hills and, joined by the troops in the tunnel and in the Flensburg trench, precipitated themselves on the 88th and 59th. The attacks were supported by powerful forces echeloned from Nauroy to Mont Haut, and were so determined that the French reserves had to be sent in. But by 4 p.m. our Allies were everywhere victorious. The temper of officers and men alike had been that of Lieutenant Sacley,

commander of a company. Mortally wounded and carried on a stretcher he had said to his comrades: "I am dying, but I am happy to have shared in the victory with you."

On the 20th Lobit's Division tried ineffectually to extend its left to a small wooded height south-east of Mont Cornillet, and, in the night of the 20th-21st detachments of Lecocq's battalion entered two trenches west of the Cornillet redoubt, reached an observatory, and drove the enemy before them. German counter-attacks, however, prevented the turning of



ZOUAVES.

Mont Cornillet from the west. On the 21st and 22nd the struggle for the redoubt and the observatories continued, and on the 25th Lobit's Division, which had been sorely tried, was relieved by that of General Trouchand.

From the exploits of Lobit's we turn to those of Naulin's Division, the left of General J. B. Dumas's command.

When night fell on April 17 it will be remembered that Lobit's Division, far in advance of Le Gallais's Division, had established itself on the southern crest of Mont Cornillet and on the summit of Mont Blond, and that its right wing during the 17th had been in a precarious position owing to the resistance met by the left of Naulin's Division at the Constanzlager redoubt, a formidable work on the country road which from Prosnes between Mont Blond and Mont Haut joins, north of the heights, the Nauröy-Moronvilliers road halfway between the two villages. Whether Lobit's Division would be able to retain Mont Blond depended on what happened to Naulin's Division.

This division was composed of Zouaves, African troops, including the *Tirailleurs Indigènes*.* On the 17th it advanced between the Prosnes-Nauröy track and the woods called La Mitrailleuse and Marteau, both south-east of Mont Perthois. Its ultimate objectives

were the twin summits of Mont Haut, the north-west trench of Le Casque, and Mont Perthois, lying south of and between Mont Haut and Le Casque.

At 4.45 a.m. the advance began, Lobit's Division on the left and Eon's Division on the right protecting the flanks of the assaulting infantry of Naulin. As it was not till 5.5 a.m. that the enemy's guns put up a barrage, the attack was in the nature of a surprise. The Zouaves were in the centre making for the Bois-en-Escalier, the *Tirailleurs* were between them and Lobit's Division, the rest of the African troops in touch with Eon's Division. Several batteries of "75" guns waited the order to follow the forward movement.

All at first went well, though the Zouaves were delayed by the resistance of the Germans in the Bois-en-Escalier, which was in the enemy's first line. The Germans here, out-flanked from the north, were eventually all killed or captured. The Zouaves then hurried up to join the *Tirailleurs*, who, abreast of the 59th Regiment of Lobit's Division, had reached the Erfurt trench, crossed it and were assaulting from the west the powerful Constanzlager redoubt. Later in the day some of the reserves of Lobit's Division were sent to the assistance of the *Tirailleurs*, while the Zouaves, having broken through the Erfurt trench, attacked the redoubt and its dug-outs from the east. The field batteries were sent for;

* *Tirailleurs* are literally skirmishers, but the name nowadays, though maintained, has lost its original significance.

the guns were galloped up and, from near the Bois-en-Escalier, opened fire. But, so strong were the concrete works that it was finally decided to postpone the attack on the redoubt and dug-outs till the next day and to leave to howitzers the task of breaching these strongholds.

The Tirailleurs and Zouaves on the 17th had remained in the vicinity of the Constanzlager redoubt. The African troops, on their right, like the leading regiments of Lobit's Division, approached much nearer to the summit of the ridge. At 5.45 a.m. they were over the eastern section of the Erfurt trench. Individual redoubts delayed them, but before noon they were in the outskirts of the Mont Perthois Wood. Here four successive counter-attacks were successfully repulsed before night-fall.

On the 18th, while Lobit's Division was entrenching itself, Naulin's Division continued its advance. The heavy guns and howitzers at 7 a.m. opened a devastating fire on the Constanzlager redoubt and dug-outs. Half an hour afterwards the garrisons surrendered. Zouaves and Tirailleurs installed themselves in the wrecked works and were

there furiously bombarded. The Constanzlager redoubt and dug-outs having fallen, the French artillery shelled for hours the two heights of Mont Haut and also Mont Perthois. At 6 p.m. the 3rd African battalion, supported by the 3/2nd Regiment of Zouaves and some companies of Tirailleurs, was launched at the two summits of Mont Haut, and the 1st African battalion attacked the trench known as the Fosse Froide, which ran from Mont Haut across the northern slopes of Mont Perthois. The Zouaves, under Lieut.-Colonel Tropet, after fierce combats, reached by 8 p.m. the eastern summit of Mont Haut, the highest point in the *massif*. They were promptly counter-attacked. Lieut.-Colonel Tropet, to a suggestion that the position was untenable, replied: "The position is taken, it will be kept by the Zouaves." Meanwhile a company and a half of the 3rd Africans with a machine-gun company had attained the eastern summit of Mont Haut, but the 1st Africans had been stopped before the Fosse Froide trench.

By April 19, therefore, the two summits of Mont Haut were gained, but the enemy was not entirely expelled from them. On that day the Tirailleurs captured part of the Fosse



FRENCH AFRICANS.

[French official photograph.]

Froide trench and partly cut the communications of the German garrison on Mont Perthois. Counter-attacks of the enemy from the direction of Moronvilliers were dispersed by the French artillery directed over the heights from the observatories on Mont Haut. The next day the same fate befell the German columns trying to reach the lost summits by the ravines south-west of Moronvilliers.

The German 5th and 6th Divisions from Alsace had now reached the battlefield and were being disposed between the south of

20th Regiment spent the Tuesday reducing the redoubts in the Bois du Chien and its neighbourhood, the Wednesday in making its preparations for storming Le Casque. The 11th Regiment, recruited from Paris, the district of Limoges and Gascony, under Lieut.-Col. Douglas (who, like Pétain, had served with the Alpine Chasseurs), on the right, started at 4.45 a.m. on Tuesday.

"Soldiers from the south and centre of France and from Paris," said its chief, "come with me and deliver our brothers of the east



[French official photograph.]

AMMUNITION FOR THE 75's.

Mont Blond and Le Téton; it was not to be expected that the German Commander would neglect to use them, and, during the next few days, the French were expelled from the summit of Mont Haut.

The summit of Mont Blond had been reached on the 17th, that of Mont Haut on the 18th, but it was not till the 19th that the division directed by General Eon was able to attack the heights of Le Casque and Le Téton. Two regiments, the 20th and 11th, had been detailed for that operation.

On April 17 the 20th Regiment had set out for Le Casque, the 11th, on its right, for Le Téton. Both regiments were delayed by the resistance of the enemy and did not reach the foot of the hills till the next day. The

and north from the hateful yoke of the invader." "Téton de ma cousine," was the regimental march, and the regiment was therefore particularly anxious to gain its objective. Négrié's battalion led, next came Ture's, Delbreil's brought up the rear; a battery of "58's" went with them.* On the east the enemy's machine-guns in the Hexen Kessel dug-outs and the Bois en V.—this wood was in the western flank of Mont Sans Nom—enfiladed the French. April 17 was passed in clearing the enemy out of his posts in these spots. Although, as will be related, Mont Sans Nom had been captured early on the 17th, this was no easy matter. On the Wednesday the 11th again moved forward, but came under a cross fire from the

* The 58's were light guns of about 2.32 in. bore.

machine-guns at the mouth of the western entrances of the Mont Perthois tunnel. The "58" guns were employed to put the machine guns out of action and to batter in the entrances, while the heavy artillery plastered the sides and summits of Le Casque and Le Téton with high explosive shells.

It was on the 19th at 5 a.m. that the struggle for the crests of the two hills began. The 20th Regiment, raked by the enemy's machine-guns above the woods on the western slopes of Mont Perthois, attacked Le Casque. To avoid the streams of bullets the French inclined to the right, climbed the slopes, and assaulted the Rendsburg and Göttingen trenches. The Germans counter-attacked, and the 20th was obliged to halt below the summit of the hill. To its right, the 11th Regiment met with more success. Négrié's battalion swarmed up the sides of Le Téton as the sun rose-crowned its crest. Hard on its heels came Ture's battalion. The resistance they encountered was of the stubbornest. Backwards and forwards swayed the struggling combatants on the narrow surface of the summit, and wave after wave of Germans with fierce shouts mounted the northern slopes to dislodge the French. In the intervals of the charges the German guns from the west, north and south hurled shells by thousands on the defenders. The French artillery replied with repeated barrages, and bombarded Moronvilliers in the hollow beneath. Columns of infantry, processions of motor lorries and batteries could be seen approaching the enemy's front by the roads from the Suippe at St. Hilaire le Petit, Bethenville and Pont Faverger. The 5th and 6th German Divisions were arriving. At 4 p.m. two German battalions mounted to the summit. Twice it was lost, twice retaken. The reserve battalion under Commandant Delbeil was called up. He fell severely wounded. Only three officers were by now uninjured. The battalions had dissolved into a mass of individuals who, without orders, worked machine-guns, fired, bombed and bayoneted. During the night of the 19th-20th the enemy slipped into the woods on the flanks of the summit.

When dawn broke on the 20th German aeroplanes flew overhead and directed the fire of the German batteries. A fresh counter-attack, in the course of which Commandant Négrié was wounded in the neck, was repulsed. To relieve the pressure the 20th Regiment

resumed in the afternoon its attack on Le Casque. The Rendsburg and Göttingen trenches were carried, and the French entered the wood on the hill. At 6 p.m. the summit of Le Casque was gained, but had soon afterwards to be abandoned. The next day the 11th Regiment was relieved. The survivors were marched past General Anthoine and were congratulated by him on their fine conduct. It was not till May 1 that the rest of Eon's Division was withdrawn to the rear.

At nightfall then, on April 20, our Allies, repulsed west of the Thuizy-Nauroy road, were clinging to the southern crest of Mont Cornillet, firmly entrenched on the summit of Mont Blond, less securely posted on the two summits of Mont Haut, were just below the summit of Le Casque and on the very summit of Le Téton. The backbone of the *massif* had been in places entirely, in other places almost, captured, but at neither end had it been turned. The Moroccan Division, the Territorials and the battalions of Mordacq's Division forming the right wing of General J. B. Dumas's command had, however, achieved far more than the Le Gallais Division on the left of General Hely d'Oissel's command.

The progress made by the Moroccan Division under General Degoutte on and since April 17 had been most satisfactory. This division at the Battle of the Marne, in the Battle of Artois, in the Battle of the Champagne Pouilleuse, and at the Battle of the Somme had won distinction. To the Moroccans, assisted by the 75th Territorial Regiment and, on the right bank of the Suippe, by the battalions of Mordacq's Division, was, as we have observed, assigned the task of capturing the Mont Sans Nom, a mile and a half south-east of Le Téton, the labyrinth of trenches and redoubts between the Mont Sans Nom and the Suippe, the village of Auberive, and the network of defences east of the Suippe covering Auberive.

Here, too, the attack at 4.45 a.m. on April 17, resembled a surprise. The German barrage was too late to save the Mont Sans Nom from capture. By 5 a.m. the Zouaves were on its summit. More than 500 prisoners, 6 guns, and a number of machine-guns were captured.

The Tirailleurs to the right of the victorious Zouaves met with more resistance, especially in front of the redoubt of the Levant trench and in the Bois Allongé. They reduced these strong points and advanced on the Landsturm trench. At dawn on the 18th the Germans

endeavoured to recover the lost ground and their troops succeeded in entering the Constantinople trench. There they were surrounded and captured. On the 20th the Tirailleurs were in the Bois Noir, and on the 21st they bombed out the Germans from the Bethmann-Hollweg trench well to the north-east of Mont Sans Nom. Six guns were among their booty. Mont Sans Nom was thus safeguarded from an attack delivered against its eastern face.

The right wing of Général Degoutte's division was formed by the "régiment de marche" of the Foreign Legion, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Duriez, mortally wounded at the opening of the battle.* Formerly recruited from adventurers, the Legion since the beginning of the war had become a rallying point for those neutrals who perceived that the victory of the Teutonic Powers would mean the enslavement of humanity, and who wished to take a hand in their destruction.

At 4.45 a.m. on April 17 the Legionaries left their trenches between the Bois en T. and the

wood La Sapinière. They were to break into the Golfe and then turn eastwards and seize the Aubérive-Vaudeincourt-Dontrien road. In a tempest of rain, their footsteps clogged with mud so as to render progress difficult, the Legionaries entered the Bouleaux trench. It was speedily carried, as were the trenches of the Golfe, two Saxon battalions with machine guns, flame-projectors, and grenades failing to stop the charge. The Byzance, Dardanelles and, to the south-west of Aubérive, the Prince Eitel trench were, one by one, taken either on the 17th or on the 18th. At dawn on the 19th the redoubt of Aubérive was secured, and at 3.30 p.m. a lieutenant with two bombers entered Aubérive, only to find the village had been abandoned by the Germans and occupied by detachments of Mordacq's Division who had crossed from the right bank of the Suippe and by Territorials of the 75th Regiment. The German garrison had retreated to the redoubt south of Vaudeincourt. Two trenches—the Posnanie and Beyrouth—and the Labyrinth work still remained to be secured before the clearing of the "Main Boyau" trench, the last artificial obstacle running down from the



[French official photograph.]

MOROCCANS WITH THEIR FLAG, WHICH HAD BEEN DECORATED FOR BRAVERY AT VERDUN.

massif to the Suippe south of Vaudesincourt, could be begun.* The Legionaries stormed the Posnanie and Beyrouth trenches and the Labyrinth. Saxon bombers hiding grenades in their hands advanced with their hands raised as if to surrender. Suddenly they flung their grenades which, bursting, forced the Legionaries to retreat. It was but for a moment. Yelling with rage they rushed forward on the dastardly Germans and bayoneted every one of them.

The Main Boyau was next entered. Its fall entailed that of the redoubt south of Vaudesincourt which, with the assistance of the 75th Territorial Regiment, part of the 185th Territorial Brigade under General Querin, was stormed on April 22. The Territorials, it may be mentioned, had previously helped in the attack on the Golfe. Nearly 1,100 prisoners, 22 guns, 50 mine-throwers, and 47 machine guns had in this fighting been taken by the Foreign Legion.

East of the Suippe, four and a half battalions of Mordacq's division on April 17 had assaulted the enemy's lines from the river bank to the Bois des Abatis salient. The Germans near the river were surprised, and the French pushed down the river bank. On the right, however, they were unable to do more than enter the German trench and, north of it, the Baden-Baden trench. Counter-attacks on the 19th, 20th and 22nd of April caused the French here to lose some of their gains.

Thus it will be seen that by the beginning of the last week of April, 1917, most of Pétain's and Anthoine's objectives had been reached; Aubérive was captured; the French had placed the Golfe and the Main Boyau behind them and were in front of Vaudesincourt. On the eastern slopes of the *massif* they had pushed forward beyond the Bois Noir and were installed in the Bethmann-Hollweg trench. Thence their line ran north-westwards of the Mont Sans Nom to Le Téton, the summit of which was entirely in their hands. From Le Téton the line turned westwards below the crest of Le Casque and ascended and embraced the lower of the two summits of Mont Haut, and the higher one had become a "No Man's Land." Beyond Mont Haut most of the top of Mont Blond was firmly held. From Mont Blond

the line descended south of the Flensburg trench, touched the southern crest of Mont Cornillet, and then turned south almost at right angles, ending east of the Thuizy-Nauroy road in the Offenburg trench, part of the enemy's first position.

It was a most satisfactory achievement, but the struggle was not yet over. The Germans



AUBÉRIVE FROM THE AIR,
Shells exploding on German Trenches.

on the *massif* were in danger of being turned from the east, but not as yet from the west. On Mont Cornillet, in the Flensburg trench, at Mont Haut and, south of it, Mont Perthois, on Le Casque and in the wooded region between the eastern slopes of Le Téton and the ridges of the *massif* west of the Suippe between St. Martin l'Heureux and Vaudesincourt they retained admirable bases for counter-attacks. From almost a straight line the French front between the Thuizy-Nauroy road to the Suippe had now become a salient, the central and most northerly point of which was the summit of Le Téton.

During the remainder of April and during May and June it was to be the aim of Pétain and his successor, General Fayolle, and of Anthoine and, later, of General Gouraud, who succeeded him, to enlarge the salient west of the Thuizy-Nauroy road by the capture of the Bois de la Grille and the Leopoldshöhe trench, and to bring the northern edge of the salient to the southern crests of all the hills of

* Boyau is the French for a communication trench and is a survival from the days when there was a very distinct difference between a "parallel" or trench facing toward a fortified town and the covered approaches or communication trenches leading to it.

the ridge, from Mont Cornillet to the east of Le Téton. On April 26 the troops in the western sector were transferred from General Hely d'Oissel to General Vandenberg. Fresh divisions were moved up to complete the victory.

Of these divisions, that commanded by General Hennoque was ordered by General Vandenberg on April 30 to seize La Grille Wood, while Trouchaud's Division finished the conquest of the *massif* from Mont Cornillet to the eastern end of Mont Blond. Hennoque's Division was composed of Bretons, and in the early spring of 1917 had pursued the retreating enemy across the devastated region between the Somme and Oise. The men were burning to avenge the wanton destruction witnessed by them.

At 10 minutes to 1 p.m. on the 30th the Bretons of the Hennoque division entered La Grille Wood, but were speedily brought to a standstill by barrages, by clouds of poison gas and by machine-gun fire from numerous concrete positions. Organising a line in the shell craters they commenced the work of reducing these strong points. Counter-attacks were repulsed, and the French gunners, in-

formed of the position of the obstacles, pulverised them one by one. On May 1 the Germans made a final effort to eject the Bretons from the battered woodland. They in vain employed liquid fire, heavy bombs, and grenades, while their guns poured shells by the thousand on the improvised French line. The next day (May 2) the regiments of Hennoque's division again advanced, but it was not till May 8 that they finally captured the last redoubt in the wood and dug themselves in on the northern edge opposite to the Leopoldshöhe trench.

East of the Thuizy-Nauroy road Trouchaud's Division had met with a similarly stubborn resistance. Before 1 p.m. on April 30 the two battalions of Carissan and Lambert reached the summit of Mont Cornillet. Counter-attacks, reinforced by the troops from the tunnel, forced them back. Lambert's battalion halted in front of the torn and twisted barbed-wire entanglements of the Flensburg trench. To its right Kerantem's battalion was repulsed, and beyond it Duclos's battalion was stopped by a circular trench on the northern slopes of Mont Blond. So severe had been the fighting that of the above-mentioned three



A CAPTURED GERMAN TRENCH NEAR AUBÉRIVE.



CAPTURED GERMAN GUNS COLLECTED AT LIVRY-SUR-VESLE.


battalions Kerantem's battalion was withdrawn to the rear and its place taken by Paillet's battalion. At 5.30 p.m. on May 4 another assault was delivered. Soyer's and Champseil's battalions ascended the western slopes of Mont Cornillet, captured a blockhouse, but being counter-attacked, chiefly from the tunnel, had to retreat. Paillet's battalion and Duclos's battalion on its right were more successful, the former capturing a battery and the latter getting some way down the northern slopes of Mont Blond. But in this sector the losses had been very heavy, and it was decided by General Vandenberg to postpone the reduction of Mont Cornillet and the Flensburg trench till a later date.

April 30 had also witnessed a violent offensive by Brulard's Division against the higher of the summits of Mont Haut, against Mont Perthois and its tunnel, the Fosse Froide trench behind it and the wood of Le Casque. The attack on Mont Haut failed, the French running into their own barrage and being mown down by German machine guns, but three battalions succeeded in capturing the crest of Mont Perthois and blocking up the entrance of the tunnels, the garrison of which, 250 privates and 9 officers, surrendered on May 2. Pressing on, the victors made for the Fosse Froide trench, which they carried in

places. Meanwhile, in the Wood of Le Casque, a battalion had after an hour's fighting seized the southern side, penetrating over 200 yards into the mass of broken trees and wire entanglements.

About 3 p.m. the first of three counter-attacks was delivered by two German companies. It did not reach the French position. Soon afterwards two battalions, in spite of the French barrage, made their way through the wood, and had to be beaten back with bombs and cold steel. A third—and smaller—counter-attack failed to dislodge the French from their posts in the Fosse Froide trench west of Le Casque. At 5 p.m. a blockhouse in the centre of the wood was captured by the French. Some 600 prisoners, including 15 officers, belonging to four of the best German regiments—the 24th Brandenburg, the 18th Grenadiers, the 64th and the 396th—were taken in these operations, also seven field guns, 12 machine guns and a vast quantity of war material.

To the east of Brulard's division Eon's division, the only one in the earlier battle which had not been relieved, fought on the 30th a defensive action, maintaining its position in the Göttingen trench and on the Téton. Riberpray's division, which had replaced the Moroccan division, on the same day foiled the enemy's attempts to recover Mont Sans Nom

*[French official photograph.]*

CAVES ON THE AISNE SECTOR.

and the trenches between it and the Suippe, south of Vaudesincourt.

Apart from the incidents already mentioned, there was during the first half of May a lull in the battle of Moronvilliers. On May 10 our Allies progressed a little north-east of Mont Haut and repulsed a strong attack on the Téton. Three fresh French divisions, commanded respectively by Generals Joba, Ferradini and Aldebert, were then ordered to prepare for a new offensive.

It was a good sign that General Nivelle was not sacrificed to the clamour of angry Parliamentarians. The Battles of Craonne-Reims and Moronvilliers, though not decisive, had been unquestionably great victories. They had used up a large part of Hindenburg's troops and rendered it impossible for him to take advantage in the west of the Russian situation.

On May 20 Generals Pétain and Fayolle ordered the new offensive which was designed to complete the Battle of Moronvilliers, just as the offensive of May 4, 5 and 6 had completed the Battle of Craonne-Reims. No attempt was to be made to pierce the enemy's lines; the aim of General Fayolle was to extend slightly and to consolidate the positions already gained.

After another gigantic bombardment on the 19th, at 4.30 a.m. on the next day, Sunday, May 20, regiments of Joba's, Ferradini's and Aldebert's divisions, in perfect weather, attacked the enemy's lines from the south of Mont Cornillet to the north of Le Téton. The chief objective was the summit of Mont Cornillet, which bore to the Moronvilliers ridge the relation borne by the Casemates and California plateaux to the Chemin des Dames hog's back.

The German garrison of this all important point had been frequently changed in the course of the prolonged struggle, and on May 17 the 173rd Regiment of the 223rd Division had been relieved by the 476th Regiment of the 242nd Division. The commander of the new arrivals was not so satisfied as his predecessor had been with the Mont Cornillet tunnel. "It can be taken with gas," he had observed and, instead of keeping three whole battalions in it, he garrisoned it with six infantry companies, two machine-gun companies, 320 pioneers—in all, with the colonels of the 1st and 2nd battalions and their staffs, totalling well under 1,000 men. The rest of the regiment was disposed in the concreted dug-outs and trenches on the summit and, behind it, on the northern slopes.

To storm this stronghold, which for over a month had kept at bay the troops of two French divisions, General Joba selected the 1st Zouaves, who had fought at the Battles of Charleroi and the Marne and who had behind them a long history of glorious deeds. During the Battle of the Aisne it had struggled for a week to maintain itself on the Craonne plateau. At the end of October, 1914, the same Zouaves had played an important part in the Battle of the Yser. During December, 1914, they had helped to defend Ypres. In February, 1915, they had been transferred to the mouth of the Yser, where they remained for several months in the Nieuport region. The next year, 1916, on March 11 they had been employed at the Battle of Verdun, at that moment passing through its most critical stage. In October they had entered the Battle of the Somme and had won fresh distinctions. Under Lieut.-Colonel Poirel at dawn on Sunday, May 20—supported by Tirailleurs on their left and by other Zouave battalions on their right—they were asked to give the finishing touch to the Battle of Moronvilliers.

Mare's battalion of the regiment was on the

left; that of Simmondet on the right; Alessandri's remained in reserve. A company of engineers joined in the attack. The day before, at 1 p.m., cheering news had been received. A German deserter had declared that the garrison in the tunnel had been asphyxiated. An hour later a group of 30 Germans who surrendered under a white flag confirmed this piece of information. It was, however, uncertain whether the tunnel during the night had not been cleared of its dead and regarrisoned.

To reach the crest of Mont Cornillet the Zouaves had—in face of a dense barrage—to ascend some 250 yards of steep incline swept by machine guns. Losing heavily they gained the crest and broke up into groups bombing and bayoneting the enemy in the craters and block-houses. Notwithstanding that they were enfiladed by the machine guns in the Flensburg trench and on the western slopes of Mont Blond, nothing could resist their pertinacious courage and impetuosity. The summit was passed and, cheering loudly, they began to descend the rugged slopes on the north, some carried away by their enthusiasm moving beyond the ordered objective towards Nauroy.



MACHINE GUN CAPTURED BY MOROCCANS AT MORONVILLIERS.

Behind the Zouaves marched the engineer company, carrying materials for blocking the entrances to the tunnel. But these entrances could not for the moment be found, for the French heavy shells had closed them with débris.

As the sun was setting, the Zouaves, aided by the engineers, fortified and connected the craters on the northern crest.


About midnight shadowy figures were perceived stealing down towards Nauroy. They were arrested, and it was thus revealed that the garrison of the tunnel was not entirely disposed of, and at daybreak two prisoners indicated the principal entry.

A captain and lieutenant of the 1st Zouaves and some men set out with electric torches to explore the tunnel. The spectacle was gruesome. Hard by the opening of the tunnel heaps of contorted corpses showed that a panic had occurred and that the men, heedless of orders, had made a wild rush for the outer air. Two French doctors, holding their noses, climbed over the dead bodies and gingerly made their way along the Decauville railroad to the transverse tunnel. Turning to the right they ascertained that the air shaft at the end, with the room beneath it, had been

crushed in by a huge shell. The bodies of the two German commanders were here subsequently identified. Retracing their steps the doctors proceeded farther down the central tunnel. Some distance farther on were two machine guns, and beyond them 80 corpses piled up. Returning to the transverse tunnel they groped along until another longitudinal tunnel four feet wide was reached. Near its entrance on both sides were other heaps of asphyxiated Germans. The special gas shells fired by the French guns had done their work most thoroughly!

Only one living German was discovered, but two or three recently lighted candles on a bench seemed to point to the fact that other Germans still survived. Whether they had escaped or died in some unexplored hiding-place was never discovered.

On emerging from the tunnel the doctors made their report, and Lieut.-Colonel Poirel and a staff captain, guided by one of the doctors, thoroughly explored the galleries. The engineers were sent for, the corpses were removed, and Commandant Simmondet established his headquarters inside the tunnel near one of its openings. By the bursting of a German shell this entrance was subsequently blocked up and



GUNS CAPTURED AT MORONVILLIERS.

[French official photograph.]



[French official photograph.]

ON THE HEIGHTS OF MORONVILLIERS.

a store of cartridges set on fire. Simmondet, who was wounded, escaped through the smoke to another entrance. The doctor who attended him, having bandaged his wounds, bravely returned to see if any of the officers and soldiers in attendance on the Commandant had been left behind. Fortunately they had all reached the surface of Mont Cornillet.

The Zouaves were all of the same temper as this doctor. Mortally wounded, one of them had declared that it was fine to die for France; another, terribly injured, had refused all help, and a third, standing on the parapet of a trench and firing at the enemy counter-attacking, had refused to take cover. "I prefer," said this soldier, called Thenier, "to die standing rather than lying down."

We have seen that on May 20 Mont Cornillet was at last taken. The same-day other battalions of Joba's division and regiments of Ferradini's and Aldebert's divisions attacked the enemy between Mont Cornillet and the north of Le Téton. On the northern slopes of Mont Blond, and the north-west slopes of Mont Haut the attack failed; but north-east of

that point and north of Le Casque and Le Téton it was successful.

In the course of the fighting on May 20 unwounded prisoners to the number of 965, including 28 officers, were captured. The losses of the enemy in dead and wounded were very considerable. In the Cornillet tunnel alone more than 600 corpses were counted. The total number of prisoners captured since 4.45 a.m. on Tuesday, April 17, by now exceeded 6,120, among them 120 officers. Some 52 guns, 42 mine-throwers and 103 machine-guns had in the Battle of Moronvilliers been wrested from the Germans.

The action of May 20 ended the French offensive begun on April 16, the opening day of the Battle of Craonne-Reims. The results had not come up to General Nivelle's expectations, but it had resulted in the capture of most of the Chemin-des-Dames plateau, notably the eastern end, which dominated the plain north of the Aisne, in the seizure of the Bois-des-Buttes, Ville-aux-Bois, with the Bois-des-Boches and the first and second lines of the enemy between those positions and the Aisne. South of the river the French in the plain had



x

GENERAL GOURAUD (marked x) DECORATING SOLDIERS AFTER A SUCCESSFUL RAID.

advanced towards the Suippe and, in the region of Loivre, had made appreciable progress on the west of the Brimont heights. Lastly, to the east of Reims, nearly the whole of the Moronvilliers *massif*, with Aubérive, had been secured. The foundations for a new offensive had been firmly laid.

Whether the price in men and munitions paid by the French for these results was too high is a question which, perhaps, it is difficult to settle definitely. The heavy sacrifice of life undoubtedly affected the feelings of French civilians, even in high places. But military opinion inclined to believe that the gains outweighed the losses. The losses inflicted on the enemy were great, and the thrust back he received must have been discouraging. Like the battle of Vimy-Arras, the battles of Craonne-Reims and Moronvilliers had shown German soldiery that in no positions, no matter what were the difficulties of attack and the lavishness of the defensive preparations, were they safe from defeat. The fairy tales which had been told to them after their enforced retreat between Arras and Soissons, that their recoil was only a preliminary to crushing offensive strokes, had proved to be without foundation. They had been expelled from three of the strongest positions held by them in the West, and had not only been unable to recover them, but their leaders had even deemed it prudent to avoid any real attempts to do

so. The Vimy Ridge, the Scarpe Heights, the caverned spurs and plateau of the Hog's Back north of the Aisne and the Moronvilliers *massif* had not been occupied by the enemy for a few days, but for some 30 months. Every square foot on them had been carefully studied by the German engineers and the resources of fortification exhausted to render them impregnable. Yet, after a month and a half's fighting, the enemy had had to abandon every one of his strong points. He was left clinging to the eastern or northern edges of the ridges of the summits from the western or southern sides of which he had been forcibly dislodged.

In 1916 the battle of the Somme had seemed to have been a Cadmean victory. When the battles fought round Craonne, Reims and Moronvilliers are seen in their proper relationship with the operations of the spring and summer of 1917 their importance will be properly realized.

It was not to be expected that the German Crown Prince would be willing or permitted to leave the French in undisturbed possession of the positions captured by them in the two battles last described. On December 26, 1916, Hindenburg had sent to his subordinates a confidential memorandum in which he had analysed the causes of the reverses suffered by the Germans on the Western Front at Verdun and in the battle of the Somme. He had set out in detail his plan for retarding and defeating

the Allied offensives during the coming year. In this document the German leader had laid particular stress not only on the necessity for increasing the depth of the German fortified zones, but on the need for vigorous counter-offensives against enemy troops who should have happened to penetrate the whole or parts of the zones in question. The principal aim of his lieutenants, he pointed out, should be to surprise the victors when disordered by their very successes—a method as old as war. These instructions had put fresh heart into the Crown Prince, though whether this heartening up had extended to the troops under his command may be doubted. On February 3, 1917, he had written that "the causes of the advantages gained by the enemy were known, and henceforth our aim is to see that in future he gains no more of them."

The moment had come to test Hindenburg's doctrine. Between Vauxaillon and Reims and on the Moronvilliers heights the French had worked their way through large portions of the fortified region. Before they could consolidate themselves the Crown Prince delivered a series of violent counter-attacks, mostly by night. These were mainly directed towards the recovery of the summits

of the Chemin des Dames and the Moronvilliers *massif*.

In the preceding chapter the narrative of the fighting between Vauxaillon and Reims was brought down to the evening of May 6. During the nights of the 6th-7th and 7th-8th the Germans strove in vain to wrest from the French the positions between Vauxaillon and Craonne won by the latter on the 5th and 6th. In the night of the 8th-9th of May our Allies bloodily repulsed the enemy near Cerny, La Bovelles and the Hautebise Farm, while on the California Plateau they beat off successive waves of attack. The next day they repulsed counter-attacks on Chevreux, the village just north-east of Craonne at the foot of the eastern extremity of the Chemin-des-Dames ridge. After sunset (9th-10th) more assaults in the same regions were rendered nugatory by the French artillery, machine guns and bombers, and the French progressed a little on the northern slopes of the Vauclerc Plateau. The following day (May 10) another attack was shattered in the ruins of Chevreux, and the French advanced north of Sancy. In the night of the 10th-11th and on May 11 the Germans were once more flung back from the California Plateau and from the neighbourhood



[French official photograph.]

FRENCH SOLDIERS SORTING CAPTURED MATERIAL.

of Cerny. Five days later a German counter-offensive on a front of two and a half miles, from the north-west of Laffaux Mill to the Soissons-Laon railroad, was shattered and numbers of prisoners captured. After sunset renewed attacks north of Laffaux Mill and north-west of Braye-en-Laonnois met with the same fate. The next day (May 17) our Allies pushed forward east of Craonne, and on the 18th repulsed still another attack on the California Plateau. Some hours later they hurled back the enemy attempting to recover the summit of the Hog's Back just west of the point where the Oise-Aisne Canal passes under it. On the 20th—the last day of the Battle of Moronvilliers—a counter-offensive, preceded by a violent bombardment, which was designed to retake the whole of the French positions from Craonne to the east of Fort de Malmaison, was at most points kept off with barrages. In the few cases where the German infantry got through there they were successfully disposed of; 1,000 unwounded prisoners, including 28 officers, being captured.

Consequently the Hindenburg theory of vigorous counter-offensives had up to the end

of the Battle of Moronvilliers failed to materialize so far as the Chemin-des-Dames Hog's Back was concerned.

We will conclude by examining the operations in the Chemin des Dames and Moronvilliers districts during the fortnight which followed the termination of the Battle of Moronvilliers. Here again it will be found that, despite the desperate efforts of the Germans, the plan of Hindenburg outlined above again achieved nothing of the least importance.

The counter-attacks in the former region during this period were the following. On May 21 surprise attacks were made by the enemy against the French on the Vauclerc Plateau, but failed hopelessly. The next day towards evening our Allies replied by capturing some of the last observation posts dominating the Ailette Valley and during the night, east of Chevreux, they carried three lines of German trenches. An enemy counter-attack on the California Plateau was smashed by shell and infantry fire and 350 prisoners, including 11 officers, were captured. At 8.30 p.m. on May 23 a German assault on the Vauclerc Plateau was beaten off with serious losses to the assail-



SOME OF THE GERMAN PRISONERS.

[French official photograph.]



BRINGING UP SUPPLIES NEAR LAFFAUX MILL.

ants. On the 24th the enemy returned to the charge, only to be driven back in confusion. Meanwhile the French at nightfall on the 24th carried the wood south-east of Chevreux, destroying almost entirely two German battalions. The next day three columns of the enemy assaulted a salient north-west of Braye-en-Laonnois. Losing very heavily, the Germans after several attempts succeeded in entering the French advanced trench. They were soon, however, expelled from most of the points captured. On May 26 German attacks on salients east and west of Cerny were repulsed, and on that and the succeeding day the enemy's efforts to progress between Vauxaillon and Laffaux Mill broke down. Two days later (May 28), a couple of attacks in the Hurtebise region were stopped by the French fire. On the night of May 31-June 1 various sudden attacks by the Germans west of Cerny came to nought owing to the accurate practice of the French gunners. On the morning of June 1 the enemy, after a heavy bombardment, took some trenches north of Laffaux Mill. In the afternoon he was dislodged from most of them.

These affairs, however, were but the preliminaries to a more serious operation. On June 2 an intensive bombardment of the whole French front from the north of Laffaux to the east of Berry-au-Bac began and in the night of June 2-3, units of two divisions delivered five successive attacks against the eastern, western

and central portions of the California Plateau and the western part of the Vauclerc Plateau. The Germans came on in dense waves, at certain points advancing shoulder to shoulder. By means of liquid fire a momentary success was gained by them on the Vauclerc Plateau, but by counter-attacks they were finally repulsed there and also on the California Plateau.

It will be noticed that the German counter-offensive, which was accompanied by constant bombardments on a very extensive scale of the French in the exposed trenches and dug-outs on the summit of the Hog's Back, had met with but trifling success, and that our Allies had, north-east of Craonne in the Chevreux region, pushed farther into the Laon Plain. The German Crown Prince, or to speak more accurately his staff, must by now have begun to doubt whether Hindenburg and Ludendorff had discovered an infallible specific. Nor on the Moronvilliers battle-field had any compensating advantages been gained.

After their defeat on May 20 the Germans had (May 21) promptly counter-attacked. They had been everywhere repulsed. On the 23rd an assault against the French on Mont Haut was stopped by barrages. Two days later towards nightfall our Allies extended their positions on both sides of Mont Cornillet and captured 120 prisoners. On Sunday, May 27, after a violent bombardment, the enemy in the



GERMANS ADVANCING TO ATTACK.

morning launched attacks against the Téton and the French positions east of that height. He entered the French trenches, but was speedily ejected. In the afternoon he attempted in vain to regain the summit of the Casque. About sunset the attacks on this point and the Téton were renewed, but, like another attack on the morning of the 28th, these efforts all came to nought. A raid against the French on Mont Blond executed on the latter day was also repulsed.

The 30th witnessed another German attempt to drive the French from Mont Blond. It was heavily repulsed. Later in the day Mont Blond and the French lines north-west of Aubérive were extensively bombarded with poison shells of heavy calibre, and at 2 a.m. on the 31st wave after wave of the enemy made for Mont Haut, the Casque, and the Téton. All through the day a fierce struggle for the summits of those hills continued. With bomb and bayonet the French met and defeated their opponents. At only one point, in some advanced posts north-east of Mont Haut, did the Germans gain a footing. A vigorous counter-attack finally threw them out from this hard-won gain.

By June 3, therefore, the German Crown Prince had recovered practically none of the ground lost between April 16 and May 20 at the Battles of Craonne-Reims and Moronvilliers. His counter-attacks had failed and his losses had been very seriously augmented. What those losses actually were was not revealed, but when we remember that the Franco-British troops on the Western Front between April 16 and June 2 had captured over 52,000 men, including more than 1,000 officers, 446

heavy and field guns, numerous trench mortars and over 1,000 machine-guns we may get some idea what they amounted to. Yet about this time the Kaiser despatched the following telegrams to the German Empress, Prince Rupprecht, and his own son, the Crown Prince :

To the German Empress :

According to the report of Field-Marshal von Hindenburg, the great British and French spring offensive has come to a definite end. Prepared for since the autumn and announced since the winter, the storming English and French Armies, supported by powerful masses of artillery and by technical resources of all kinds, have failed after a hard struggle of seven weeks. God's aid has been granted to our incomparable troops and has given them superhuman force to accomplish these excellent deeds and to endure successfully in the mightiest battles ever waged in the history of war. They are all heroes. Their deeds command the respect and gratitude which every German must show them. Praise and glory be to the Lord for His help and our thanks to Him for such a magnificent people in arms.

To the Crown Prince Rupprecht :

On the battlefields of Arras troops from all parts of Germany, under your command, have, in the fierce battles of the last two months, brought England's warlike intentions at this point to nought. Iron determination and firm will to victory spoke from the eyes of those whom I saw on my visit. A similar feeling fills the entire army. With me, the German Fatherland thanks its sons for their loyal devotion to our great German cause. Make known to all the leaders and the troops these my thanks, coupled with the confidence that, with God's help, they will be victorious also in the future fighting.

To the German Crown Prince :

On my visit to the front I only had an opportunity to address deputations from the armies which, under your command, in the two last months frustrated great French attempts to break through on the Aisne and in Champagne. I charge you to express my, and the Fatherland's, thanks to all the leaders and troops who in these difficult weeks exerted all their energy and ability and risked their blood and life, and by whose iron determination the enemy's assault was shattered. The German Fatherland is proud of its brave sons and full

of confidence that the new fighting will also bring new victories. God grant it.


The great British and French *spring* offensive had come to an end, according to Hindenburg. As it was now June that was obvious and banal, but the *summer* offensive of the Allies on the Western Front was by no means ended. A few days after those telegrams were despatched by Wilhelm II. another and more terrible Battle of Flanders opened with the explosion of the gigantic mines which had been laid beneath the German lines on the eastern end of the Mont des Cats ridge in the neighbourhood of Messines. Before, however, describing this battle, we shall have to turn back and see what Sir Douglas Haig had achieved before and during the Battles of Craonne-Reims and Moronvilliers. On April 9, 1917, he had hurled the armies of Horne and Allenby against the German positions from the ridge of Vimy to the southern face of the Scarpe heights east of Arras. The details of the fighting that had ensued will be given in a later chapter, but some idea of the effect of the sudden and unexpected offensive of the British in the Arras region may be gathered from the following statements made by a German prisoner to a wounded British officer. This German had lived several years in America,

and his views of the war may be fittingly contrasted with those of the Kaiser in the above telegrams :

This war is the greatest crime the world has ever seen.* The crimes that made the French Revolution are nothing if you compare them with the crimes of the beasts who are running Germany to-day and keeping this war going. They were only thieves and brigands when they began it, and thought they'd bring it off; but now they're the bloodiest murderers by wholesale that the world ever produced. There never was anything like it before. They know perfectly well they've lost the war; they've known for months that the last chances they ever had have gone. But they are frightened of their own miserable skins to admit it and call a halt; and because they are frightened of what the people might do when they learned the truth they keep the thing going, and sacrifice many thousands of Germans every single day and millions of money. For what? To shield the reputations of a handful of princes and politicians. It's the greatest crime the world has ever known. Here on this front our people are being killed like flies. Your artillery kills them in bunches. There isn't a minute of the day but legs and arms are being blown off. Our men would gladly give themselves up to end it, but you know they cannot. When there seems to be a chance there is always an officer or N.C.O.'s about. It is not only your guns that kill. Many Germans fall every day with German bullets in them. They are driven like dogs to the fighting. And to what end? Because our cursed Kaiser and the creatures we call statesmen are afraid of their lives for what will happen to them when the people know it's all up.

But plenty of them know it now. Many knew before ever I was forced to join up. And perhaps I never should have been made to join if I had known less and

* *Morning Post* of May 31.



LIQUID FIRE.

never said a word of what I did know. I talked a little of what I knew. And that is enough. In Germany to-day the man who will tell the truth must be hustled out of the way. That is why I see no hope for Germany; because those left in the country have no spirit; can do nothing. All the strength of the country, such as it is, is in the fighting lines—helpless as slaves. The others there in Germany, they are slaves—starving, starving quietly, never daring to say a word. The few who speak soon find themselves hustled into the front line, and no more is heard of them. They go on paying the price—thousands of lives ever day; every single day. The Central Powers' casualties now must be a hundred thousand a week. And all for what? The crazy dreams of a few bankers and merchants, and the cowardly fears of a few politicians and of the Hohenzollerns. They say the Hapsburgs, too; but the Austrians would be thankful to make peace to-morrow, but they cannot. They are as much sacrificed by Berlin as we poor devils are here on the front. All the bloody slaughter of this war, with its millions of money and thousands of lives lost—every single day—what keeps it going long after it has been finally decided is not the will of nations. No, it is the murderous criminality and cowardice of a little handful of men in Berlin who never have been anything but a pest in Europe.

Is not that the greatest crime the world has ever known? And is it not strictly true? Does any sane German suppose the appointed end can be altered when the whole New World is ranged against Germany as well as the Old? They know all about the hundred million men in the States; and the millions of millions of money; the innumerable factories and shipyards. They know that America can put hundreds of thousands of fresh troops on this front next spring, and that the exhaustion of Germany long before then will be frightful. It is frightful now; it has been frightful for a year and

more. They know it all; and, brute devils that they are, they choose to keep the awful slaughter going, not because they hope it can alter the end but for what you call "Wait and see!" because they fear to face to-day what they can put off till to-morrow, at the cost of another few thousand decent lives, another few millions of money. Never before since the world began has a twentieth part of such suffering been allowed to continue day after day and month after month to protect a handful of exalted criminals from general recognition of their crimes. The Russian people rose and smashed the bonds that bound them. Yes; but not our people. Our tyrants have been cleverer. It was only the bodies of the Russian people that were fettered. Their minds were free. No German mind, in Germany, has been free since 1870. The Berlin criminals have seen too well to that. Our people think they have been well educated. So they have—very well, very carefully—for just what they are doing now; for the blindest and most damnable kind of slavery the world has ever seen; for a slavery in which the will of the masters must be paid for daily by steadily running streams of the blood of their victims, victims taught to bare their own throats to the knife on the word of command. If your armies could reach Germany itself the slavery might end suddenly. But Germany to-day is one vast prison full of starving slaves who cannot lift a hand to help themselves, and that it will remain while William the Murderer can go on buying a daily reprieve for his own miserable family in return for the blood of ten thousand of his slaves. Thank God I am out of it!

It is not unfair to assume that there were others who held the same opinions about the situation as this prisoner.





CHAPTER CCXI.


THE INTERVENTION OF CHINA.

CHINA IN 1914—YUAN SHIH-K'AI AND HIS POLICY—HIS NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN—HIS PROPOSED CORONATION AS EMPEROR—HIS DEATH—THE NEW PRESIDENT AND PREMIER—THE FINANCIAL PROBLEM—SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS WITH GERMANY—A POLITICAL STRUGGLE—CHANG-HSÜN—THE "RESTORATION" OF THE MANCHUS—THE COUP D'ETAT AND "BATTLE OF PEKING"—TUAN CHI JUI AS DICTATOR—DECLARATION OF WAR—ALLIES' CONCESSIONS TO CHINA—"WELTPOLITIK" AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE—THE MISTAKES OF BRITISH POLICY—GERMAN TRADE DURING THE WAR—GERMAN PROPAGANDA AND INTRIGUES—PIRATE DIPLOMACY—THE OUTLOOK

THE present chapter deals with the history of China from the outbreak of hostilities in Europe to the declaration of war by China against Germany on August 14, 1917. The narrative of events during this period falls under three headings. In the first place it reviews briefly the condition of affairs in China, economic and political, which existed in 1914, and the subsequent course of internal events. Secondly, it explains the causes and circumstances which finally led the Chinese Government to join the ranks of the Allies. Thirdly, it describes the intrigues of Germany in China, intrigues no less deep laid and unscrupulous than those adopted by her diplomatic and secret service agents in other parts of the world.

As the Great War proceeded it became clear that when the great balance-sheet of the struggle was struck, when humanity came to compute the actual and prospective gains which it might set against its vast sum of suffering and devastation, the benefits accrued and accruing to China from the world war, and from its readjustment of the balance of power in the Far East, should form an important asset on the credit side. At the beginning of 1914 the process of national disintegration, which first became clearly marked in China

after her disastrous war with Japan in 1894, had been greatly accelerated by the disorders and internal dissensions following upon the collapse of the Manchu dynasty in 1912. The nation had been exhausted by the paroxysms of civil strife, brigandage and bloodshed, which resulted from the disappearance of established authority and the relaxation of moral restraints. The country was threatened not only by demoralization from within, but by forces of disintegration from without. Young China, as an effective regenerating force in politics, had been tried in the balance and found wanting. The hybrid radicalism of the Cantonese agitators led by Sun Yat-sen; the flagrant corruption of many of the professional politicians who had elected themselves to Parliament and to the provincial assemblies; the complete absence of any constructive policy in the Kuo-min-tang or any other exponent of Young China's exotic Republicanism—all served to justify the conclusion that nothing but the restoration of a strong centralized Government and autocratic methods could save China from bankruptcy and eventual partition. The financial condition of the country had been steadily going from bad to worse since the revolution of 1911 had dislocated the fiscal relations between the pro-



SUN YAT-SEN, AS PRESIDENT-ELECT OF THE CHINESE REPUBLIC, ON THE WAY TO SACRIFICE AT THE TOMB OF THE FIRST MING EMPEROR (FEBRUARY 15, 1912).

vinces and Peking, and let loose hordes of undisciplined troops to prey upon productive industry of every kind. Each provincial authority had become a law unto itself, supplementing its meagre revenues by all manner of desperate expedients, seeking ruinous relief

at the hands of foreign financiers, whose loans covered far-reaching schemes of peaceful penetration fatal to the economic independence of the country.

More than once in the recent history of China the stars in their courses had fought to

save the world's oldest civilization from final disruption. It was so in 1904, when Japan disputed with Russia the possession of Manchuria and the Liaotung Peninsula; it was so in the critical days of 1901, after the capture of Peking by the Armies of the Allies. In 1914 the dangers which threatened China, both from within and without, were sensibly diminished by the convulsion of war in Europe, and particularly by its effect upon her financial and political stability. The new situation afforded good reason for hoping that much of the sapping mole-work accomplished during the past decade by cosmopolitan finance directed from Berlin would be undone when peace should lead to an international agreement amongst the Allies concerning Far Eastern affairs. It was evident that, once relieved of the German menace which had fettered the policy of the Entente in China and imposed upon the commercial Powers a renewal of the "spheres of influence" régime (temporarily suspended after the Russo-Japanese war), the Anglo-Saxon race on both sides of the Atlantic and at the Antipodes would be able to devote to Chinese affairs the attention they deserved, and, with the sympathetic cooperation of Japan, to give the Chinese Government the moral and material support to set its house in order and to insure it against instability in the future. First, the opening of the Panama Canal, and now the emergence of the United States as a great military State, combined to make the future of China a matter of paramount importance to the balance of power in the Pacific. The interests of the world's peace and the progress of civilization would therefore necessitate insistence on the maintenance of the principles upon which the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was founded—the "open door" of equal opportunities, the protection of China's territory against encroachment, and of her sovereign right as an independent State. China's friends were justified in believing that the country had now a better prospect of establishing a stable and well-ordered Government than at any time during the past decade. At the same time much must depend, now and hereafter, upon the character of these rulers and the authority which they could command in the provinces.

In the summer of 1914 China possessed in Yuan Shih-k'ai a ruler whose statesmanship and personal prestige justified the hope that, under



[Elliott & Fry.]


DR. SUN YAT-SEN,

Leader of the Cantonese Radical party.

his firm guiding hand the authority of the Central Government might be effectively restored and law and order gradually evolved out of the chaotic conditions in the provinces. An orthodox Confucianist of the old school, Yuan Shih-k'ai had established under the Manchus a great reputation for diplomatic suppleness and energetic initiative, qualities which brought him conspicuously to the front as Viceroy of Chihli after the death of Li Hung-chang in 1901. He was a firm believer in benevolent despotism as the only possible form of government for China as at present constituted; a despotism like that of his illustrious mistress, the Empress Dowager Tzù Hsi, which should be strong enough to check the activities of political agitators and other creators of disorder. At the outbreak of the revolution in 1911 he had stood firm and resisted, practically single-handed, Young China's Republican programme, openly denouncing their theories and experiments in the art of government as bound to produce "the instability of a rampant democracy, of dissension and partition." His claims to leadership and authority were recognized at this crisis, not only by the Manchus, who recalled him hastily from retirement to supreme power,

but even by the revolutionaries themselves, who subsequently accepted him as the first President of the Chinese Republic. In that capacity Yuan Shih-k'ai adopted at the outset a policy of watchful waiting, slowly but surely gathering into his own hands the reins of power, gradually consolidating his administration at Peking and in the provinces by the appointment of officials pledged to support a policy of centralization. By the end of 1913 having secured the sinews of war in the shape of a foreign loan, he had shown his hand and, after easily defeating an armed insurrection of the Cantonese faction, had announced his intention of governing the country without interference and in accordance with ancient

concentrated in his own person, together with absolute control of the Army, the Navy and the Treasury. In June he greatly strengthened his control over the provinces by separating the civil from the military administration and by appointing his own nominees as military governors, controlled by the Ministry of War. Finally, with a clear recognition of the vital



[Elliott & Fry.]

SIR JOHN NEWELL JORDAN, K.C.B.,
British Minister in Peking since 1906.

tradition. He proceeded therefore, à la Cromwell, to put an end to the sorry farce of Parliamentary Government by abolishing the Kuo-min-tang (Radical) party and replacing Young China's provisional constitution by an administrative conference selected by himself. While continuing to render lip service to the broad principles of representative government, he assumed in fact all the prerogatives of an autocratic dictator, ruling China as Porfirio Diaz ruled Mexico, with an iron hand concealed under the velvet glove of oriental statecraft. In April, 1914, he framed a new Constitution, by which all administrative authority was



[Elliott & Fry.]

SIR RICHARD DANE, K.C.I.E.,
Foreign Chief Inspector of Salt Revenue, China,
since 1913.

importance of re-establishing the national finances on a sound basis, he endeavoured to restore the financial relations between Peking and the provinces and to re-organize the fiscal administration of the country. Much of the old medieval machinery was scrapped, men of his own choosing were set to work along new lines; his lieutenants at the provincial capitals were brought to recognize the necessity for providing from the country's internal resources revenue sufficient to meet its obligations without recourse to foreign loans. In this matter the war in Europe came as a blessing in disguise, in that it suspended the activities of the cosmopolitan financier, and with them the temptation to pay old debts by incurring new ones. But most important amongst the President Dictator's schemes of financial reform were those which he promoted under the able direction of Sir Richard Dane, in the drastic reorganization of the Salt Gabelle, reforms which produced amazing results and greatly improved the stability of the Central Government's financial position.

Yuan Shih-k'ai's subsequent attempt to restore the monarchical system of government in his own person merely carried his openly

avowed principles to their logical conclusion. Neither by his actions nor by his utterances had he ever definitely abandoned those principles or modified his profound distrust of "changes which run counter to immemorial custom." Had the question of the monarchy been solved along the lines of classical tradition, as a matter of internal politics, it can hardly be doubted that Yuan as Emperor would have succeeded in establishing his effective authority to the general satisfaction and benefit of the Chinese people. In the summer of 1914 it had become abundantly clear that his policy as President was deliberately intended to bring about the restoration of the Dragon Throne as the centre of the social structure prescribed by the Confucian system. By his decision to perform the Imperial sacrifice at the Temple of Heaven, he had virtually proclaimed himself, as *The Times* Correspondent at Peking observed, "an autocratic ruler, responsible not to the nation, but to the Almighty alone." Apart from the opposition of the Kuo-min-tang faction led by Sun Yat-sen—nationally speaking not so important a factor in the situation as some foreign observers were led to believe—everything pointed to the probability that the nation, if left to itself, would have welcomed the restoration of the monarchy, if only because the masses had come to associate the Republican doctrine with bloodshed and brigandage, and were weary of being looted in the name of liberty. The ruling class, the mandarin hierarchy, were always instinctively in sympathy with the restoration of the monarchical form of government.

But the question was not destined to be settled as a matter of internal politics. The plans of Yuan Shih-k'ai and his supporters failed to realize the danger of foreign intervention and particularly the interest evoked in Japan by any important change in China's affairs. The President's methods and mandates during the year preceding his acceptance of the Throne afforded striking proof of his profound knowledge of his countrymen, but they revealed also his inability to appreciate the international situation.

The movement for the restoration of the monarchy, organized by the Chou-An-hui Society, began to assume a definite form a year after the outbreak of war in Europe, in August, 1915. It failed conspicuously to take into account the significance of the demands which Japan had addressed to China, in settle-

ment of her outstanding claims, after the expulsion of the Germans from Kiao-Chao. These demands, submitted to the Chinese Government in the form of a Protocol by Mr. Hioki on January 18, 1915, were unmistakably of a nature to emphasize the special rights and material interests claimed by Japan as the result of her victories. As *The Times* observed, "it was obvious to everybody, except, perhaps, to the Chinese statesmen, that Japan would



YUAN SHIH-K'AI.

Viceroy of Chihli under the Manchus.
First President of the Republic. Died June 5, 1917.

probably make use of her opportunity to obtain some definite settlement of her many outstanding claims against her neighbour." It is not necessary, for the purposes of the present narrative, to recapitulate these claims or to recount the subsequent negotiations which took place at Peking between January and May. It was recognized in England that certain of the "contingent" and questionable demands put forward (which were not communicated to the Allied Powers) were inspired by the exigencies of the internal political situation in Japan. The Okuma Government had been defeated in the Chamber and a general election was impending, in which the Government had perforce to reckon with a strong popular demand



**YUAN SHIH-K'AI PERFORMS THE IMPERIAL SACRIFICE AT THE
TEMPLE OF HEAVEN:**

The president (marked with a X) on his way to the Altar.

for a stronger "forward" policy in China. After four months of tedious negotiations at Peking (in which German intrigue played its usual unblushing role by means of a systematic propaganda of falsehood in the Chinese Press) the Japanese Government presented an ultimatum to China (May 6) in which the "contingent" demands above mentioned were withdrawn and reserved for future discussion. Count Okuma's party had won the elections in March, but popular feeling was still strongly expressed on the subject of China, and the Government was being charged with vacillation and urged to employ its military forces to back its demands. On April 2 Count Okuma had taken occasion, through Reuter's correspondent, to declare that Japan's position and policy in her negotiations with China had been deliberately misrepresented, especially in America, as the result of false statements spread broadcast by German agents.

The attitude of Yuan Shih-k'ai throughout these negotiations was friendly but evasive; in refusing the greater part of the Japanese claims, he took his stand on the ground that it

was not possible for the Chinese Government to concede any demands calculated to impair China's sovereignty or the Treaty rights of other Powers, an attitude which effectively barred discussion on many of the subjects under discussion. He had also stipulated from the outset that Kiao-Chao should be completely restored to China and that China should be represented in the general peace negotiations after the war. In declining the finally modified demands of the Japanese Government on May 3 the Chinese Foreign Office expressed itself in a distinctly unconciliatory manner, revealing most inopportunistically the traditional mandarin arrogance and contempt for Japan's claims to be treated as a great Power. In this attitude it was encouraged, no doubt, by Count Okuma's public declaration of pacific and reasonable intentions. When confronted with a 48-hour ultimatum, however, Yuan Shih-k'ai and his advisers made the usual virtue of necessity and promptly yielded. By the terms of the settlement thus effected, Japan regularized and consolidated her position in Shantung (in succession to the Germans), in South

Manchuria, Eastern Inner Mongolia, and on the coast of Fukhien province.

The unpublished "contingent" demands, which meanwhile had formed the subject of "conversations" between Japan and her Allies, and which the wisdom of the Elder Statesmen eventually saw fit to postpone to a more convenient season, were not easy to reconcile with the assurance voluntarily communicated by Count Okuma's Government to the State Department in Washington at the beginning of the negotiations. As *The Times* observed :—

Demands that China should purchase from Japan more than half of any munitions of war she might require, or, in the alternative, that she should permit Japan to establish an arsenal in China to be worked jointly by the two States, that the police in parts of the Chinese Empire should be jointly administered by them, that Japanese advisers should be employed in political, financial, and military affairs, and that Japan should have the right to own land in the interior for certain purposes, were certainly liable to misconstruction, and might readily have opened the door to dangerous controversies in the future. Rights of the kind require to be strictly defined, if they are not to interfere with the political independence or the territorial integrity of the State to which they apply, or with the policy of the open door which Japan has advocated in common with England, the United States, and other Powers.

Yuan Shih-k'ai's diplomacy had brought him thus far fairly successfully through a

difficult situation ; but his usual astuteness was lacking when he failed to draw from these negotiations the obvious conclusion that, in the matter of his personal ambitions to found a new dynasty, he would have to reckon seriously with the Japanese Government. He had never been *persona grata* in Japan since the days when, as Li Hung Chang's lieutenant and Resident in Corea, he had opposed Japanese policy and supported that of Russia ; he might well have foreseen that the Government at Tokio would discourage any attempt on his part to establish himself upon the throne of China. He was certainly not without warning on this score. One of the ablest and most influential writers in China, the famous scholar Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, who had served as Minister of Justice in Yuan's first Cabinet during the crisis of 1911, and had then strongly supported the maintenance of the Monarchy, together with a constitutional form of government, retired from the State Council in August, 1915, and openly denounced the monarchical movement on broad principles of national policy. In September he published his opinions on the subject in a series of articles in the *Peking Gazette*. His objections to Yuan's accession



YUAN SHIH-K'AI PERFORMS THE IMPERIAL SACRIFICE AT THE TEMPLE OF HEAVEN:

The president descending from the Altar after the ceremony.


to the Throne were based partly on grounds of classical orthodoxy and partly on recognition of the certainty of Japan's intervention. Regarding the matter from the point of view of historical precedents, ever dear to the mind of the *literati*, he observed that public opinion would undoubtedly support the President's accession to the Throne "if he had first defeated a foreign foe in a decisive battle." There being no immediate prospect of this solution, he laid stress on the fact that "full recognition of the monarchy was not likely to be accorded to China by certain Powers until after the Peace Conference of Europe has concluded its business." Referring specifically to Japan, he observed that "the country which has the loudest voice in our affairs is that which lies close to our elbow," and predicted that "if this country has occasion to consider the question of recognition, it will also have occasion to interfere. Even a little child," he concluded, "can foresee that Japan will not recognize the new Government without demanding the concession of further privileges, which China dare not refuse." Yuan Shih-k'ai was undoubtedly impressed by the views of this famous writer. He recognized their far-reaching influence, and made every effort to enlist Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's support and to persuade him to speak smooth things; but in vain.

In October the State Council made a show of constitutional procedure by referring the question of the monarchy to a vote of the

provinces, or rather to a number of individuals selected by the President and his supporters to represent them. In due course, on October 30, the expected happened. The Japanese Minister at Peking, accompanied by his British and Russian colleagues, called at the Chinese Foreign Office and offered friendly advice on behalf of his Government against the restoration of the monarchical system. He pointed out that while Europe was at war it would be dangerous for China to make changes likely to create internal dissensions; for this reason his Government respectfully advised the President temporarily to postpone the projected change. The Foreign Minister replied that the Chinese Government had no reason to anticipate serious opposition in the provinces, and that, having referred the question to the decision of the people, they must abide by the issue, whatever it might be. The issue, of which there never was any doubt, was a practically unanimous "vote" in favour of Yuan's accession (November 5). Yuan Shih-k'ai's attitude at this juncture plainly intimated his conviction that the danger of foreign intervention in China's domestic affairs would not be increased or diminished by any change in the form of the Government. He believed, indeed, that the pre-occupation of the European Powers in the war had greatly lessened the chance of such intervention, and he evidently under-estimated the risk of serious opposition being organized



YUAN SHIH-K'AI (IN CENTRE) AND HIS SUPPORTERS:
Taken at the Wai-wu-pu after the ceremony of the inauguration of Yuan Shih-k'ai as president.



THE CEREMONY AT THE TEMPLE OF HEAVEN:

Juvenile choristers with pheasant-tail wands.

against him in China. As regards Japan, he appears to have thought that active intervention from that quarter would strengthen his hands and gain for him the support of patriotic opinion, even amongst the Young China revolutionaries. In deference to further representations from the Japanese Minister and his colleagues, he directed the Minister for Foreign Affairs to state that the Government was in a position to deal with opposition in China, but that it must depend on the good offices of foreign Governments to control revolutionaries domiciled outside its jurisdiction—an unmistakable reference to the support given in Japan to Sun, Yat-sen, Huang Hsing, and other political agitators. (Here again, Yuan's courage was greater than his wisdom: for his experience during the revolution of 1911 and on many other occasions should have reminded him that revolutions in China are rather a matter of money than of political ideals, and that a handful of energetic men with dollars could get the rabble army of any province to move in any and every direction.) On November 9 the Chinese Government, while adhering to its intentions, announced that no change in the system of government would take place before the New Year.


On December 6 came the first mutterings of the storm which eventually put an end to Yuan Shih-k'ai and all his ambitions. A Government cruiser lying off the Arsenal at

Shanghai was seized by a party of 30 revolutionaries, chiefly naval students; but the affair was purely local, and the subsequent proceedings on both sides savoured of opera bouffe. Thereupon the State Council memorialized the President to put an end to the prevalent uncertainty and unrest by proclaiming himself Emperor without further delay. After the customary face-saving protestations of unworthiness, Yuan Shih-k'ai complied, and on the 12th of December the monarchy was proclaimed. The coronation ceremony was fixed for February 9. But it was not to be.

Within a week after the issue of the mandate announcing Yuan's accession came rumours of a serious insurrection brewing in the far-western province of Yunnan, organized and led by Tsai Ao, a military official educated in Japan, whom Yuan had appointed to the military governorship of the province after the revolution. On December 27 the revolutionary leaders and gentry of Yunnan declared the independence of their province, in opposition to the monarchy, and Tsai Ao dispatched a rabble army, estimated at 30,000 men, against the Imperial forces which had been hurriedly sent to Szechuan. Despite initial successes gained by the Government, the insurrectionary movement spread rapidly; it was bound to do so in view of the fact that in nearly every province there were bodies of unpaid and undisciplined troops, under generals of doubtful

loyalty, eager for opportunities of looting. By the end of January the provinces of Kueichou and Kwangsi had renounced their allegiance. Yuan's star was now visibly declining, and his supporters, following immemorial custom, were deserting him. When his right-hand man, Feng Kuo-Chang, the Commander-in-Chief at Nanking, declined to support him, and bodies of the Imperial troops began to make common cause with the rebels, his friends at the capital persuaded him to issue an official announcement (January 22) that the establishment of the monarchy would be indefinitely postponed. But the step came too late. In China nothing fails like failure, and Yuan, as aspirant Emperor, could never hope to command from the *literati* the same kind of blind loyalty which the best type of classical Confucianists displayed for the Manchu dynasty, even in its decline.

By the end of March the tide of ill-fortune was running so strongly against him that his few remaining friends urged him to abdicate the Presidency and retire into private life. A month later the provinces of Kuangtung and Kiangsi had joined the hue and cry; Yuan was denounced as a traitor and a usurper by the representatives of the same provinces which had urged him to ascend the Throne six months before. The remnants of his army were isolated and helpless in far-off Szechuan, the provincial Treasuries had suspended all remittances to Peking, and his act of renunciation had merely served to intensify the vindictive feelings and personal ambitions of his adversaries. His position was clearly impossible; even amidst his own protégés of the Court faction there were few to do reverence to the Strong Man who had failed. On



FUNERAL OF YUAN SHIH-K'AL

April 22, hoping still to retrieve something of the desperate situation, Yuan agreed to surrender all civil authority to the Cabinet, reconstructed under the Premiership of Tuan Chi-jui, who came to the front at this juncture. Tuan, of whom more will be heard, was Yuan's Minister of War in 1913, when he had displayed much energy and ability in defeating the abortive "campaign to punish Yuan," launched by Sun Yat-sen and his revolutionary friends. Despite his conservative and monarchical tendencies, he was popular with the leaders of the southern faction; an able diplomatist, and credited by his friends with unusual nimbleness of opinion in politics. Upon his accession to the premiership, his Cabinet proceeded to placate the southern party by announcing its intention of re-establishing Parliamentary Government at an early date. Meanwhile the southern Kuo-min-tang leaders had proclaimed Li Yuan-hung, the Vice-President of the Republic, as President, and had constituted themselves into a new Provisional Government at Canton, without reference to Peking. What would have been the ultimate fate of Yuan Shih-k'ai under these conditions none can say; he solved all such problems by dying on June 5. The medical men who attended him ascribed his death to kidney trouble and nervous prostration; the man in the street at Peking said, with equal truth, that he died of "eating bitterness" and loss of face. Officialdom at Peking appeased its conscience, and possibly placated the soul of the departed, by a State funeral on a most imposing scale.

Yuan Shih-k'ai having passed to his rest, Li Yuan-hung became President of the Chinese Republic, with Tuan Chi-jui as Premier. The country, or, rather, the vernacular Press, expressed great relief at the change and confidence in the early establishment of law and order under the beneficent direction of a constitutional Government. But if ever, when in disgrace with fortune, Yuan may have had misgivings as to the wisdom and patriotism of his own policy, his august shade had not to wait over long by the Yellow Springs of Hades to see them justified, and his words fulfilled concerning the need for benevolent despotism and the evils of government under a "rampant democracy." The late Dictator had not been dead a month before it became apparent at Peking that only a strong hand of absolute authority could hope to impose a stable govern-

ment upon the conflicting policies and ambitions of the semi-independent military chieftains and amateur politicians who now aspired to rule the country. Many experienced observers had foreseen that the substitution of the Dictator's rule for that of a number of jealous provincial



GENERAL LI YUAN-HUNG.

Succeeded Yuan as President of the Republic.
Resigned July, 1917.

governors would mean chaos, and they were right.

The passing of Yuan left the central Government's finances in a parlous state and the administration completely disorganized. A month before his death the Government banks at Peking had suspended specie payments and the military leaders were fiercely clamouring for money. Tuan Chi-jui and the new Cabinet formed at the end of June, containing representatives of all parties, hoped to restore the fiscal machinery by convening the Parliament of 1913 for August 1 and by other measures calculated to conciliate the Kuo-min-tang leaders. The Cantonese section, however, showed no signs of willingness to cooperate with the new Government. On July 8 Admiral Li Ting-hsin published a manifesto at Shanghai, in which he declared that the Navy was determined to prevent the domination of the country by the militarists and monarchists who still controlled the administration; behind the

Navy was Tang Shao-yi, who had been a staunch monarchist under the Manchus and one of Yuan Shih-k'ai's ablest lieutenants in the Chihli Viceroyalty, but now a leader of Young China irreconcilable. Tang Shao-yi and his friends demanded the immediate revival of the provisional Constitution drawn up by the Republican leaders at Nanking in 1911. Tuan Chi-jui endeavoured to win over this very able but fractious official by making him Minister for Foreign Affairs in the new Cabinet, but Tang declined the honour. The proceedings at the re-opening of Parliament on August 1 showed clearly that the opposition of the Kuo-min-tang to Peking had not ended with the monarchy, but that it would continue to be actively organized against the military party and its leader, the Premier Tuan Chi-jui. The military governors, on their side, who actually dominated the situation, were willing to give the Parliamentarians an opportunity of justifying their political existence, but they were frankly sceptical as to the utility of an institution which in the past had confined its constructive statesmanship to voting £600 a year to each of its members. From the outset it was clear that the life of the resuscitated Parliament would depend upon the good pleasure of the military governors and upon funds being made available for the generous maintenance of their armies.

For the remainder of the year the financial problem continued to be serious, though somewhat relieved by the increasingly satisfactory results of the Salt Gabelle under Sir Richard Dane. In the spring of 1917 the question of China's entering the war on the side of the Allies came to be seriously considered by the Chinese Cabinet. Tuan Chi-jui had for some time past been in favour of this course, because he realized that it would not only improve China's political position, and entitle her to a voice in the ultimate settlement of Far Eastern affairs, but that it would greatly alleviate the country's financial situation. When, therefore, at the beginning of February, the U.S. Minister at Peking invited the Chinese Government to follow the example of the United States by formally protesting against the illegality and barbarism of Germany's submarine campaign, and by severing diplomatic relations, the seed fell upon ground well prepared. On February 9 the Chinese Government replied to the German Note announcing the unlimited submarine campaign, by an

energetic protest and an intimation that if the protest were disregarded diplomatic relations would be broken off. But Tuan Chi-jui and his friends were not to have their undisputed way in this matter. As usual, the question became rapidly involved in a network of internal politics, in which German intrigue played no inconsiderable part and German money secured the support of a considerable faction. The result, as usual, was a ministerial crisis, in which the President's and the Premier's views came into sharp conflict. Tuan Chi-jui's supporters, all for immediate and energetic action, were opposed by the President on the ground that the matter was one for the decision of Parliament; their action was fiercely attacked and their motives impugned by the German-subsidized Press. At the outset their position was somewhat weakened by the delay which took place in the severance of relations between the United States and Germany, and by the failure of the Allies to convey any collective intimation to China that her intervention in the war would be welcome. This deficiency was remedied, however, on February 28, when the Allied Ministers at Peking presented a memorandum to the Chinese Government expressing sympathy with its action in regard to Germany and promising, in the event of diplomatic relations being severed, to consider favourably the suspension of the Boxer indemnity payments and a revision of the Chinese Customs tariff. Germany, on her side, was spending money freely at several military headquarters and had offered to wipe out several outstanding financial claims against China, in the hope of avoiding a rupture. Tuan's Cabinet, after referring the matter to the political leaders at Peking and in the provinces, decided on March 2 to sever relations with Germany and to instruct the provincial authorities accordingly. President Li Yuan-hung, however, declined to sign these instructions, whereupon Tuan Chi-jui resigned. But the majority of Parliament and nearly all the leading politicians were against the President; Tuan could also count upon the energetic support of the military governors. After twenty-four hours' reflection the President gave way, whereupon Tuan withdrew his resignation, and proceeded to lay the facts of the situation before a meeting of representatives of both Houses of Parliament. On March 11 Parliament voted for the severance of relations with Germany. They were severed on the 14th, and on the same date the German

ships at Shanghai and Amoy were seized by the Chinese authorities.

So far so good. But neither China nor the Allies could hope to derive advantages from the steps thus taken commensurate with their importance unless and until they were carried to their logical conclusion by a declaration of war against the Central Powers. Looking back on what occurred at Peking during the five months which elapsed before this declaration

abhorrence The Chinese people are accustomed, as the result of the many invasions and rebellions that have ravaged their country, to the savageries of bandit warfare, to the looting of cities and the slaughter of unoffending citizens, but their history contains no record of cold-blooded barbarism to equal the deliberate policy of ruthless warfare upon civilians initiated by the rulers of Germany. Even more than by the sinking of neutral merchant ships,



THE MAIN STREET OF SHANGHAI.

was made, it is evident that at no time was there ever any serious difference of opinion among the various political and military factions as to the advisability of China throwing in her lot with the Powers fighting for the ideals and institutions of civilized humanity against Germany's ruthless barbarism. Differences of interests there undoubtedly were, and factional jealousies that became actually intensified by the prospect of a central Government at Peking relieved of its most pressing financial burdens; but never any vital differences of principles or national policy. Despite the activity of German propaganda, educated opinion throughout China had slowly but surely come to appreciate the inherent brutality of German kultur and to regard its results with

the Chinese were impressed by the Germans' violations of international law in Belgium, by their wholesale deportation of defenceless Belgians into captivity and forced labour; but all their humane and religious instincts were particularly outraged by the horrible callousness of the Germans in their treatment of their dead.

The Chinese Cabinet's war policy was therefore approved in principle by Parliament, and generally endorsed throughout the country, at the end of March. A conference of military leaders held at Peking on April 26 voted for an immediate declaration of war; six days later the Cabinet passed a unanimous resolution to the same effect. On May 10 the matter was brought up for debate in the Lower House




HSU SHIH-CH'ANG,
Viceroy of Manchuria under the Manchus.
A Monarchist "Elder Statesman."

of Parliament; the result showed clearly that while there was no genuine opposition to the war, the Parliamentarians, with the President behind them, were determined to treat the question as an opportunity for an attack upon Tuan Chi-jui and the military party. How far German threats and bribes were factors in this determination remains necessarily a matter

for conjecture, but both undoubtedly carried a certain amount of weight with the opposition. On May 19 a resolution was adopted by Parliament declaring that, while not opposed to the entry of China into the war, the House would refuse to consider the question until the Cabinet had been reconstructed. In other words, the situation was to be determined, not by the merits of the national policy proposed, but by gratifying the envy and jealousy of politicians. All parties recognized quite clearly the moral and material advantages which the Chinese Government might expect to gain by declaring war on the Central Powers (the abolition of indemnity and loan interest payments to Germany alone represented a sum of £6,000 a day), but the opposition headed by the Kuo-m'n-tang was not disposed to see those advantages secured by Tuan Chi-jui and the military governors without a struggle.

The struggle accordingly took place. It involved in its three months' course the dismissal of Parliament by order of the military governors, the resignation of the President, and finally an abortive restoration of the Manchu dynasty and a comic-opera battle between Republican-Monarchists and Monarchist-Republicans around the Forbidden City. Following immediately upon Parliament's demand for a reconstruction of the Cabinet, the President decided upon a new trial of strength with his masterful Premier. He proceeded to reconstruct the Cabinet by obtaining the resignation




LOOT AND REFUGEES AT TIENTSIN, MARCH, 1912.

or by the dismissal of all its members except Tuan himself. But the Cabinet, thus reduced to one, adhered firmly to its position and declined to renounce its policy; it urged the President to dissolve Parliament, plainly hinting that the military governors, determined on the declaration of war, had no intention of leaving Peking until he had done so. On May 23 President Li (apparently supported by a section of the military party) took his courage in both hands and dismissed the Premier. Tuan announced his intention to defy the mandate, and proceeded to confer with his friends at Tientsin. A week later the military governors of several provinces north of the Yangtze declared their independence of the Central Government. The attitude of Vice-President Feng Kuo-Chang at this juncture was, as usual, one of benevolent neutrality, and the solution of the crisis seemed therefore to rest with General Chang Hsün, the genial swashbuckler of Shantung, who had made a name for himself as a military Vicar of Bray under the Manchus and during the revolution. In the south Sun Yat-sen, Tang Shao-yi and other Kuo-min-tang leaders were loudly denouncing Tuan and his supporters as exponents of militarism, and calling on all patriots to rally to the defence of Parliament and the people's liberties. Their voice was the voice of Young China, but too often there was reason to believe that the unseen hand was the hand of Potsdam.

The military governors, after accusing the President and Parliament of trying to destroy the responsible Cabinet system, cut short further argument about constitutional principles by nominating a Provisional Government of their own at Tientsin, with Hsü Shih-chang (an amiable septuagenarian, ex-guardian of the Manchu heir-apparent) cast for the dummy rôle of Dictator. The President's position had now become difficult and dangerous. General Nieh, Military Governor of Anhui, defined it succinctly by stating that he would be allowed to retain office only on condition of submitting to the military party and dissolving Parliament. He added, with curious frankness, that if General Chang Hsün went to Peking it would not be to make peace between President and Premier, but to restore the Manchus. On June 12 Chang Hsün arrived at the capital, preceded by a "bodyguard" of several thousand men. He came ostensibly as mediator, but it was observed that his troops

proceeded to occupy the Fengtai railway junction and other strategic points. His mediation proved rapidly effective; on the day after his arrival, the President dissolved Parliament by mandate.

No sooner had Chang Hsün emerged as the



GENERAL TUAN CHI-JUI,
Premier and Leader of the Peiyang
party.

central figure on the stage than there were signs of trouble and dissension between him and certain of his colleagues in the military party. At this juncture, the question of declaring war against Germany was temporarily relegated by common consent to the background of practical politics; public attention became completely engrossed in the clash of personal ambitions at Peking. Tuan Chi-jui remained at Tientsin watching events; a new Premier had been elected by Parliament (Li Ching-hsi, a son of Li Hung-Chang), but he had so far declined to assume office and seemed rather disposed to support

the action of the section of the military party which demanded the reinstatement of Tuan. The leaders of the Kuo-min-tang in the dissolved Parliament had made haste to leave for the south, where the Press was proclaiming an irreparable breach with the north, and the navy, manned chiefly by southerners, made no secret of its intention to oppose Peking and the military governors.



GENERAL CHANG HSÜN.

Leader of the abortive restoration of the Manchu dynasty.

This tangled situation was rendered still more complicated, and the President's anti-war policy temporarily strengthened, by a Note handed to the Chinese Government by the American Minister at Peking on June 6, in which the United States Government deplored the growth of internal dissensions in China and intimated that the restoration of national unity and a stable administration was even more important than the declaration of war by China against Germany. This advice was morally justified, no doubt, by the facts of the situation; nevertheless, it had several obviously weak points which made it politically unsound. In the first place, it conflicted sharply with the advice tendered from Washington only two months before; in the second, it was calculated (as a Reuter message from Tokyo promptly observed) to accentuate the existing party strife at Peking, for the reason that the

President's faction would naturally regard it as an intimation that the U.S. Government was opposed to the policy of Premier Tuan and his adherents. A considerable section of public opinion in Japan regarded this Note as unjustifiable under the circumstances and likely to do more harm than good. The fact that since his accession to power as Premier Tuan Chi-jui's policy had been framed and carried out in close touch with Japan was a factor in the situation that could not be ignored; it was, indeed, Young China's chief political reason for denouncing him and his military supporters. Everything justifies the assumption that Tuan's policy in this matter was largely due to his intelligent observation of the causes that had contributed to the downfall of Yuan Shih-k'ai, and to the prudent advice of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao; to recognition, in fact, of Japan's predominant position in the Far East and of her material interests in China. Sun Yat-sen and his friends of the Kuo-min-tang had frequently recognised that position and those interests, when it suited them to do so, in the past, and most notably when they sought and obtained material assistance from Japan in the revolution of 1911. This, however, did not prevent them now from denouncing Tuan Chi-jui as a tool of the Government at Tokyo and accusing him of having made a secret agreement prejudicial to China with Japan, as the price of her support for the military-monarchist party.

The "mediation" of General Chang Hsün, as events proved, was not intended to promote either the policy of the President or that of the Premier. There was German money behind him, it is true, and had his *coup de main* been successful there would have been little prospect of China's joining the Allies; but his immediate object was the restoration of the Manchu dynasty in the form of a Regency administered by himself as Viceroy of Chihli. During the 18 days that elapsed between the arrival of his advanced guard at the Temple of Heaven and his proclamation of the restoration of the Dragon Throne (July 1), General Chang Hsün continued to mediate, for form's sake, with the President, with the result that by June 24 Li Ching-hsi had agreed to assume the Premiership for three months, and the President had consented to a conservative redrafting of the Constitution, a considerable restriction of his own powers and the election of a new Parliament with reduced member-

ship. These things being settled, the Military Governors of Honan, Shantung, Chihli and Fengtien agreed to withdraw their troops and rescind their declaration of independence. Things seemed to be shaping towards an amicable settlement in accordance with the wishes of the military party; but as a matter of fact, every innkeeper and muleteer in Peking knew that something was afoot more important than these face-saving negotiations, and that the Son of Heaven, after five years' dignified detachment in the profound seclusion of his palace, was about to be brought back, together with many other ancient ways suited to "the unbroken continuity of immemorial tradition." There is no possible doubt that the restoration of the Manchu dynasty as a Constitutional Monarchy had been discussed and approved by the Military Governors, including Tuan Chi-jui, at their several Conferences at Hsü-chou-fu in 1916; the failure of Chang Hsün's colleagues to support him and the restored throne in July, 1917, was not due to any Republican sympathies on their part, but solely to the fact that Chang Hsün, a blunt, ambitious soldier and no politician, had stolen a march on his associates and could by no means be permitted to reap the fruits thereof.

His Majesty the boy Hsüan Tung and the remnants of the Imperial Manchu family in the tranquil recesses of the palace, had certainly no hand in the plot. When, after six days of brief eminence (more emphasised in the European and American Press than in his own capital) he returned once more to the enjoyment of the stately dignities and ceremonial etiquette of his Court without a kingdom, the triumphant "Republican" generals published a communication from the Emperor in the *Peking Gazette*, explaining that he, being only a boy, had been unable to prevent General Chang Hsün from issuing edicts in his name, but that the authority of the House of Ching had been wrongfully invoked and abused.


On July 1, following the precedent for similar *coups d'état* established by her Majesty the Empress Dowager Tzü Hsi, General Chang Hsün dragged the reluctant young Emperor from his bed at three o'clock in the morning. Forthwith the city bedecked itself with Dragon flags, by order of the police (the very fact that they were available gives cause for reflection), and within 24 hours the old order was peacefully re-established. It has already been said

that Chang Hsün was no politician; he now proved it by a tactless assumption of supreme authority, conferring the highest honours in



HSÜAN TUNG,
The Boy Ex-Emperor of China.

the land, indiscriminately and without consulting the recipients, and by assuming that the Military Governors' avowed sympathy for the monarchy would lead them to support it under his direction. Therein he erred, chiefly because (as *The Times* correspondent justly said) he himself was an "outsider," almost an accident, in the Councils of the Peiyang military party. Tuan Chi-jui now emerged from his retirement at Tientsin, and promptly put himself at the head of an army determined to vindicate the Republic and to "exterminate Chang Hsün as a criminal and a robber." In this object he was supported by the Vice-President, Feng Kuo-chang, commanding the Republican army of the south, and by other generals who, as a matter of common knowledge, had been staunch monarchists a year before. Not without justice was Chang Hsün's pathetic plaint for mediation addressed to the Foreign Ministers. When he found himself out



THE ATTEMPT TO RESTORE THE MONARCHY:

Chang Hsün's followers outside the Temple of Heaven after the proclamation of Hsuan Tung.

numbered and cornered he said that, in restoring the Emperor to the Throne, he had acted in complete good faith, hoping to put a stop to the country's internal dissensions, and having every reason to expect support "from his pledged associates, with whom he was now forced to do battle." His troops realized, just as readily as their leader, that there was little advantage to be gained by endeavouring to maintain an untenable position; the defence of the monarchy was therefore half-hearted and desultory. On July 12 the defenders of the Imperial City capitulated, upon an amicable understanding that they were to receive three months' pay, money down. The total casualties, including a number amongst the Legation Guards and foreign civilians, amounted to 25 killed and 45 wounded. Before retiring upon his last position in the Imperial City, Chang Hsün had asked the Foreign Legations to mediate, and had threatened, if pushed to extremities, to publish the minutes of one of the conferences at Hsüchow-fu, at which, he said, both Tuan Chi-jui and Feng Kuo-chang had promised to support the restoration of the Manchus. Chang Hsün, after escaping to the refuge of the Dutch Legation with the help of some of his Austrian friends, was eventually permitted to retire into private life and left in enjoyment of his property.

This semi-farcical restoration escapade proved in its conclusion to be a blessing in disguise, in that it expedited and facilitated the establishment of a strong Cabinet under Tuan Chi-jui (who now returned to resume the Premiership) and practically ensured the declaration of war by China against Germany. President Li Yuan-hung, who had fled for refuge to the Japanese Legation on the proclamation of the monarchy, finally declined to resume a post for which he had never had any inclination or real fitness, and which Tuan Chi-jui triumphant would have made very uncomfortable for him. On July 18 it was announced, to the very general relief of those who feared further internal dissensions, that Vice-President General Feng Kuo-chang had agreed to accept the Presidency and that he would cooperate in the policy of Premier Tuan. For some days it was feared that General Feng, an opportunist of the wait-and-see order, might elect to throw in his lot with Tuan's adversaries, the Kuo-min-tang leaders, and the navy in the south. The Kuo-min-tang had just published a manifesto at Shanghai in which they declared

themselves opposed to Tuan, for the same reason that they professed to favour his policy of war against Germany—namely, that they disliked exponents and supporters of militarism. The navy had issued a similar document, declaring the Government at Peking to be illegally constituted, and demanding the immediate convocation of Parliament. Had Feng Kuo-chang and his army taken sides with the southerners, Tuan Chi-jui's chances of organizing anything like a strong Central Government would have been problematical; observers on the spot had reason for grave misgivings on this score, because it was well known that, apart from the chronic jealousies that exist between the Peking and Nanking administrations, there had never been much love lost between Generals Tuan and Feng.

The return to power of Tuan, practically in the position of a Dictator, made it certain that China's diplomatic rupture with Germany would now be followed by a declaration of war, involving not only the sequestration of German property and the internment or deportation of German subjects, but also the complete uprooting of German financial and commercial interests throughout the country. It was not long before the Premier, having formed his Cabinet on conciliatory and moderate lines, gave evidence of his intentions in this matter. Having ascertained General Feng's willingness to accept the Presidency, he informed the Allied Ministers that, upon the latter's arrival in Peking and assumption of office, the Cabinet would proceed to declare war; in the meanwhile, he intimated that it would greatly strengthen his hands if the Allied Powers, in fulfilment of their promises, would now make a definite declaration of the financial and other advantages which they were prepared to concede to China. On more than one occasion since March the representatives of Great Britain, Japan and the United States had assured the Chinese Government that the Allies would treat China generously as regards the suspension of the Boxer indemnity and the revision of the customs tariff, and the Chinese, on their side, had expressed their readiness to declare war against Germany without making a specific bargain, relying upon the Allies' promise of fair treatment; nevertheless, bearing in mind the number of Powers concerned in the indemnity question, and their possibly conflicting interests, it was only natural that Tuan and his supporters should desire, before


taking the final and irrevocable step, to receive assurances of a kind that would give confidence to waverers and prevent effective criticism by the opposition. Owing chiefly to the situation in Russia, it was not possible for the Allied Governments, however well disposed, to come quickly to a common understanding in these matters; recognizing this fact, and being urged by the Japanese and British Governments to rely upon the good faith of the Allies,* Tuan decided to face the risk of the Kuo-min-tang's opposition, and to proceed to declare war against the Central Powers.

Feng Kuo-chang arrived in Peking on August 1; his assumption of the Presidency greatly strengthened the position and prestige of the Central Government. A few days before Sun Yat-sen and his extremist friends had issued a proclamation in Kuangtung refusing to recognize orders from Peking and proposing that Parliament should meet under a provisional Government at Canton; but without men or money behind them the fulminations of the Kuo-min-tang leaders might well be disregarded. The strength of Tuan's position in dealing with the southern revolutionary element and the professional agitators of Young China lay chiefly in his good understanding with the Japanese Government; for the first time since

* The concessions which the Allied Powers agreed to make to China, in recognition of her spontaneous declaration of war, were communicated to the Chinese Government on September 8.

the Russo-Japanese war the Central Government at Peking might confidently expect the Japanese authorities in China and Japan to discourage any further attempts at treasonable conspiracies and sedition in the central and southern provinces. In this assurance Tuan Chi-jui and his Cabinet proceeded therefore to carry out their policy, and on August 3 unanimously resolved on declaring war against the Central Powers. The formal declaration took place on August 14.

Had it not been for the peculiar qualities of jealousy and intrigue which habitually dominate politics in eastern countries, public opinion, so far as it exists, in China would undoubtedly have brought about the declaration of war at the same time, and for the same reasons, that the United States threw in her lot with the Allies. Internal politics intervened, as has been shown, to prevent this. To a certain extent it may be admitted that President Li Yuan-hung and those who supported his policy of neutrality were influenced by considerations of a prudent and patriotic nature and unaffected by the atmosphere of poisonous intrigue, intimidation and bribery which emanated from Germany's diplomatic, consular, financial and secret-service agents. President Li himself, for example, was certainly much influenced by fear of the effects of the revolution in Russia, a fear which he frankly confessed and which outweighed in his judgment the help which the Allies might



CHANG HSÜN'S FOLLOWERS TAKEN PRISONER BY REPUBLICAN TROOPS.

expect to receive from the United States. But, broadly speaking, the opposition to President Tuan's war policy was due to German instigation, and maintained by German intrigues and a lavish expenditure of German money. Of which matters more remains to be said.

The last manifestation of internal politics with which Tuan Chi-jui had to contend, viz., Chang Hsün's *coup d'état*, was undoubtedly "made in Germany." As events proved, however, it turned out to the advantage both of Premier Tuan and of the Allies, who desired to see China closed to the activities of German agents. So long as the President and the Premier at Peking were divided in counsel, there could be no hope of establishing the strong Central Government in which lay China's only hope of peaceful progress and stability. Chang Hsün's blundering attempt to restore the Manchus enabled Tuan Chi-jui to make a fresh start, with every prospect of financial solvency and of assistance from the Powers best able to give the Central Government effective support, moral and material. As *The Times* observed (August 18), stability of government at Peking being fundamentally a question of solvency,

Chang Hsün's blundering attempt to restore the Monarchy has proved a blessing in disguise, in so far that it has enabled Tuan Chi-jui to resume control of the Government with the half-hearted, but nevertheless effective, blessing of General Feng Kuo-chang, who succeeds to the Presidency. It is characteristic of the peculiar qualities of intrigue which habitually dominate politics in Eastern countries that many of those who fervently supported Tuan against President Li in March, when he insisted on severing relations with Germany, now oppose him with equal fervour on grounds of internal politics, for having carried that act to its logical conclusion. Scheming agitators of the Cantonese faction, politicians of the class of Sun Yat-sen and Tang Shao-yi, now refuse to recognize the authority of the Central Government, not because of its policy in joining the Allies, but on alleged grounds of concern for the purity of Republican ideals and the sanctity of Parliamentary procedure.

By an agreement between the *Consortium* banks at Peking (excluding the German) it was arranged upon China's declaration of war that the Chinese Government should receive an immediate loan of 10,000,000 yen for general administrative purposes, secured against the Salt Gabelle revenues. The Chinese Government, having many claims to meet at home and abroad, would have liked to borrow on a much larger scale, but in their own interests they were advised that with exchange at its then high level it would be folly to do so. As the result of the war in Europe, and of China's participation therein, she soon stood in a

financial position which, if carefully handled, should enable her to recover complete stability. Her internal resources were increased and her foreign obligations reduced; under these conditions it was to be hoped that the Allies would agree to discourage the Chinese Government from any further dalliance on the primrose path of borrowing and urge them to take advantage



軍督蘇江領統總副
璋 國 馮

GENERAL FENG KUO-CHANG,
President of the Chinese Republic, August, 1917.

of the existing most favourable conditions to set their house in order and to make timely provision for emergencies; to tabulate and regulate all internal loans and financial claims; above all, to take steps for the disbandment of irregular armed forces in the provinces and the centralization of military authority in a national army under the Ministry of War. No matter how great the country's resources, they can never be sufficient for its needs so long as independent bodies of troops are allowed to levy taxes on their own account and to claim payment for making (or for not making) attacks on the established order of things. With the elimination of Germany, sower-in-chief of trouble, China had an opportunity such as she never enjoyed before for working out her own salvation.

Speaking in the Japanese Diet on June 26, 1917, Viscount Motono, Minister for Foreign Affairs, expressed the hope that the Chinese Government would soon be able to solve its internal difficulties and declare war against



TANG SHAO-YI,

an official who held many high offices under the Manchus; subsequently a leader of the Cantonese Radical faction.

Germany, and thus put an end to German intrigues and German influence, which were the cause of much of China's own political and commercial unrest. To deal fully with the ramifications of German intrigue in the Far East would require much more space than is here available; the present chapter can only give a brief resumé of the subject. For this purpose it will be convenient in the first place to deal with the political and financial policy pursued by the German Government in China before the war—essentially a policy of intrigue—and then to describe some of the characteristically unscrupulous methods adopted by German agents at Peking and in the provinces to mislead and intimidate the Chinese Government and to prevent them from joining the Allies.

The first definite indications of German *Welt-politik* activities in the Far East synchronized with the rapid development of the Pan-Germanic "*Drang nach Osten*," which took place after the Kaiser's second visit to Constantinople in 1898, his emergence as the

protector of Islam, the granting of the first Bagdad Railway concession, and the significant announcement of the fact that Germany's future lay upon the water. Russia's forward movement in Korea and Manchuria and the inauguration of her policy of conquest by Railway and Bank at Peking (1896) were closely followed by the Emperor William and his advisers. Three years before the definite establishment of "spheres of influence" in China (1898), which resulted from Russia's advance in the north, Germany had intimated her intention of taking a hand in the scramble for reversionary rights to the sick man's estate in the Far East. In 1895, the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, then newly established at Berlin to perform for Germany services similar to those which the Russo-Chinese Bank fulfilled for Russian policy, concluded an agreement with the leading British Bank in China (the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation), by virtue of which both parties agreed to share all Chinese Government business which either might obtain. This apparently innocuous financial arrangement was concluded with the knowledge and approval of the British Foreign Office; it was generally regarded as a measure beneficial to British interests and calculated to serve as a counterpoise to the forward movement of Russian ambitions, then supported by French capital. Three years later Germany's aggressive aims were revealed by her utterly unjustifiable seizure of Kiaochau (as compensation for the murder of two German missionaries), and it began to be perceived that the support which she had given to Russia and France in compelling Japan to abandon the fruits of her victory on the Liaotung Peninsula was by no means disinterested. The "sphere of influence" régime was definitely established after the "Battle of Concessions" in 1898; but it was not long before the unpleasant truth was manifest that, under the cloak of friendliness, Germany was intent not only upon establishing her own exclusive sphere in Shantung, but that she was determined to oust Great Britain from her legitimate sphere in the Yangtze Valley and to undermine our vested economic interests there and elsewhere in China. As the result of the firm stand taken by Lord Salisbury in 1898, the British sphere had been definitely recognized by the German Government; more than that, an agreement was concluded in September of that year between the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank and the

Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, by virtue of which German capital was precluded from competing with British capital in the Yangtze Valley in return for a similar self-denying undertaking by the British in regard to Shantung and the Yellow River Valley (*vide* China Blue Book No. 1 of 1899). This agreement was officially endorsed by both Governments. But the ink was hardly dry on this scrap of paper before the Germans showed that they had no intention of fulfilling the compact. They realized that the British Government's vigorous defence of its interests on this occasion was not the outcome of any continuous or consistent national policy in the Far East, and they laid their plans with characteristic German thoroughness of dishonesty to take advantage of the fact. Pursuing for the time being a policy of peaceful penetration along the lines of least resistance, the activities of German diplomatic and financial agents were steadily directed to pegging out new claims to influence, chiefly at Great Britain's expense. The British Foreign Office, thenceforward basing its policy to a very great extent upon the advice of the financial syndicate to which had been entrusted the financing and construction of several important railway undertakings, went out of its way to reassure and conciliate the German Government by a series of graceful concessions. In August, 1898, for example, it assured the Berlin Foreign Office that "the action taken by Sir Claude Macdonald at Peking (in securing the railways for British enterprise) had been taken in the common interest of England and Germany, and that a co-operation of British and German capital in China was what the British Government desired." The British Government was destined


to get it, and to learn by bitter experience the cost of that "co-operation."

After obtaining the "lease" of Weihai-wei from China, the British Government went out of its way to give assurances that it would not interfere with Germany's special privileges, "especially in regard to railways and mining enterprises" in Shantung. The Boxer rising in 1900 provided Germany with an opportunity of revealing the manner in which she intended to carry out her undertaking to act reciprocally as regards recognition of the British sphere of influence. The murder of the German Minister at Peking constituted a sufficient pretext for her to claim the leadership of the Allies' avenging forces and to impress the Chinese people with the might and majesty of the mailed fist. Incidentally, as part of the military operations, she claimed the right to join in the landing of troops for the protection of Shanghai. When the time came in October, 1902, for the joint evacuation of that centre of British influence by the international forces, the German Government gave unmistakable evidence of its policy by making it a condition of the withdrawal of her troops that China should agree "not to grant to any other Power any preferential advantage, political, military, maritime or economic in the Yangtze Valley, nor the right to occupy any point commanding the river, whether below or above Shanghai." Had Great Britain possessed anything like a policy in the Far East this insolent repudiation of a definite understanding would have been countered by insistence on Germany's abandonment of her claims to preferential advantages in Shantung. Downing Street, however, deriving its inspiration from Lombard Street



VIEW IN THE GERMAN CONCESSION AT HANKOW.

could see no danger in the situation beyond that of Russia's advance. Germany's blunt challenge was gracefully overlooked, her humiliating conditions were tacitly accepted, and irreparable injury was thus inflicted upon British prestige throughout Central China. Thereafter, as Russia's grip tightened upon the Manchurian



THE CORNER OF THE BRITISH LEGATION IN PEKING

which was held against the rebels in 1900.

provinces in 1902, and as war between that Power and Japan (allied to Great Britain) became more and more probable, the activity of German agents increased in undermining British interests of every kind. The defeat of Russia by Japan checked for a moment, but in no way modified, the Kaiser's plans. For a little while, from 1905 to 1907, his agents walked more delicately; German finance, represented by the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, began to manifest a marked desire for renewed "cooperation" with British financiers, and under the unrevoked agreement of 1895 (above referred to) insisted on rights of participation with the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank in the Boxer indemnity loan. This financial *rapprochement*, as many foresaw, was only one of the means designed for insidious attacks upon the British position—the camouflage of high finance. In the diplomatic field no opportunity of damaging that position was ever lost. Reviewing the situation at the beginning of 1905, *The Times* Correspondent at Peking observed:—

The policy of Germany is consistent and definite. Having established her influence in Shantung, where she possesses a monopoly of all railway construction and mining, she has seized the advantage given by our vacillating policy to make a bid for political supremacy in the Yangtsze Valley. Having entangled financially the avaricious Sheng and the Viceroy Chang Chih-tung, she has secured control of the Pinghsiang collieries and railway and the important Hanyang ironworks. A German from the Consular service is foreign adviser to Chang Chih-tung; a German shipping firm receives a subsidy of £3,000 a year from the Viceroy as compensation for being denied permission to station a pontoon in the fairway near the Han river; a German gunboat

now patrols the Yangtsze; German post offices are being extended, and new German Consuls are being appointed. While the number of British in Hankau has remained stationary during the last 13 years, the number of Germans has increased eightfold. Germans are now negotiating for the right of equipping the great arsenal which China contemplates establishing at Ping-hsiang.

It might reasonably have been expected that, after establishing the *Entente* with France, Great Britain would have realized and opposed the obviously hostile machinations of German policy in China; but the Foreign Office gave no signs of appreciating its dangers, and British policy continued to drift with the tide of *laissez faire* and cosmopolitan "free trade" in capital. When in 1907, as the result of considerable agitation by Parliament and the Press, steps were taken to proceed with the construction of the British railway concessions which had remained undeveloped since 1898, the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank made its intentions quite clear by informing its British partner that, unless admitted to full participation in these British enterprises on terms of complete equality, it would compete for them and other business in the Yangtsze Valley and elsewhere.

It proceeded to give an earnest of those intentions in 1898 by opening independent




A CHINESE POLICEMAN IN GERMAN PAY, WITH PIGTAIL, AND CHINESE GOVERNMENT ARMED POLICE IN MODERN UNIFORM.

negotiations with the Viceroy of Wuchang for two railways, both of which had been definitely recognized as reserved for British enterprise by the Chinese Government. From this date forward the policy and proceedings of the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank constitute a very instructive object-lesson in German political finance and afford conclusive proof of Ger-

many's scientifically organized use of the cosmopolitan financier as an auxiliary force for the advancement of her *Weltpolitik*. It is no exaggeration to say that the activities of British and French financiers, largely directed from Berlin, and their unfortunate influence in Downing Street, from 1907 to the outbreak of war, made British diplomacy and British capital subservient to the political purposes of Germany in China. They resulted in 1909 in the surrender to Germany, under most humilia-

construction must be accompanied by certain measures of supervision and control over the expenditure of loan funds. The Chinese Government, and the Viceroy Chang Chih-tung in particular, greatly resented these restrictions, which they considered derogatory to their dignity, although accumulated experience had shown them to be fundamentally necessary. The German Bank's simple and ingenious method of procedure was to promise the Chinese Government loans freed from these



THE MAILED FIST IN CHINA:

Count Waldersee at the march of the Allied Forces through the palace at Peking in 1900.

ting conditions, of rights of participation in the Yangtze Valley railway concessions, and this despite repeated protests from the French Foreign Office and warnings from His Majesty's Minister at Peking.

The method by which the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank enlisted the sympathy of the Chinese Government and of the high provincial authorities in support of its proceedings and induced them to evade or repudiate their obligations to Great Britain combined simplicity with far-seeing ingenuity. The policy which Great Britain and France had adopted, with a view to increasing the stability of China's finances, was to insist that all loans made to China for railway

vexatious restrictions, while at the same time assuring the Anglo-French financiers that it desired participation in the loan business with a view to imposing them more effectively. In eventually repudiating their political obligations to Great Britain, the Chinese Government had every reason to believe that the British and French financiers concerned chiefly desired to avoid cut-throat competition in the loan business, and, having no direct interest in the maintenance of the safeguards in question, would be prepared to dispense with them and to follow the German lead. All that was required was a bold *coup de main* by the German Bank, backed by the German

Government, and this was forthcoming at the psychological moment. On January 1, 1909, the Anglo-French negotiations for the Hankow-Canton Railway loan with the Viceroy Chang Chih-tung had reached a critical stage, the Viceroy objecting to the conditions stipulating for control over expenditure on construction. At this point the German Bank came forward in London with a definite claim to participate in the loan. The representative of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank—who was in favour of admitting them to participation—was thereupon authorized by the Foreign Office to consult the French Government and the French financial groups in the matter. The French Government firmly declined to listen to the proposal. Their reply was communicated to the Germans “word for word, accompanied by an expression of regret at its unfavourable character” by the British Bank, a proceeding to which the French Ambassador in London took strong exception. The British Foreign Office at this juncture had no policy other than that of its financial advisers, as subsequent events clearly proved. The Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, confronted with the French refusal, but assured of the sympathy of its British associates, announced its intention of competing for the loan. Ten days later the Viceroy Chang, fully informed of the facts of the situation by Herr Cordes,

the political Director of the German Bank, definitely declined to concede the conditions which H.M.’s Minister at Peking had declared to be the irreducible minimum consistent with Great Britain’s preferential rights. A week later, anticipating the *coup de main*, Sir John Jordan officially notified the Chinese Foreign Office that Great Britain would expect the Viceroy to recognize his obligations by not accepting any foreign offer for the loan without first informing him of its conditions and allowing a reasonable time for their consideration by British capitalists. This Note, which partook of the nature of an ultimatum, would no doubt have proved effective had the Chinese Government had reason to believe that the British Government would stand to its guns. Unfortunately, two days after its dispatch, the representative of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank was again authorized by the Foreign Office to approach the French group with a view to securing German participation in the loan, as the result of which mission an arrangement was concluded between the financiers at Paris on February 27 and in Berlin on March 1 for “an Anglo-French-German understanding in China for equal participation in all railway loan business.”

The action of the British Foreign Office in sanctioning these negotiations by financiers in



LOCAL MILITIA, NORTH KIANGSU,
Typical of the Chinese provincial recruits.



IMPERIAL CHINESE TROOPS, UNDER THE MANCHUS.

matters of far-reaching political importance affecting the *Entente* could only be justified *vis-à-vis* the French Government on grounds of expediency, and if it could be shown that the admission of the German Bank to participation in the loan would promote the avowed policy of England and France by collective insistence on the maintenance of the necessary control over expenditure—in other words, if Germany's financial and diplomatic agents at Peking would repudiate the promises they had made to the Chinese Government. Accordingly the preamble to the new "Tripartite" agreement contained an undertaking that all loans would be "accompanied by suitable guarantees that the loan funds would be devoted to the object for which they were ostensibly raised." The Deutsch-Asiatische Bank group in Berlin also agreed that "in return for participation, they would withdraw their offer to the Chinese, and adhere, along with the Anglo-French group, to the policy of insisting upon effective control over loan funds."

It was now time for the *coup de main*. Accordingly the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, ignoring the scrap of paper which they had signed in Berlin five days before, proceeded through their representative in Peking to sign a loan agreement with the Viceroy Chang for the Hankow-Canton Railway, in which the stipulated control over loan funds was *not* included. The German Legation at Peking took an active part in persuading the Chinese Government that they might with impunity

commit themselves to this flagrant act of bad faith, and the result was welcomed by the German Press as a triumph of German diplomacy. Downing Street, confronted by the *fait accompli*, sought comfort and justification for inaction in its persistent belief in the abiding virtue of cosmopolitan finance as a peace preserver. Having secured its ends, the German Bank offered to share the business with the British and French groups. After some face-saving negotiations, the offer was eventually accepted, with the result that, under German auspices, British and French capital was made available for the Chinese under conditions which were bound on the one hand to promote the prestige and commercial interests of Germany and on the other to accelerate the pace at which China was moving towards bankruptcy and disaster.

In extenuation of the part played in this lamentable surrender by the British, and eventually by the French financiers concerned, it is only fair to say that, failing a firm policy and a clear recognition of Germany's aims in Downing Street, failing anything like the German coordination of political and financial ends, they could never hope to compete successfully with the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank at Peking. Behind that Bank were all the highly organized industrial forces, all the utterly unscrupulous methods of Germany's *Welt-politik*. Behind the British Bank, entrusted by the British Government with the carrying out of important railway concessions (to obtain



PEKING.

which China had been threatened with a naval demonstration), there was nothing but the policy of *laissez-faire*, and a somnambulistic belief in the benevolent purposes of internationalism in high finance. The British Government, as Mr. McKenna complacently admitted in the House of Commons as late as 1916, "had no evidence that the relations which have existed between the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank have had a prejudicial effect upon British interests or British prestige in the Far East, or that German influence has had an opportunity in this connexion of being exercised to the prejudice of British interests." Such being the convictions, such the policy of the British Government, it is perhaps not a matter for wonder that British financiers should have felt justified in following the line of least resistance, and should gradually have become more and more closely associated with the German State-controlled Bank.

They were certainly not alone in their failure to realize the fact that the "cosmopolitanism" of German finance, like that of German Socialism, was a deliberate conspiracy of intrigue and falsehood, skilfully directed by the German Government. Indeed, if we look to the condition of affairs obtaining in England before the outbreak of the war, and bear in mind how far-reaching was the "peaceful penetration" of Germany's State-controlled finance and industries in the most vital centres of our national life, the stranglehold obtained by Germany over our political finance in the Far

East sinks into comparative insignificance. One is prompted, indeed, to wonder what would have been the eventual results of the Teuton's "peaceful penetration" had there been no war. In China, at all events, his patient unscrupulous mole work had taken such advantage of our easy-going "free-trade" blindness that in Hongkong and the Treaty ports much of the position secured for British traders by our earlier wars and treaties with China had passed into German hands. German interests had been steadily developed and extended at our expense. As the result of this policy, at least 25 per cent. of the Manchester piece goods trade was handled in China by German agents, a state of affairs which naturally created a strong undercurrent of sympathy for German interests, only too clearly reflected in our financial and diplomatic activities. At Hongkong, in particular, the results of the subtle and insidious influences brought to bear by Germany were most marked. For example, the Board of Directors of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank in the Crown Colony boasted four Germans in 1914; the whole business and administration of the Colony was, indeed, so permeated by German influence that, long after the outbreak of war, it continued to be characterized by such benevolent sympathy for German interests as to evoke strong protests from patriotic British residents. In June, 1915, the British Chamber of Commerce at Shanghai passed a resolution regretting the action of the British Government in giving its tacit consent to German trading; at the same time Reuter's

agent stated that in consequence of "support from Manchester" German trade was reviving in China. The China Association recorded its opinion that "it was bad policy in our own interests to help Germans in China to maintain their commercial position in China as we had been doing for the past ten months." *The Times* observed that there was ample evidence to warrant the belief that trade between Manchester and Germans in China, which the British Government had refused to prohibit, really amounted in many instances to trading between Manchester and Germany. The contention of the Manchester merchants interested in this trade was that if their German distributors were prevented from obtaining Lancashire goods they would obtain supplies from Japan; in deference to this view, Germans in China were not regarded as enemies within the meaning of the Act until the strength of public opinion on the subject became unmistakable.

On June 25, 1915, a Royal Proclamation was issued forbidding trade with Germans in China and Siam. The ingenious Teuton, however, still confident of sympathy and support from unregenerate free traders, frequently found means of evading the King's regulations. According to dispatches sent from Shanghai in July, special licences issued by the Board of Trade enabled him to obtain possession of all supplies in the hands of shippers before July 26: at the same time many German merchants became Chinese traders by the simple expedient of a nominal transfer to dummy Chinese firms, of which they remained managers. In Hongkong vigorous action by the community was required before the interned German merchants were eventually deported, despite undeniable evidence of their continued intrigues with the Chinese, despite the fact that German agents were using the Crown Colony and the Treaty Ports of China as centres for a Bolo



Li Ching-fong, Chinese Minister in London. Tsai Fu. Tang Shao-yi. Mr. Chung, Secretary.
SPECIAL MISSION, UNDER TANG SHAO-YI, TO STUDY THE BRITISH FISCAL SYSTEM, 1908.


propaganda of scurrilous falsehood and as bases for creating sedition and unrest in India. The liquidation of the business of the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank and other large German businesses proceeded with a leisurely deliberation which evoked much unfavourable comment. The benevolent attitude displayed by the administration and the widespread belief that many Germans' places were being kept warm for them, evoked several strong expressions of dissatisfaction from the unofficial members of the Legislative Council and the British commercial community. The last of these demonstrations of public feeling took place on April 19, 1917, when the three unofficial members of the Council brought forward a resolution calling for the exclusion of Germans from Hongkong for a period of ten years after the war. The resolution was unanimously rejected by the official members and by the Chinese representatives as being opposed to the interests of the Colony. The resolution may have been premature, pending *post-bellum* settlement of the question as to the future use of British coaling stations by German shipping, but its proposer undoubtedly expressed the consensus of British opinion when he pleaded for effective steps to prevent Germany hereafter from resuming her peaceful penetration in the strongholds of British commerce.

After the outbreak of war in Europe it became speedily manifest that Germany would

exploit every possible opportunity and employ all possible means to induce China to maintain her neutrality and to use her neutral territory as a base for the dissemination of German propaganda throughout Eastern Asia. Her activities in the first instance were concentrated upon securing control of the Chinese Press and particularly of the Chinese newspapers published in English at the capital. To achieve this end German agents spent money freely, and the results achieved were at the outset of considerable importance. In October, 1914, by intimidation and bribery, they secured the dismissal of the British editor of the *Peking Gazette*, on the ground that under his direction the paper had displayed an unneutral hostility to Germany. In September, 1914, a scurrilous circular, printed in English and Chinese, was spread broadcast throughout China under the title of "The Truth about England." In the spring of 1915 German agents were sent out to tour the provinces with cinematograph pictures especially designed to impress the Chinese with the might, majesty, dominion, and power of the German Army. Even the German missionaries contributed their share to the work of propaganda. When the war broke out a general appeal to the charitable was made on behalf of the German missions in South China, on the ground that they were isolated and in distress; to this fund Englishmen and Americans subscribed. The missionaries showed their gratitude by



REGIMENTAL BUGLERS AND DRUMMERS.
Of the Chihli Viceroy's troops before the Revolution of 1911.



CHINESE TROOPS OF THE NEW ARMY MARCHING THROUGH PEKING.

printing and distributing gratis a weekly pamphlet containing all the officially inspired lies about Great Britain. In November, 1915, a new pamphlet, scandalous in its falsehoods, was published in English at Shanghai and sent free to all Chinese officials, universities, and schools, giving the German version of the origin of the war. At the same time special attention was directed to propagandist work among the Chinese Mahomedans in the north-west, of which the foundations had been carefully prepared years before, with a view to taking advantage of the increasing intimacy of relations between Chinese Moslems and their co-religionists in Turkey and India. (As far back as 1910 the German Consul in Tientsin had issued a circular to Turkish subjects in Kashgar, informing them that at the request of the Turkish Government the German Emperor had undertaken the protection of Turkish subjects in China, formerly exercised by France.) The efforts of German agents working under the orders of the Legation at Peking were now directed to convincing the Chinese that Germany's advance in the Balkans was the beginning of a triumphal march through Persia which would put an end to British rule in India. With a view to stirring up sedition in that country, proclamations in Arabic were systematically smuggled from Shanghai to various centres in India; these documents, calling upon all Moslems to unite in a Holy War against England and her Allies, were signed by the Sultan, the Sheikh-ul-Islam and Enver Pasha.

But the activities of the German Legation were not confined to its literary efforts. In the spring of 1915 Dr. Otto von Hentig was sent on a special mission to Afghanistan in the hope of inducing the Ameer to declare himself against the Allies. Politely ejected from the Ameer's territory, he proceeded to Yarkand and there spent much money in organizing a Moslem rising against the local Russian settlers. He was successful in so far that he induced the Kirghiz and Sarts to fall upon and massacre a large number of Russians—men, women, and children. In the subsequent suppression of the rising, thousands of his dupes were slain, besides a number of Chinese. His good work done, von Hentig, accompanied by Hassam Effendi, a relative of the Emir of Bokhara, made his way to the German Consulate at Hankow and thence succeeded in returning to Germany.

Von Hentig's efforts at spreading sedition in Central Asia were seconded by those of Major Winkelmann, an individual who was removed from his position as a military adviser of the Chinese Government in 1915 on account of his unneutral activities. In May, 1916, he disappeared from Peking and was next heard of in Kashgar, whence, had the auspices been favourable, he intended to proceed to Afghanistan. Eventually, travelling by the Pamir route, he reached the Indian frontier, via Taghdumbash, and committed the indiscretion of entering Indian territory. He was promptly arrested at Hunza-Najar and was found to be in possession of £9,000 in sovereigns.

Captain Pappenheim, military attaché to the Legation at Peking, was amongst the first of Germany's official representatives to inaugurate the *régime* of treacherous sabotage and criminal plots which the Bernstorffs, Boy-Eds and Luxburgs afterwards showed to be part of a German diplomatist's accomplishments. Shortly after the outbreak of war this gallant officer left Peking, ostensibly for a shooting trip in Mongolia. It was subsequently discovered by the Russians that his outfit for this expedition consisted of a camel

intimidation which German officials and agents were allowed to conduct with impunity from the security of their Concessions at Tientsin, Hankow, and elsewhere, that the *Novoe Vremya* drew attention to the matter. It compared the situation in China with that existing in Persia, and urged that the German Concessions should be treated as German territory (which to all intents and purposes they were) and seized by the Allies without further delay. There was ample justification for such action, for the Concessions had become



CHINESE OFFICERS STUDYING EUROPEAN WARFARE WITH THE
FRENCH ARMY, 1917.

caravan loaded with explosives, escorted by a few Germans and a small body of Chinese bandits. The party was surprised and destroyed by a band of Mongols on the march towards Tsitsihar. The object of the expedition was twofold: to create disaffection amongst the Chinese troops in Mongolia and to blow up tunnels on the Siberian Railway.

During the period immediately preceding the downfall and death of Yuan Shih-k'ai and the rise to power of Tuan Chi-jui as Premier, German propaganda became intensified in virulence, and money was spent lavishly in an organized attempt to stir up ill-feeling against England and Japan amongst the leaders of the military party in North China. So unscrupulous was the campaign of falsehood and

hotbeds of hostile activity which the Chinese authorities were unable to control or prevent; the necessity of the measure was urged by the Allied Consuls at Tientsin, but for reasons unexplained no steps were taken to put an end to this dangerous and anomalous situation.

In January, 1916, the German Legation, realizing that China would eventually be led to throw in her lot with the Allies, endeavoured to create internal disorder by fomenting and supporting Tsai-Ao's insurrection against the Central Government in the province of Yunnan, where the Mahommedans have always a more or less disaffected and rebellious element, and where German propaganda had been most effective in stirring up hostility to the Allies. Up to the outbreak of war German officials



From a photograph taken at Newchwang.

CHINESE INTERESTED IN PICTURES OF THE EUROPEAN WAR.

and merchants (chiefly interested in the sale of arms) had held practically a monopoly of the business at the disposal of the provincial authorities in Yunnan. They had made good use of their opportunities, as usual, to trouble

the waters, preparing the way for future claims on the Chinese Government, hastening the local administration on the road to insolvency by methods which appealed to the cupidity of corrupt officials. When Tsai-Ao, the Military



TSING-TAU (KIAO-CHAU) WATER FRONT.

Governor of the Province, declared the independence of Yünnan in December, 1915, and organized his marauding force of buccaneers against the adjoining province of Szechuan, he did so with the blessing of the German Consul at Yünnanfu, who officially expressed to the rebel leader his gratitude for "Yünnan's desire to cultivate friendly relations with Germany." Tsai-Ao was willing enough to make use of German help, but his rebellion against Yuan Shih-k'ai was inspired solely by motives of personal animosity and ambition. It proved eventually to be the beginning of a general movement against the would-be

of waging war was great. The official class, the vernacular Press, and the intellectuals of Young China generally saw through the crude falsehoods and stratagems of German agents in the Far East. After the fall of Kiao-Chao and the complete disappearance of German shipping from Far Eastern waters, German fiction continued to be received politely, but in the matter of the payments made to Chinese for its assimilation and distribution there arose a marked reluctance to accepting German cheques. In business circles it was soon perceived that German trade had been strangled, and that the prospect of its re-



BRITISH AND JAPANESE OFFICERS ON THE WAY TO KIAO-CHAO.

Emperor in which, as luck would have it, Germany and her interests were lost sight of altogether, and which ended in Yuan Shih-k'ai's Government being replaced by a group of men hostile to Germany. In supporting Tsai-Ao, and later in backing Chang Hsün, the object of the Germans was to create such internal dissensions in China as to prevent her rulers from developing a foreign policy favourable to the Allies. In this they failed.

In spite of its feverish activity and a lavish squandering of money, the result of Germany's propaganda upon the educated classes in China was on the whole very small, whilst the accumulative effect of her barbarous methods

establishment was uncertain; but the Chinese merchant, usually indifferent to the issues at stake in Europe, was quite willing to encourage German agents in spending large sums in cultivation of the field which they hoped eventually to resume and exploit. Up to the time of China's declaration of war the amount of money at the disposal of the German Legation for political propaganda and the bolstering up of German trade interests was very large; the interest on the German share of the Boxer indemnity (£21,313,499) and of Anglo-German Government loans (£24,333,000) amounted to £2,190,000 a year, which was paid regularly by the Chinese Government to the Deutsch-

Asiatische Bank. In addition, there was the interest on China's debts, amounting to several millions sterling, to Krupps and other German arms dealers. A year after the outbreak of war Germans in Peking were openly boasting of the amount of money at their command, and the *Peking Gazette* went so far as to suggest that if the Chinese Government could not borrow the £1,500,000 it wanted from the Allied Banks, the Deutsch-Asiatische could meet its requirements. In a country where the activity of political factions and the loyalty of troops are often open to purchase by the highest bidder, a great deal may be done with two or three million dollars a month; it speaks highly for the intelligence and culture of the ruling classes in China that the net result of German propaganda was so small.

With China's entry into the war all payments by the Chinese Government to Germany naturally ceased, simultaneously with the closing up of the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, and with them the dissemination of falsehoods made in Germany. The organization of plots against the Allies also came to an end with the taking over of the German Concessions and the abolition of the extra-territorial privileges enjoyed by Germans under their Treaties with China, now abrogated. With the expulsion of all German officials and the removal of over two hundred Germans holding office in the



[Russell.]

MR. SAO-KE ALFRED SZE,
Chinese Minister in London.

Chinese public service, the stream of Teutonic intrigue in the Far East was cut off at its source.

Discussing the situation in China after the severance of diplomatic relations, the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, chief exponent of German am-



THE LAST OF THE KIAO-CHAO GARRISON AWAITING DEPORTATION TO JAPAN.



CARAVAN IN MANCHURIA.

bitions in the Far East, paid unconscious tribute to the discriminating intelligence of the Chinese in a leading article, which said :—

Germany has no friends in China; that has been proved by China's attitude. The officials at Tsingtao, the German professors at the Academies for Chinese, and the German missionaries who thought that the well-meant words of admiration of their polite Chinese acquaintances for Germany's greatness and efficiency were the expression of a widespread public feeling deceived themselves. The Chinese people do not know us.

In this the Chinese were like the rest of the world, but China, like Great Britain, had learned to know the German for what he really is: and the moral results of that knowledge were likely to be of more consequence to Germany when seeking to recover her position in the Far East than the material losses caused by the seizure of her shipping and the stoppage of her trade.

By taking her place beside the Allies in the struggle of civilization against Germany's barbarous militarism China materially strengthened her own moral and material position. By declaring war upon Germany the Central Government at Peking not only won the sympathy and future support of the Entente Powers and the United States, together with a right to be heard at the final Peace Conference, but was relieved of the heavy financial obligations which in recent

years had precluded all hope of successful reorganization and stability. The war gave China a much-needed breathing space, a relaxation of foreign pressure upon her Treasury and her frontiers, opportunities for profitable trade, and new hopes for the future. It united the Governments of the Powers friendly to her in a policy which recognized the necessity for giving all possible support to the Central Government, and for discouraging the seditious activities of professional agitators and Young China's firebrands. But above all, it brought home to the educated and ruling classes in China the truth, that the aims pursued and methods employed by Germany in the promotion of her policy in the Far East had been a factor, by no means inconsiderable, in the production of the financial difficulties and political dissensions which had filled the country with unrest and distress in recent years. They were brought to realize that the task of effective financial reform, essential to the stability of the Central Government, had been systematically hampered at Peking, as it was at Constantinople under the Hamidian *régime*, by Germany's methods of political finance, by a deliberate policy which, had it remained unchecked, must inevitably have brought China to financial disintegration for the ultimate benefit of the Teuton.





CHAPTER CCXII.

THE NAVY'S WORK IN 1917.

GERMAN NAVAL POLICY—RAIDS AND COAST DEFENCE—CHANGES AT THE ADMIRALTY—SIR E. CARSON AND SIR E. GEDDES AS FIRST LORDS—UNRESTRICTED SUBMARINE WARFARE—EXTENT OF THE GERMAN MENACE—SMALL ACTIONS OFF THE DUTCH COAST—GERMAN "TIP-AND-RUN" RAIDS—BRITISH COUNTER-MEASURES—SHIPPING LOSSES—THE AMERICAN NAVY IN THE ALLIANCE—DELIBERATE DESTRUCTION OF HOSPITAL SHIPS—ADMIRALTY REFORMS—INCIDENTS OF THE YEAR'S OPERATIONS—ACTION IN THE KATTEGAT—THE ALLIED FLEETS.

THE three salient features of the sea campaign during the third year of war were an increased aggressiveness of the enemy from the Belgian ports, the intensive and ruthless character of the attack by submarines on the world's Mercantile Marine, and the result afloat of the entry of the United States and other nations into the struggle. The effect of the Revolution in Russia upon the sea war in the Baltic theatre and that of the reverses in Italy upon the position in the Adriatic were felt widely, and necessitated the reconsideration in some of its aspects of the naval policy of the Allies. Furthermore, in a survey of the sea affair during 1916-17, it must be noticed that the changes at the Admiralty and in the Government were influenced largely by public opinion, deeply stirred and concerned by questions of naval policy.

The Battle of Jutland Bank took place May 31—June 1, 1916, and after that event on only one occasion within the period under review did any large German force appear in the North Sea, and then only to retire at once to its port when some of the heavier ships of the Grand Fleet were sighted. The policy adopted by the enemy was that of sallying forth in detachments small enough to evade the British patrols and swift enough to seek safety by

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flight if discovered. In this manner a number of raids were made upon the British coast and in adjacent waters, chiefly from the seaports of Belgium, and mainly with small craft assisted or accompanied by air forays. These raids became more frequent, and greater audacity was exhibited by the German naval commanders, towards the end of 1916, when not only the coasts of Essex and Kent but the entrance to the Thames and the Straits of Dover were boldly attempted, and Calais, Dunkirk, Folkestone and Dover were bombed from the air or shelled from the sea.

The successes of the German raiders at this time and their immunity from serious retribution or punishment were attributed, in part at least, to the naval policy of the British Government and its strategic interpretation by the Admiralty under Mr. Balfour's administration. Certainly, there were indications of a change in the method of utilising the naval resources of the country for its protection. When the German cruisers shelled Scarborough in December, 1914, some complaint was made that this watering-place was without adequate naval protection. The Admiralty of Mr. Churchill and Lord Fisher replied in an official *communiqué* in these terms:—

The Admiralty take the opportunity of pointing out that demonstrations of this character against unfortified towns or commercial ports, though not difficult to accom-

plish provided that a certain amount of risk is accepted, are devoid of military significance. They may cause some loss of life among the civil population and some damage to private property, which is much to be regretted; but they must not in any circumstances be allowed to modify the general naval policy which is being pursued.

The general naval policy of that period was indicated by the action in the Heligoland Bight of August 28, the constant bombardment of the Belgian coast ports in October, the air raid on Cuxhaven in December, 1914, and the cruiser action off the Dogger Bank in the following January in which the *Blücher* was



[Bassano.]

SIR ERIC GEDDES, K.C.B.

Appointed Inspector-General of Transport in all Theatres of War, March, 1917—Vice-Admiral and Controller of the Navy, May, 1917—First Lord of the Admiralty, July, 1917.

destroyed. With these operations may be coupled the decisive battle off the Falklands about the same time, all of them significant of an offensive-defensive strategy, as a reply to the sallying tactics of the enemy. When, however, in April 1916 England's home coast was again attacked, and an appeal was again made for local defence, the reply of the Admiralty was of a different character. In a letter to the Mayors of Lowestoft and Yarmouth, Mr. Balfour, after pointing out that from a naval and military point of view the German bom-

bardment of open towns had been singularly futile, added :—

It is not an experiment which (so far as we can judge) they would be well advised to repeat. This would be true even if the distribution of our naval forces on the East Coast was undergoing no alteration. In the earlier stages of the war considerations of strategy required us to keep our battle fleets in more northern waters. Thus situated they could concentrate effectively against any prolonged operation such as those involved in an attempt at invasion, but not against brief dashes effected under cover of the night. But with the progress of the war our maritime position has improved. Submarines and monitors, which form no portion of the Grand Fleet, are now available in growing numbers for coast defence, and, what is even more important, the increase in the strength of the Grand Fleet itself enables us to bring important forces to the south without in the least imperilling our naval preponderance elsewhere. It would be unfitting to go into further details, but I have, I hope, sufficiently stated the reasons for my conviction that another raid on the coast of Norfolk (never a safe operation) will be henceforth far more perilous to the aggressors than it has been in the past, and if our enemy be wise is therefore less likely.


Here there was suggested a change of policy, and a decision, in response to public agitation, to resort to measures of local coast defence in substitution for the methods of offence which had proved effective at an earlier period, and which had the sanction and support of centuries of naval experience. It was within a few weeks of this letter being written that the Battle of Jutland occurred, in appearance a chance collision of the British and German forces, but possibly brought about by an attempt on the part of the enemy to test the strength or the weakness of that division of the Grand Fleet adumbrated by Mr. Balfour. There followed the raiding tactics and desultory coast warfare to which reference has already been made, and which is more fully described later. The naval policy of the Government and the administration at the Admiralty were challenged in the Press, and more aggressive action by its naval forces demanded by the country. As a result of this agitation, combined with other matters, important changes in the composition of the Board were made, having for their object reforms in the constructive policy of the Admiralty and the initiation of more vigorous measures at sea. Simultaneously, a new Government came into office.

As will be shown later, the preparations begun at this time could not, and did not, have effect for some months, but Sir John Jellicoe, who had been recalled from the command of the Grand Fleet to take the post of First Sea Lord, made it clear in an interview with an American journalist on April 12, 1917, that he

and the Board which he represented were in favour of the traditional policy of an offensive-defensive, and were determined to put it into practice as soon as the means were available. "In conclusion," he said, "I cannot do better than quote from your great author, Captain Mahan, in his volume, 'The Interest of American Sea Power, Present and Future.' He wrote :

To Great Britain and the United States, if they rightly estimate the part they may play in the great drama of human progress, is intrusted a maritime interest in the broadest sense of the word, which demands

done in this matter was fully explained by Sir Eric Geddes, for whom the office of Controller was revived in the first place, and who afterwards succeeded Sir Edward Carson as First Lord of the Admiralty. Of Sir Eric Geddes it may be said that he had won distinction as an organizer of the output of material. He gained experience in railway management in America, and afterwards became Deputy General Manager of the North-Eastern Railway Company. At the beginning of the war his services were rendered in connection with the organisation



KIEL HARBOUR IN 1914.

In the foreground a German Submarine of that period.

as one of the conditions of its exercise and its safety the organization of a force adequate to control the general course of events, to maintain if the necessity arise, not arbitrarily, but as those in whom interest and power alike justify the claim to do so, the laws that shall regulate maritime warfare.

"And again :

War, once declared, must be waged offensively, aggressively. The enemy must not be fended off, but smitten down. You may then spare him every exaction, relinquish every gain, but till down he must be struck incessantly and remorselessly."

During 1917 further changes were made in the composition of the Board of Admiralty, with a view to the division and better co-ordination of the branches of strategy (operations) and supply (maintenance). What was

of the supply of munitions, and then his energy and driving power were directed to the reform of the military transport system. He became Director-General of Military Railways, and afterwards Director-General of Transportation. His appointment in May as Controller of the Navy was a great tribute to his efficient work as an administrator, and his reputation in this connexion, combined with his business capacity, were doubtless the qualifications which weighed in his selection as the civilian head of the Navy. The substitution of officers fresh from the Fleet and with war experience, as well as younger men for the new Admiralty personnel,

was a marked feature of these changes. The distribution of work among the members of the Board was thus described by the First Lord in an address to the House of Commons in November:—


The members of the Board, in addition to dealing individually with work allotted to them under the table of distribution of business in the Admiralty, have been grouped into two formal Committees—namely, the Operations Committee and the Maintenance Committee, each of which meets once a week, or more often where necessary.

The First Lord is the *ex officio* chairman, and personally I make a point of presiding over them as often as is possible. The Operations Committee consists of myself, as *ex officio* chairman, the First Sea Lord, the Deputy First Sea Lord, the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, and the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff, with the Fifth Sea Lord attending when necessary. This Committee deals with large questions of naval strategy, with operational plans, and with the scale of provision and equipment of the Navy, as a fighting force, and with its efficiency, organization, and utilization. The other Committee, the Maintenance Committee, consists of the six members of the Board concerned with personnel, material, supplies, works, production, and finance. It deals with questions affecting these matters, and with the fulfilment of the demands of the Operations Committee and Naval Staff. The Deputy First Sea Lord, representing the Operations Committee, and the Fifth Sea Lord, attending when necessary, form the link between the operations side of the Board and the maintenance side of the Board. The Board itself also meets once a week, or more often if necessary. Matters coming within the administrative spheres of the different members of the Board are, if they fall within certain definite categories of importance, referred for

consideration to the appropriate Committee of the Board, which either arrives at a definite conclusion or refers the matter for decision or confirmation to a full meeting of the Board, as the nature of the subject may require. This is generally the change or development of the organization that has taken place in the Board of Admiralty and in its procedure.

The favourable view of the nation on these appointments and changes, and the more vigorous policy they denoted, was reflected in the speeches of public men and in the Press.

Towards the end of 1916 the growing seriousness of the submarine menace became a matter of national anxiety. The alleged dilatoriness of Ministers in their preparations for dealing with this matter was a factor of influence when a change of Government took place in December. There was a public demand for the immediate arming of all merchant ships and for more energetic measures against the underwater boats and the lairs from which they issued on the Belgian coast. Towards the end of February the Prime Minister stated his belief, in view of the shipping losses, that "the ultimate success of the Allied cause depends, in my judgment, on our solving the tonnage difficulties with which we are confronted." Mr. Lloyd George further stated that very drastic methods were necessary for dealing with the submarine peril, and that, if



GENERAL VIEW OF A CONVOY.

the nation was not prepared to accept them, "there was disaster in front of us." He outlined these measures as follows :—

(1) Measures to be adopted by the Navy to grapple with the menace.

(2) The building of merchant ships wherever we can get them.

(3) To limit our needs from oversea transport by dispensing with all non-essential commodities which are brought from overseas, and by producing as much of the essentials of life as we can at home.

The intensive submarine campaign threatened by the German Chancellor at the end of January was at this time in full swing, both with underwater craft using torpedoes and mines and guns on the surface. Never was a more ruthless campaign against innocent traders and non-combatants attempted since the days when the pirates waged war indiscriminately upon all who sailed the seas. The cowardly and brutal treatment of merchant seamen and seafarers of both sexes has been described in a previous chapter,* and details of the attacks made on hospital ships are given later on. The campaign was carried to its greatest height in April, when the heaviest loss in British tonnage occurred, and the Merchant Marine of the Allies and neutrals suffered in proportion. The campaign was waged with an utter disregard of restraint or respect for international law (which the Kaiser said no longer existed) and the precepts of humanity. A little later new methods of meeting the menace began to take effect, and Mr. Lloyd George was able to announce in the House of Commons that the figures for the month of May were a considerable improvement on the anticipations of the Admiralty. The First Sea Lord stated that the increasing armament of the Mercantile Marine had made the submarines more cautious, and a larger proportion of attacks were made by the boats in a submerged condition. This had an advantage, as the submarines were dependent upon their torpedoes for such attacks, and, being only able to carry a limited number, had to return more often to their ports for a supply. In a speech made on August 16 the Prime Minister was able to say that the Government had come to the conclusion that, with the exercise of reasonable economy, there was no chance of the Germans succeeding in starving out the population of the British Islands. The definite promise given to the German public, that by the month of August the submarine campaign would have effected such ravages on



[Russell.]

COMMODORE GODFREY M. PAINE, C.B.,
M.V.O.,
Fifth Sea Lord.

the Mercantile Marine that England would be forced to abandon the war, could not be fulfilled. Mr. Lloyd George added that owing to the means which had been devised for dealing with the situation the losses, which were in April 550,000 tons, in July had come down to 320,000 tons, and, if the August figures continued at the same ratio, the net losses during the months of July and August would be at the rate of 175,000 tons a month. In October there was a further increase in the number of ships sunk, but by the following month the First Lord was able to state that the measures taken by the Admiralty had considerably lessened the gravity of the situation. The arming of merchantmen, the introduction of the convoy system, measures taken to replace lost tonnage, and the more stringent use of the blockade were all matters which had their effect in curbing the enemy's activity and assisting in the prosecution of the sea war.

As a result of the extension of the submarine campaign and the continued and notorious infraction of every agreement, promise, and pledge the United States declared war on Germany, and many other nations hitherto neutral followed their example. Before the end of 1917 17 countries had taken up arms against Germany and nine others had severed relations

* Vol. XIII., Chapter CXCv.

with that country. The American Navy, and to a larger extent than before the Japanese Navy, provided contingents to the naval forces of the Allies in European waters to assist in meeting the submarine menace.¹ Owing to the large number of merchant vessels taken up for naval and military purposes, the proportion of tonnage engaged in carrying food products and other necessities to the British Islands and to the Allied countries was small, and it sustained further diminution from the action of submarines and mines. Owing to the reduction of imports due to these causes, it became necessary to take precautionary measures for economising many of the essentials of life.

Generally, the work of the Allied Fleets was devoid of large dramatic incident, and was principally confined to affording protection to the ships of the Mercantile Marine engaged in the conveyance of reinforcements of troops and supplies to the various armies and for carrying out the business of trade and commerce. At the same time, the entry of the United States into the war enabled the blockade of Germany to be enforced with greater stringency and with a corresponding influence upon her economic condition. She was made to feel to a wider extent than before the deprivation of many articles and commodities necessary for the prosecution of her military aims. The position towards the end of the year 1917 was admirably summed up by General Smuts in a speech made to the Association of the Chambers of Commerce in October :—

More and more the real inwardness of the war situation is being appreciated in Germany. The German rulers are trying to still the fear of the people with vain hopes that the submarine weapon will beat us yet, and that we will be forced to make a German peace. All their hopes now centre in the submarine, but these hopes are destined to be illusory. Whatever the dangers of the submarine, it has ceased to be a decisive factor. The submarine has been beaten by the silent heroism of our Navy and our Mercantile Marine. Deeds have been done on the sea so astounding that details cannot be published until the end of the war. In the general critical temper of our times less than justice has been done to this aspect of our naval effort, but I feel sure that the future will appraise it at its true value.

The period covered by the present chapter is from November, 1916, to December, 1917, and the change in the higher naval policy of the country which occurred during this period cannot better be illustrated than by recalling the circumstances which obtained at the earlier of these dates. On November 1, 1916, Mr. Balfour was still First Lord and Admiral Sir Henry Jackson First Sea Lord. With one

exception the Board was composed of members who had not seen active service at sea since the outbreak of war. Public opinion was at the time much stirred in regard to the apparent indecision or inability to make the most use offensively of the power of the Navy, in order to curb the activity of the enemy, such as had been shown by the raid on the Channel transport traffic on October 26, 1916.*

In replying for the Navy at the Lord Mayor's Banquet on November 9, 1916, Mr. Balfour referred at some length to this raid in the Channel, in which the enemy sank several patrol boats and a destroyer and got away practically unmolested. He explained how, on a night of pitch darkness, no moon, clouds and storm, a few fast torpedo vessels were able to enter the Channel and get as far west as Folkestone, returning without having done any permanent damage to our lines of communication. The great stream of men and munitions which went ceaselessly from England to France was not disturbed. While he did not say that such a raid could not be repeated, Mr. Balfour did suggest that it would not be repeated, because it was not worth the enemy's while to run the risks involved, and he expressed the confident hope that if German destroyers again entered the Channel they would not be able to get out of it again without heavy disaster.

The Germans, however, soon afterwards made two raids into English waters in a week. On November 23 they sent six destroyers to raid the north end of the Downs. The boats attacked a patrol vessel, and claimed to have shelled Ramsgate, which was denied. All of them returned safely to their base. On November 26 German small craft raided the waters off the Norfolk coast and sank the armed trawler *Narval*, which was on patrol, capturing her crew.

It was apparently in response to the general criticism already referred to that the Board of Admiralty was, at the end of November, strengthened by the infusion of younger men fresh from sea service, men who had distinguished themselves in the war and knew what was necessary for the war. The appointment was announced on November 29 of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe to be First Sea Lord, and of Admiral Sir David Beatty to succeed him as Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet. Sir

* Vol. X., page 55.

John Jellicoe brought with him to the Admiralty from the Grand Fleet Admiral Sir Cecil Burney as Second Sea Lord and Commodore Lionel Halsey as Fourth Sea Lord, as well as many other officers. Before the announcement of these changes had been made known to the public Mr. Asquith's Government went out of office, and in the new Ministry formed by Mr. Lloyd George the post of First Lord of the Admiralty was accepted by Sir Edward

and the rest scattered, having suffered considerable punishment. Meantime there was another encounter off the Schouwen Bank between British and German destroyers, in which one of the former was struck by a torpedo, and so severely damaged that she had to be sunk by our own ships. The severity of the conditions under which this action was fought was shown by the arrival at Ymuiden of the German destroyer "V.69," flagship of the



JAPANESE DESTROYERS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

Carson. The new patent was published in the *London Gazette* of December 15, 1916. The outstanding feature claimed for the new Government was its greater vigour and energy, and the speeding up was reflected in the administration at the Admiralty.

On January 22, 1917, a timely check was inflicted upon the German flotillas at Zeebrugge by two short and sharp actions off the Dutch coast, fought in very severe weather. British light forces met an enemy destroyer division whilst on patrol, and in the engagement which followed one of the German boats was sunk

flotilla. The boat limped into the Dutch port in a terrible condition, with eight members of her crew who had been killed frozen hard to the deck. Her commanding officer, Lieut.-Commander Boehm, was reported to be uninjured, but the commander of the flotilla, Corvette-Captain Schultz, was killed early in the engagement with other officers, by a shell which wrecked the bridge of the "V.69." The boat was repaired and returned to a German port on February 11, 1917.*

* See Vol. XIV., p. 198.



GERMAN SUBMARINE WRECKED ON THE COAST OF JUTLAND.

This check off the Dutch coast did not suffice to stop entirely the German raids into British waters. On the night of January 25, 1917, a small unidentified German vessel approached the Suffolk coast, and fired a number of shells, only a portion of which reached the land. There were no casualties, and only insignificant damage was caused. The night was very dark, and the firing opened with a star-shell, which lit up the coast, but most of the shells which followed fell into fields, and the bombardment was all over in less than five minutes. According to the German account of this little affair, their light forces "penetrated to English coast waters south of Lowestoft in order to attack hostile patrol vessels and outpost ships previously reported there. In the entire sea region which was searched nothing of the enemy was seen. Thereupon the fortified place of Southwold was illuminated from a short distance by star-shells. Our torpedo boats then opened fire, and direct hits were observed."

A more ambitious raid, by two divisions of enemy destroyers, was carried out on the night of February 25. The destroyers approached the Kentish coast at 11.15 p.m., and fired a number of shells at the unfortified towns of Broadstairs and Margate, the bombardment lasting for about ten minutes. The material damage caused was slight, but three people were killed in an old-fashioned cottage between Broadstairs and Margate which was destroyed by the firing. The hostile forces were reported

by a British destroyer on patrol duty in the Channel, and a short engagement ensued, in which the British vessel was not damaged, although under heavy fire from guns and torpedoes. The enemy vessels were pursued, but were lost in the darkness. In the German account it was mentioned that the destroyers were commanded by Commander Tillessen and Commander Konrad Albrecht.

In the next of these "tip-and-run" raids, also carried out by two groups of destroyers, the town of Ramsgate was subjected to a slight attack. Very early in the morning of March 18 some enemy destroyers approached the Kentish coast and fired a number of shells, but there were no casualties and the material damage was slight, one occupied and two empty houses only being hit, according to the British official report. These Ramsgate raiders retired hurriedly before the local British forces, and escaped in the darkness, so that it was not possible to ascertain the damage inflicted on them. At almost the same time, however, enemy destroyers engaged one of the British destroyers on patrol, to the westward of the Straits of Dover, sinking her with a torpedo. She returned the fire, using torpedoes and guns, but the result was not known. From the crew there were eight survivors, but all the officers were drowned. A second British destroyer was torpedoed, but not seriously damaged, whilst picking up the survivors from the first. During this same night a British


merchant vessel in the northern part of the Downs was sunk by a torpedo from what the Germans called their "northern attacking group" of destroyers.

Dunkirk was the next object of attack by the German raiders, some sixty shells being fired into the French town by torpedo boats about 2 a.m. on the morning of March 26, 1917. Similarly, during the night of March 28-29, there was a foray off Lowestoft, although on this occasion the enemy did not bombard the town itself. According to the Admiralty *communiqué*, "some firing was observed some miles off shore from Lowestoft. Our patrols were sent to the scene at utmost speed, but nothing was seen of the enemy, who had made off." The Germans claimed to have sunk by gunfire the armed English steamer *Mascotte*, and to have taken seven men of her crew prisoners. This vessel was a patrol trawler—a class of vessel the crews of which suffered much and endured much during the guerilla warfare which was practised with ever-increasing boldness about the time under review.

The frequent raids upon the coast of Thanet were naturally somewhat disturbing to the inhabitants of that part of Kent, and in the first week of April, 1917, a deputation from the towns in this locality waited upon Sir Edward Carson and Sir John Jellicoe at the Admiralty, the party including the Mayors of Margate and Ramsgate and the Chairman of the Council of

Broadstairs. Sir Edward Carson assured them that, in spite of alarmist rumours, the position was not more serious than it had been since the beginning of the War. The First Lord added that he had no intention of removing his grandson from the school he attended in Thanet, and he hoped himself, as in the past, to spend occasional week-ends there.

From about the middle of April a new phase in the raiding warfare was entered upon. A decided check was put upon the German enterprises, and the British counter-measures partook more of an offensive character than previously. Not that the Navy had remained content to leave all the offensive strokes to the Germans before this. On the contrary, the Royal Naval Air Service had kept up from the beginning of the winter a constant succession of bombing raids upon the Belgian coast strongholds from which the hostile craft emanated. These attacks, however, were evidently found to have only a limited value. On January 8, for instance, the *Echo Belge* stated that a great number of submarines and torpedo boats were then in the port at Zeebrugge, which had not suffered much from the bombardments. The harbour works were practically intact. This place differed from Ostend, in that it was merely the port of Bruges, and so long as that arsenal was able to turn out and to shelter war craft the latter could always fly back there for safety whatever happened to the port itself.




GERMAN MINE-LAYING SUBMARINE WRECKED NEAR CALAIS.

All the same, R.N.A.S. machines made frequent assaults upon Bruges, as upon Zeebrugge and Ostend, during the first three months of 1917.

In April, however, as has been said, more aggressive methods seemed to come into operation. On the night of April 7, in conjunction with seaplane attacks on the Mole at Zeebrugge and on ammunition dumps near

Ghent and Bruges, it was officially announced that "other operations were carried out off Zeebrugge during the same night, as the result of which two enemy destroyers were torpedoed. One of these was seen to sink; the fate of the second is not certain, but she was very severely damaged." In this attack the British sustained no casualties, but the Germans



THE HAND-TO-HAND FIGHT ON BOARD THE "BROKE."

admitted the loss of their torpedo boat G88. A fortnight later the country was thrilled by a spirited encounter in the Dover Straits, in which the Germans lost two more torpedo boats, G85 and G42. On the night of April 20 about five German destroyers attempted a raid on Dover, the Vice-Admiral at which base reported that




THE NEW BELL OF THE "BROKE."
Cast from the lid of a Torpedo Tube of G42.

the attack resulted in the enemy firing a number of rounds into a ploughed field a few miles distant from the town. The enemy then apparently steered in the direction of some of our shipping, possibly with the intention of attacking, but was met by two vessels of the Dover patrol. In five minutes these two vessels, the Broke and the Swift, commanded respectively by Commander E. R. G. R. Evans, R.N., of Antarctic fame, and Commander A. M. Peck, R.N., engaged and sank at least two, and possibly three, of the five or six enemy boats, the remainder making off at a high speed during the short engagement, and escaping in the darkness. The British Admiralty report commended the conduct of those concerned in this affair as follows: "Our vessels suffered no material damage, and our casualties were exceedingly slight in comparison with the results obtained. Our patrol vessels were handled with remarkable gallantry and dash, and the tactics pursued were a very fine example of destroyer work. We were fortunate in being able to save the lives of ten German officers and 108 men from the vessels which were sunk." Telegraphing on April 27 to the Vice-Admiral at Dover, his Majesty the King commanded that his hearty congratulations should be conveyed to the commanders,

officers, and men of the Swift and Broke "on the skill, dash, and bravery displayed on the night of April 20-21 off Dover." During this encounter one of the enemy destroyers was rammed by the Broke, and while the two boats were thus locked together a desperate hand-to-hand conflict, in quite the style of the olden days, took place. With fine spirit, the men of the Broke, headed by Midshipman Donald A. Gyles, R.N.R., cleared their decks of the Germans who managed to scramble on board.

The skill and gallantry of the officers and men engaged in this affair were recognised in a *Gazette* dated May 10, 1917. Commanders Peck and Evans were promoted and awarded the D.S.O., Engineer-Lieutenant-Commanders Hughes and Coomber were also promoted. The



[Official photograph.]

THE STEERSMAN OF THE "BROKE."
W. G. Rawles, C.G.M., who remained at the Wheel throughout the action, although wounded.


following officers were awarded the D.S.C.: Lieutenants G. V. Hickman, navigator and second in command of H.M.S. Broke; R. D. King-Harman, navigator of H.M.S. Swift; M. C. Despard, first and gunnery lieutenant of H.M.S. Broke; H. A. Simpson, executive officer and gunnery lieutenant of the Swift; the two Probationary-Surgeons C. T. Helsham, R.N.V.R., of the Broke, and J. S. Westwater, R.N.V.R., of the Swift; the two gunners H. Turner and F. Grinney, and Midshipman

Gyles of the *Broke*. The only award of the C.G.M. was to able-seaman William George Rawles, who continued to steer *H.M.S. Broke* although wounded badly in the legs in four places. There were other awards of the D.S.M., and also many officers and men were mentioned in dispatches or noted for early promotion.

After the *Swift* and *Broke* affray, coupled with more frequent and effective air attacks on the enemy's bases, there was a considerable diminution in the raids by enemy destroyers. The German boats were prevented from coming within striking distance of the British or French coasts. A few shells fired into Dunkirk early on the morning of April 24, by some torpedo boats under Captain Assmann, and the destruction of about 20 houses in Ramsgate on the night of April 26-27, were among the last attempts of the Germans to carry out raids in the Narrows. In the former a French torpedo boat was sunk, and in the latter, although most of the shells fell in the open country, two people were killed and three

injured. But with the advent of May the Allied forces had clearly asserted their mastery. On May 10 light cruisers and destroyers from Harwich under Commodore Sir R. Tyrwhitt sighted a force of 11 German destroyers at about 4 a.m. between the English and Dutch coasts, heading southward. The British forces immediately closed, but on their opening fire the enemy made off at full speed under cover of a dense smoke screen, and although shelled for an hour and twenty minutes at long range it was not possible to overtake them. Four destroyers chased the 11 German destroyers to within range of the guns of Zeebrugge. Again, on the night of May 19-20 a patrol of four French torpedo boats met off Dunkirk a flotilla of German destroyers making for that port, but after a short engagement the Germans withdrew at full speed.

Following up these successful operations, others of a still more successful nature were undertaken on June 5. Early on that morning the enemy's naval base and workshops at Ostend were heavily bombarded by units of



THE "SWIFT" PICKING UP SURVIVORS OF G42 SUNK BY THE "BROKE."



COMMANDER EVANS of the "BROKE" (left) and COMMANDER PECK of the "SWIFT."

Photographed at the Investiture in Hyde Park, when each received the D.S.O.

the Dover patrol, a large number of rounds being fired with good results. (On the 6th it was officially reported that photographic reconnaissance over Ostend showed that the bombardment had seriously damaged or totally destroyed the majority of the workshops in the dockyard.) While this operation was in progress, another force from the Harwich flotillas was patrolling off the Belgian coast, evidently with the object of bringing to action any of the German vessels which might be driven out to sea by the bombardment. This force under Commodore Sir R. Tyrwhitt sighted six destroyers, and engaged them at long range.

In the running fight one of the enemy boats, S20, was sunk by the British gunfire and another severely damaged. Seven survivors from S20 were picked up and made prisoners, and there were no British casualties.

The effect of the attacks on June 5, and of others made from the air, was that not only were several vessels sunk at Ostend but that the entrance gates to the dockyard basin, the wharf, the submarine shelter, and a destroyer under repair were badly damaged. On June 10 the Admiralty reported that, according to a message from the Vice-Admiral at Dover, the latest reconnaissance of Ostend showed that all large shipping had been removed from that harbour. The harbour presented a deserted




MIDSHIPMAN GYLES of the "BROKE" Who headed the fight against the boarding party.

appearance, it was added, and the two destroyers which had lately been reported as being towed to Zeebrugge were probably those damaged during the bombardment which had been removed from the basin.

Referring to these raids on unfortified towns and to the fighting in the Narrows, Sir J. Jellicoe said :—

We deplore the loss of life among non-combatants; but, after all, we are engaged in a war whereon the freedom of the world depends, and we cannot deflect our strategy from its main purpose. That is what the Germans hoped to effect, and they have failed. At the same time, perhaps, I may add, that since the exploit of the Swift and Broke the enemy has attempted no raid on the British coast.

This leads me to say a few words as to the destroyer and submarine bases on the Belgian coast which are in the occupation of the Germans. One is Ostend, the other is Zeebrugge. The Germans have applied to this length of sand-fringed coast the same principle of intensive fortification adopted higher up on the North Sea and the Island of Heligoland. The coast line is



THE DESTROYER ACTION OFF ZEEBRUGGE, JUNE 5, 1917:


studded with heavy guns, which in themselves constitute infinitesimal targets at a range of more than 20,000 yards on which any bombardment could be carried out. Moreover, the enemy has not been slow to make the fullest use of aircraft and smoke screens by way of protection.

Ostend offers the best target, but it can only be attacked at rare intervals, when a favourable combination of wind, weather and sea conditions can be attained. Zeebrugge, in the real sense of the word, is not a naval base, but merely an exit from the inland port of Bruges, with which it is connected by a wide deep-water canal. There is little to hit at Zeebrugge. Still, I hope that the problem which the Belgian coast presents is not insoluble.

During the period under review the intensified submarine war waged by the enemy overshadowed events at sea. Towards the end of 1916, in addition to the dissatisfaction aroused in the country by the constant raids by torpedo craft on the east and south-east coasts, there was a feeling that the submarine menace was not being grappled with as it had been in the autumn of the previous year (1915), when Lord Selborne was able to say on behalf of the Cabinet that it was "well in hand." The sinking of merchant ships increased and the proportion of lost tonnage relatively to the amount available for the trade of the British Isles increased in even greater ratio. With something of a shock, the country learnt from Mr. Prothero, the new Minister for Agri-

culture (speaking in the House of Commons on December 20, 1916), that in his opinion "we ought to realize, and the War Office ought to realize, and the whole country ought to realize, that we are a beleaguered city." About three weeks afterwards, in the first public speech he made after giving up the command of the Grand Fleet, Sir John Jellicoe stated at the Fishmongers' Hall that "the submarine menace to the Merchant Service is far greater now than at any period of the war, and it requires all our energy to combat it." So much for the gravity of the problem. That its development had not been anticipated and provided against in adequate measure was made clear by Captain Bathurst, speaking on behalf of the Ministry of Food, in the House of Commons on March 23, 1917, when he said that "the food position and the food outlook are not wholly satisfactory, but it would be much easier to cope with the difficulties of this food stringency, which was likely to develop, had it been foreseen at an earlier period of the war and more far-reaching steps taken to grapple with it."

This, of course, was some few weeks after the official opening of the unrestricted submarine war, of which the Germans had given notice on January 31, 1917. But as early as November, 1916, there was much uneasiness



[After a Sketch by an Eyewitness.]

BRITISH CREW THROWING LIFE-BELTS TO GERMAN SAILORS.

felt in regard to the matter. It was one of the causes of the disquiet which brought about changes at the Admiralty and the accession to office of Sir Edward Carson and Sir John Jellicoe. On November 30, 1916, *The Times* had said, in discussing elements of weakness in Admiralty administration, that "the departments responsible for strategy, intelligence, and supply notoriously call for immediate attention, for the whole *raison d'être* of the change is the public dissatisfaction with lack of initiative, ignorance of enemy movements, and ill-organized construction." On the following day, December 1, 1916, a meeting was held in the City, under the chairmanship of Lord Leith of Fyvie, which passed a resolution calling on the Government to exercise a more thorough blockade of Germany, and to take efficient steps for the protection of merchant shipping against enemy submarines.

Indications of what the Germans could do with their submarines of the newer types had been given by the journey of U53 to the United States in October, 1916, and there were also several reports from the Continent of feverish activity in submarine construction. Lord Milner, while in Petrograd on February 9, 1917, estimated the number of U-boats in use at that moment at about 200, and other esti-

mates were even higher. Into the motives underlying the fateful decision taken by Germany to wage a ruthless submarine war and risking all consequences it is unnecessary to enter here. The avowed intention was to starve England by U-boat warfare, but while they had to put forward this view in public, and brought on themselves a good deal of political trouble, it probably did not represent their real calculation, which was to damage the whole war machine of the Allies as much as possible.

It was on January 31, 1917, that Herr Zimmermann informed the American Ambassador at Berlin that wide zones around Great Britain, France, and Italy, as well as in the Eastern Mediterranean, were to be considered blockaded areas, in which, without any further notice or warning, all sea traffic would be prevented by all available weapons as from the following day (February 1). The following were the salient points of the German Note, which was ostensibly issued in reply to the message of the President of the United States on January 22 on the subject of peace, and of a Memorandum appended to the Note:

The freedom of the seas as a preliminary condition for the free existence and the peaceful intercourse of nations as well as the open door for trade were always the guiding principles of German policy.

The attempt of the four Allied Powers to bring about peace failed on account of the lust of conquest of our adversaries, who want to dictate peace.

Thus a new situation has sprung up, which also forces Germany to new decisions.

For the past two years and a half England has misused the power of her Navy in a criminal attempt to force Germany by hunger into subjection.

The Imperial Government before its own conscience and before history is unable to assume responsibility if any one means to hasten the end of the war be still untried. Together with the President of the United States they had hoped to attain this aim by negotiations.

The attempt to establish an understanding between the adversaries having been answered by an announcement of intensified warfare, the Imperial Government, it in a higher sense it wants to serve humanity and not sin against the friends of its own nation, must now continue the war for existence once more forced upon her by means of using all weapons. The Imperial Government is, therefore, also forced to do away with restrictions which up to now it has imposed upon the use of its fighting means at sea.

From February 11, 1917, within the barred zones

around Great Britain, France, Italy and in the Eastern Mediterranean, all sea traffic will forthwith be opposed by all means.

Neutral ships plying within the barred zones do so at their own risk.

Traffic of regular American passenger steamers may go on unmolested:

(a) If Falmouth is taken as the port of destination.


(b) If on the outward and return journeys the Scillies as well as a point 50 degrees north 20 degrees west are steered for. On this road (route) no German mines will be laid:

(c) If steamers bear the following special signs which are allowed to them alone in American ports—viz., to be painted on the ship's hull and on the superstructure, three metres broad, vertical stripes alternating white and red. On every mast a large flag chequered white and red: on the stern the American national flag. During darkness the national flag and painted stripes to be easily recognizable as possible from far away and the ships to be completely and brightly illuminated.

(d) If one steamer runs in each direction every week, arriving at Falmouth on Sundays, leaving Falmouth on Wednesdays.



THE AREA OF THE GERMAN "BARRED ZONES" OF FEBRUARY, 1917.



THE HOSPITAL SHIP "ASTURIAS," WHICH WAS SUNK WITHOUT WARNING.

(e) If guarantees are given by the American Government that these steamers carry no "contraband" according to the German list of "contraband."

* * *

It is further stated that Germany is prepared, in view of the need for Continental passenger traffic, that every week-day a Dutch paddle steamer shall receive free and unobstructed right of passage in each direction between Flushing and Southwold, on condition that said paddle steamers only pass through the barred zones by daylight, and that they steer by the North Hinder Lightship both on the outward and homeward voyage. On this route no German mines will be laid. The marks on the ships making these voyages to be the same as those given regarding American passenger steamers.

* * *

The Germans lost no time in putting their threats into execution. The Dutch steamship Gamma, the Danish steamer Lars Kruse (employed on Belgian relief work), the American steamer Housatonic, and other vessels fell victims during the first three days of the new campaign. As regards hospital ships, the Asturias was destroyed on the night of March 20-21, the Gloucester Castle on the night of March 30-31, and the Salta on April 10, 1917, among others. In the early days the newspapers of the country were allowed to give particulars of the sinkings of ships, and to tabulate lists, but a change of policy in this respect was introduced by Sir Edward Carson on February 28, 1917. He had stated in his speech in the House of Commons a week earlier that nothing could be worse than the inaccurate recording of submarine losses. Incomplete lists and accumulations of losses afforded no comparison with the actual volume of trade which was being done. From the week ending Sunday,

February 25, therefore, the Admiralty issued a weekly table showing the number of all vessels of over 100 tons using British ports, the number of British vessels sunk by mine or submarine, and also the number of British vessels attacked but not sunk. The form in which this weekly return was published was determined by the Government after consultation with the Allied Powers, who also adopted the plan and issued similar returns. The Admiralty considered that there were cogent naval reasons against publishing the tonnage figures, as thereby the enemy would obtain accurate information of considerable military value.

The official tables of losses were the subject of much criticism, especially in regard to the omission of the tonnage destroyed, but the system continued during the year. The high-water mark of the new campaign was reached in the week ending April 22, 1917, when 41 British vessels of over 1,600 tons were sunk by mines and submarines. In regard to the totals of losses, Mr. Lloyd George gave a number of figures in his speech on August 16, 1917. Later information on the important matter of the tonnage losses was given by Sir Eric Geddes in his first speech in Parliament as First Lord on November 1, 1917. He said that the Germans claimed to have destroyed 808,000 tons in August, but this was for all nationalities. In point of actual fact, they sank very little more than a third of that amount of British tonnage and a little more than half for all nationalities. For September their official

figures were 672,000 tons, a decrease on the previous month, but again they sank far less than a third of that amount of British tonnage and less than half that amount of all nationalities. The Germans explained the reduced sinkings on the ground that the world's tonnage had sunk so low that there were not enough ships to enable the submarine commanders to maintain their "bag," but in confuting this Sir Eric Geddes showed that during September the oversea sailings of all ships of 1,600 tons and over were higher by 20 per cent. in numbers and 30 per cent. in tonnage than in April, the heaviest month of sinkings. The First Lord added: "The net reduction in tonnage in the last four months is to-day 30 per cent. less than was anticipated in an estimate prepared by me for the Cabinet early in July." He also stated that during the past quarter the enemy had lost as many submarines as they lost during the whole of 1916, and since war began between 40 and 50 per cent. of the U-boats operating in the North Sea, Atlantic, and Arctic Ocean had been sunk.

A distinctly human touch was imparted by the First Lord to his survey of the submarine position when he was describing the measures, offensive and defensive, taken to deal with the menace. He showed that in the submarine warfare, as elsewhere, it was becoming a test of determination, grit, and ingenuity between the two contending forces, and for the present he came to the conclusion that the U-boat war was going well for us. He then made the following point, showing how priceless an asset Great Britain has in her trained and seasoned merchant seamen, and how the man in the end proves superior to the machine:—

We, of course, analyse in every possible way submarine sinkings, and although we may do, and are doing, a great deal by the use of science, by various kinds of weapons and appliances, to defeat the submarine, there is one thing which is almost the most potent protection against submarines that exists. It is not an appliance; it is a gift that God has given to men on the ships. It is their eyesight. It is a good look-out that is kept. I will give figures to the House which, I think, will interest it, and will tell those outside how they can help the Navy against the submarine. A good look-out kept by an experienced man, covering a great many attacks by submarines, has given us the following facts, that if a submarine is sighted by the look-out on a vessel, whether the vessel is armed or not, it makes no difference, taking it all over, it is seven to three on the ship in favour of it getting away. Out of every ten attacks when the submarine is sighted by the ship seven of them fail, but of every ten attacks when the submarine is not sighted eight ships go down. It is seven to three on the ship if the submarine is sighted, and four to one against it if it is not.

On this point the Naval Correspondent of *The Times* had already remarked:—

Something, however, may be said for the results of Sir Alfred Yarrow's public-spirited offer of a reward to those men who first see and report a submarine. Every now and again the presentation of the reward to some man or boy for sighting a submarine before his shipmates have seen it is noticed in the papers. But these isolated cases by no means indicate the stimulating effect upon the watch for periscopes which Sir Alfred's generous gifts have produced, nor their results in reducing the mercantile losses. Out of 172 cases in which Sir Alfred Yarrow's award was given for sighting submarines up to October 1 in this year, the number of vessels attacked and sunk by torpedo was 12; the number attacked and sunk by gunfire was five; the number attacked and damaged seriously, but not sunk, was five; the number attacked which escaped without serious damage was 65; and the number which observed submarines, but were not attacked, was 86. It is obvious that it is of the utmost importance to bring the vessels safely into port without damage of any kind, and over 85 per cent. of the vessels for which claims were made accomplished this successfully, while nearly one-half, or 49·7 per cent., got in without being attacked at all.

Before dealing further with the progress of the unlimited U-boat campaign, it must be recorded briefly how it brought about an epoch-making event from the naval standpoint in the progress of hostilities—the introduction of the United States into the war. The historic meeting of the American Cabinet held immediately on the receipt of the German Note of January 31, 1917, and other political and diplomatic events, will be found referred to in other chapters of this History. The American Navy was the first to feel the effect of, and to act upon, the change in the relations between the United States and Germany. The Atlantic Fleet at Guantanamo, Cuba, was advised of the possibility of a rupture as soon as a decision was come to by the Cabinet to break off all diplomatic relations, and the usual daily announcements of the movements of American men-of-war also ceased. On February 5, following a conference between the President and the Secretary of the Navy, it was announced that an understanding had been reached by which American merchant ships might carry guns, amidships as well as forward and aft, for their protection against submarines. With commendable pluck, however, several merchant captains put to sea after the declaration of the war zone without any guns to rely upon, but only trusting to their good fortune and skill to avoid destruction. Two such vessels the voyages of which attracted a good deal of attention were the *Orleans* and the *Rochester*, the one belonging to the Oriental Navigation Co.

and the other to the Kerr Line. Disregarding the German demands that any ships entering the war zone should be painted in red and white vertical stripes, these vessels left New York on February 10, and arrived at Bordeaux on February 27 and March 2 respectively. Their voyages were quite uneventful, and

vogue was afforded by the attack on a convoy of seven Dutch vessels on February 22, 1917. The ships had been lying at Falmouth a few days, and on the morning in question received instructions from the Dutch authorities to put to sea, three being inward and four outward bound. When only a few miles out they



BRITISH "SEA TANKS" (MONITORS) OFF ZEEBRUGGE.

neither of them saw any submarines. The captains and crews received a great public ovation. They modestly disclaimed, however, to have done anything beyond their duty, and indeed it was remarkable that the German threats, save only in the first day or two after they were made, when a state of partial paralysis existed in the neutral shipping industry, entirely failed to intimidate the merchant seamen into refusing to carry on the trade of the world.

An illustration of the arbitrary methods in


were met by a submarine, said to be U3, and six were sunk by torpedoes or bombs. Their crews were turned adrift in five minutes, and remained in boats for about fifteen hours before being rescued. It was officially announced from The Hague on February 24 that the German Government had declared its readiness to comply with a request made that none of the Dutch vessels *en route* to and from Dutch harbours at the time of the introduction of unlimited submarine war should be molested. It was owing to this promise that the seven

ships left Falmouth. No instructions as to routes were asked from, or given by, the British Admiralty, yet this did not prevent the German Legation at The Hague making an attempt to saddle the responsibility for the outrage upon England.


This onslaught on a Dutch convoy showed once more how futile it was to rely on any paper promises, or indeed on anything less than armed force, in dealing with the German raiders. It was for this reason that the advent of America into the war was of immediate advantage to the Allies, since she was able to place at the disposal of the naval commanders in European waters a destroyer force, in addition to relieving the Allies of certain patrol work in the Atlantic. In May the Admiralty announced that "a flotilla of United States destroyers has recently arrived in this country to co-operate with our naval forces in the prosecution of the war. Vice-Admiral W. G. Sims, U.S.N., is in general command of all United States naval forces that are sent to European waters, and he is in daily touch with the Chief of the Naval Staff. The services which the United States vessels are rendering to the Allied cause are of the greatest value, and are

deeply appreciated." During the absence on leave of Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, the British Commander-in-Chief on the coast of Ireland, in June, 1917, Vice-Admiral Sims temporarily took over the Irish naval command, and for the first time in the history of the naval affairs of the United Kingdom the Republican flag of a friendly and allied nation floated from the flagstaff of the British naval headquarters at Queenstown. In a speech on May 17, 1917, Sir Edward Carson expressed his appreciation of the first instalment of the assistance which the American Navy was giving to the Allies. "I have been told," he said, "and I have received the news with great pleasure, of the great efficiency of the flotilla which has been sent over. I am told that the construction of the ships is magnificent, their armament perfect, their officers and men also magnificent."

There was another striking demonstration about this time of the solidarity of the Allied navies by the action of the Japanese authorities in sending a number of destroyers to the Mediterranean. On June 11, 1917, the Japanese Naval Attaché in London announced that one of the Japanese flotillas attacked enemy



THE TRANSPORT "TRANSYLVANIA" (TORPEDOED IN THE MEDITERRANEAN).



THE "GLOUCESTER CASTLE" SINKING, SHOWING THE RED CROSS AT THE BOW.

submarines in the Mediterranean, but the result was not known. On this occasion the destroyer Sakaki, one of the new boats added to the Japanese Navy since the outbreak of war, received some damage by an enemy torpedo, with a loss of 55 lives, but she was towed safely into port. The British Admiralty supplemented this announcement by stating that the Sakaki was one of the destroyers which so gallantly aided in rescuing a large number of the troops and crew from the transport Transylvania, which was torpedoed on May 4, and from which 413 lives were lost. The destroyer's crew went to the aid of the transport at the imminent risk of themselves being torpedoed, and the handling of the boat won general admiration.


Perhaps the most diabolical part of Germany's programme of ruthlessness was the threat to sink hospital ships on the military routes for the forces in France and Belgium, *i.e.*, within a line drawn between Flamborough Head and Terschelling on the one hand, and from Ushant to Land's End on the other. It was alleged that the German Government had "conclusive proof" that in *several instances* enemy hospital ships had been misused for the transport of munitions and troops. The British Foreign Office promptly denied this assertion, and pointed out that under the Hague Convention belligerents had the right to search hospital ships, and the German Government had therefore an obvious remedy in case of suspicion—a remedy which they had never utilised. But the Germans persisted in their statement that the decision not to tolerate the traffic of hospital ships was taken on account of English abuse.

On the night of March 20-21 the Asturias^{*} was torpedoed without warning. She had discharged her cargo of wounded, but the casualties were, among the military, 11 dead, three missing, and 17 injured; and among the crew 20 dead, nine missing, and 22 injured. The missing included a military female nurse and a stewardess. On the night of March 30-31 the Gloucester Castle was torpedoed without warning in mid-Channel, and 52 were drowned or killed in consequence. All the wounded were successfully removed from the ship, including some German wounded. There was no doubt in regard to this outrage, because the German wireless on April 11 claimed that the ship had been torpedoed by a submarine. On April 10 the hospital ship Salta struck a mine in the Channel and sank. There were no wounded aboard, but 52 lives were lost from the R.A.M.C. personnel. On April 17 two hospital ships, the Donegal and Lanfranc, were destroyed with the loss of 41 and 34 lives respectively. From the Lanfranc 152 German wounded were saved. In announcing the loss of these two vessels the Admiralty stated on April 22, 1917, that owing to the fact that the distinctive marking and lighting of the hospital ships rendered them more conspicuous targets for German submarines it had become no longer possible to distinguish our hospital ships in the customary manner. The markings—white hull with a green band and red crosses, and also special flags and lights—which had been agreed upon in the Hague Convention, and which had guaranteed the immunity of hospital ships from attack, rendered them no longer inviolable. It was therefore decided that sick and wounded,

together with medical personnel and supplies, must in future be transported for their own safety in ships carrying no distinctive markings, and proceeding without lights in the same manner as ordinary mercantile traffic.

In coming to the above decision the British Government were doubtless influenced partly by the failure of their experiment in the policy of reprisals for hospital ship attacks. Immediately on the German threat of January 31 being made, the German Government was informed that if it were carried into effect reprisals would immediately be taken by the British authorities concerned. Accordingly, on April 14, in consequence of the attacks of German submarines on hospital ships, a large

upholding the principles of humanity and justice would not prove a deterrent to Germany in the future. Such reprisals could be only punitive in effect." Later, on May 26, the German Government issued another Note including the Mediterranean in the danger zone for hospital ships. On the same day as the Note was dated, the Dover Castle was twice torpedoed in the Mediterranean and sunk. The whole of the hospital patients and hospital staff were safely removed to other ships, and the crew was also saved, except six men missing, who were supposed to have been killed by the explosions. Previous to this Note, however, the hospital ship Britannia, in November, 1916, was sunk in the Aegean Sea,




THE HOSPITAL SHIP "DOVER CASTLE," TWICE TORPEDOED WITHOUT WARNING.

The photograph was taken just after the second torpedo had struck the ship.

squadron, composed of British and French aeroplanes, carried out a reprisal bombardment of the town of Freiburg, many bombs being dropped with good results. The spirit in which the Allies exacted retribution was shown by the purely military character of the measures adopted. As the Admiralty pointed out, the airmen who executed this attack were exposed to, and did in fact incur, precisely the same dangers from the town defences as they would have been in the course of an ordinary action. Three machines failed to return after the expedition. However, on April 22, it was pointed out by the Admiralty that "any retaliatory measures open to a Government

and in the same month the Braemar Castle was also mined or torpedoed in the Mediterranean.

The hospital ship question was carried a satisfactory step further by the generous action of the King of Spain. Lord Robert Cecil announced on August 16 that in order to remove all suspicion the British and French Governments had agreed that all hospital ships should carry a neutral commissioner, to be appointed by the Spanish Government. Eleven Spanish naval officers were reported to have left Spain in that week for French ports, to take up their duties in conducting hospital ships. From September 10, it was announced in a French



DESTROYERS RACING TO THE HELP OF THE "DOVER CASTLE,"

Which is seen in the centre of the photograph.

semi-official statement, the German naval forces would respect hospital ships in the Mediterranean, which would no longer have to be escorted by armed vessels, and from this date the German officer prisoners of war were landed from the French hospital ships on which they had been placed as hostages.

Turning to the measures taken to counter the enemy's plans, Lord Curzon referred to them as follows, on February 7, in the House of Lords:—

We are arming merchant vessels to an extent which, were your lordships aware of it, would give you lively satisfaction, but the figures of which I have not the slightest intention of stating. We are employing and developing scientific inventions for the discovery and destruction of submarines. We are exerting ourselves to protect neutral shipping from the dangers by which they are threatened. We are organizing the sea waters in the endeavour to provide lanes of safety through the danger zone. We are building at an accelerated rate of speed new vessels to replace those that have been or are likely to be lost.


A fortnight later Sir Edward Carson, speaking on the Navy Estimates, said that there had been established at the Admiralty an Anti-Submarine Department, composed of the best and most experienced men who could be drawn upon for the purpose from among those serving at sea. Their whole time was devoted to working out the problem in connexion with this menace. The officer chosen to be the Director of this new Anti-Submarine Division of the Admiralty War Staff was Captain William W. Fisher, M.V.O., R.N., who when war broke out was commanding the battleship *St. Vincent* in the Grand Fleet and serving as Flag-Captain to Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas. The official Navy List for July, showed that he had two other naval captains—Claude Seymour, D.S.O., and H. T. Walwyn,

D.S.O.—as his Assistants, in addition to 17 other naval officers.

A factor of the greatest importance in the measures and methods taken to counteract the U-boat campaign was the skill and dexterity shown by the mercantile captains. Commodore Lionel Halsey, the Fourth Sea Lord, drew attention to this in a speech at the Imperial Merchant Service Guild at Liverpool on March 6. Quoting from an official paper containing an analysis of attacks by torpedo without warning, he showed that out of 32 attacks 27 succeeded, the ships being sunk in 22 cases, and beached in five. Of the five unsuccessful attacks, two torpedoes missed ahead, one missed astern, and in two cases the periscope was sighted and the torpedo avoided. Of the 27 successful attacks, in 21 cases the ships were not zigzagging. In one case a ship, through zigzagging, passed only two miles off an island where a submarine was waiting. Commodore Halsey, in expressing the hope that the information he had given would be circulated, so that every captain of a ship leaving the British Isles would be able to see what happened, said that the figures afforded a very good example of the importance of zigzagging with discretion.

The inventive resources of the Allies had full scope in being centred upon the means of dealing with the submarines. Lord Beresford referred to this phase of the matter in a speech at the Birmingham and Midland Institute on October 11, 1917. According to the report in *The Birmingham Daily Post*, the Admiral said:—

Public mention had been made of the hydrophone, or listener, and mines, as well as the smoke-boxes now in use, but owing to our ineradicably dilatory methods these inventions, which were brought out a short time after the outbreak of war, were held up. If they had



DESTROYER SUMMONED BY A "BLIMP" SINKS A SUBMARINE.

been taken and pushed at once, the hydrophone would have saved the country many millions sterling, as the enormous barrages and obstacles which had been placed in the sea would have in many cases been quite unnecessary, and the smoke-boxes would have saved many a vessel from gun and torpedo attack.

In September and October the Admiralty to a certain extent lifted the veil which had hidden from the view of the public the daily drama at sea between the merchant vessels of all nations and their protecting units of the Allied navies on the one hand and the U-boats on the other. There were published extracts from official reports showing vividly how the submarines were being harassed and attacked night and day by various methods. Of special interest was the revelation that naval aircraft were playing a prominent part in these operations. The following was the official account of a fight between a seaplane and a German submarine: "A seaplane attacked an enemy submarine, which she had observed apparently manoeuvring into position to fire a torpedo at a passing merchant ship. Before the seaplane arrived over the submarine, the latter submerged, but three bombs were dropped on the position where he had disappeared from sight. In five minutes' time a large upheaval was noticed where the bombs had been dropped; this could best be compared to a huge bubble, rising some distance above the level of the sea, and distinctly visible for a minute or more. There was no further sign of the submarine."

On another occasion a German submarine was torpedoed, and undoubtedly destroyed, by one of our submarines, as described in the following extract from an Admiralty report: "A certain British submarine on patrol sighted an enemy submarine. Both boats were on the surface, and a heavy sea was running at the time. The British boat dived, and a quarter of an hour later succeeded in picking up the enemy in her periscope. She fired at an estimated range of 800 yards, and after a pause of a minute heard the concussion of a violent explosion. She rose to the surface and sighted a patch of oil, with survivors swimming in it, who were taken prisoners. These stated that the torpedo had struck them just before the conning tower. The submarine rolled over and sank, the survivors being blown up through the conning tower."

Even more remarkable and exciting must have been the encounter between a British naval airship and a U-boat, described in the following passage from Admiralty records,

issued to the Press on October 22, 1917:

"One of the coastal airships, of a type familiar to visitors at seaside resorts, was recently on patrol, and sighted a steamer in distress. On descending to investigate closer it was found that she had been torpedoed by an enemy submarine, but was capable of being towed into harbour. Accordingly the airship summoned assistance by wireless, and until it arrived hovered protectingly round the crippled merchantman. No signs of her late assailant were visible, and in due course the steamer was taken in tow by tugs and headed for harbour. The aerial escort accompanied the tow, and about an hour later sighted the conning tower of a submarine about five miles to the south-eastward of the convoy, apparently manoeuvring for another shot. The airship instantly signalled by wireless the position of the submarine to all men-of-war in the vicinity, and swooped down to attack. The submarine saw her coming, and dived, but too late to avoid this glittering Nemesis from the skies. Two bombs were dropped simultaneously in front of the swirl of his descent; a violent explosion ensued, followed by oil and air bubbles in ominous quantities. Shortly after a destroyer arrived and investigated with sweeps. The airship, returning to her base for a further supply of bombs and petrol, was overtaken by the following aerial signal: 'You've undoubtedly bagged him.'"

Evidently anticipating Germany's development of her submarine warfare, the British Admiralty towards the end of January notified neutral Governments of an extension of mine-laying operations in the North Sea. A large area was declared dangerous to shipping, and it was described as follows by the American State Department from information supplied to them:—"The area comprising all the waters, except the Netherlands and Danish territorial waters, lying south-westward and eastward of a line commencing four miles from the coast of Jutland, in latitude 56 deg. N., longitude 8 deg. E., and passing through the following positions:—Latitude 56 deg. N., longitude 6 deg. E.; latitude 54 deg. N., longitude 0°45 min. E., thence to a position in latitude 53°37 deg. N., longitude 5 deg. E., seven miles off the coast of the Netherlands." Thus from a point off Ringkøbing, Denmark, the danger area extended across the North Sea, north of the Horn Reef, thence slanting south-

ward, but including the Dogger Bank in its area, to a point off the Yorkshire coast, south of Flamborough Head. This area was subsequently extended on more than one occasion, both on its west side and closer to the limit of the Dutch territorial waters on the east side.



CAPTAIN W. W. FISHER, M.V.O.,
Director of the Anti-Submarine Division of the
Admiralty War Staff.

On July 4, 1917, the Admiralty published a "Notice to Mariners," headed "North Sea Caution with regard to Dangerous Areas," in which it was pointed out that, in view of the unrestricted warfare carried on by Germany at sea by means of mines and submarines, not only against the Allied Powers but also against neutral shipping, and the fact that merchant ships were constantly sunk without regard to life and the safety of their crew, the Government gave notice that the area in the North Sea rendered dangerous to all shipping by operations against the enemy would be further extended, and should be avoided. The positions given in this notice showed that the danger area had been considerably enlarged.

We may now turn to certain phases of the

work of the British Navy in the North Sea not already dealt with in these pages. In the course of the interview, already quoted, which he gave on April 12, 1917, to an American journalist, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe said that it could not be denied that naval strategy had undergone a vast change as the result of the illegal use by Germany of submarines. Their advent as a fighting weapon had made a blockade of an enemy's coast impossible, and had added to the difficulties we had to face on account of the natural features of the German coast line for either attack or defence. The First Sea Lord went on to show that the most striking feature of the change in our historic naval policy resulting from the illegal use of submarines, and from the fact that the enemy surface ships had been driven from the sea, was that we had been compelled to abandon a definite offensive policy for one which might be called an offensive-defensive, since our only active enemy was the submarine engaged in piracy and murder. We had to give our Mercantile Marine a measure of protection which would not be dreamed of if the Germans merely used their U-boats for legitimate naval warfare, and so many of the smaller warships had to be used for this purpose that the "tip-and-run" raid became a possibility, while our own blockade efforts suffered.

How this new offensive-defensive line of policy worked out in practice was illustrated by several events during the year. During the weeks immediately following Sir John Jellicoe's remarks there were undoubtedly signs of increased activity, if not of greater vigilance, on the part of the patrols. A scrap which occurred on August 16, 1917, indicated that the British outposts were pushed right up into the enemy's home waters. On this day, some of our light naval forces, scouting in the German Bight, sighted an enemy destroyer at 9.45 a.m. Fire was opened and the destroyer was chased. She was seen to be repeatedly hit and on fire, but she escaped through the mist over a minefield. Enemy mine-sweepers were sighted shortly after the destroyer and heavy fire opened on them, at least two being observed to be very severely damaged. But, as with the destroyer, our ships were unable to follow them owing to the proximity of minefields. During the engagement the British vessels were attacked by a submarine, and after the action a second submarine attacked, but in both cases the U-boats were unsuccessful. In

the German account of this affair, their forces were described as a guard patrol, which had encountered British cruisers and destroyers "on the fringe of the English barred zone." British light forces presumably patrolled regularly in the neighbourhood of the outside edge of the German triangle from Sylt to Borkum, for the double purpose of watching the enemy's exits and enforcing the British danger area, the limits of which, as is shown elsewhere, were in close proximity to the German mine fields. In these circumstances, it was remarkable that an encounter with German units did not occur more frequently.


A little further to the northward, off the Danish coast, west of Ringkøbing Firth, there was an action on September 1 between British light forces and four enemy mine-sweeping vessels, the latter being all destroyed. Unofficially, it was stated that two submarines and two seaplanes assisted the German vessels, and that one of the seaplanes was destroyed. Finding themselves attacked by superior forces, the mine-sweepers ran for the shelter of the Danish territorial waters, and some of them ran aground on the coast of Jutland. About 100 German sailors gained the shore on rafts or by swimming. Arising out of this fight, the Danish Legation in London received later in September a Note from the British Government on the violation of Danish neutrality alleged to have been committed by British naval forces in pursuing the German mine-sweepers. The British Government expressed its sincere regret, and offered indemnification for any damage which might have been caused.

It was in this locality a few days earlier—on


August 21—that a portion of the British light forces on patrol brought down an enemy Zeppelin, from which there were no survivors. This was the third Zeppelin reported to have been destroyed at sea by British naval forces during 1917, the others being L22, on May 14, and L43, on June 15. These losses all went to show that the advantage ascribed to the German Navy in its possession of a fleet of scouting airships was somewhat at a discount.

Naturally, in spite of all that the British seamen could do in keeping their watch and guard off the approaches to the German naval bases, isolated raiders were bound to sneak through, especially submarine raiders. One such vessel appeared off Scarborough about 6.45 p.m. on the evening of September 4, at a time when thousands of holiday makers thronged the beaches and promenades, and fired thirty rounds at the town, about half of which fell on land. The material damage was slight, but three persons were killed and five injured.

A raid of a more serious nature was that which resulted in the destruction of two British destroyers and nine Scandinavian merchant ships under convoy on October 17. The Admiralty report of this misfortune stated that two very fast and heavily armed German raiders attacked the convoy in the North Sea about midway between the Shetland Islands and the Norwegian coast. The destroyers, *Mary Rose*, Lieutenant-Commander Charles L. Fox, and *Strongbow*, Lieutenant-Commander Edward Brooke, which formed the anti-submarine escort, at once engaged the enemy vessels, and fought until sunk after a short and unequal engagement. Their gallant action



GERMAN MINE-SWEEPER DRIVEN ASHORE ON THE DANISH COAST, SEPT. 1, 1917.



TWO MORE GERMAN MINE-SWEEPERS DRIVEN ASHORE ON THE DANISH COAST, SEPTEMBER 1.

held the German raiders sufficiently long to enable three of the merchant vessels to effect their escape, but five Norwegian, one Danish, and three Swedish vessels—all unarmed—were thereafter sunk by gunfire without examination or warning of any kind, and regardless of the lives of their crews and passengers. The following remarks were made in the Admiralty *communiqué* :—

Lengthy comment on the action of the Germans is unnecessary, but it adds another example to the long list of criminally inhuman deeds of the German navy. Anxious to make good their escape before British forces could intercept them, no effort was made to rescue the crews of the sunk British destroyers, and the Germans left the doomed merchant ships while still sinking, thus enabling British patrol craft, which arrived shortly afterwards, to rescue some thirty Norwegians and others of whom details are not yet known. The German navy by this act has once more and further degraded itself by this disregard of the historic chivalry of the sea. The German official *communiqué* on this subject states that the attack took place within the territorial waters in the neighbourhood of the Shetland Islands, and that all the escort vessels, including the destroyers, were sunk with the exception of one escort fishing steamer. The statement as to the locality of the attack is untrue, as is also the statement regarding the destruction of the escort vessels.

Replying to questions in Parliament, Sir Eric Geddes said that a court-martial into the loss of the destroyers and the circumstances attending the attack on the convoy would be ordered by the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet immediately the survivors were fit to attend, and the Commander-in-Chief would appoint the members of the Court and frame the charges. A naval inquiry presided over by Sir Eric Geddes was also held immediately, to deal with the general question of convoy, and all relevant matters. On

October 29, Sir Eric Geddes announced that the inquiry was attended by the members of the Board concerned, together with the officers dealing with the matter in question. The Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, also attended. So far as the feeling aroused by the brutality of the Germans was concerned, this was well illustrated by the Note from the Norwegian Government to the German Government on November 1, which included the following passages :—

This conduct on the part of the German warships was the cause of a great number of Norwegian sailors being killed and wounded by shell-fire or losing their lives by drowning. The Norwegian Government will not again state its views, as it has already done so on several occasions, as to the violation of the principle of the freedom of the high seas incurred by the proclamation of large tracts of ocean as a war zone, and by the sinking of neutral ships not carrying contraband. It is owing to various measures of this kind that Norwegian ships, as well as those of other neutral countries have been compelled, in order to procure for Norway her essential imports, to seek protection in the past, as they will in the future, by allowing themselves to be convoyed by warships belonging to Germany's enemies.

Similarly, on October 23, it was announced from Copenhagen that Captain Roald Amundsen, the famous Norwegian Arctic and Antarctic explorer, and discoverer of the South Pole, had returned his German decorations to the German Legation at Christiania, with the following letter :—

As a Norwegian sailor, I permit myself to return my German decorations, the Prussian Order of the Crown First Class, the Bavarian Order of Luitpold, and the Emperor Wilhelm's gold medal for art and science, as a personal protest against the German murders of peaceful Norwegian sailors, the latest being in the North Sea on October 17, 1917.

Captain Otto Sverdrup, the Arctic explorer, followed Amundsen's lead in handing back his German decorations on October 25. In the course of his speech in Parliament on November 1, Sir Eric Geddes entered at length into certain professional aspects of the loss of the convoy. The ships were attacked about 6 a.m., just as day was breaking, and the enemy's first shot wrecked the wireless room of the Strongbow and did other damage. In spite of the great gallantry with which she was fought, the Strongbow was sunk, and the two raiders then attacked the Mary Rose, which was blown up by a shot in her magazine. Next the convoy was sunk. There was a third armed British vessel, fitted with wireless, in company, but owing to the fact that this ship had been detached to screen one of the merchantmen which was stopped owing to the shifting of her cargo, no message reached the Admiral Commanding the Orkneys, the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, or the Admiralty, that the convoy had been attacked until the surviving ships arrived at Lerwick. The Admiralty did not receive the information until 7 p.m. The First Lord, replying to the question of why the enemy raiders were not intercepted before they attacked the convoy, reminded the House that the area of the North Sea was 140,000 square nautical miles, that the coast from Cape Wrath to Dover subject to attack by raiders was 566 nautical miles in length, and that the area of vision for a light cruiser squadron, with its attendant destroyers at night, was well under five square miles. The Scandinavian convoy system was started in April, 1917, and more than 4,500 vessels had been convoyed by the British Navy in that convoy alone, none having been lost by surface attack until this raid of October 17. Referring also to the ceaseless patrol of the North Sea from north to south and east to west, day and night, the First Lord said that during a recent month the mileage steamed by His Majesty's battleships, cruisers, and destroyers alone amounted to 1,000,000 ship-miles in home waters, in addition to which there was the ceaseless patrol of the Naval auxiliary forces, amounting to well over 6,000,000 ship-miles in home waters in the same month.

In a few days after the loss of the Strongbow and Mary Rose, the Navy had given demonstration of its alertness and enterprise by the destruction of several German vessels in the Kattegat. The British forces operating in this

locality on November 2 destroyed a German auxiliary cruiser, armed with 6-in. guns, and also ten armed patrol craft. Sixty-four German prisoners were rescued, and there were no British losses. The German vessel was reported to be the Maria Flensburg, and was probably a potential raider similar in type to the Möwe. In such an event, the action was very timely in nipping a commerce-destroying enterprise in the bud. The fight was also welcome as showing the extent to which the British patrols



[Russell.]

**COMMODORE SIR REGINALD TYRWHITT,
K.C.B.**

In command of destroyer flotillas in the North Sea.

and advanced scouts had been pushed well into waters adjoining the enemy's bases of operations.

There were, in fact, about the time Sir Eric Geddes was speaking of the incessant and arduous patrol work of the Navy, several incidents exemplifying the force of his words. In the first few days of November, in addition to the scrap in the Kattegat already mentioned, there were others in the southern area of the North Sea, and also well into the Heligoland Bight. On November 12, as officially announced two days later, some German destroyers came out from under the protection of their shore batteries along the Flanders coast and fired a few rounds at our patrol vessels, none of which was hit. The fire was promptly returned, and


the Germans immediately retired under the protection of their shore batteries, and the patrol was resumed. The Admiralty made the following comment on this brief skirmish: "Incidents of this nature occur daily, and in no way interfere with the maintenance and efficiency of our patrol, and they are therefore not reported." About a fortnight earlier, on the afternoon of October 27, six British and French destroyers patrolling off the Belgian coast sighted and attacked three German destroyers and 17 aeroplanes. Two direct hits were obtained on the enemy's destroyers, which immediately retired under the protection of their land batteries. The aeroplane formation was broken up by the anti-aircraft gunfire of our destroyers, each of the aeroplanes dropping three bombs in the vicinity of our vessels, which suffered no damage beyond two men being slightly wounded. These and other incidents all went to show that there was no more busy and alert section of our naval forces in home waters than those from Dover and Dunkirk.

It was from the Belgian coast that the Germans sent out to attack our patrol vessels on November 3 an electrically-controlled high-


speed boat. The attack was defeated and the boat destroyed. This was the fourth boat of its kind—regarded by the Admiralty as freak vessels—to be destroyed. The first was reported to have come to grief by running into a pier on the German coast. Two others were destroyed in September, 1917, although the fact that they were electrically-operated craft was not disclosed. On November 12, the Admiralty issued the following particulars of these new boats:—

The electrically-controlled motor-boats used on the Belgian coast are twin petrol-engined vessels, partially closed in, and travel at a high speed. They carry a drum with between thirty and fifty miles of insulated single-core cable, through which the boat is controlled electrically. The fore part carries a considerable charge of high explosive, probably from 300–500 lb. in weight. After the engine has been started the crew leave the boat. A seaplane, protected by a strong fighting patrol, then accompanies the vessel at a distance of three to five miles, and signals to the shore operator the helm to give the vessel. These signals need only be starboard, port, or steady. The boat is zigzagged while running; this may be either intentional or unintentional. On being steered into a ship the charge is exploded automatically. The device is a very old one. A boat similarly controlled was used in H.M.S. *Vernon* (the torpedo experimental ship) as far back as 1885. The only new features in the German boats are petrol engines and W/T. signals, neither of which existed then.

Further to the north, some fighting took



A DESTROYER ROLLING IN A ROUGH SEA.



[From a German photograph.]

A GERMAN SUBMARINE FIRING WHAT THE GERMAN PHOTOGRAPHER CLAIMS TO BE A "WARNING SHOT."

place in the Heligoland Bight on November 17, when the British patrols chased some German light cruisers, destroyers, and patrol boats to within 30 miles of Heligoland, until the enemy got within the protection of their Battle Fleet and minefields. The Germans stated that "for the first time since the early months of the war strong English naval forces sought to penetrate into the German Bight on the morning of November 17. They were discovered by German naval patrols as soon as they had reached the Riff-Terschelling line, and by counter-operations, which were begun immediately by our advanced post forces, were repulsed without difficulty and without loss to ourselves." It will be noticed that this account admits that the British took the initiative. A later British official report stated that :—

From the report of the vessels engaged in the action on Saturday, November 17, in the Heligoland Bight, it appears that shortly before 8 a.m. our forces sighted four light cruisers on a northerly course, accompanied by destroyers and minesweepers or patrol vessels. The minesweepers or patrol vessels made off to the north-east, and one of them was sunk by gunfire from destroyers, a number of survivors being rescued, among whom were a naval lieutenant and five naval ratings. The enemy light cruisers and destroyers turned off towards Heligoland, and were pursued by our advanced forces through the minefields. A running engagement took place under a heavy smoke screen until four enemy battleships and battle cruisers were sighted. Our advanced forces broke off the engagement, and turned back to meet their supports outside the minefields. Owing to the presence of minefields it was necessary for our vessels to keep to the line taken by the enemy's ships, and consequently this area was too restricted for the supporting ships to manœuvre in. The enemy did not follow our vessels outside the minefields. Our vessels report that during the action they scored a number of hits on the enemy. One light

cruiser was seen to be on fire, a heavy explosion was seen on another, while a third was dropping behind, evidently damaged, at the time the action was broken off. The destruction of these ships was prevented by the presence of the enemy's large vessels and by the proximity of Heligoland. The damage done to our vessels was slight, but some casualties were caused to officers and men in exposed positions.

From the foregoing it will be obvious that it was only because the Germans feared to come out with their larger ships that this encounter did not develop into a much bigger affair. In this respect, the incidents in the Bight and the Kattegat always had an importance, and differed from those off the Belgian coast, which could never lead to anything more than patrol encounters, because there was no stronger enemy force behind them. All along the enemy coastline, however, there was in process of execution that "offensive-defensive" line of strategy spoken of by Sir John Jellicoe, and once again the British seamen were demonstrating the truth of the old maxim that the frontiers of England are the coasts of the enemy.

The affair in the Kattegat on November 2, to which reference has already been made, brought to light two German raiding captains of earlier days. The captain of the *Maria Flensburg*, the sunken auxiliary cruiser, was Captain Lauterbach, whom the *Weser Zeitung* described as "one of the heroes of the *Emden*." He appears to have commanded one of the colliers attached to that famous raider, and when the *Emden* was lost he succeeded in

reaching the Malay Archipelago. Captured by the British and interned at Singapore, he escaped with nine companions, and returned home via the Philippines, Japan, and America. The second officer of the *Maria Flensburg* was Lieutenant Christiansen, who was killed on the bridge during the Kattegat fight by a shell. Early in the war he ran the British blockade and reached the German African colonies with a shipload of much-needed provisions and war material. It was probable from the presence of these two officers in the vessel destroyed on November 2 that she was attempting to reach the open sea to begin a raiding career such as the *Möwe* had entered upon eleven months earlier. This ship was first sighted in the North Atlantic on December 4, 1916, and was reported to be "a German armed and disguised vessel of mercantile type." Nothing was revealed about her movements officially until January 17, 1917, when she was announced to have captured ten Allied merchant vessels in the space of one month. In addition, the British steamer *St. Theodore* was captured and a prize crew put on board, evidently to assist in raiding, and the steamer *Yarrowdale* was sent back to Germany with a number of captive British crews and stores from the prizes. The *Yarrowdale* reached Swinemunde on January 20, 1917, under the command of Lieutenant Badewitz, who was also in the *Möwe* on her first cruise, when he distinguished himself by taking the captured British steamer *Westburn* into Teneriffe with captive crews, landing them, sinking the steamer outside the harbour, getting himself interned in Spain, and escaping back to Germany.

On March 23, an official Berlin telegram announced the return home of the *Möwe*, under Commander Count Dohna-Schlodien, from her second cruise in the Atlantic, during which she made prizes of 22 steamers and five sailing vessels, with a total of 123,100 tons gross register. The *Möwe* also took to Germany 93 prisoners, in addition to the 469 conveyed in the *Yarrowdale*. The tonnage destroyed by the raider was about 107,600, or nearly twice the amount sunk during her first cruise early in 1916. The White Star liner *Georgic*, of 10,077 tons, was her largest victim.

Even more romantic in some respects was the cruise of another German raider, the *Seeadler* (Captain Count von Luckner), which was found to be at work in the Atlantic towards


the end of March, 1917. This vessel was reported to have been the captured American barque *Pass of Balmaha*, of 1,571 tons, belonging to the Harris-Irby Cotton Company, of Boston, U.S.A., and captured in 1915 while on a voyage to Archangel with cotton. Having been fitted with oil engines, and armed, she left Germany on December 22, 1916, as a raider, and from January 9 to March 11, 1917, destroyed 11 Allied merchant ships. Not until October, 1917, did the fate of the *Seeadler* become known. She had been heard of as a minelayer off the coast of Brazil. Later, at the end of March, the French barque *Cambrenne* arrived at Rio de Janeiro with over 200 survivors of 11 ships sunk by this raider off Trinidad. The *Seeadler's* practice was to show Norwegian colours until the victim had come within range of her guns, and then quickly to hoist the German ensign. During October a dispatch to the American Navy Department from Tutuila, Samoa, announced the fact that an open boat had arrived there with the master of the American schooner *R. C. Slade*, who stated that the German raider *Seeadler* had run ashore, and was abandoned on Mopalia, Lord Howe Island, on August 2. She had been beached for cleaning, but a storm embedded her in the sand. The captain and some of the officers in a motor sloop and the remainder of the crew in the French schooner *Lutece*, put to sea on August 21 and September 5, presumably to carry on raiding. Before stranding, the *Seeadler* had sunk the American schooners *R. C. Slade*, *A. B. Johnson*, and *Manila*. She left 47 prisoners on the island. Later on, the boat containing the captain of the raider was captured off the Fiji Islands. The fate of the *Lutece* was still in doubt at this time.

Although dealing in the main with the work of the British Navy, this chapter would not be complete without some reference to the services of the Allied Fleets, more especially as the British seamen were so closely connected with the latter in many different spheres of operations. Indeed, there were no waters except those of the Black Sea in which the British seamen were not represented during the fighting in 1917. Even into the Baltic, in spite of all that the Germans could do with their superiority of force and the use of obstructions, a British submarine penetrated, and on September 20, 1917, was reported to have attacked German warships off the Island of Oesel. A British

submarine was also reported to have assisted the Russians in the fighting for the possession of the Gulf of Riga. The events which led to the loss of those waters to the enemy will be chronicled elsewhere, but it is timely to note in passing that they arose directly out of the political conditions obtaining in Russia on account of the Revolution. The discipline of the Fleet being broken, and its *personnel* demoralised, the command of the Baltic, from having been in dispute since the beginning of

bouching from the Great Belt—the only possible passage—in a necessarily deep formation on a very narrow front, would have found the whole German Fleet deployed against them. Moreover, the question of keeping open communications to such a fleet when every supply ship would have had to travel within thirty miles of Kiel would have proved insuperable.

In the Mediterranean, the British Navy had a round of duties to perform as arduous as it was varied. At the opening of the period



A TRANSPORT STEAMING WITH BOATS SLUNG OUT READY FOR EMERGENCIES.

the war, passed absolutely into German hands, and without adequate naval protection the islands fell. It had been suggested that when the German Fleet issued forth in the Baltic convoying transports and the like, the British Fleet should have entered that sea and forced a fleet engagement, with the double object of destroying the enemy fleet and bringing aid and relief to the Russians. Sir Eric Geddes, however, set forth the official view in his speech on November 1. The operation of passing through into the Baltic would have been a protracted one, as he showed, and apart from the question of the neutrality of the Danish islands, there were extensive minefields to be cleared. The leading vessels of a fleet de-

under survey, the Allied Fleet was off the Piræus, and carrying out a blockade of Old Greece to enforce the demands of the Entente. There was also considerable work in progress for the suppression of the submarines, the depredations of the latter being shown in the destruction of the *Arabia* on November 6, 1916, the hospital ships *Braemar Castle* and *Britannic* on November 14 and 21, the transport *Ivernian* on January 1, 1917, the French battleship *Gaulois* on December 27, 1916, the British battleship *Cornwallis* on January 9, 1917, and the French battleship *Danton* on March 19, 1917. The British seamen also lent active support to the military undertakings at Salonika, in Egypt, and in Palestine, and the



ONE OF "IVERNIA'S" OVERLOADED BOATS SINKING.

work of the naval airmen was also distinguished. Particularly brilliant was a raid on Constantinople made by the R.N.A.S. on the night of July 9, 1917, when the Turco-German Fleet lying off the city in the Golden Horn was bombed. When the battle-cruiser Goeben, surrounded by warships, including submarines, had been located, the attack was made from a height of 800 ft. Direct hits were obtained on the Goeben and the other enemy ships near her, big explosions being caused and several fires observed. The War Office was also attacked and a direct hit obtained. The enemy appeared to have been completely surprised, as, until the bombs had been dropped, no anti-aircraft batteries opened fire. The airmen returned safely without any casualties.

Turning to the situation in the Adriatic, the part played by the British seamen in the operations in this theatre of the war was both dramatic and creditable. The most striking incident was perhaps the gallantry shown by the crews of the drifters on patrol in the Straits of Otranto when a descent was made upon them by an Austrian force of light cruisers and destroyers. This occurred on the morning of May 15, 1917, and as a result of the raid 14 British drifters were sunk, from which, accord-

ing to the Austrian *communiqué*, 72 prisoners were taken. The British cruisers Dartmouth, Captain A. P. Addison, R.N., with the Italian rear-admiral on board, and Bristol, Captain G. J. Todd, R.N., immediately chased the enemy off, assisted by French and Italian destroyers. The chase was continued with the enemy under heavy and continuous fire till near Cattaro, when, some enemy battleships coming out in support of their cruisers, our vessels drew off. During her passage back, the Dartmouth was struck by a torpedo from an enemy submarine, but returned into port with three men killed and one officer and four men missing—believed dead—and seven wounded. The whole country was thrilled a few days after this affair to learn of the gallant conduct of the men in the trawlers and drifters, whose behaviour was worthy of the highest naval traditions. To one of the skippers the Victoria Cross was awarded—the first occasion on which the distinction had been gained by a member of that hardy and valuable section of the Royal Naval Reserve. The heroism of Skipper Joseph Watt, R.N.R., commanding the drifter Gowan Lea, will be found fully recorded elsewhere in this History. In addition to this officer, others whose conduct called for commendation or

reward were Sub-Lieutenant Barling, R.N.R., commanding a group of drifters, who, when attacked by an enemy cruiser, bravely replied to the shots of his formidable assailant with his one light gun, and was killed at his post. A brother officer, Skipper D. J. Nicholls, R.N.R., took command on the death of Sub-Lieutenant Barling, and continued the struggle with his one light gun. After being three times wounded and with four killed and three wounded out of a crew of 10, he succeeded by his energy in saving his ship, which was seriously damaged. Mention must also be made of the devotion to duty shown by the wireless operator of the drifter Floandi, Douglas M. Harris, A.B., R.N.V.R., who was found dead in his chair at the conclusion of the action, collapsed over the wireless log in which he was writing at the moment of his death.

It was satisfactory that the Bristol and Dartmouth were able to inflict a certain amount of punishment upon the Austrian raiders before the latter gained the shelter of their fortified base. Captain Todd, of the Bristol, was awarded the D.S.O. for his services during the action, while Captain Addison received the C.M.G. for his conduct, and especially for his excellent judgment and work in bringing his

ship safely into port, when she had been torpedoed by an enemy submarine on her passage back, after the cruiser action was over.

Very effective also was the help rendered to the Italian forces by the British monitors sent to operate in the Adriatic. It was revealed in May that these monitors, operating from the Gulf of Trieste, were bombarding the Austrian positions and lines of communication, and enfilading the Hermada ridge. They came into action at daybreak on May 24, 1917, and bombarded with visible effect the railway near Nabresina, the fortifications at Presecco, a village with a high belfry which formed a conspicuous landmark, and Opicina Railway junction. Profiting by the fact that the Austrians evidently did not expect to be attacked from the sea, the range of their coast batteries not being long, the monitors approached near enough to the coast to be able to bombard the south-western slopes of Mount Hermada.

Three months later, on August 19, 1917, the monitors were reported to be again effectively co-operating with the Italian Royal Navy in bombarding the enemy communications and positions on the Lower Isonzo. Similarly, in the retreating movement of the Italian troops.



SOME OF "IVERNIA'S" CREW ON A RAFT.



NAVAL AIR PHOTOGRAPH OF ZEEBRUGGE AFTER NAVAL BOMBARDMENT.

A, E, caissons of lock ; B, spare caisson ; D, E, bridge ; F, storehouse damaged.


Shell holes can be seen all about the locks.

which began towards the end of October, 1917, the monitors were able to delay the Austrian advance by shelling from the sea off the mouth of the Piave.

Although at times, as has been indicated, questions of Admiralty methods or of Government policy were subjected to criticism, there was a general appreciation all the world over of the vital part which the British Navy continued to play in the conduct of the war on the side of the Allies. The burden upon the

British seamen was increased rather than decreased by the events of the year under review. Sir Eric Geddes, in his important speech on November 1, 1917, said :—

There are great and ever-greater calls upon the shipping of the world. The huge army that our ally, the United States, is preparing has to be transported and maintained. Our French, Italian, Russian and other Allies require sea-borne help, and that help can only be given to the full extent which this country would wish if the nation is prepared strictly and rigorously to curtail its needs, to develop home resources and to conserve its present and potential maritime strength.





CHAPTER CCXIII.

NEWFOUNDLAND AND THE WAR.

NEWFOUNDLAND'S PART IN THE WAR—HISTORY OF THE COLONY—CABOT'S DISCOVERY—RULE OF THE "MERCHANT ADVENTURERS"—HOW HARDSHIP DEVELOPED CHARACTER—INACCESSIBILITY—MODERN DEVELOPMENTS—RAILWAYS AND PAPER MILLS—THE "GOLDEN AGE"—SIR E. MORRIS'S ADMINISTRATION—OUTBREAK OF WAR—NAVAL RESERVISTS—NEWFOUNDLAND REGIMENT—TRAINING IN ENGLAND—GALLIPOLI—CAPTURE OF CARIBOU HILL—GREAT STORM—THE POST OF HONOUR—RETIREMENT FROM CAPE HELLES—BRIGADIER-GENERAL CAYLEY'S TRIBUTE—EGYPT AND FRANCE—RAIDING GERMAN TRENCHES—TRAGEDY OF BEAUMONT HAMEL—AN IMMORTAL MEMORY—THE PREMIER'S VISIT—FIGHTING IN THE YPRES SALIENT—SERGEANT GARDENER'S ADVENTURE—GERMAN ATTACK ON PALZ TRENCH—BATTLE OF MONCHY-LE-PREUX—A DESPERATE POSITION—HOW NINE MEN SAVED THE DAY—BATTLE OF "FLOATING SWAMP"—CONDITIONS IN THE YPRES SALIENT—A YEAR'S FIGHTING RECORD—SITUATION IN NEWFOUNDLAND—PATRIOTIC ASSOCIATION—ORGANIZATION IN BRITAIN—POLITICAL POSITION—FORMATION OF UNION GOVERNMENT—LIQUOR TRAFFIC PROHIBITED—SIR W. DAVIDSON'S DEPARTURE—NEWFOUNDLAND FORESTRY BATTALION—LUMBERING IN SCOTLAND—NEWFOUNDLAND WEEK—NEWFOUNDLAND REGIMENT'S LIST OF HONOURS.

THE part played by Newfoundland in the war was noteworthy, more especially in view of the limited population and resources of England's oldest colony. When war broke out the total population of the Island was barely 250,000 and the total annual revenue of the Government was below £900,000. This small community, with fewer men and less public income than many an English provincial town, at once set about the independent organization of its man power and the adjustment of its finances to help in the war. Within two years the Newfoundlanders had won for themselves a distinguished reputation among the Allies for courage and sacrifice, even in a war where great courage and great sacrifice were the universal rule.

To understand the full significance of what was accomplished, it is necessary to recall the history and circumstances of the Colony. Newfoundland, the tenth largest island in the world, with an area of 45,000 square miles, was discovered by John Cabot, a Venetian mariner, in 1497, five years after Columbus set

foot on America. Cabot was sent out by some "merchant venturers" of Bristol, and his ship was manned by West Country seamen. He had a charter from King Henry VII. to "seek out, discover and find whatever isles, regions, countries or provinces of the heathens and the infidels, wherever they may be, whatsoever they be, and in whatsoever part of the world, which before this time have been unknown to all Christians." He returned home with wonderful accounts of the richness of the fisheries of the new land he had found, and before many years seamen of Western Europe, English and French, Basques and Spaniards, Bretons and Portuguese, ventured along the coast to gather the harvest of the sea and find shelter in the island's harbours. Cabot's enterprise laid the foundation of Britain's Empire, and Newfoundland became England's first colony.

It was more than a hundred years later before Sir Humphry Gilbert took formal possession of the island in the name of his "most gracious lady, Queen Elizabeth," and the first permanent settlement was made by

Alderman Guy of Bristol and 52 West Countrymen in 1610. The population which slowly trickled in was almost wholly fishermen from the West of England, and Devonshire names predominate among the people to this day.

The history of Newfoundland during the two centuries that followed forms an amazing

station, and nothing more. No woman was allowed on the island; no man could, if discovered, remain there during the winter or build a permanent house. Close watch was kept that no sailor escaped from his ship and attempted to settle in the interior. The masters of the first three vessels arriving in a




THE DEPARTURE OF JOHN AND SEBASTIAN CABOT FROM BRISTOL ON THEIR VOYAGE OF DISCOVERY, 1497.

From the painting by Ernest Board in the Bristol Art Gallery.

record of struggles, fighting, and deliberate and largely successful attempts to prevent the development or settlement of the island. After long strife between the British and French for supremacy, England prevailed. The "merchant venturers" secured control of Newfoundland. They aimed to keep it as a fishing

harbour became "fishing admirals" for the season, with power to execute justice as they willed, unhampered by any constitution or code of laws. They burned the houses of would-be settlers, and drove many of them to New England.

Despite every repressive measure, some



ST. JOHN'S, NEWFOUNDLAND.

settlement went on, and as the settlers grew in number they won with great difficulty some recognition of their rights. By slow degrees the story of their wrongs was brought to England, and publicity helped to secure redress. Governors were appointed, laws enacted, and a reign of law established. The first Governors were little better, it is true, than the "fishing admirals," and adopted a deliberate policy of harshness towards the population, a policy typified in the instructions given to one Colonial Governor that "what the colonists want raw, they should be given roast, and what they want roast should be given them raw." For a long time it was a penal offence to plant even a potato on the island. The harm done by the long era of repression lasted for generations afterwards. As late as 1789 Governor Millbanke wrote that "it is not in the interest of Great Britain to encourage people to winter in Newfoundland." It was not legal to build permanent houses until 1811. The first road was not constructed until 1825.

When responsible government was granted to the people of the island, in 1855, the population numbered 97,000. The interior was without settlers and much of it unexplored; there was not a hamlet three miles from the shore; the great mineral and timber wealth lay undeveloped, and rich potential farming lands untouched. The population was composed of little settlements of fisherfolk around the creeks and coves, and one town, the capital, St. John's. The islanders were hampered in their fishing by an historic dispute with France over the fishing rights on parts of the coast, a dispute which was not settled until 1904, when

France surrendered her claims in consideration of concessions made by England elsewhere. The islanders had friction with their neighbours in the New England States over fishing rights in the North Atlantic, disputes which caused much trouble until they were ended by a Hague Tribunal in 1910. Lord Salisbury on one occasion epitomized Newfoundland's fate during close on four centuries as "the sport of historic misfortunes."

These years of long battling against unfavourable circumstances profoundly affected the character of the people. They became a hardy, self-reliant, open air folk, of rigid principles, strictly adhered to. Visitors to the island in the early years of the twentieth century found them Sabbatarians to a degree scarcely known elsewhere. Serious crime was practically non-existent. Churches were numerous and influential, and the people were exceedingly kindly, charitable and strong in the primitive virtues. The standard of sobriety was very high, and soon after the war began the Legislature, in response to the popular demand, prohibited the liquor traffic altogether.

Newfoundland's great handicap was its inaccessibility. It lay right outside the direct route of world traffic. Every ship crossing the Northern Atlantic sighted it, but few passengers thought of visiting it. Its main port was close on 2,000 miles from Liverpool and about the same distance from big American cities, and the Atlantic liners did not call there. The journey from Canada or from the United States was long and during many months of the year very rough. While England's nearest colony if reckoned in the number of miles away, it was



MAP OF NEWFOUNDLAND.

among the more distant if reckoned in convenience of transit. The people might have been excused if, being thus largely out of touch with England, they had let their Imperial ideals grow dim. The testing times ahead were to demonstrate, however, that the colony had preserved a passionate loyalty as glowing as any part of the Empire, a loyalty that was soon to give proof of its genuineness by its sacrifice.

A new era opened for Newfoundland with the co-ordination and extension of its system of railways. In 1890 the Government of Sir William Whiteway entered into a contract with Mr. (afterwards Sir) Robert Reid, for the completion and extension of a system of island railways, extending from St. John's, the capital, on the coast to Port-aux-Basques on the south-west, where daily steamer communication was maintained with the Canadian mainland. In connection with this railway, which was leased in 1901 for 50 years to the Reid Company, an extensive system of

connecting steamers and of other allied enterprises was launched. The railway opened up the interior for hunters, prospectors and farmers. Soon further plans were afoot for other developments. Iron ore mines were operated with much success at Bell Island.

The next great step in the island's history was the launching of the paper and paper pulp mills of the Anglo-Newfoundland Development Co., at Grand Falls. Lord Northcliffe and Lord Rothermere had for some time been seeking a suitable timber district for the production of paper pulp to supply their extensive publishing enterprises in the United Kingdom. Up to this time Newfoundland's great timber wealth had been left untouched. Extensive areas were purchased in the valley of the Exploits River and at Grand Falls, and here, under the direction of Mr. Mayson M. Beeton, one of the largest paper producing plants in the world was quickly built, with extensive permanent mills, with railways to the coast, piers, harbours, ter-

minal wharves, and its own fleet of steamers to carry pulp and paper to England. A model town was built in record time on what shortly before had been a wilderness.

The enormous extent of the Anglo-Newfoundland Company's enterprise attracted widespread attention, with the result that other industrial and manufacturing establishments came to the island. Newfoundland had for its Premier from 1908 a far-sighted and enterprising statesman, Sir Edward Morris. Under the Morris Government the colony's rights were defended, railways were extended, education improved, old age pensions begun, the completion of the lighthouse system for the coast advanced, and extensive agricultural and trade schemes initiated. At the beginning of 1914 Newfoundland was in the midst of a period of unequalled prosperity. In a little over a decade its exports and imports had both more than doubled. The State revenue had more than doubled, and a substantial reserve had been accumulated out of the surplus. Still bigger schemes were afoot, for the opening up of coal areas and mineral resources, the establishment of a smelter for the refining of copper, the utilization of peat beds for fuel, and the development of new markets for cod and other fish. "The past ten years have been the 'golden age' of the Colony's history," one authority declared.


Then came the declaration of war. In an

hour, the whole energy, enthusiasm and devotion of the Colony turned from material development to the defence of the Empire.



NEWFOUNDLAND PARLIAMENT HOUSE.

Party politics were sunk and the leaders of the Opposition cooperated in every way with the Governor and the Premier. Newfoundland was not prepared for war. The Government declared that it would provide a force of 1,000 efficient naval reservists by October 31 for naval service abroad, and a battalion of men for the army overseas. The provision of the naval reservists was comparatively simple, for a system had been for some time in force of training fishermen for that purpose. But New-



GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEWFOUNDLAND.

foundland had no military organization whatever. The last soldiers had quitted the island in 1868, when Mr. Gladstone had withdrawn the British garrison from St. John's. Their very barracks, after remaining a ruin for some years, had been burned to the ground. There were no militia, no volunteers, no nucleus on which to build, and the most military organizations available were bodies like the Church Lads' Brigade, the Roman Catholic Cadets, Methodist Guards and Highlanders, and the Boy Scouts. Undeterred, the Newfoundlanders sought instructors, ordered text books, and started recruiting.

In 1892 the British Government had sent an old cruiser, the *Calypso*, to Newfoundland in order that the young fishermen might be trained as naval reservists. Since then hundreds had gone through training every year, all young fellows between the ages of 16 and 24, and after their preliminary course on the *Calypso* they had undertaken further training voyages in other ships of the Navy. These men were quickly enrolled. No fewer than 3,663 offered themselves between the outbreak of war and the spring of 1917 for active service in the Navy. Of this total no fewer than 124 were in that time drowned, killed in action, or died. The Newfoundland fishermen were scattered throughout the ships of the British Navy and did not work as a separate unit; consequently it is difficult to give any account of their doings. Several of them were mentioned in dispatches for bravery. Sir Walter E. Davidson, the Governor of Newfoundland, outlined their services in his Report to the Patriotic Association in 1917:—

We know from the unanimous announcements that the men of the Newfoundland Royal Naval Reserve bear the highest reputation as seamen. We know that Newfoundlanders are found in most boarding parties and wherever handy men are required to man ship's boats on stormy seas. The Newfoundland R.N.R. serve on drifters and mine sweepers, on cruisers and torpedo boats, in battleships and armed auxiliary cruisers. Many know the North Sea well, and the Channel and the narrow seas. Many have cruised as far North as Jan Mayen Land and are familiar with the coast of Iceland and the shores of the Northern Isles. Others are serving in the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and all over the Atlantic. When the *Greif* was sunk, Newfoundlanders were on the *Alcantara* and won prize money in that famous fight. Others were in Beatty's squadron when the *Blücher* was sunk. Some helped to hunt the German High Seas Fleet back behind its mine-fields when they ventured out just for once as far as the Jutland Coast. Many were in action at the Dardanelles, and several received special distinction in that service.

But when the Honours and Awards are counted, the individual distinctions throughout the Naval forces are very few in number. All that can be said is that every Naval officer praises the Newfoundland Reservists and

every captain wants to have as many of them as possible on his own ship. Our own conclusions may be based on the fine type of men who return on furlough to their native shores, men who, whatever they may have been when they departed at the call of duty, have returned as smart men-o'-war-men, of stalwart physique and with that air of self-resource which is only possible among trained men who are conscious of being held in esteem by their commanders. Men such as Leander Green (who has won the Conspicuous Service Medal), or Sampson, or Samuel Warren are but chosen representatives of our splendid type of seamen.

There was no difficulty in raising recruits for the Army. The majority of the volunteers at first came from St. John's. Men of all classes joined the Service, professional men and lumberjacks, fisher lads and bank clerks, sons of statesmen and sons of labourers. Their average age was a little over 23. Within eight weeks the first contingent, 500 strong, set out for England. This contingent grew in numbers until by 1917 no fewer than 4,133 had enlisted in the Newfoundland Regiment and in the Forestry Company. In addition to these, thousands of Newfoundlanders went to Canada, attracted by the conditions of Canadian service. It was officially stated in Newfoundland early in 1917 that the total number who had volunteered their services had been about 9,500. Those who had volunteered in Canada and elsewhere had been computed by competent authorities at 3,000 in number. "We may safely say that the Colony has offered fully 12,000 of her sons—the flower of the race—to fight for Right."

The Newfoundland contingent arrived in England early in October, 1914, and after a short stay at Salisbury Plain proceeded to Fort George, in Inverness-shire, an historic barracks built for the troops planted in Scotland after the Jacobite Rebellion of 1745. From Fort George the troops went on to Edinburgh, and afterwards to Aldershot. There were months of wearisome training for both officers and men, and many a fear was expressed that they would not reach the fighting front until after the war was over.

The troops were enlisted at first for a year, and when the fourth quarter of that year had nearly ended they were still in England. Further drafts were sent out, bringing the regiment up to full battalion strength, besides leaving troops for a reserve in the United Kingdom. They were then offered the choice, as were other troops at this time, of re-enlisting for the period of the war or returning to Newfoundland at the end of the year. Every man re-enlisted. After a review by Lord


Kitchener the first Newfoundland Regiment was sent to Gallipoli.

The regiment proceeded first to Alexandria and went on to Cairo, where early in September, 1915, it was attached to the London Infantry Brigade. It arrived at Suvla in the evening of September 19, at about 9.30, and the men at once began to disembark at Kangaroo Beach.

They did not finish landing until nearly 1 o'clock. It was an exceedingly cold and

troops moved off to the hills in platoons numbering about 35 or 40 each, and reached a ravine, afterwards called the Newfoundland Ravine. The Turkish fire followed them, and grew so heavy that men had to break up into sections of 10 or 15. This first experience of war cost them some 65 men, killed and wounded.

They dug themselves into their quarters in the ravine and camped there for about two days. Then they were scattered among various



THE MILL, GRAND FALLS.

stormy night, and all the shelter available was a series of open dug-outs, holes never more than four feet deep, dug in the sand. In the early morning the men began to deepen their holes, but the Turks, seeing some signs of movement, located them and began shelling.

It was the first time the regiment had actually been under fire, and the men had not yet learned the necessity of taking all possible shelter. After the explosion of each shell they ran out to pick up bits as souvenirs. Nothing that their officers could do could keep them under cover. Time after time they went out, and several men were hit in consequence. Ultimately the shell fire became so heavy that they had to move away to the hills near by. Every few minutes a shell burst near them. The

regiments in the front lines in order that they might learn something of actual trench conditions. Then they took over their own part of the line. The first casualties in the firing line were on September 22, when one man was killed and four were wounded.

On September 28, just as one company was leaving the trenches, the Turks began attacking some miles off on the right. The Newfoundlanders received orders to stand to arms. At last, they thought, their first experiences of real fighting were about to begin. A terrific cannonade followed, all the batteries at Suvla and all the ships in the Bay taking part. For two hours the men stood at attention, expecting at any moment the order to go over the top or expecting to have to meet a big Turkish ad-



RECRUITS AT HEADQUARTERS, ST. JOHN'S, 1914.

vance and engage in hand-to-hand fighting. But nothing happened. The Turks had been defeated by our artillery and had suffered heavy casualties. The Newfoundlanders had no casualties at all.

The experiences of the next few weeks were exceedingly trying, not because of the severity of the fighting, but because of the monotony of the life and the hardness of the conditions. There was a shortage of food and of water. Tinned water was sent from Alexandria about once a fortnight. Enteric and dysentery swept the ranks. Flies made life a burden. Men took turns night after night two hours at a time in standing all along the trenches and shooting with rifles at any movement or sign in the Turkish trenches. If there was nothing to aim at they fired at random now and then to make the Turks realize that they were always on the watch. There was patrol work and digging, trench making and the bringing up of supplies. Day and night seemed to merge together in one long wearisome round. Each day saw fresh parties of men down with illness, and on most days there were fresh casualties from the Turkish snipers and Turkish guns.

Up to October 11 only one half of the regiment went into the firing line at a time, being relieved after about six or seven days by the other half. But from that date the whole regiment went in at once and was relieved usually

after 10 days by Imperial troops. This time of relief was very uncertain, however, and largely depended on the condition of the troops that were being sent up. On one occasion the Newfoundlanders were in the trenches for 35 days at a time. When in the firing line working parties of about 15 would go out from each company to dig trenches and advance saps. Digging parties set to with such zeal that the Newfoundland diggers soon became famous. Patrol parties would creep along in No Man's Land to find out what the enemy were doing. The Newfoundlanders now formed part of the 88th Brigade of the famous 29th Division, the other regiments in the Brigade being the 2nd Hants, 1st Essex and 21st London Royal Fusiliers.

The soldiers had come expecting to find war a life of excitement. They found it, on the contrary, duller than the most dreary spells of lonely life in the back woods of their own island. Either side kept constant watch on the other. Snipers waited eagerly for the least sign of life that they could fire on. Shells rained down wherever troops were suspected to be. Aeroplanes came humming overhead dropping bombs or observing. The heat, the hard work, the flies, the thirst and the intermittent shelling combined to tax the nerves and temper of the men to the full.


Every day they prayed that something might

happen, that orders might come for them to attack the Turks, or that the Turks might attack them.


On the night of November 4 patrols were sent out to reconnoitre some Turkish posts on a ridge half-way to the enemy trenches. A number of Turkish snipers used to come down at night time and occupy this ridge, leaving it before daybreak, and the British had suffered heavily from them. Most of the Newfoundlanders' casualties had come from here. A patrol under charge of Lieut. Donnelly took possession of the ridge before the Turks arrived for their night's work. The enemy came up as usual, not knowing that they had been forestalled. Immediately they saw our men they attacked them. The Newfoundland patrol numbered 1 officer and 7 men; the Turks numbered about 50. Lieut. Donnelly repulsed the first attack with some slight casualties and held on.

The Officer Commanding, hearing the firing from the ridge, became anxious about the safety of the men, and sent out another six

round the original patrol on the ridge, and would have done so had not the second party of our men met them. A skirmish followed, and the whole of the men except Sergt. Greene and Pte. Hynes were wounded, one man being hit by five bullets and another by four. These two men gathered the wounded together and kept on fighting, driving the Turks off. The rapidity of their fire evidently completely deceived the Turks about their strength, for



CAMP OF THE FIRST NEWFOUNDLAND REGIMENT AT PLEASANTVILLE.



THE GOVERNOR (SIR WALTER E. DAVIDSON) PRESENTING COLOURS TO THE FIRST NEWFOUNDLAND REGIMENT.

men under Lieut. Ross and Sergt. Greene to reinforce Lieut. Donnelly. As this party was creeping through No Man's Land they were suddenly challenged in English with "Who goes there?" The officer thinking that it was our own patrol they had met replied "Newfoundland." The Turks immediately opened fire. The soldiers said afterwards they believed it was a German who challenged them. This party of Turks were on their way to sur-

after a time, finding themselves unable to advance, they retired to their own trenches.

Meanwhile the original patrol held the ridge all night, and in the morning Lieut. Donnelly turned up and reported that the ridge was still held, and he had left a corporal in charge. They were soon relieved by another party. Every man of the little group had been wounded. This ridge, the foremost point in our line, was afterwards called Caribou Hill, in

honour of the Newfoundlanders, the name being taken from the caribou which formed their regimental badge.

On the following night the Turks attacked again, but by this time our line had been carried out to the ridge, and the Newfoundlanders had established themselves in the position and placed machine-guns at commanding points.

A number of decorations were bestowed on the men who particularly distinguished themselves on this occasion. Sergt. W. Greene and Pte. R. E. Hynes were both given the Distinguished Conduct Medal for conspicuous gallantry—Sergt. Greene for his conduct when he took command after his officer had been wounded, and for the way in which he drove off the Turks and brought in wounded men; Pte. Hynes for his courage in keeping up repeated fire at close range when nearly all the men of the party were wounded, and in thus causing the Turks to abandon their enterprise and enabling the wounded to be brought in. Lieut. J. J. Donnelly received the Military Cross for his coolness and skill in handling his small party in the face of several determined Turkish bomb and rifle attacks on his front and his flanks.

The General of the Division complimented the men very highly on their endurance. The

taking of Caribou Hill was followed by a marked diminution of Newfoundland casualties, for most of the losses had been caused by sniping from that particular place. But the few weeks of the war had already considerably thinned the ranks of the regiment.


On November 26 a terrific storm of wind and rain began, the rain turning later into sleet. The night was pitch black except when vivid flashes of lightning illuminated all the surrounding country. For close on five hours the rain became heavier and heavier and the ravines became raging torrents, the rain pouring down them like a roaring sea. Gradually the streams settled in the trenches until there were in some places several feet of water. In most trenches the water was over the men's waists; in parts it was as much as nine feet deep. Parapets caved in and trenches were blotted out. Equipment was washed away. Dug-outs became flooded and in many instances collapsed altogether. Men struggling in the higher parts of the trenches could hear despairing shouts and cries through the darkness. It was impossible to go to the help of any one who might be drowning even a few feet away. One unit, not Newfoundlanders, were making winter dug-outs. When the water rose the dug-outs caved in and 60 men were drowned.

The rain kept on and the weather grew colder



MACHINE-GUN PRACTICE AT ST. JOHN'S. 1914.

The Hon. J. R. Bennett, Colonial Secretary (afterwards Minister of Militia), firing the first round.



TROOPS EMBARKING AT ST. JOHN'S IN THE SEALER "NEPTUNE," 1914.

Afterwards transhipping to the "Dominion" after passing ice.

and colder. On the following evening the rain turned to snow and the water began to freeze. It was impossible for a time to get food up, for the support trenches were washed away. When the food arrived there were no means of cooking it, for it was impossible to kindle a fire. The water in the men's water-bottles was frozen solid. The men's soaking clothing froze stiff on them. Their only chance was to stand wherever they could in the least exposed positions, for nothing could be done until the water had drained out of the trenches. There was no real shelter. The men who were too ill were sent down to the beach, and many of them fell on the way and died from exposure. The northerly blizzard lasted with intense frost for three days.

Gradually the trenches began to drain. Little groups of six or eight men had been standing hour after hour on little uplands two or three feet long, huddled together, trying to keep warm. The trenches were not fit to go back into until December 10. Had the Turks been able to attack then it would have been impossible to resist them. But the Turks were probably in very much the same condition as our own men. The soldiers could not have used their rifles, for they were clogged up with mud and dirt. One of their great problems day after day, after the first storm abated, was to find ways of cooking their food. Buckets were sent up, holes bored

in them, and they were used as braziers. One fortunate company managed to light a fire. It was the envy of all.

The regiment had now been in the trenches since November 16. The troops who were to have relieved them had been so reduced in numbers that they could not take their place. There was nothing to be done but to hold on, day and night, enduring one of the most dreadful and trying ordeals that soldiers have ever had to pass through.

The troops had known before the storm came on that our positions were to be evacuated, and the little groups cheered one another with assurances that they must soon be going. "Hold on, Boys," was the message of the officers. "Hold on, you'll soon be out of this," the doctors said, as they moved from man to man. Even the sick men held on in the lines, and deeds of heroism were so many at this time that they went unchronicled.

One special case of bravery was that of Pte. Fitzgerald, of the R.A.M.C. On the morning of December 1 a ration party coming to the support trenches was fired upon by the Turks, and all the men wounded or killed. Fitzgerald, seeing the wounded men lying in the open, got out of the trench and began to bandage their wounds. The Turks located him and fired repeatedly on him, wounding him several times. He quietly kept on despite



OFFICERS OF THE NEWFOUNDLAND REGIMENT AT ST. JOHN'S, NEWFOUNDLAND, SEPTEMBER, 1914,

With the Governor, Sir Walter E. Davidson, in the centre (seated).

his wounds and had bandaged three men before a bullet killed him.

The regiment was now down to little over a quarter of its original strength. A very welcome draft of about 90 officers and men arrived on December 1 straight from England, and brought the strength up to about 400 men.

The night before the storm preparations had been begun for the evacuation and for the removal of surplus goods and stores. After the storm abated the men were so weak that they could scarcely do anything. They, however, struggled on. Wires and bombs and land mines were laid in No Man's Land and attached to our own barbed wire, so that they might be exploded if the Turks attempted an attack during our evacuation. Candles of different lengths were put in biscuit tins cut for the purpose. Attached to the candles were detonators which exploded as the candle burned down. These detonators thus exploding at different times made the Turks believe that our men were still in the trenches, while they were actually on their way down to the beach.

About 30 men forming a rearguard were left as a final party to complete the preparations for the deceiving of the Turks. The tents at the rest camp were gradually reduced

in number, although not to any noticeable extent, and many tents were left to make the Turks think that they were still being occupied. The guns were removed and 4-inch piping was set up and arranged to look like batteries in case Turkish aircraft should come over. On the night of the evacuation, one gun, the only one left, was fired at intervals of about every five minutes. Eight or ten men remained by it. At the last moment a horse was hitched to it and made to gallop over the hill and down to the beach. The little rearguard thought it impossible that they could get away, but in this case daring had its reward, and they were all in the boats before the Turks had suspected their departure. There were two casualties on the night of the embarkation.

The remnants of the regiment reached Mudros about 4 a.m. on the morning of December 20. They remained at Mudros and Imbros for a few days and then were sent back to Cape Helles to help in the evacuation at this point. Part of the regiment was given the post of honour as the rearguard here.

Arriving off W. Beach on the night of December 26, they found it impossible to land on account of the heavy swell. They were ordered to wait until morning, but landing was still impossible. About sunset they re-

turned to Cape Helles, where they succeeded in getting ashore and proceeded to the reserve trenches, staying in reserve for about four days. They then moved down to W Beach and occupied dug-outs at Lancashire Landing, which had previously sheltered a Greek working party.

Every available man was now put on working parties, making roads and building bridges and temporary piers at X, V, and W Beaches. The Turks maintained heavy shelling day and night, and the Newfoundlanders suffered an average of about 20 casualties each night. Their conduct on this occasion earned very high praise from the General Officer commanding.

On New Year's Day, 1916, the troops were short of food, for no stores had been landed on account of the coming evacuation. They were also very short of water. The Turks made one attack, but were repulsed with heavy losses with the aid of our naval guns.

The first party left Cape Helles on January 4. It consisted of 1 officer and 30 men, mostly sick men. Three days later 4 officers and 147 men left the dug-outs at Lancashire Landing and went down to the magazine, working for some hours storing ammunition and laying wires to enable it to be blown up. At 10.30 that night, after they had finished, they made their way down to V Beach and embarked about midnight from the River Clyde on to a trawler and from it on to a waiting steamer, bound for Mudros.


The final casualties at Gallipoli were incurred about an hour before they left Lancashire Landing, when one man was killed and two wounded by shell fire from Anzac Point. The Turks were already occupying both Anzac and Suvla, where we had fought so long.

On January 12, after having been joined by their wounded, the remnants of the regiment left Mudros for Alexandria. About 1,050 men had left England; 933 officers and men arrived on the Peninsula; afterwards further drafts arrived from England. Only 170 were left to answer their names at the Roll Call after the final evacuation.

Brigadier-General Cayley, commanding the 88th Brigade, paid a high tribute to the gallantry, efficiency and adaptability of the Newfoundland soldiers at Gallipoli. Writing to the Governor of the Colony, Sir Walter Davidson, he said :

I feel sure that you and the people of Newfoundland will be anxious to hear of the doings of their contingent since they have been on active service. As you doubtless know, the regiment landed at Suvla in the Gallipoli Peninsula in September, and were attached to the 88th Brigade of the 29th Division, which brigade I have the honour to command.

The brigade was holding trenches very close to the Turks on the left centre of our line. The Newfoundland Regiment was at first in reserve. Whilst in reserve all officers and the different companies were sent up to the trenches and attached to regiments in warfare. All ranks were remarkably quick in picking up all there was to be learnt, and their keenness was very noticeable. The result was that after a very short time they took over part of the firing line as a separate unit. There was no big operation, but small enterprises were frequently on foot, and in all they had to do the regiment continually showed a splendid spirit of readiness and



PARADE OF NEWFOUNDLAND TROOPS AT THEIR QUARTERS IN ENGLAND.

resource. I especially recall incidents of the nights of November 4 and 5, when we advanced a part of our line. I detailed them for this work, and it was admirably carried out, all who took part showing the highest courage and determination in face of very severe opposition. The results of the operations were entirely successful.

Another occasion I should wish to recall is the storm of November 26 and following days. A very violent rainfall, which flooded the trenches more than waist deep, was followed up by three days of northerly blizzard with intense frost. The conditions were such that the most veteran troops might have been excused for losing heart, but, in spite of very heavy casualties from exposure, the regiment never for a moment gave in, but maintained their spirit and cheerfulness in a most wonderful manner.

Then again, in the evacuation of Suvla and Helles operations, of which the success depended entirely upon the steadiness and discipline of the troops taking part, their share in these extremely anxious movements was most admirably performed.

It has been the greatest honour and pleasure to me to have these gallant fellows in my brigade, whose traditions they have most worthily upheld. Their fellow-countrymen have every reason to be proud of them on their doings. Their casualties have been many from bullets and sickness.

On leaving Gallipoli, the Newfoundland Regiment stayed for a time in Egypt, where under Lieut.-Col. Hadow, the battalion was rebuilt after its exacting and exhausting experiences. From Egypt it moved on in March, 1916, to France, reaching Marseilles on March 22. The next few weeks were spent partly in the trenches and partly in reserve, without very much happening. Late in June it took up its position as one of the army that was to make the long-planned attack on the German lines on the Somme.

On June 26 and 27 the Newfoundlanders attempted two raids on the German trenches. The first was undertaken by a party of 50 selected men who had undergone special training and were under the command of Capt. B. Butler. They moved forward very stealthily through No Man's Land, and got right under the German wires. They found, however, that the Germans had put in fresh strands of wire so strong that it was impossible to sever them. None of the wire-cutters available were of any use. The defending troops detected them, and they were obliged to retire.

On the following night they made another attempt. On this occasion they actually reached the enemy's trenches. They were met with heavy fire and a shower of bombs. The Newfoundlanders bombed back until every hand grenade had been used. They were unable to make any further progress, and had to retire, but not before every officer in the

attack, including Captain Butler, had been wounded. Six of other ranks had been killed and 13 wounded. Capt. Butler received the Military Cross for the great courage and ability which he showed on this occasion. Pte. J. Cahill displayed most conspicuous gallantry in bringing back wounded men. Then after the raid he went out once more on his own initiative to make sure that no wounded remained behind. He was not seen again, but news came later that he had been wounded and captured by the enemy and had died of wounds. Pte. F. M. O'Neill picked up a bomb which was thrown by the enemy and hurled it back. The bomb burst on leaving his hand, severely wounding him. But for his promptitude it would undoubtedly have caused several casualties among our men. In raids like this many deeds of great gallantry go, of necessity, unrecorded, for the men who witnessed them are themselves in too many cases killed. In the case of Pte. O'Neill nothing was said about his action until many months afterwards. He was invalided out of the Army on account of his wounds, and those who witnessed what he did themselves became casualties during the raid. Another soldier who won special mention, the Military Medal and the Russian Order of St. George was Pte. G. Phillips, who flung himself against the enemy's trench, killing or wounding several Germans single-handed. After the party had to get out of the trench, he went back again to try to obtain some identification. He remained out all night and had to cut his way back through the enemy wire.

On the night of June 30 the Newfoundlanders were brought up to the lines from Lunencourt to act as supports to the Brigades which were to attack the first system of the enemy trenches south of Beaumont Hamel. The Brigade of which the Newfoundlanders still formed part, was to move forward at 8.40 to act as the third wave in the advance. Word came shortly after 8 o'clock that the troops were not to move until further orders; evidently even the gallantry of the Ulsters and the Inniskillings who had gone ahead had failed to bring victory at this point. Less than half an hour afterwards a second message came that the Newfoundlanders were to advance with another battalion and take the first line of trenches. They were to move if necessary independently, and to go forward as quickly as possible.



GROUP OF NEWFOUNDLAND OFFICERS AND MEN FROM GALLIPOLI SERVING IN FRANCE, 1916.

The distance to be crossed at this point varied from 650 to 900 yards. Despite our tremendous artillery bombardment, the way over this long distance was by no means clear. Lines had been cut through our own wires through which the troops might move, but those gaps were not nearly sufficient in number. The enemy knew all of these lanes and had their machine guns playing directly over them. There was a slight dip in the ground shortly after leaving our trenches, about three or four feet deep. The German machine guns had thus an admirable line of sight towards which they could sweep their fire, making the passage impossible. Immediately our artillery barrage slackened, the German machine gunners poured from their dug-outs.

Our men moved off at 9.15. They were the very pick of the population of the Island Colony. They had been thoroughly trained. Many of them were skilled sharp-shooters, men who, living for years in the open hunting and trapping, had all the keenness of vision of the born forester. Some were picked lumbermen. Most had been accustomed to open-air life, and were magnificent specimens of humanity. For months they had trained, day after day, for this hour.

They knew before they started that they

were undertaking an almost impossible task. The Colonel called his Company Commanders together and briefly addressed them telling them what was ahead. The men in the ranks exchanged words together with tight-set lips. "If I go down," said the corporal to the private at his side, "you take charge and go straight ahead."

The Newfoundlanders advanced as steadily as though on parade. The ranks kept perfect line. They moved forward with two companies in the first line in platoons in file at 40 paces interval and 25 paces between sections, followed by two other companies in similar formation at 100 paces distance. Their line of advance was over the open from the near trenches known as St. John's Road and Clonmel Avenue. The German machine-guns played right on them. As the men passed through the gaps in our own front wire they were mown down in heaps. The survivors kept on. "Push on with it," said the sergeant to the man under him as he himself fell, struck by a bullet in the chest. "Push on with it." Some survivors got as far as the German wires. It is told of one officer that finding all his men were shot down he himself ran forward straight at the Germans, to be shot before he reached them. One man, Regt.-Sergt.-Major W. Clare, kept on alone, and

was one of the very few who succeeded in reaching the enemy wire.

The blow was so sudden and so overwhelming that it seemed almost impossible that it could be true. A number of wounded dropped down in shell holes where they remained, some of them, for days before they could creep in. But for the time nothing could be seen of them. The officers and men left behind did their utmost to rescue the wounded in No Man's Land.

The survivors were so eager to go out to rescue the wounded that it was necessary to check their zeal, for the enemy could still sweep the entire line and blazed away even at men going over the top on errands of mercy. Lieut. S. C. Frost brought in two wounded men, carrying them on his back, and one of them was shot as he bore him along. He would have gone out again had he been permitted. Two men in the ranks received Military Medals for their gallantry in attempting this. Pte. S. Dewling brought in two wounded men under machine-gun fire, and worked continuously relieving the wounded under heavy shell fire. On the day after the attempted advance he brought in six wounded men under shell and machine-gun fire in broad daylight. On July 3 he went out again in daylight looking for more. Pte. J. Cox was also decorated for showing conspicuous gallantry and contempt for danger.

Every officer had been hit except the Colonel and a Captain. Newfoundlanders suffered more heavily in the advance of July 1 in proportion to numbers than any other branch of the British Army.

The news of this gallant attempt sent a thrill through the Empire. To the people in Newfoundland itself it came as a message for greater efforts and greater sacrifice. "We will show ourselves worthy of our men who have fallen," said the people. Fresh recruits were enrolled. Fresh drafts were sent out. July 1, 1916, will remain an immortal memory to England's oldest colony.

Sir Douglas Haig sent a message to the Government of Newfoundland which well voiced the general feeling. The Lieut.-General now in command of the Corps, expressed, both to the Premier and to the survivors themselves, his appreciation of their splendid courage and determination. He declared that the charge would live in history, and that the Newfoundlanders had added another deed to that

glorious chronology of valiant deeds on which our Empire was built. In a letter to Sir Edward Morris the Lieut.-General said :

That battalion covered itself with glory on July 1 by the magnificent way in which it carried out the attack entrusted to it. It went forward to the attack when two other attacks on that same part of the line had failed, and by its behaviour on that occasion it showed itself worthy of the highest traditions of the British race, and proved itself to be a fit representative of the population of the oldest British colony. When the order to attack was given every man moved forward to his appointed objective in his appointed place as if on parade. There were no waverers, no stragglers, and not a man looked back. It was a magnificent display of trained and disciplined valour, and its assault only failed of success because dead men can advance no farther. They were shot down by machine guns brought up by a very gallant foe under our intense artillery fire. Against any foe less well entrenched, less well organized, and above all, less gallant, their attack must have succeeded. As it was the action of the Newfoundland Battalion and the other units of the British left contributed largely to the victory achieved by the British and French farther south by pinning to their ground the best of the German troops and by occupying the majority of their artillery, both heavy and field. The gallantry and devotion of this battalion, therefore was not in vain, and the credit of victory belongs to them as much as to those troops farther south who actually succeeded in breaking the German line. An attacking army is like a football team : there is but one who kicks the goal, yet the credit of success belongs not alone to that individual but to the whole team, whose concerted action led to the desired result.

I should like you to let my fellow citizens of the Empire in the oldest Overseas portion of the British Realm know how well their lads have done, both officers, non-commissioned officers and men, and how proud I, as their Corps Commander, am to have had such a battalion under my command, and to be a comrade in arms of each and all of them.

The Premier of Newfoundland went over to France to visit the depleted battalion. He found that it had now been pulled out of the line. Fresh drafts had come out from the Depot in Scotland. All he could do was to tell them that all appreciated their achievements.

I told them (he said, describing the gathering) how much we appreciated their work and especially their action on July 1, and how we had followed their career with interest from the day they had left our shores. "I told them what we thought of their conduct in Gallipoli and in France and how we rejoiced in the splendid name they had won for themselves and their country ; how their example had fired the patriotism of their brothers and relatives in their far-off home, and that whilst I spoke a leviathan of the ocean was ploughing her way through the Atlantic, followed by a keel-compelling breeze from their own shores, carrying in her cabins 550 of their brothers to reinforce their ranks and prepare them for the day if they should ever be called upon to again go into action. I told them of the letter addressed to them by their Lieut.-General ; how it was an heirloom that each man would transmit to his children, a legacy establishing the honour, patriotism and character of their fathers, of more value than gold and precious stones. They in no way appeared to be cast down by the losses of July 1. On the contrary there was a light in the face of every man of them, and a ring of determination in the voices of all ; they appeared to long only for the hour when they would have

an opportunity of getting at the insolent foe and avenging the death of those of their comrades who had fallen. And yet, I could not but feel sad to see so few of that splendid battalion, that to us represented and meant so much. I had seen them grow from the enlistment of the first man; it seemed a part of myself. But they had died for their country, their death was like the death of those bright stars whose death is day. The war-training had developed them; they had become magnificent men. Of those that had gone into battle that July morning the average age could not have been more than 24, and this in itself made it particularly sad to think that the course of so many of them should have been run at so early an age.

It is not growing like a tree,
In bulk, doth make man better be;
Nor standing like an oak, three hundred year
To fall at 'ast a log, dry, baid, and serj.
The lily of a day
Were fairer far in May
Although it drooped and died that night,
It was the plant and flower of light.
In small proportions we just beauties see,
And in small measure life may perfect be.

The regiment was built up again, fresh reserves being sent from England, and after a short time behind the lines in the Ypres Salient it went to the Somme to take part in the great attempt of early October which followed the capture of Thiepval. It reached the Somme when the physical conditions of the war were exceedingly trying. The weather was very wet and cold, and the heavy shelling of the previous three months had reduced the entire Somme and Ancre front to a mass of silted and sifted earth

in which men sometimes sank bodily and even horses were drowned.

The regiment reached Poperinghe from the Ypres Salient on October 5. Two days later it entrained for the south, and on October 10 it left Corbeille and bivouacked in the open, south of Longueval, moving into the line after dark. The fighting strength of the regiment this time was not half what it had been before the battle of Beaumont Hamel.

Next day, October 11, as though the Germans knew of the arrival of the regiment, very heavy shelling was opened upon their position. On the same day orders were received that the Newfoundlanders were to take part in a big movement forward on the morrow, their objective being the strong German positions at Gueudecourt. The preliminary German shelling continued so heavily that the casualties were considerable.

There was a conference of Company Commanders on the Wednesday night. Every one knew that a few hours hence they were to make their second great effort since they left Gallipoli. Every man had fresh in his memory what had happened at Beaumont Hamel. Even while they were waiting it seemed that under the unceasing shell fire of the enemy there might be very few left to go forward. But each man



INSPECTION BY PRINCESS HENRY OF BATTENBERG AT CHELSEA HOSPITAL,
NOVEMBER 10, 1916.

was resolved that now the moment had come to strike hard. Newfoundlanders would prove afresh that they could do their duty. In the heart of many a soldier that night there were memories of old friends who had gone, friends whose loss was to be avenged.

On Thursday the regiment moved forward to attack, in conjunction with other Imperial Brigades to its right and to its left. Once more it was side by side with the Regiment

Capt. March and Capt. Butler, were left to carry on.

Capt. J. W. March subsequently received the Military Cross and the Croix de Guerre for his gallantry in this fight. He was senior officer and showed the greatest dash and determination in organizing the defence in the captured trench and in beating off a hostile counter-attack after we had occupied it. He himself in the original attack bayoneted three Germans.



[Official photograph.]

NEWFOUNDLAND OFFICERS AT THEIR BILLETS IN FRANCE.

which had fought to the right of it at Beaumont Hamel.

October 12 was only a partial success for our armies. Strong enemy machine gun fire prevented our advance to the right and to the left. The Newfoundlanders were more fortunate than some others. Two companies advanced in two waves, each on a front of two platoons. These were followed in similar formation by other companies. The advance was well covered by a very effective barrage and the troops kept close up behind it and seized the enemy trench.

Capt. Donnelly, who had so distinguished himself in previous fighting, was killed on reaching the trench, and Capt. O'Brien was hit on the way over. Two officers,

Capt. Butler was given a Bar to his M.C. He personally shot 15 Germans in capturing the trench, and by his able dispositions consolidated and helped to hold it against counter-attacks. Sergt. R. Neville found himself, when entering the trench, opposed by a strong group of Germans. He promptly led a bombing squad, and after a battle in which British grenades and German cylindrical sticks formed the weapons on either side he cleared out the trench and connected up with another party. Lance-Corpl. A. Manuel was in charge of a Lewis machine gun. All of his team became casualties before reaching the hostile trench, but he kept on and brought his gun into action single-handed and did fine work during a hostile

counter-attack. Pte. D. Brown was one of the first to reach the German trenches. He bayoneted three of the enemy and bombed many dug-outs. During the counter-attack which followed he shot seven of the enemy.

Every man seemed fired with the same determination. One runner, Pte. O. Goodland, earned a decoration for his great coolness and gallantry in carrying back messages three times through a heavy barrage to battalion headquarters. He was severely wounded. Another private, B. Carroll, volunteered to go out and aid wounded in the open after we had taken the trench. He advanced under very heavy fire and saved a number of men. Lance-Corpl. W. Bennett was subsequently given the Distinguished Conduct Medal for his behaviour on this occasion. After three times going through the barrage with messages, he got back in the trench. After nightfall he observed a party of the enemy creeping up on the left flank. He took two men and, after firing a volley at them, charged with the bayonet and took the whole party—1 officer and 13 men—prisoners. A Distinguished Conduct Medal was also given to Sergt.-Major C. Gardener, a soldier who was to gain even greater glory later on. Seeing a hostile bombing party in a gap in the captured trench attacking another company, he promptly advanced upon them with two men, bombed them, defeated them, and took 1 officer and 15 men prisoners.

The first trench being won, an attempt was made to advance still farther, and a party under Lieut. Cecil Clift moved forward, but was wiped out. The Newfoundlanders proceeded to clear the trench which they had taken. They bombed the dug-outs and captured the Germans in them. When they found that our troops to their left had retired to their original trenches, Capt. March at once sent a patrol to the unoccupied trench on our left and held it with his greatly depleted ranks. The enemy came up and counter-attacked. By this time the Newfoundlanders' casualties were considerable.

A company of the 2nd Hampshires was sent up as reinforcements, and early next morning a second company of the same regiment arrived, when all that was left of the Newfoundland Regiment was withdrawn to the support trench. The Newfoundlanders had paid a high price, but had obtained a great success. It was estimated that 250 of the enemy had been killed, three machine guns captured and two

officers, one warrant officer and 56 men taken prisoners.

After a period of rest in camp the regiment marched back into line at Guillemont over frozen and very slippery roads early in January. The position it now had to hold was little more than a broken front where the very trenches had disappeared. The regiment took active part in the ceaseless work at this point. Sergt.-Major Gardener, the son of a fisherman of Trinity Bay, who had already been decorated for gallantry, did an act which made him the pride of the regiment. He followed a regiment into No Man's Land, with a party of stretcher bearers. Having filled all the stretchers, he noticed that there were some Germans in the trench directly in front of him. He immediately walked up to them, and demanded that they should surrender. One German came and gave himself up. Then Gardener shouted to the others, "Très bon. You're late. Everybody else has kameraded." Whether the enemy understood his words or not, they comprehended his gestures. Other men came out of the trench. Eventually Gardener collected 72 prisoners, whom he marched off and handed over to a party of the regiment. By his initiative and daring, the British troops were able to make good their flank, without opposition.

When two Imperial regiments were attacking, Lieut. R. P. Holloway, who had already won a great reputation for his work as sniping and intelligence officer, went out to locate the exact position gained by our troops who had made the attack. He not only visited all the positions captured, but gathered up six prisoners, whom he brought back with him. The weeks that followed were filled with the usual routine of trench and rest-camp life.

Early in March, 1917, the regiment was at Sailly Saillisel, where it was face to face with some very active German brigades, which kept up a constant bombardment and frequent bombing raids. On March 3, after there had been several bombing attacks against our men, an enemy artillery bombardment opened at 7 a.m. on Palz Trench. The bombardment grew in intensity, until by 8 o'clock it was almost overwhelming. At 8.15 the enemy advanced. The day was very misty, and the Germans used smoke bombs still further to conceal their movements. The attackers were within 650 yards of the trench before they were discovered. Then about 50 Germans could be seen advancing on



A WARD IN THE THIRD LONDON GENERAL HOSPITAL, WANDSWORTH.

In the hospital, at which many Newfoundlanders were treated, men from all quarters of the Empire shared the same wards, and exchanged ideas and information to their mutual benefit.

one side, two men carrying what appeared to be a large wooden box between them. Another 50 extended to the other side of the trench. At the moment of their attack a shell pitched just inside one part of Palz Trench, killing two of our bombers and wounding one of the Lewis gun team supporting them. The platoon commander at this point had been severely wounded during the preliminary bombardment. As the Germans approached a S.O.S. signal was sent over the telephone to headquarters. Immediately afterwards all communication by telephone was cut off. A non-commissioned officer began to fire rockets as signals for aid. He fired two, but before he could discharge the third he was wounded. The Germans were now right on our men. The first bomb which was hurled in the trench put one Lewis gun out of action. A second Lewis gun near the head of the communication trench was jammed on account of dirt thrown up by the bursting of the bombs. This left only one Lewis gun bearing on the attackers. While the bomb battle was going on between the advancing Germans and our own men,

three more Lewis guns were quickly brought up, and the four of them were playing on the advancing enemy at the range of less than 200 yards.

The Germans got in at the right of Palz Trench and drove our men back, reaching as far as the head of the communication trench. By this time a British barrage had opened to prevent further Germans from getting up. At the most critical moment a young officer, 2nd Lieut. G. G. Byrne, saved the situation by his courage and initiative. Byrne was in command of a platoon situated about the centre. Without orders and without any hesitation he arranged a bombing counter-attack, supported by a squad of Rifle Grenadiers. He personally led the attack up the trench, which was knee-deep in mud, drove the enemy out, and followed them into their own trench. Despite heavy shell and rifle fire and a rain of bombs he held a section of their trench and put a new block in it about 40 yards in advance of the old one. He subsequently received the Military Cross for his work that morning.

Lance-Corporal M. Picco was in the trench

at the point where the Germans first attacked. He and the remainder of his men were only driven back when they had thrown all their bombs. The German bomb which had put the Lewis gun out of action slightly wounded Picco in the first two fingers of his left hand. Nevertheless he continued bombing, drawing the pins from the bombs with his little finger. When his men were driven back into the communication trench Picco obtained further supplies of bombs from the company in support, and counter-attacked at the same time that Lieut. Byrne and his men moved forward. He then helped Lieut. Byrne to build a block and remained in command of our new advanced bombing post. On being relieved that night he marched back to Combles. Next day at foot inspection the Medical Officer found that he had been fighting despite the great suffering from a very bad attack of trench feet, which necessitated immediate hospital treatment. Private J. P. Lewis was to the left of Palz Trench when the fight began, and so was out of the immediate area of the fight. When a demand came for bombs from his position, he

knew that the stock of fighting men must be running low. Without any orders he jumped over the parapets and ran back across the open to Potsdam Trench behind, obtaining two boxes of bombs from the company in support. He carried them up over the open under very heavy shell fire, and was running for some more when he was stopped by an officer, as the enemy had been driven out.

On the evening of April 13, 1917, the regiment moved into the lines near Monchy-le-Preux, 5½ miles south-east of Arras, in order to attack the village and heights there. This was part of a great movement then being made by the British armies along the whole Arras front from Souchez to Henin. Following the German retreat on March 2 on the Somme and Ancre our armies had driven them north and east, the German line resting with its right on Arras and swinging back north-eastwards on to the Hindenburg line from Arras to St. Quentin. Then early in April we struck farther north, driving them out of Vimy Ridge and out of the country on the Arras front to the south of it.




BILLIARDS AT THE THIRD LONDON GENERAL HOSPITAL, WANDSWORTH.

Two Newfoundlanders are playing.

The Germans sought by tremendous artillery fire and by counter-attacks, particularly on such positions as Thelus and Monchy, to stay our advance.

Monchy, spur of a salient, our most advanced point, and in some ways the key of our position, was the special object of the German counter-



[Downey.

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS LLOYD
PRESENTING THE D.S.O. TO LANCE-
CORPORAL M. PICCO

At the Third London General Hospital,
Wandsworth.

In the background, left to right, Major Timewell,
Sir Edward P. Morris, H. F. Reeve, Esq., C.M.G.,
E. R. Morris, Esq.

attacks. The enemy had massed a German Division to attempt to retake it, and had accumulated a very large number of guns against it. The General then in command of the Brigade, resolved not to wait for the enemy attack, but to push forward against them and to attack and capture the German trenches on the spur and ridge and high lands to the east of Monchy-le-Preux. The Worcesters, the Hampshires, the Newfoundland Regiment and another battalion were to share in the attack, and they were supported by two battalions of another Brigade. The troops were to push forward after gaining their immediate objectives to the Bois-du-Vert, the Bois-du-Sart, the Bois-des-Aubepines and Kelling Cops and to occupy these points and the high ground around in strength if possible.

At 5.30 on the morning of the 14th our barrage opened and the troops advanced, each battalion moving in two waves on a front of two companies, and with a frontage of about 500 yards. The advance had not gone far over the shell-torn and difficult country before the

Germans retorted with a tremendously heavy counter barrage. As our troops moved forward they came under considerable machine-gun fire. One company of the Newfoundlanders to the left rushed through and captured a ruined windmill which was apparently a small strong point. Then they pushed on to a small wood beyond it. What happened there was never fully known. The men were seen digging in. Then the wood caught fire. Another company dug itself in behind the top of a ridge, while the second wave going beyond it advanced over the spur beyond which was part of our objective. They moved up, and on, and were simply swallowed up. Two Lewis guns from the first wave moved up to cover them. Occasionally the guns could be heard firing.

Still farther along our advance a company came on a German trench newly begun. A few enemy wounded were in it, and about 10 others were captured. The remainder retired. A platoon was left in the trench to mask a dump of wood where a party of about 30 of the enemy were active. The regiment which was advancing by the side of the Newfoundlanders had missed this dump when they moved on beyond it. Three platoons advanced here and began digging in. Then a number of them could be seen pushing forward into the wood.

Our scouts and snipers were all knocked out by shell fire soon after the start. The casualties during the first part of the advance were heavy. Men were falling in all directions from shell fire and from snipers. Victory was impossible. A brigade, which was supposed to occupy the spur on one flank of the Newfoundland Regiment, could not be found. One Regiment reported soon after 7 in the morning that it had taken its objective and was digging in. Then it became evident that a terrific counter-attack was in progress.

At this time large numbers of enemy could be seen advancing on the left, flocks of skirmishers in front, with ample supports behind. The company of the Newfoundlanders which had reached the German trench was practically surrounded by enemy troops advancing from different directions. The men fought on until they were hemmed in by the Germans, who were all around them at 50 yards' range. Then little knots of soldiers could be seen surrendering. About 10 of this company ran for it to break through, but only one escaped.

The battle now reduced itself to a series of

isolated and heroic conflicts. Little groups of men struggled against overwhelming masses of the enemy. Some of our platoons tried to retire, holding their own till the last moment and then rushing back. One platoon opened fire on two companies of Germans who were advancing. Its Lewis machine gun and team were soon knocked out by a shell, but the remainder of the men, few in number, continued to do good execution. The Germans had been advancing *en masse*; now they extended out on both sides of the road and came on. A wounded officer ordered the platoon to retire; but they were reinforced at the back of the village and soon re-entered the firing line.

The special observers had all been knocked out; the Intelligence Officer on the front had been killed; two companies had disappeared, and the enemy shell fire seemed to grow heavier and heavier. An Imperial regiment held the line to the right and reported by telephone that bodies of the enemy were coming behind and cutting off the line of retreat. Half an hour later a battalion signalling officer, who had been sent up the trenches to observe and report, came back with the news that we had not a single unwounded man on the east side of Monchy, and that between 200 and 300 Germans were advancing and were only about 300 yards

away. Every officer and man at Battalion headquarters at once fell in to step up to the fighting line. They numbered 20.

The telephone line to Brigade headquarters had been broken, so the Adjutant was sent back to report on the position, while the remainder of the little group of headquarters men moved through the village out into our trench. They paused at the last big house in the village and one man climbed up from a ladder to a shell hole in the wall to look ahead. He saw that the enemy were just jumping into our Assembly Trench. Half way towards it was the last hedge of the village, forming a slight bank. The headquarters men made a rush across about 100 yards of open ground to the hedge. Only two officers and seven non-commissioned officers and men reached the hedge—the bombing officer and the signalling officer, the provost-sergeant and the provost-corporal, the signalling corporal and two signallers, the regimental messenger and a private of another regiment. The enemy at once opened rifle fire on them from the front and machine gun fire from the left. The little band fought on. The bank of the hedge was a parapet of quite a good trench. It provided excellent cover and commanded a good field of fire, the men in it being able to face



MONCHY.

[Official photograph.]

north and south as well as east. The Assembly Trench, our old position, a little over 100 yards away, was now full of Germans. Fire was at once opened on the enemy by the little com-

pany. The machine gun to the left, firing at a range of about 200 yards, was knocked out of action in a few minutes, apparently by a British machine gun farther to the left. The Germans who were in the Assembly Trench were pinned down there, each man who showed

his head being shot. After the first few minutes the nine men, recognising that they must be careful of their ammunition, refrained from firing at any save enemy close to them.



THE NEWFOUNDLANDERS MARCHING BACK TO BILLET AFTER MONCHY. [Official photograph.]

pany. The machine gun to the left, firing at a range of about 200 yards, was knocked out of action in a few minutes, apparently by a British machine gun farther to the left. The Germans who were in the Assembly Trench were pinned down there, each man who showed

In the first two hours they shot 40 Germans at close range.

Soon after noon it became evident that the Germans' attack was developing on the right rear, which was held by the Worcesters. By the sound of the firing it appeared as if the

enemy had entered the village from the south. But the worst was now over. The Germans had had enough fighting for one day. Their firing died down. British reinforcements came up. At 4.15 in the afternoon a heavy enemy bombardment opened again and our guns put a barrage down east of the village. At 8 in the evening the Newfoundlanders were relieved. The Germans who had been pinned in Assembly Trench were seen retiring in small parties and were heavily fired on as they tried to get away. Then the little remnant of the regiment gathered together.

But the Newfoundlanders had held Monchy. Beaten and more than beaten early in the fight, they had refused to recognize the fact, and had won victory out of defeat. This battle may well, in future ages, be ranked among the most desperate and heroic struggles of the war.

Several decorations were given to the regiment. Lieut.-Col. J. Forbes Robertson, who had collected the men at battalion headquarters, received the D.S.O. "He undoubtedly saved a very critical situation by his promptness, bravery and example." He had been given the Military Cross seven months before for continuous devotion to duty and consistent good work. Lieut. K. J. Keegan, the signalling officer, was also given the Military Cross. Lieut. Keegan in addition to great gallantry during the fight, went into Assembly Trench with two men as the Germans were retiring in the evening, and brought five of our wounded lying there who survived. Capt. J. W. Tocher received a Military Cross for his devotion to duty in attending to wounded for many hours in an intense bombardment that day. His aid post in a cellar was three times penetrated by shells, killing some of the wounded. Sergt. A. Gobby received the Military Medal for going out under heavy shell fire and superintending the bringing in of wounded from the front. He returned to the aid post through a heavy barrage for some stretchers, then he went forward again and collected more wounded. Afterwards he kept on at work in the aid post under an intense bombardment during which the post was blown in. Corpl. Parsons, the signalling corporal of the headquarters party, was also given the Military Medal, and every one of the nine was decorated.

The survivors had to get to work burying the dead and salvaging. In these days of


desperate fighting even tremendous losses such as these were not sufficient to cause the battalion to be withdrawn from the line for any time. The regiment soon recovered its formation. It was able to show a strength of 220 rank and file and 12 officers. Then in the fighting of April 23, where the British troops on the right bank of the Scarpe forced their way forward on a wide front south and east of Monchy-le-Preux, the weakened regiment once more did great service. The loss on this occasion was due to severe shell fire and a great deal of machine-gun fire.

The regiment now moved back to Boneville for training and rest and to have its ranks refilled by drafts from the dépôt at home. It then went on to Belgium and took up a position near Woestern, north of Ypres. Sir Douglas Haig had been for some weeks pushing a strong attack on the German lines here, an attack which had driven the enemy a considerable distance back and had deprived them of a large part of the Western Belgian Ridge. On August 15, 1917, the Newfoundlanders took part in an advance along a wide front against the German lines. The regiment had two objectives, the first about 400 yards from the British trenches, and the second 400 yards beyond the first. The attack started just as it was getting light in the morning. The troops followed a creeping barrage, successfully taking both objectives. At the first point a large number of Germans were killed and two machine guns captured. Two other machine guns were captured at the second objective, and the men immediately consolidated their position by digging in.

The ground over which the regiment had to go during the first part of the advance was a mass of shell holes. But the second 400 yards was much more formidable, for here the troops had to cross a piece of land known as the "Floating Swamp" and to attack a strongly fortified position with concrete defences on the other side.

"Floating Swamp," said a correspondent at the time, "is the name for a quaking morass which gives no foothold anywhere, but heaves and oozes and bubbles to unknown depths as you wade through it."

"In this case experience showed that the depth varied from the height of a man's waist to his chest or throat. When a man sank much above his waist he had to stay there to be pulled



[Official photograph.]

NEWFOUNDLAND TRANSPORT COLUMN.

out, if fortune favoured, later. Those who were only knee-high or waist-high or less than up to the armpits went on. There was no time to stay then to pull a comrade out, for the barrage, like a pillar of smoke by day, moved on before, and they must follow as close as might be behind it."

The German machine-gun fire was largely blinded by the splendid British barrage, but some of the bullets could not fail to go home. Any man who was badly hit in the swamp sank and had little chance of getting out. The slightly wounded might struggle back. The unwounded, muddy from head to toe, holding their rifles above their heads, dragged themselves through the mass of ooze. When they once got on dry land again there was no resisting them. No machine guns, no shell fire, could hold that tremendous rush. Some

men, despite their struggles, had failed to get through and stuck in the slime, as soldiers during the winter months were sometimes stuck in mud. They had to wait, careful not to move too much in case they sank farther, until their victorious comrades returned to pull them out. As the Newfoundlanders stormed the concrete emplacements English troops, working around the south side of the swamp, rushed at the "pill boxes" there.

Many soldiers particularly distinguished themselves on this occasion. Corpl. H. Raynes received the D.C.M. and the Croix de Guerre for his splendid conduct during one part of the engagement. His company was held up in front of a road by rifle fire. He, with two others, Pte. J. J. Peddell and Pte. G. Lacey, who were both given the Military Medal, went out on their own initiative, creeping from shell hole to shell hole under very heavy fire, finally getting to the rear. There they bombed out small dug-outs containing two or three men. They killed about 19 of the enemy and signalled to their company to come on. They prevented the advance of the company being held up at this point. A private soldier, A. Murray, was in charge of a Lewis machine gun section. Under very great difficulties he kept his men together and kept his gun in working order, when holding an advanced position which was filled with mud and water to a depth of three feet, for 26 hours. Another private, E. G. Wiseman, was No. 1 man on a Lewis gun team when his platoon was held up by machine-gun fire from a block-house. He worked round the flank and made to the rear of the block-house, where he turned his gun on the enemy machine gun team, killing several men.

Another Lewis gunner, Pte. F. Dawe, took his gun and two carriers into action after the rest of the team were knocked out by a shell. He also retained his rifle and bayonet. Although the deep mud made it exceedingly difficult for a man to drag himself along, he held on to his gun and arrived at the objective in time to give valuable assistance to the people on the left who were held up by a block house.

Pte. J. H. Simms, in command of a Lewis gun section, found himself, when going through the swamp, faced by a piece of bog ground practically without foothold, through which it seemed impossible to pass. One of his men had sunk almost to his shoulder in the mud. Simms succeeded in rescuing him. Then, when he got out, he hurried forward under a heavy barrage

located an excellent position for his gun and operated it with great success against the enemy. Lance-Corpl. J. Rose was in charge of a Lewis gun team that came under such heavy shell fire that all but two of the men were wounded or killed. Rose pressed on with the two still left, kept his gun playing on the enemy's strong points, and enabled his platoon to consolidate with exceptionally few casualties.

Alongside these records may well come the account of a typical stretcher bearer. Volunteers were called for, to go out and rescue the wounded under an intense bombardment. Pte. R. Spurrell offered himself and made two trips to a dressing station 750 yards away, under heavy fire. Two of the bearers with him were wounded on the first trip and one killed on the second trip. He went into the attack as a stretcher bearer and made two complete trips across the "Floating Swamp"

was some little distance south of the Broenbeck River. It was planned for it to take one objective in the attack, Imperial battalions preceding it.

Owing to the difficulties of the ground, and to the weather, the troops lost direction and the regiments became mingled. The Newfoundlanders found themselves in the front attacking wave in place of the wave which they had been detached for. They went forward with comparatively little difficulty, in spite of German machine-gun fire and sniping from "pill boxes." A number of prisoners were taken and the positions were secured shortly after dawn.

It was soon evident that the Germans were not going to allow them to be retained if they could stop it, for during the morning our men could see large numbers of troops assembling, and they were heavily sniped from one farm



[Official photograph.]

OFFICERS OF THE NEWFOUNDLAND REGIMENT IN FRANCE, 1917.

to the dressing station, then 1,300 yards distant.

In October the battalion moved to Canal Bank, close to Ypres, and remained there for a day and a night before an attack which was timed to take place a couple of days later. The weather was miserable, with heavy rains which made the country an even greater mud heap than it usually was, and fog day and night. The position fixed for the regiment in the attack

in front of them. A strong counter-attack was made against the Newfoundlanders at noon, but was driven off. A still stronger attack was made at 6.30 in the evening all along the line. The troops to the left of the Newfoundland regiment were forced back, and, their flanks being exposed, they had to retire for about 200 yards. A portion of this ground was retaken the same night.

This is typical of the sustained spell of



[Official photograph.]

NEWFOUNDLAND CYCLISTS RETURNING TO BILLETS AFTER MONCHY.

fighting which the Newfoundlanders were now experiencing in Flanders. The whole character of the war had undergone great changes since the comparatively recent days of the battle of Monchy. Poison gas and flame were exploited to an even greater extent than ever. The Germans had been able to concentrate a great strength in guns and in machine guns. These latter, always one of their very strong features, had increased in numbers during the summer by 40 per cent. They had also been able to bring large bodies of picked troops against our front, in part owing to the Russian débâcle. Our men at every point were faced by reinforced concrete emplacements of varying sizes. The enemy made a larger use of aircraft on this front than ever before, sending over their bombing planes protected by fighting planes above in daylight, and raiding far behind the British lines at night. Their long-range guns shelled areas which in the previous year had been considered as practically outside the fighting area.

But most of the troops engaged would have agreed in the statement that their chief trial was neither shells nor bombs, but the mud.

The autumn of 1917 in northern France and in Flanders had been one of more rain than had ever before been known in the records of that district. The lowlands were swamps, the hill-sides were slippery masses on which it was often scarcely possible to obtain foothold. On some parts of the line the bodies of the dead sank out of sight within a few hours if they were not previously removed. In much of this British advance in which the Newfoundlanders played their part, the enemy faced us in positions strengthened by years of work and by every device known to modern militarism. They operated from their well-protected and comparatively dry points on the hill tops. Our men had to advance against them in the open, through fields and morasses and up hills where at every footstep it seemed that it would be impossible to move farther forward because of the mud. The German artillery at some points were superior in numbers, although not equal in direction to our own. The German troops were the pick of the Army—strong, sturdy, able-bodied, and well-trained men. The wonder remains the greater that so much should have been accomplished in the face of obstacles such as these.

In one year of war the Newfoundland Regiment had been moved from one to the other of the areas on the Western front where the fighting was severest. They had taken a prominent part in the battle of the Somme, where they had earned recognition as a regiment from the Commander-in-Chief in his dispatches, a recognition given to very few regiments. From here they had gone to the apex of the advance on the Arras front—Monchy-le-Preux—where, at a very heavy loss, the regiment had held the spur of our position. Monchy had been followed by the long and exacting battle of the Flanders ridges.

Let us turn to events in Newfoundland itself during these anxious and trying years of war. The realities of the conflict were fully brought home to the people by the terrible losses of the battle of Beaumont Hamel, when a large number of the pick of the young manhood of the island were killed or wounded in a few minutes. Meetings were called at different parts, and the people, rich and poor alike, pledged themselves to further endeavours and greater efforts. A year later, on the third anniversary of the war,


the Governor of Newfoundland was able to send this message to the Motherland :—

The people of Newfoundland have in the city of St. John's and in every town of the Colony this day, with every sign of steady courage, passed the subjoined resolution :—

That on this, the third, anniversary of the declaration of a righteous war, this meeting of the citizens of St. John's records its inflexible determination to continue to a victorious end the struggle in maintenance of those ideals of liberty and justice which are the common and sacred cause of the Allies. . . ."


And my Ministers bid me say that the people of Newfoundland, with growing energy, will do all they can in aid of the magnificent Armies under his (Sir Douglas Haig's) command.

Recruiting was pushed on. It was not considered necessary to resort to conscription. The first contingent of 500 men, raised in August, 1914, was only a beginning, and by the autumn of 1917 some thousands of combatants had been sent to England. The work of military organization was at first undertaken by the Patriotic Association, under the chairmanship of Sir Walter E. Davidson, the Governor. As the regiment grew, and as it became more and more apparent that there would be need for a long time ahead for military preparation, a Ministry of Militia was created.



BOTWOOD: THE NEW PORT FOR THE SHIPMENT OF PAPER AND PULP.

No record of Newfoundland's effort in the war would be complete without reference to the work of the Patriotic Association. This body, consisting of representatives of the whole community, set about organizing the war work of the Colony, from the collection of funds to the establishment of hospitals for the treatment of disabled sailors and soldiers; from the compiling of war records to the recruiting and training of troops. One department raised an aeroplane fund, amounting to \$53,564, which provided an air squadron carrying the name of Newfoundland over the lines of the enemy. Another popular effort was the Cot Fund. This, beginning humbly, as children's collections in the school, grew to the place of the largest and most widely supported fund ever inaugurated in the Colony. By the end of 1916 the collections amounted to \$80,000, used to endow and maintain, in the name of Newfoundland, wards and cots in numerous hospitals in France and Great Britain. By the spring of 1917 300




[Swaine.

SIR EDWARD P. MORRIS, K.C.M.G.,
Premier of Newfoundland since 1908.

hospital beds were bearing the name of Newfoundland. "Fathers and mothers of the gallant lads whom they have proudly speeded on their path of duty have poured their savings from every bay and harbour of this sea-girt isle," wrote the Governor, "happy to think that they help to make easy the lot of the stricken men of our Army and Navy, and hoping that their own

boys may be cheered by the sight of the home name when they are being soothed and tended in a distant land." This Cot Fund owed much to the sympathetic administration of the Earl of Ranfurly.

Up to the end of 1916 the people of Newfound-



[Elliott & Fry.

SIR WALTER E. DAVIDSON, K.C.M.G.,
Governor of Newfoundland 1913-1917.

land, through the Patriotic Association and its sister body, the Patriotic Association of the Women of Newfoundland, raised half a million dollars in voluntary subscriptions for war funds.

Dr. Wilfred T. Grenfell, writing from St. Anthony, Newfoundland, in 1915, gave some idea of the efforts and self-sacrifice the raising of these funds involved:—

This little district has collected, by hard labour and unselfish sacrifice, 1,500 dollars (£300) for the Patriotic Fund, besides 15 men. The men sold watches from their pockets and rings from their fingers, loggers cut one day or two free for the fund, and fishermen brought for sale fish, lines, hooks, needles, sledges, snowshoes, etc., while the women cooked and sold everything they could lay hands on.

It was necessary to create administrative machinery for the regiment in Great Britain. A base depôt was placed in Scotland, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel C. W. Whitaker. Here the recruits were sent from Newfoundland for training, and the convalescent sick and wounded for recovery. In London, the head-

quarters were administered by Major H. A. Timewell and a staff of invalided soldiers. These London offices, originally the Pay Department, grew as the war progressed. Here the Comforts Association for the Newfoundlanders had its headquarters; the work of clothing and caring for prisoners in Germany was undertaken, and much general work done.

The political situation in the colony centred around the war. Sir Edward Morris had been, since 1908, Prime Minister. Sir Edward was formerly Attorney General in the Liberal Administration of Sir Robert Bond. He left the Bond Government in 1907 and, in conjunction with certain other seceding members and with the Conservative Party, he formed a new party called the People's Party. A General Election followed, and resulted in a tie. Sir William MacGregor, the then Governor, gave a dissolution to Sir Edward Morris, who went to the country and gained a majority. From May, 1908, onwards Sir Edward Morris continued Premier of the colony. In that capacity he represented Newfoundland at the Coronation, when he was made a Privy Councillor.

There was another General Election in 1913. Two parties, the Fishermen's Union Party and the Liberal Party, united forces. Sir Edward Morris was again victorious, beating the combined groups. But the election was so close that, although Sir Edward had a majority of seven candidates in the Legislature, the Opposition represented more votes.

With parties so evenly divided, the Opposition might, had it adopted a purely partisan attitude in the war, have seriously hampered the Government. Both sides however sank their differences so far as the war was concerned and cooperated. This naturally led to still closer union, and in August, 1917, a Coalition Government was formed, in which all the members of the Opposition joined the Government, Sir Edward Morris remaining as Premier; Dr. Lloyd, the former leader of the Opposition, becoming Attorney General; and the Cabinet, or Executive, being made up of equal numbers of representatives from each party.

The colony showed the lengths to which it was prepared to go in conserving its resources for the war by enacting the total prohibition of the liquor traffic. For 50 years there had been a strong temperance movement in Newfoundland, and for a long time a law similar to the Canadian Scott Act, giving localities

power to prevent the sale of intoxicants within their borders, had been in force. It was thought that the time had come for a larger measure, and an Act was introduced giving the whole country the right to vote on the direct issue of the complete prohibition of the liquor trade. A plebiscite was granted, and there was a majority of 20,000 votes in favour of total prohibition. On January 1, 1917, six months after the plebiscite was taken, an Act came in force totally prohibiting the importation, manufacture or sale of intoxicants



[Russell.]

SIR C. ALEXANDER HARRIS,
Governor of Newfoundland 1917.

throughout the colony. The only exception was beer with under 2 per cent. of alcohol.

The measure was the most drastic prohibitory Act ever carried. In other lands, such as Canada and the United States, it was possible for people in districts where prohibition was the law to import for their own use, although not for sale. In Newfoundland even this was disallowed. People were permitted to keep for consumption any drinks in their possession when the Act was passed, and they could even give these as a free gift to others. But nothing could be brought in. The Act was immediately and strictly enforced.

The enforcement of the Act caused little disturbance because the population were already among the most sober in the world.



THE NEWFOUNDLAND FORESTRY CAMP IN SCOTLAND.

The annual liquor bill before the introduction of prohibition gave an average for intoxicants retailed over the counter of only 4 dollars per head. The people thought that they would be better without even this, better economically and as a fighting unit, and so they cut it off.

Sir Walter Davidson, who had been Governor since before the outbreak of the war, and had done admirable service helping to weld the whole community together, was appointed Governor of New South Wales in the autumn of 1917, and his successor was Sir Charles A. Harris, who had lived for some years in Newfoundland as a lad, when his father was head of the Church of England Academy and afterwards vice-Principal of Queen's College. Sir Charles Harris had long experience in the Colonial Office, and had for many years served as Chief Clerk there.

A Newfoundland Forestry Battalion was formed in the Spring of 1917. Owing to the great difficulty of importing supplies from abroad a timber famine threatened in the United Kingdom. Organized parties of lumbermen had already come from other parts of the Empire—notably from Canada—to help to cut down the woods and forests of Great Britain. Mr. Mayson Beeton, of the Anglo-Newfoundland Company, suggested to Sir Edward Morris that a battalion of Newfoundland lumbermen might be organized for the same purpose. It appeared that the British authorities were asking for help of this kind, and Mr. Beeton with the Premier and the British Director of Timber Supplies at once

went to Lord Derby. A scheme for a Newfoundland Forestry Corps was arranged within 24 hours. The direction and organization were left in Mr. Beeton's hands. Cables were set to work, and the recruiting began in a day.

Within a few weeks the first companies of the corps had crossed the water, and were set to work on the famous plantations of the Duke of Atholl, at Craignevearn, in Perthshire. The personnel of the corps was remarkable. All the officers, from the Commander, Major Sullivan, to the orderlies, with a possible exception of the Adjutant, whose business was to maintain military administration and discipline, were practical lumbermen. Recruits were not accepted for this corps unless they were unfit for fighting or well over early manhood, married, and with a family. Some of the men had fought and had been wounded in France, and were unfit for further active service at the front. Some were veterans of 60 years and more, too old for the fighting lines; some were lads in their teens, too young to go to France to fight, but not too young to do what they could for the Empire.

The Newfoundland lumbermen somewhat surprised the Scottish workers by their methods. They erected a lumber camp that was a replica of lumber camps in their own colony. Experienced local men considered that it would be necessary to have a mountain railway equipped with winding drum and steel cables to carry the great trees down from the two

high levels where they were being cut, 1,800 feet in all. Building this would have meant much delay and would have involved considerable expenditure. The Newfoundlanders made a simple chute consisting of a triple line of trunks of trees, a kind of running trough down which the monster logs could slide. At the bottom was a sloping curve to bring them gently to their place. The chute was completed in a few days by the men themselves, at a cost, apart from the material obtained on the spot, of a few score of pounds.

"The whole place has an air of hustling resolution," wrote one visitor. "The rough wooden huts of the men, and the simple effective machinery, do not seem to belong to an old civilization like ours. Planted down here, one might imagine that you were in Newfoundland. In truth, Newfoundland has transferred its ways to the heart of Perthshire."

"These men work as though they are fighting against time," said an old Scottish factor, somewhat resentfully, when he saw the Newfoundlanders set to. "We are," came the ready reply. "That is what we are here for in war time." At first the Scotch woodsmen were inclined to feel sore at the unconventional

methods of these newcomers, and various big challenges were exchanged. The cutting down of trees is a solemn affair; it ought to be done with a certain stateliness. It ought above all to be done sparingly, and with a certain nicety according to estate traditions. That is the old British idea. But here were men doing it wholesale, leaving nothing behind.

The Newfoundlanders were soon welcome guests among the Scottish folk. The trees were magnificent. More than a century before a famous Duke of Atholl had planted the various mountain sides of his estates with spruce and larch by the million, believing that they would prove sources of wealth generations ahead. His foresight had been justified. Here were spruce in some instances over 100 feet long, monster logs sometimes weighing 20 tons, trees running straight and true and high.

The lumbermen found themselves at home. The mountain deer became less alarmed after a time at the invasion of their solitudes, and crept warily along at uttermost heights to look down on the newcomers. Coveys of partridges would rise up from the ground and run straight ahead as the men cleared fresh districts, and the woodland rabbits darted



NEWFOUNDLAND FORESTRY BATTALION CUTTING TIMBER IN SCOTLAND.

across their paths. To the Newfoundlanders all this seemed like their native caribou and other game spoken of in their own language as deer, grouse, hares, partridges and rabbits. Most pronounced of all among the privileges of hospitality granted to them was the privilege of using rifle and gun occasionally around their camps for their camp pot. In Newfoundland no private rights of ownership exist, and this generous concession of the ducal sportsman went straight to the hearts of the Newfoundland sportsmen who were his temporary guests.

The Newfoundland Forestry Corps grew by the autumn of 1917 to several hundred men in the United Kingdom. Fresh contingents were arriving, and it was hoped eventually to increase their number to 1,000.

The 420th anniversary of the discovery of Newfoundland was celebrated by six prominent Imperial institutions in London—the Royal Colonial Institute, the British Empire League, the Victoria League, the British Empire Club, the Overseas Club and the Newfoundland War Contingent Association.

It was resolved to make the people of England know more of Newfoundland, and to pay a tribute to the heroism of her soldiers. The difficulty was to find Newfoundlanders, for the different branches of the regiment were either



LIEUT.-COLONEL W. H. FRANKLIN, D.S.O.,
Attached to the Newfoundland Regiment 1916-7.

fighting in Flanders, recovering from their wounds in hospital, or training in Scotland. Fortunately, the band of the Newfoundland Regiment was available, and a series of engagements was arranged, including one before the King.

From London the band proceeded to Sheffield and Liverpool. The visit to Sheffield was the outcome of a scheme by an active but little known organization—the Imperial Air Fleet Committee. This body suggested to the City of Sheffield that it should raise the money to pay for a first-class aeroplane which would be presented to Newfoundland and used in its name on the fighting front. Mr. W. H. Ellis, the Master Cutler of Sheffield, adopted the idea with enthusiasm, and the band went with representatives of Newfoundland and of the Empire for the christening and launching of the gift plane.

An enormous crowd, fully 80,000 in number, gathered to witness the ceremony. The Lord Mayor of Sheffield presented the aeroplane to the Imperial Air Fleet Committee, and Mr. Hewins accepted it from the Committee on behalf of the Government of Newfoundland. The wife of the Master Cutler christened the aeroplane. "I name you Sheffield," she said. "May our enemies tremble and our friends rejoice when they see you. May those who fly in you do their duty to their country, their King and their God, and may God have you and those who fly in you safe in His keeping."



LIEUT.-COLONEL C. W. WHITAKER,
Commanding the British Base Dépôt.




MAJOR H. A. TIMEWELL,
Chief Paymaster and Officer in Charge of Records.

Newfoundland week served to bring the colony to the attention of the British public and caused much discussion in the Press and elsewhere of the doings of its men and of the possibilities of development of its resources after the war.

Lists of honours are never a wholly satisfactory way of judging the work of a unit. Yet such lists do tell something, and the list of honours earned by the Newfoundland Regiment in a little over two years was a notable one. Lieut.-Col. A. L. Hadow received the C.M.G. in the Birthday Honours of 1916. Two officers were awarded the D.S.O., Lieut.-Col. W. H. Franklin, for his gallantry and dash in the attempted advance at Beaumont Hamel, and Lieut.-Col. J. Forbes Robertson for his fight with the Headquarters Staff at Monchy-le-Preux. This last-named officer joined the Newfoundlanders from the Border Regiment in June, 1916, and remained with it until August, 1917, when he was promoted to the command of the Middlesex Regiment. Seventeen were given the Military Cross, and three bars to the Cross. Fourteen Distinguished Conduct Medals were bestowed, one earning the bar in addition. The other honours and awards were—Military Medal, 58; Royal Victoria Medal, 1; Mentioned in Despatches, 14; Mentioned in Home

Despatches, 2; French Croix de Guerre, 4; Italian Bronze Medal for Military Valour, 1; Russian Medal of St. George, 1.

Newfoundlanders would declare that the above record was incomplete without special mention of two names. Capt. R. W. Bartlett was a member of an old and typical Newfoundland family, sailors who for generations had taken their ships in the Arctic Seas. His brother was the famous Arctic explorer who accompanied Peary on his journey to the North Pole. Captain Bartlett enlisted at the beginning and quickly made his mark as one of the best and most popular officers in the regiment. He served in Gallipoli and in the French and Flanders campaign. He won his Military Cross on April 23, 1917, at Monchy, where, when his Company Commander had been wounded, he took command and occupied the forming-up trench under very heavy shell fire. When the Division on his right had been repulsed he went down the line and organized a party of men, got them in position and repulsed a counter-attack. He showed on that day an absolute disregard of personal danger and a great example to his men. But this was his habitual way. Later he was given a bar to his Military Cross. His deeds became a tradition in the regiment. He lost his life gallantly leading his men in the fighting in the autumn of 1917.



MR. MAYSON M. BEETON,
Officer-in-Charge Newfoundland Forestry Corps.



THE NEWFOUNDLAND BAND AT THE ROYAL EXCHANGE, LONDON.

The Goodyear family, the five sons of Mr. Josiah Goodyear, of Grand Falls, a typical Newfoundland lumberman, all served in the regiment. They were known far and wide for their amazing physical strength. Two of them—one whose prowess as a transport officer was known throughout the Division—were killed in France. The remaining three were badly wounded.

As the years of war stretched on, the people of the island felt that not only their hour of trial had come, but their day of opportunity was approaching. The land of "historic misfortune" was entering into a fresh chapter in its history. Isolation must make way for closer connections. The progress of methods of transit promised to change Newfoundland from a by-way into part of the very highway of the world. In the days following the war hundreds of thousands of men, released from

military service, would be seeking means of life different from the clerk's stool or shopman's counter of olden days. Why should many of them not come to Newfoundland, help to open up the big farming lands still waiting settlers, and aid to develop the mineral and timber wealth of the colony?

The men of the island, taken suddenly from their fishermen's huts and lumbermen's camps, from the circumscribed life of a remote community, had been introduced to a wider world, the great cities of England and Scotland, the Mediterranean, Gallipoli, and France. They had fought in the ranks with men from a dozen English counties, Canadians, Australians and New Zealanders. They had come to know the Empire and the world. They saw a new day dawning for their island and for themselves after peace should come.



CHAPTER CCXIV.

FRANCE : 1914-16.



FRENCH PSYCHOLOGY AND FRENCH POLITICS—FALL OF THE VIVIANI GOVERNMENT—THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST MILLERAND AND DELCASSÉ—THE NEAR EAST—THE BRIAND GOVERNMENT OF OCTOBER, 1915—"PEACE THROUGH VICTORY"—PROBLEMS OF ALLIED COOPERATION—GENERAL JOFFRE REMOVED FROM THE WESTERN COMMAND—THE ALLIED CONFERENCE OF MARCH, 1916—THE PARIS ECONOMIC CONFERENCE—RECONSTRUCTION OF BRIAND MINISTRY—GENERAL LYAUTEY AS MINISTER OF WAR—M. BRIAND RESIGNS—THE RIBOT MINISTRY—M. PAINLEVÉ AS MINISTER OF WAR—THE HIGHER COMMAND—ECONOMIC PROBLEMS—FOOD DIFFICULTIES—LABOUR TROUBLES—FINANCE AND WAR LOANS—THE SPIRIT OF FRANCE.

IN an earlier chapter (Vol. II., Chapter XLV.) a brief account was given of conditions in Paris during 1914, and some reference has been made (Vol. IX., Chapter CXXXVIII.) to the political aspect of the Verdun offensive. It is now necessary to deal in more detail than has hitherto been done with the general life of France in its social, political, and economic manifestations during the first two years of war. That period may be divided into two sections; during the first the whole nation was thrilling in response to the call of danger, and during the second the French realized that the British had been right in predicting a long war, and the whole machinery of French life was tested by the strain.

The Germans made many miscalculations in their war plans. First of all they erred with every other Continental nation in believing that the struggle would be both short and decisive. Making the psychological mistakes of the world in general they imagined the Frenchman to be a worthless and frivolous creature who would prove of no avail as a fighter. They counted upon political collapse and public panic, such as characterized 1870, to give them a speedy victory. Instead of that they had the Marne and a complete absence of any kind of politics until the close of 1914. Then when their first dream of the rapid crushing of France was turned to naught

by the strange and, from a German point of view, almost criminal powers of French resistance, the enemy found comfort in the thought that in a war of attrition France was bound to go to the wall.

There were many grounds for Germany's belief. The whole system of French life was but little adapted to the waging of a war requiring prolonged effort. In 1914 the French Republic was but 44 years old. The Constitution of the Third Republic was definitely framed so as to facilitate a return to a monarchical system and there were still many people in France who considered that the Republican *régime* had by no means entered the stage of consecrated institutions. There were still Monarchists and Republicans. The political world had not yet recovered from the bitterness of the Radical war upon the Church. The discussions which marked the passing in 1913 of the Three-Years' Military Service Bill, the reply of France to Germany's military preparations, had shown that there were still large and organized bodies of Frenchmen who believed in the efficacy of Hague Tribunals, to whom dreams of International Brotherhood still seemed real. The constantly falling birth rate of France still further suggested that the nation had made up its mind, and made its choice against plain living and national strength, and for luxurious comfort and national decadence.

To many German observers it appeared that France had relinquished her rôle as a torch-bearer of civilized intellect and was ready to accept the more humble, if more comfortable, part of a purely materialistic people. All these calculations were rudely shattered in 1914. But the enemy psychologist found fresh comfort in the future. Examining the institutions of the country he was imbued with the conviction that they could not stand the strain of a long-drawn-out war. Here, again, he had much support for his views, nor were they entirely false. A country with the turbulent political history of France could not




[Manuch.]

M. MILLERAND,
French War Minister, 1915.

but have a political system and an administrative organization in which, to some extent, were reflected the tremendous upheavals of the past and the empiric solutions given to the problems of almost incessant evolution if not of revolution. In addition, the bourgeois Republic, which arose from the incendiary ashes of the Commune of 1871, apart from its hotly contested colonial policy, had remained steadfastly peaceful. So much so that when the war broke out all ideas of warlike revenge for Alsace-Lorraine had vanished. France, moreover, had been the home of international pacifism—a doctrine which, owing to the claims of universal military service, had made great progress among the labouring classes.

The Germans were also right in looking upon the French as the least disciplined and the most individual of the great peoples of Europe, as well as the people who in their civil administration, at any rate, were the least fitted to stand the strain of a war of endurance. The Republican system of France was the natural enemy of any political continuity. The possibility of a change of *régime* throughout the history of the Republic had at once rendered suspect any man who by unusual talent had succeeded in raising himself to great eminence or who threatened to acquire great power. This impression is well shown by the constant anxiety of the true red Republican to enthrone the mediocre in the Presidential palace of the Elysée. The whole system led to constantly changing Governments, and those constant changes inevitably placed any power of continuity in the hands of the Republican bureaucracy. The main foundations of that bureaucracy were laid down by Napoleon and had as their guiding principle Napoleonic centralization and as control Napoleonic despotism. When Republican nepotism took the place of Napoleonic despotism, the machinery groaned in every shaft, and at the outbreak of war Germany was not far wrong in imagining that the centralized bureaucracy of France would prove incapable of supporting the strain of its own inherent failings, and the superimposed burden placed upon it by the political system.

Politics, by which in France is meant party politics, temporarily ceased to exist on August 4, 1914. They grew slowly and surely during the absence of the Government at Bordeaux, for clear-sighted men in the adjourned parliament perceived the necessity of controlling the policies and acts of the vastly swollen military and civilian bureaucracy called into action by the war. It has to be realized that in France politics were the concern of the few; that the general public displayed indifference to political matters even at times of the quadrennial general elections. It has also to be realized that the discipline of the party politics of pre-war Britain was unknown in France. Save in very rare circumstances, elections in France turned upon some matter of purely local interest, and the deputy once returned was free for four years to do what he liked, vote how it pleased him, have what general political faith he cared to adopt, provided always that he looked after the purely



THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES IN SESSION.

local interests of his district and was properly attentive to the personal and material requirements of his constituents. Governments might fall one after the other; the deputy went on, if not for ever, at least for four years. With contemptuous indifference on the part of the public towards serious political questions and licence on the other hand for the member to do what he pleased for four years, it is not surprising that the French Chamber was not an ideal expression of the sovereign will of the people; still less was it an efficient instrument for the waging of war.

This brief summary of general political conditions is necessary if the political history of France during these first two years of war is to be understood. Until the Government returned from Bordeaux, at the end of December 1914, Parliament had voluntarily given up its right of control over the actions of the Executive. During the Bordeaux period, however, parliamentarians became anxious as to the trend of many matters, and seeing that their responsibility was after all involved in the mistakes of the Government, immediately on the reopening of Parliament in Paris in December 1914, began to claim their full rights of control.

The Ministry of War was most criticized. Its occupant, M. Millerand, was a lawyer of

great talent and one of the many men in France whose political history is marked by a steady movement from the Left towards the Right. He had had to grapple with the vast problem of munitions, which clamoured for solution in France immediately after the battle of the Marne. When the war broke out, France, although better organized and equipped than she was in 1870, was nevertheless woefully deficient in artillery—particularly in heavy artillery. Her forts were antiquated. The equipment for mobilization was far below requirements, and there were, in particular, shortages of millions of boots, blankets, and uniforms. The sanitary service was particularly badly off. There were practically no motor ambulances, and the whole system of medical organization was faulty in the extreme. M. Millerand was driven to every kind of makeshift in an attempt to make good all these deficiencies, and early in 1915 Parliament became seriously alarmed at the results of his policy, which began to show themselves in the extremely faulty nature of the shells supplied to the artillery in the field. In the early part of the year those criticisms found expression in the growing demand for closer Parliamentary control over the Executive. The French Parliament was admirably equipped for such a task of control, and had in its big Committees,

to which all legislation had to be referred, the machinery necessary for a close study of the Government's management of affairs. The Army Committee of the Senate, with M. Clemenceau, was perhaps the fiercest critic of the Minister of War. Its secret reports amounted almost to indictments of the policy pursued by M. Millerand. Those reports naturally contained much information of a confidential nature, for example as to the number of field guns destroyed month by month by premature shell bursts, which would have been of the greatest use to the enemy. There began, therefore, an agitation for the holding of a secret sitting of the Chamber of Deputies, at

Debates in Parliament certainly showed that M. Millerand defended his officials in season and out of season and looked upon his portfolio as being nothing but a brief for the defence of everything that happened in the Rue St. Dominique. They also gave M. Millerand the occasion of displaying a fine obstinacy of character which still further exasperated the increasing opposition to him in both Houses of Parliament.

In addition to well grounded complaints as to supply of shells and as to failure to improve the pre-war chaos of the French Army Medical Services, there were deep-seated political causes for the campaign against the Minister of War in 1915. For the same reasons General Joffre, the Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies, was exposed to similar criticisms and attacks. At the bottom of these campaigns lay the civilian politician's distrust of military and bureaucratic government. The question was bound to arise in any democracy in time of war, and particularly so in France where the *régime* had been so frequently changed by the Army. No one was foolish enough to suspect General Joffre of harbouring any desire to canter down the Champs Elysées on a coal-black charger, but there was nevertheless a widespread feeling in Parliament that M. Millerand, as Parliamentary Minister of War, had not properly upheld the rights of the Government and of Parliament to control the plans and actions of the Commander-in-Chief and of the General Headquarter Staff.

Throughout the summer of 1915 the battle between the Minister of War and the Opposition was fought more or less in silence. M. Millerand stuck doggedly to his portfolio, but was induced nevertheless to accept the collaboration of three Under-Secretaries in his office. The Government likewise was brought by pressure to admit the principle of parliamentary control within the zone of the armies.

A German attack on the French positions in the Argonne brought this suppressed crisis to a head. The attack was successful and might have had extremely serious results. As it was the French lost ground and sustained heavy losses through gas. The enquiry held into the circumstances of the defence led to the removal of the officer commanding that section of the front—General Sarraill. This officer was, before the war, closely connected with the more radical elements of French politics. He was known as a "Republican" General, and his removal from his command precipitated the crisis. A



Manuel.

M. VIVIANI,
Prime Minister June, 1914—Oct. 1915.

which definite charges could be formulated against M. Millerand on the basis of the various Committee reports.

The general charges made against M. Millerand were that he was lacking entirely in imagination, was the slave of the bureaucracy of the War Office, and thought more of defending his own officials than of beating the enemy

period of extreme, if hidden, political effervescence followed, which was by no means allayed by the appointment of General Sarrail, on August 6, to command the French forces at the Dardanelles.

The storm broke in the last week of August 1915, after many private attempts had been made to induce M. Millerand to resign. The defence offered by M. Millerand in the debate on August 20 only succeeded, by its tactless if courageous defence of the most notorious sinners in the War Office, in still further exasperating the Opposition, and had it not been for a speech of superb Latin eloquence by the Prime Minister, M. Viviani, six days later the fate of the Government would have been sealed by a hostile decision to hold a meeting of the House in Secret Committee.

Oratorical effect, even in France, is of but passing importance, and the majority obtained by the Government even after the great effort of the Prime Minister—289 votes to 237—offered no prospect of long Ministerial life.

The actual crisis came from an entirely different quarter—from the Near East—and affected another Member of the Cabinet, M. Delcassé, Minister for Foreign Affairs. An examination of the Eastern policy of France does not come within the scope of the present narrative, but the circumstances which surrounded the Salonika expedition were so fruitful in their effects upon French politics that they must be touched upon.

By the close of 1915 there was a general feeling of concern in Parliament and among all those who studied Eastern affairs as to the course of Balkan politics. The British appeared to French contemporary eyes to have backed the wrong horse in endeavouring to obtain Bulgarian cooperation. The game was, perhaps, worth the candle, since it meant that had Great Britain's diplomacy been crowned with success it would have achieved a more or less lasting settlement of Balkan differences. What our diplomacy aimed at was the re-creation of the Balkan League against Turkey. It failed, and it was almost the last repressive act of diplomatic censorship in Great Britain that prevented the British Press from knowing and publishing extracts giving the views of the French Press on the matter, which were entirely hostile to any further negotiations with Bulgaria. On October 12, after a suppressed crisis of some violence, M. Viviani made a statement to the French deputies in

which he dwelt upon the generosity of the Allies in endeavouring to remake the Balkan Alliance, and admitted the failure of those efforts. The first officers of the Allied Armies had already landed at Salonika by that date, and already, although suppressed, a crisis had arisen within the French Cabinet. M. Delcassé,



[Mantel.]

GENERAL SARRAIL.

Commanded French Armies in the Argonne and at the Dardanelles, and afterwards took command of the Allied Forces at Salonika.

the Minister of Foreign Affairs, had, in fact, tendered his resignation some 12 or 15 days before, giving as his reasons ill-health. This resignation he renewed on October 12, 1915. The facts of the case were, summarily stated, that, when Bulgaria entered into the war, allied diplomacy sounded Greece with a view to discovering whether she was prepared to meet her treaty obligations to come to the assistance of Serbia in such a case. Greece pointed out that those obligations made it incumbent on Serbia to provide a certain number of troops for the assistance of Greece; Serbia, threatened with attack on her Austrian and on her Bulgarian fronts, was obviously unable to meet her obligations, and the Allies were called upon to supply the equivalent number of troops to enable Serbia to meet her treaty obligation. This was the beginning of the Salonika Expedition. It arrived and acted too late; but, when Venizelos resigned on finding that the engagements he had made as Prime Minister of Greece towards the Allies were no longer to be observed, the first troops

of the Expedition had reached Salonika and the moral credit of the Allies, if no other, was staked upon the success of the adventure, M. Delcassé, whose health had in reality broken down momentarily under the strain of office, did not feel himself justified, in the face of the resignation of Venizelos, in going



[Manuel.

M. BRIAND,

Prime Minister Oct. 1915—March 1917.

further with the Salonika expedition, and his resignation was definitely announced on October 13. It precipitated the inevitable fall of the Ministry, which the last-hour efforts of well-meant but ill-informed British diplomacy in offering Cyprus to Greece, in the hope of bribing King Constantine into a sense of honour, were unable to prevent.

The last week of October, 1915, was a week of crisis. The Ministry was moribund. It had lost all hold upon the Chamber. The continued presence of M. Millerand within it was as a red rag to a bull. The departure of a Foreign Minister so much respected by so large a body of public opinion as M. Delcassé was a severe blow. It had, moreover, long been apparent that under the surface of Parliament there existed a crisis in the Higher Command which Viviani was either unable or unwilling to solve. The problem of Salonika for the first time raised the whole problem of "Westernism."

While this Ministerial crisis was in progress

the hostile attitude of the new Greek Government, and particularly of Court circles, became more and more clear. Nevertheless, the French Government, largely upon the advice of M. Briand, the Minister of Justice, and the equal of M. Viviani in political importance, determined to go through with the operations begun by the first landing at Salonika.

It had become clear to political observers as early as August that M. Briand was destined to take the place of M. Viviani when the Cabinet fell. M. Viviani, in the interests of the Union Sacrée, preferred to go without waiting for defeat. For a few days France knew that there was in reality no Ministry, while M. Briand as the prospective Prime Minister was engaged in studying the political and military situation both in France and elsewhere.

It was a period filled with the most disturbing rumours as to peace. It was roundly asserted in the Lobbies of the Chamber that a Briand Ministry meant a premature peace. All these suggestions died a speedy death when M. Briand's Ministry was formed on October 29, 1915. It was then seen that he had sought a wider national basis of Government by including representatives of every political shade of opinion in his Cabinet, which was as follows:—

M. Briand, Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs.

M. de Freycinet, Minister of State

M. Bourgeois, Minister of State.

M. Combes, Minister of State.

M. Guesde, Minister of State.

M. Denys Cochin, Minister of State.

M. Viviani, Minister of Justice.

General Gallieni, Minister of War.

Rear Admiral Lacaze, Minister of Marine.

M. Malvy, Minister of Interior.

M. Ribot, Minister of Finance.

M. Méline, Minister of Agriculture.

M. Sembat, Minister of Public Works.

M. Clémentel, Minister of Commerce.

M. Doumergue, Minister of Colonies

M. Painlevé, Minister of Instruction and War
Inventions.

M. Albert Thomas, Under-Secretary of
Munitions.


M. Jules Cambon, Secretary General of
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Five Under-Secretaries.

The new Cabinet, from a party point of view, was composed of three Collectivist Socialists, MM. Jules Guesde, Marcel Sembat, Albert Thomas; three Independent Socialists, MM.


Briand, Viviani, Painlevé; six Radicals, MM. Bourgeois, Combes, Doumergue, Clémentel, Malvy, and Métin; two Moderate Republicans, MM. de Freycinet and Ribot; one Progressist, M. Méline; one member of the Right, M. Denys Cochin.

The forces which gave birth to this Ministry were almost entirely to be found within Parliament. There was no movement of public opinion such as that which later brought about the return of M. Clemenceau to power. The change was, however, a welcome one since it



M. DE FREYCINET,
Minister of State in M. Briand's Cabinet.

[Manuel.]



M. LÉON BOURGEOIS,
Minister of State in M. Briand's Cabinet.



M. ALBERT THOMAS,
The Socialist Minister of Armaments.



M. MALVY,
Minister of the Interior in the Briand and Ribot Governments.

[Manuel.]

gave the country the full benefit of the talents and abilities of M. Briand, who as Minister of Justice had not been able to exert a direct control over war leadership, although in the negotiations for the Salonika expedition he had played a very important part. The new Prime Minister enjoyed in a very striking degree the confidence of the moderate elements of the country. The presence of a soldier, General Gallieni, one of the heroes of the Battle of the Marne, at the War Office was another popular feature among the French, while abroad the

appointment of that tried and trusted diplomatist, Jules Cambon, was in itself an answer to the peace rumours with which the enemy was accustomed to flood France at any moment of crisis in her history.

The new Premier took speedy steps to put an end to this agitation by declaring that "Peace through Victory" was the only possible peace France could contemplate. It was indeed impossible to doubt it. During the first 15 months of war the French had suffered cruelly in the field. Their two great efforts to "break through" in Artois and in Champagne had ended in local victories of encouraging moral importance, but of but little strategic significance. The people, however, stoically accepted the evident inevitability of another winter campaign, and what discontent there was in the country was in no way tinged with pacifism. Those who observed the French at close quarters during that period were indeed puzzled by the attitude of the people, who, in the darkest as in the brightest days of the campaign, allowed no trace of despair or exaltation to appear. The economic state of the country was no doubt a great factor in this steadiness of public opinion. The question of

unemployment, never a serious matter in so thinly populated a country, was converted into a labour shortage on the day of mobilization. The women of France during these 15 months, by their labour in the fields, did much to limit the rise in the price of food stuffs. The moratorium proclaimed at the beginning of the war was so framed as to make it impossible for any landlord to collect his rents from any mobilized tenant, or from any tenant who chose to declare that his income had so suffered from the war and its effects as to make it impossible for him to meet his liabilities for rent. Any such tenant could not be got rid of, even should his lease expire. Full, and in thousands of cases abusive, advantage was taken of these benefits. With the richest industrial departments of France in the hands of the invader, with a country paying already so much in blood, the Government had shrunk from imposing any war taxation. With an increasing demand for labour from private industry and from munitions, with good pay for men and women, separation allowances, no increase in taxation, and no rent to pay, the material position of the labouring classes was in nearly every respect better than it had been before the war. The



SHORTAGE OF AGRICULTURAL LABOUR: WOMEN HARROWING.

moral of labour was also good; of general political discontent there was no sign. The justified and keen criticisms of politicians upon the previous Government's inertia were but vaguely reflected in the country. They were

policy on November 3, 1915. The debate which followed closed with a vote expressing confidence in the Government by 515 votes to 1. The debate showed clearly the changes wrought in the Parliamentary mind by the



REAR-ADMIRAL LACAZE,
Minister of Marine.

the inevitable effect of a stagnant trench line, and consisted in the view that all the resources of the Allies were not being used to the best account, and that in military as well as in civil administration, the proper spirit and methods of war had not replaced the old habits of precedent, circumlocution, and red tape. The old Napoleonic system of centralized administration had indeed, to a very large extent, broken down. The great weapon of the French Minister, the "circulaire," was ignored. Laws remained without application. Prefectural decrees were dead letters to an extent which was beginning to have a prejudicial effect upon the life of the country and its strength for war.

The arrival of the Briand Ministry marks, in a certain measure, the recognition of the fact that the happy-go-lucky methods of *liaison* between the Allies had to go; that the days of more or less untroubled material comfort were at an end, and that the Civil Services were not helping as they might to promote the vigorous prosecution of the war.

These were the points laid before the Chamber by the new Government in its declaration of



Manuel.

GENERAL GALLIENI,
Minister of War in M. Briand's Cabinet.

disappointments and failures sustained by the Allied cause during the first 15 months of war. The previous Government had been given a free hand by Parliament. M. Briand, although perhaps the possessor of a greater reputation and more personal popularity than his predecessor, M. Viviani, was plainly told that he could no longer in the existing circumstances expect to be loved for himself alone, but would be judged by the energy and decision which his Government displayed. He was urgently advised to press at once for the formation of an Inter-allied War Council on the lines of that set up two years later by the Rapallo Agreement. There is, perhaps, no matter more exasperating to contemplate during the first three years of the war than the utter failure of the Allied Powers to achieve common decisions followed by common and rapid action in every field of war activity. Until the arrival of the Briand Government practically nothing had been done towards this end. In all these matters, in spite of the telegraph, the Allies persisted in working on the outer lines of inter-government commu-

nication; there was not even the beginning of coordination or even of cooperation, save that which had been forced upon the Allies by the financial requirements of Russia. In the field the British and French Armies worked together through the somewhat uncertain medium of occasional staff meetings, and through *liaison* officers who, however great their merit may have been, lacked the authority of final decision. Everybody in both countries, save the persons immediately concerned, was convinced of the necessity of such close cooperation. But up till then there had been considerable difficulties in the way of its realization.

In Great Britain the men who were of most value, the men who would have formed the nucleus of an Imperial General Staff, had naturally, as the best men available, been sent

The arrival of the Briand Cabinet coincided with an increase in the demand for more centralized control of operations. It is almost pathetic to see how in 1915 all the arguments produced in favour of a General Staff of the Entente, which should coordinate policy and the demands of the different fronts (to which quite newly had been added Salonika), were to be reiterated in 1917 after the Rapallo Agreement, and Mr. Lloyd George's speech at the Ministry of War in Paris.

Much of the hesitation on both sides of the Channel to accept one control of military affairs, as the idea was presented in the early days, arose from the fact that both the French and the British leaders in the field were reluctant to serve under the orders of the other. All these hesitations and reluctances may have



LABOUR SHORTAGE: WOMEN AS CHIMNEY-SWEEPS.

to control the destinies of the British Expeditionary Force in France. In the same way, the General Officers—Joffre, Castelnau, and Foch—who had formed the Supreme War Council of the French Army in time of peace, were on the outbreak of war appointed to command armies in the field. In this manner the armies, and certainly the strategy, of both countries had been deprived of the guidance of the best brains respectively available in the two capitals.

been regrettable, but they were, after all, comprehensible both from the point of view of the soldiers and of the politicians of both countries. Both countries possessed Parliamentary institutions, and the two Governments could be called to account for any disaster in the field in which either army might appear to have been sacrificed. Both armies possessed a proper pride in themselves, and might not have supported without friction the leadership of a foreign General.



THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, QUAI D'ORSAY.

The first idea of the Briand Government in fulfilling its undertakings before the Chamber had been to create a body which would have been in reality nothing more nor less than an Inter-allied General Staff.

The invitation given by M. Briand to British statesmen to collaborate in this work of co-ordination was immediately seized upon. Until November, 1915, the *liaison* between the two Cabinets in France and in Great Britain, and between the two armies, had been more or less satisfactorily maintained by the ordinary machinery, which, although far from perfect, nevertheless did manage to get the two armies on the Western Front to work more or less together. The extension of the Anglo-French theatre of war to the East in the Dardanelles expedition was the first sign of the necessity of world strategy. The Salonika expedition furnished another and a formidable argument in favour of close cooperation.


And, to a certain extent, it was the urgent peril of the British force in Greece which first brought about the Allied Council, which reason had for months been demanding.

The first Anglo-French Council was held in the Salle de l'Horloge of the Quai d'Orsay (the French Foreign Office), on November 17, 1915. It was a council arising partly out of the desire clearly expressed on both sides of the Channel for close cooperation, but also partly out of the menace to the safety of the British

force in Greece. It was followed by a series of meetings between French and British war leaders in Paris and Calais and by action by the French Government which tended to create a greater unity in the employment of French forces on all fronts, and at the same time to keep within limits the growing dissatisfaction of the Chamber with regard to the policy and general war-leadership of General Joffre.



M. BRIAND AND GENERAL JOFFRE.



THE FIRST GREAT ALLIED CONFERENCE

In the Salle de l'Horloge of the French Foreign Ministry, March 27 and 28, 1916. See key on opposite page.

M. Briand sits in the centre of the table by the fireplace, and a little to the left of the clock.

concluded between the General Staffs, unity of economic action, of which the present conference has settled the organization, and unity of diplomatic action, which is guaranteed by their unshakable determination to continue the struggle until the triumph of the common cause has been attained.

II.—The Allied Governments decide to put into practice in the economic field their solidarity of views and of interests. They entrust the Economic Conference which will shortly be held in Paris to bring forward measures likely to realize this solidarity.

III.—In order to strengthen and to unify the economic action to be taken with a view to preventing the revictualing of the enemy, the Conference decides to establish a permanent Committee in Paris upon which all the Allies shall be represented.

IV.—The Conference decides—

- (a) to proceed with the organization in London of a central international freights bureau
- (b) to act together as quickly as possible in considering the best practical means to be used in

ately after the war; and (3) after the war and the after-war period had elapsed.*

It is not within the scope of this chapter to enter into full details of the Paris Economic Conference, except in as far as it represented the redemption by the French Government of the pledge that there should be greater co-ordination in the relations between the Allies. It was in some respects unfortunate that the first field chosen for such a demonstration should have been the field of economic exchange. Both the British and the French delegates entered upon the discussion at the Conference with imperfect knowledge even of their own requirements, and although the result of the



[French official photograph.]

A SITTING OF THE PARIS ECONOMIC CONFERENCE, APRIL 1916.

distributing fairly among the Allied Nations the charges of maritime transport and in putting an end to the rise in freights.

The Allied Conferences became more and more frequent as time went on, and the discussions of military, naval and financial problems grew in utility. The attempt made at the first Conference to bring about a practical and solid economic alliance, however, led to no wide-reaching practical results during the first three years of the war. The Economic Conference met in Paris on June 14, the British representatives being Lord Crewe, Mr. Bonar Law, and the Australian Premier (Mr. Hughes). Its resolutions were intended to lay the basis for economic policy during three distinct periods: (1) during the war; (2) during the period of reconstruction immedi-

Conference was a series of very important resolutions, the resolutions were not entirely convincing from the business man's point of view, and they were used to feed the suspicions of the French Socialist party as to the "capitalistic" aims of the French and British Governments.

While these important deliberations were proceeding the Germans were battering with all their strength upon Verdun, and the Government was faced with a disquieting parliamentary situation, which, however, after many secret discussions, both in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate, resulted in the Government obtaining a large majority and in further demonstrations of the Union Sacrée. Nevertheless there remained a good deal of political

* See Vol. X., p. 341.



THE ECONOMIC CONFERENCE IN PARIS: MR. BONAR LAW TALKING WITH
M. CLÉMENTEL (Minister of Commerce) AND M. DOUMERGUE (Colonies)

In the garden of the Foreign Ministry.

discontent beneath the surface ready to manifest itself at the first opportunity. The causes of this discontent were, briefly, the desire for closer Parliamentary control over the army and the growing agitation, which, although subterranean, was none the less effective, in

favour of a complete reorganization of the Higher Command of the Army. The summer of 1916 was rendered notable by the intervention of Rumania in the war, and by the declaration of war upon Germany by Italy, who, until then, had been conducting a separate war upon

Austria. These two successes for Allied diplomacy were in great part due to the diplomacy of M. Briand. They, and the tremendous development of British military power, as shown in the first great British offensive on the Somme, enabled the Ministry to carry on without difficulty until the autumn.

M. Briand, reviewing the situation in September, 1916, and speaking of the causes which had brought about Rumanian intervention and the Italian declaration of war upon Germany, was able to point out with satisfaction that they were the fruits of the activity he himself had displayed towards coordination of the Allied efforts. The principle of unity of action upon unity of front was being still further extended, and the first fruits of that policy had been to reduce the Germanic Empires to the defensive—for the moment. Military initiative was no longer theirs. The course of the war in different theatres of operations showed that the Allies possessed undoubted military ascendancy over their enemies, and already a point had been reached which justified confidence.

M. Briand was acclaimed in the Chamber, but already the forces which were to bring about his downfall were becoming manifest. By

December a crisis was in full swing, every point of discontent suddenly reaching an acute stage of development. The causes which led to this crisis were manifold, and may be summed up in the demand for better utilization of Allied resources in men and material, the need of a smaller Cabinet, and greater energy in the conduct of the war. The impunity with which King Constantine had been allowed to flout Allied representations—an impunity attributed, in part, to M. Briand's respect for Greek Royalist susceptibilities but due also to Italian obstruction and to British luke-warmness—the massacre of French sailors in the streets of Athens, the certainty of another winter campaign, the increased cost of living, and the necessity of change in the Higher Command in the Army, all tended to make the Government unpopular in the country and in Parliament.


After nine days of secret session, in which a frontal attack was made upon the Government on the whole of its general policy, the following resolution was carried by 344 votes to 160:

"The Chamber, recording the declarations of the Government as to the organization of the country in a few hands, confident that the Government, in full accord with the Allies, will



[French Official Photograph.]

THE VERDUN MUNICIPAL COUNCIL MEETS IN PARIS.



[Forbin.]

GENERAL LYAUTEY,
Minister of War in M. Briand's reconstructed Cabinet.

obtain the common satisfactions which are admitted to be indispensable to attain victory by the redoubling of energy . . . passes to the Order of the Day."

This constituted a pretty clear intimation to M. Briand of the Chamber's desires. He was given, after some moments of hesitation, a free hand which enabled him to meet them to the best of his ability. After long and not altogether easy negotiations, M. Briand was able to effect that extremely delicate political operation known in France as a reshuffling of the Cabinet.

M. Briand remained as Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Ribot, Minister of Finance, M. Malvy as Minister of the Interior, and Admiral Lacaze as Minister of Marine. The "elder statesmen" were completely thrown overboard, since the motto was concentration. General Lyautey was summoned from Morocco, where he had earned a great reputation as a soldier and as an administrator, to take the portfolio of War. M. Clémentel became Minister of National Economy, and reigned over Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture. From Lyons the energetic Mayor and Senator M. Herriot was summoned to become Minister of Transport and Supply. M. Albert

Thomas—one of the striking successes of the previous Cabinet—rose from Under-Secretary of Munitions to be the newly created Minister of Armaments. M. Doumergue, a sound and solid man who had been often tried, became Minister of the Colonies. Two business men taken outside Parliamentary ranks entered the Government, M. Claveille, the able manager of the Ouest-Etat Railway, and M. Loucheur, a successful war contractor, being appointed respectively Under-Secretary for Transport and assistant to M. Albert Thomas. Technically, the new combination was very much better than its predecessor. Politically, it was already doomed to failure.

Rarely during the war did a French Cabinet fall from the purely outside force either of public or of political opinion. In each crisis, until the arrival of Clemenceau to power, there was some disintegrating force of ambition, or of conviction, at work consciously or unconsciously sapping the strength of the Government as a whole.

That force was represented in this particular instance by a man who had been but little before the public eye, M. Painlevé, who had been Minister of Inventions in Briand's first Ministry.

M. Painlevé entered politics in 1905, but played no particular part in them until the opponents of M. Briand found in him a weapon. The Socialist Radicals and the Socialists succeeded in pitting him quite



M. CLAVEILLE,

Under-Secretary for Transport in M. Briand's reconstructed Ministry.

definitely against M. Briand during the crisis which always attends Ministerial reshuffling. The result of these tactics was that M. Painlevé inevitably became the candidate of a large section of the Left in their opposition to Briand. At the time of the reshuffling of the Briand Cabinet he claimed the Ministry of War, and added to that claim demands with regard to the High Command which M. Briand found himself unable to accept. M. Painlevé, in fact, made his acceptance of the War portfolio dependent upon a change in the Chief Command of the French Armies, and his candidate was General Pétain, the defender of Verdun. The alteration made in the terms of General Joffre's appointment in the middle of December, 1916, had made of him Consultative Technical Adviser to a War Cabinet framed more or less on British lines and consisting of M. Briand, M. Ribot, General Lyautey, Admiral Lacaze, and M. Thomas. M. Malvy was subsequently joined to the number. General Nivelle had been appointed to the command of the French Armies on the Western front.

M. Briand did his utmost to placate the opposition. He endeavoured up to the last moment to persuade M. Painlevé, who was supported by the Left Groups, to accept the Ministry of War, but without success. His reshuffled Cabinet met the Chamber on December 13. The operation of ministerial

reconstruction in France usually means that the Premier realizes that his days are numbered and that his successor is not yet quite ready to produce his ministerial crew. Such was, in a marked degree, the position of this second edition of Briand's Cabinet, and the Chamber showed unmistakeably that it was tired of his leadership when he appeared at the head of his new combination. None of the concessions made had satisfied this political discontent.

One of the chief demands of the Opposition had been for more vigour on the "home front." Speaker after speaker had pointed out that the Government ought not to shrink from demanding further power from the Chamber. When M. Briand asked for fuller powers—namely, the right to settle by decree a number of the matters affecting points of internal economy—those same men howled aloud that the Republic was threatened with a dictatorship. They gave unmistakeable evidence of their intention to upset the Ministry on the first plausible occasion.

One of the most satisfactory explanations of the constant changes in the Government of



M. LOUCHEUR,

Under-Secretary for Armaments in M. Briand's reconstructed Ministry.

the Third Republic is that no man can possibly support the worries and the weight of office in France for more than a certain time. The French are indeed implacable in the demands they make upon their public men. M. Briand had a somewhat ill-deserved reputation. He was pictured by his enemies as a man who, owing to physical disabilities, was at bottom lazy. It was an absolute impossibility for any man combining the two tasks of presiding

over the Cabinet and over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be other than overworked according to our English standards. This appearance of laziness received a certain colour from the very talents and gifts of the Prime Minister. He possessed an astounding faculty of assimilation. Day after day scores of people of every kind passed through his tapestried room at the Quai d'Orsay. Most of them came with the intention of listening to him. Most of them went away having given him what was best either in their knowledge of any particular subject or in their general view of the political situation.

The strain of such a method of work is considerable, especially if there be added to it the constant demand of the Chamber, which at any moment may call for an eloquent oration on any subject from pensions to peace. Towards the close of 1916 that strain made itself felt. There became apparent also all the results of war strain upon France, and all the weakness and inefficiency of the French Civil Services aggravated the economic results of the war.

The French possess the most admirable qualities in the world, but they do not possess a sense of civilian discipline. They showed themselves at this period too individualistic to be able to respond to the various appeals made to them. Indeed, at one time there was the paradoxical spectacle of the Frenchman in uniform putting up with every kind of restriction and self-sacrifice while the Frenchman who was not in uniform grumbled like a soldier and at the same time did his utmost to ignore restrictions. Together with the rising discontent of the people with the internal management of the affairs of France there arose a constantly growing feeling that in the handling of foreign affairs, and particularly those of Greece, there was a lack of vigour, an absence of any guiding hand which ended time after time in the triumph of German influence at Athens, and in an intolerable humiliation of France.

The massacre of French marines in the streets of Athens filled this cup of general discontent to overflowing. As so frequently happens in French politics, the actual fall of the Briand Ministry was accidental. It was brought about by General Lyautey.

The Minister of War was a man with a great and honourable record as a Colonial administrator. He reached maturity at the right

moment to assume the very heavy task of strengthening the hold of France over Morocco and of grafting on to the almost scriptural Orientalism of the Land of Sunsets the right amount of Western civilization. His record



M. PAINLEVÉ,

Minister of War in the Briand and Ribot Governments; afterwards Prime Minister.

in Northern Africa was splendid. He had there displayed a talent for organization tinged with a certain necessary despotism admirable in dealing with a Mahomedan country, but which gave rise to justified doubts as to the success of General Lyautey as Minister of War when dealing with a turbulent and suspicious political assembly such as the Chamber of Deputies. It was felt, and rightly felt as



SHORTAGE OF LABOUR: TERRITORIALS CARRYING COALS TO DEALERS.

events showed, that General Lyautey would one day show himself soldierlike, impatient of the petty side of politics. The accuracy of this feeling was proved.

General Lyautey, Minister of War, resigned on March 14 as the result of the Parliamentary opposition he encountered in connexion with a Bill for the re-examination of those who had been rejected as physically unfit for the army. General Lyautey was a soldier more accustomed to the methods of military autocracy in dealing with coloured populations than to the supple give-and-take of French politics. He aroused the indignation of the Chamber by declaring that he had great doubts as to the usefulness of the Secret Sessions and by declining to take part in a technical discussion "because even in Secret Committee that might expose national defence to dangers." In this last sentence the Left, consisting of the Socialists and Radical-Socialists, were quick to see an insult to Parliamentary institutions. Uproar ensued. The House went into Secret Session and General Lyautey resigned.

Three days later M. Briand, having met with very great obstacles in his endeavours to reconstruct his Ministry, also placed his resignation in the hands of President Poincaré.

Whatever may have been the faults of the Briand administration during the war, M. Briand was a loyal servant of the Alliance, and gained for it not a few of the successes of 1915 and 1916. Perhaps in no way did he better serve these Allied interests than in his handling of the various peace proposals set on foot by Germany. He came into power at a moment when the whisper of Peace was heard in every gallery in Europe, when a couple of extreme French pacifist Socialists had sufficiently forgotten their nationality to meet German deputies in Switzerland, when German emissaries were active in every neutral capital of the world. In dealing with these "wild" Socialists M. Briand had behind him the whole support of the country and had at his service one of the most eloquent tongues in Europe. Rebuking M. Brizon for his craven talk of peace, M. Briand said: "Look at your country, M. Brizon! It has been violently attacked, it stands for something in the world as the sower of those ideas which have contributed to the progress of the world. When your country has had the honour during two years of being the champion of right, when it has stayed the invader and defended the whole world, while it is pouring out its blood, you say, 'Negotiate

peace.' What a challenge! What an outrage to the memory of our dead! What, M. Brizon, ten of your country's provinces are invaded, our old men and women and children have been carried off, they bear their wretchedness courageously awaiting deliverance at your hands. Is it then that you come to us and say, 'Negotiate, go and ask for peace'? You little know France if you imagine that she can accept economy of millions, or even of blood, in such humiliating circumstances. What peace would you get for France? It would be the peace of war. If you wish that peace should shine upon the world, M. Brizon, if you wish ideas of liberty and justice to prevail, ask for victory and not for the peace obtainable to-day, for that peace will be humiliating and dishonouring. There is not a Frenchman who could possibly desire it."

The political crisis which resulted in the formation of M. Briand's first Government saw the first peace debate in the French Chamber. The period of political unrest which brought about the reconstruction of that Government in December 1916, was again exploited by the pacifists, but this time on a larger scale, on the initiative of the German

Government. In the handling of this proposal, and in the manner in which M. Briand dealt with the various initiatives of President Wilson, he showed himself possessed of the broad view of a statesman.

His friends were of opinion that, had Briand in the early days of the winter of 1916 managed to free himself from the enervating atmosphere of the Chamber, with its easy-going habits of political good-fellowship, he might have reformed his Ministry upon a more lasting basis. As it was, when he resigned in March, 1917, he left office without having suffered defeat either in the Chamber or the Senate. He departed in a moment of triumph, when the Germans were retreating upon a 50-mile front, when Bapaume, Lassigny, and Roye were torn from the invaders' grip. Politically, however, his position had become untenable, and he would certainly at no distant date have been turned out of office by an adverse vote in Parliament.


The crisis thus opened was very quickly settled. The political heat engendered during the last six months of the Briand Ministry made it necessary that the new Premier should be a man who was able to exact a personal



GERMANS CARRYING OFF PLUNDER FROM A FRENCH TOWN.

respect from all parties, and that at the same time he should be one who had been more or less outside the heat of the battles which were past. In M. Ribot these qualifications were found, and he was able to meet the Chamber with a new Government on March 21, 1917. His Ministry was composed as follows:

M. Ribot, Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs.
M. Viviani, Justice.
M. Painlevé, War.



[Manuel.

M. RIBOT,
Prime Minister March—October 1917.

Admiral Lacaze, Marine.
M. Thomas, Armaments.
M. Thierry, Finance.
M. Malvy, Interior.
M. Steeg, Public Instruction.
M. Desplas, Public Works
M. Clémentel, Commerce.
M. Fernand David, Agriculture.
M. Viollette, Supply.
M. Léon Bourgeois, Labour.
M. Maginot, Colonies.

When M. Ribot said, "We strive ever for results, and it may become necessary to create some instrument of allied coordination or to revise in some way or other in accordance with the changing requirements of the campaign the present excellent arrangements between

the armies of Sir Douglas Haig and General Nivelle," the Prime Minister was perhaps indulging in unconscious prophecy.

On April 16 a big French offensive was begun in Champagne. It resulted in the breaking of the German line between Soissons and Rheims, in the capture of some ten thousand prisoners and a large quantity of material. But the French were unable to exploit their advantages, and subsequent developments showed that General Nivelle had not managed to perform all that he had promised in connexion with this big blow. The Champagne offensive was in some ways the result of an Allied Conference at Calais at which the rival claims of French and British armies to the task of dealing the main blow upon the enemy had been debated. It was finally decided, upon French representation, to entrust General Nivelle with the task of endeavouring to break through the German lines and to leave the British Army the responsibility of the important but strategically secondary operation. As a matter of fact, the French operations, satisfactory though they were locally, failed entirely to produce the wide strategic results which General Nivelle had expected of them. There immediately arose an acute crisis with regard to the Higher Command in which M. Painlevé played an important part. M. Painlevé, who had practically refused to join the reconstructed Briand Ministry towards the end of 1916 because of Briand's refusal to appoint General Pétain as Commander-in-Chief, had nevertheless accepted office as Minister of War, and had accepted General Nivelle's appointment as Commander-in-Chief on the Western front. M. Painlevé was a man with a career unusual among French politicians. He was born in 1863, and until 1910 his life had been spent in the serene atmosphere of academic mathematics. He was a professor at the Paris University and the Ecole Polytechnique, and was elected a member of the Academy of Science in 1900. Since the death of Henri Poincaré he had been the undisputed leader of mathematical science in France. Immediately after his entry into French politics he became interested in the Navy. He was reporter of the Naval Committee of the Chamber in 1911 and Chairman of the Committee in 1914. He first took office as Minister of Public Instruction and of War Inventions in October, 1915, and, as has been stated, became the mouthpiece of the opposition to Briand. He was a

man of radical tendencies in so far as his political opinions were concerned, and one who regarded all the problems which came before him in the light of almost naïve scientific clarity.

The Champagne offensive, successful though its local results may have been, failed, for reasons which became apparent later, to correspond with the wide strategic conceptions of

General Nivelle, and Painlevé at once undertook a radical reorganization of the Higher Command of the Army. On April 30 a Presidential decree appeared in the *Journal Officiel*, appointing General Pétain to the post of Chief of the General Staff of the Army at the Ministry of War. This action was taken on a report to the Cabinet by M. Painlevé, in which he pointed



[French official photograph.]

"BUSINESS AS USUAL" BEHIND THE FIRING LINE.



EXAMINING A PEASANT'S PASS IN NORTHERN FRANCE.

out that the functions of the Chief of the General Staff were limited to questions directly concerned with the organization and utilization of national resources, and it further declared, "the Government considers it necessary, in order to ensure more efficient direction of the war, that the General Staff of the Army should cooperate in the examination of all problems connected with the preparation and coordination of military operations, the extent of which is ever on the increase. It therefore appears indispensable to appoint as head of these services a general officer with wider powers than those at present given to the Chief of the General Staff."

The circumstances of General Pétain's appointment were such as to lead to the settlement of the whole latent crisis of the Higher Military Command. The appointment meant that General Pétain was to become the real staff director of French military operations not only in France but also in the Near East. The situation was one which rendered impossible the continuance not only of General Nivelle as Commander-in-Chief of the armies on the Western front, but also of General Joffre as technical adviser to the War Committee of the Cabinet. The powers conferred upon General Pétain were extremely wide. He was to act as technical adviser of the Minister of War on "the general conduct of the war, and the cooperation of the allied armies; on the general operations drawn up by the Commanders-in-Chief, who alone are to be entrusted with their execution; on programmes of construction, material, artillery, and aviation; on the

distribution of the country's resources of manpower and material between the different theatres of operation; on the use of transport as regards the movements of troops and war material; and, in general, on all questions submitted to his examination by the Minister of War. He is the central authority over military missions and French military attachés abroad. Foreign military missions in France have a representative at the General Staff of the Army." *

Quite obviously, in view of the wider power entrusted to General Pétain, neither Nivelle nor Joffre could remain at their posts, and on May 15, after a Cabinet Council at the Elysée, it was announced that General Nivelle had been appointed to the command of an Army group, that General Foch had been appointed Chief of the General Staff, and that General Pétain had succeeded Nivelle in command of the Northern and North-Eastern Armies.

The rapidity with which these changes were made rather bewildered the country, but the feeling of bewilderment was far outweighed by the popularity of the new appointment. Politically something had to be done. Parliament, which had adjourned for its Easter holidays, had already shown by a number of interpellations that it intended to have a searching inquiry into the course of the April offensive. The quick and drastic action of the Government answered in advance Parliamentary criticism, and General Nivelle, who was

* The question of the command, in connexion with the French offensive of 1917 is discussed also in Chapter CCIX. of this volume.

responsible for the April offensive, had been taken over by the Government from its predecessor. *The Times* Military Correspondent, who had just returned from a visit to General Pétain on the eve of his appointment, indicated that prudence and patience were to inspire the military policy of the new Commander-in-Chief. These qualities of prudence and of patience were never more necessary than in the spring of 1917. While from a military point of view the legacy of M. Briand to the new Ribot Government was brilliant, in many other respects the situation was gloomy.

attempt made to educate the people up to a sense of the gravity of these matters and to a realization of the absolute necessity of personal discipline in the consumption of such staple articles as meat, flour, sugar, coal.

The authorities tinkered at these problems, and in more than one instance it was again shown that the central authority was incapable of making its decisions respected throughout the country. Standard bread of a peculiarly unsavoury description was instituted in which all but the absolute refuse of wheat was employed. The bread supplied varied according to



PREPARING SUGAR CARDS IN PARIS, BOYS AND GIRLS ASSISTING.

Internally, things were not as they should have been, and during the winter of 1916-1917 the lack of economic coordination between the Allies, and, be it again said, the faulty working of the centralized French Administration, began to bear bitter fruit. Internally, the French had lived from hand to mouth. There were in the various Government offices a variety of Committees appointed to deal with the problems of industry, food supply, and transport. None of them managed to get a broad view of the problems as a whole. Decrees of the most drastic character were issued which enjoined certain food restrictions. They were more honoured in the breach than in the observance. There was no one in the Briand Ministry who appeared to trouble himself about such vital, if politically uninteresting, questions as food and coal supply. Nor was any really serious

locality, and occasionally even according to the political complexion of a particular town, from a dirty grey to the pure whiteness of pre-war days. Meatless days were ordered. First of all it was decreed that on six evenings of the week no meat should be served in restaurants. After many hesitations and many receptions of delegations from the meat merchants and restaurant keepers of France, this regulation, which had never been strictly kept, was rescinded. Finally, for several weeks meat was totally prohibited on Mondays and Tuesdays in the restaurants and the butchers' shops remained closed. Even in important restaurants this prohibition was not respected, and, owing to the complete absence of any campaigns of food economy such as that undertaken later on in 1917 in Great Britain, there was very little sign of personal domestic discipline in this



STREET TRADING IN PARIS: GETTING READY FOR THE DAY'S BUSINESS.

matter. The most striking result, and the only definite result of the shutting of the butchers' shops on Mondays and Tuesdays, was that on Sunday meat in the butchers' shops was sent up to absurdly inflated prices by the demand of the people who on that day bought enough meat to provide them with all their requirements during the two "meatless" days.

In the same way, and largely with the same results, cakeless days were established. Confectioners' shops were closed on two days a week, only to do full business in superfluities during the other five days. The police in the various towns fixed maximum prices for food which were entirely ignored by the tradesmen and by the public. There were a number of factors which made the maximum prices difficult to enforce; some of these factors were local and others due to the general transport crisis.

Food difficulties were, however, negligible compared with the coal shortage throughout the country. This shortage was due to two obvious main causes—a tremendously increased demand for the industrial purposes of war, and a complete stoppage of supplies from the invaded coalfields of eastern and north-eastern France. There were a number of other contributory causes, the fact that much of the labour in the mines had been drafted

into the Army on mobilization and, once again, transport trouble. Sharp frost immobilized at Rouen and other Seine ports hundreds of big barges laden with coal that would otherwise have been available to ease the position in Paris. Great Britain endeavoured to relieve the situation by supplying 1,500,000 tons per month, but Britain, too, was grappling with the coal problem, and submarine warfare made the supply to France uncertain.

A tardy and unavailing attempt was made to meet the situation by economy. All except food and chemists' shops were ordered to close at six o'clock in the evening and the cafés at 9.30 p.m. Theatres were shut four nights a week; all the underground railways of Paris were closed at 10 p.m., save on two days a week, the population was rationed in regard to gas and electric light, but none of these measures could be anything more than palliative. By the middle of December the situation had become grave. Electric light had at times failed altogether in Paris, and in many of the provincial towns the supply of gas had given out completely. Indeed, over a hundred gasworks were forced to close down, and what was even more dangerous, more than one war factory had been obliged to suspend its operations owing to lack of coal.

While in England during this same period coal reached the price of fifty shillings a ton, in Paris it went up to as much as £12 per ton, and was even at that figure almost impossible to obtain. Everybody was affected, and coal was sought for in every corner with the energy and enterprise displayed by gold or diamond prospectors.

The winter of 1916-17 was bitterly cold, and the position of the poorer portions of the population was extremely wretched. The Municipality endeavoured to relieve their sufferings by opening special depôts for the sale of small bags of fuel, where at any time of the day a long coal queue was to be seen waiting. Perhaps the most striking of these depôts was that opened in the National Opera House, which once again, as in 1871, became a distributing centre of supply. In those days the Opera House doors were opened at eight in the morning to the waiting crowd of people, each bearing an empty sack or bag. It was not infrequent that after three hours' waiting in the cold many were disappointed, and when they reached the ticket office, where the supply was regulated, were given a ticket for 20 pounds of coal and asked to come back and get the coal in a month's time. The Municipality made attempts also to relieve suffering, but

all these endeavours amounted to nothing but attempts to make bricks without straw. The various coal depôts opened up in Paris where coal in very small quantities could be obtained after long hours of waiting were constantly the scene of disturbances, and the police throughout the winter had a very anxious time.

This coal problem, and the failure of the authorities either to foresee it or to meet it as it came, coupled with the hopeless tinkering with food restrictions, contributed not a little to the very pronounced wave of depression which passed over France at the close of 1916. These also were among the causes which brought about the fall of the Briand Ministry in March, 1917.

It is not within the scope of this chapter to give an account of the Ribot administration, but it is necessary, nevertheless, to refer to the results of the economic crisis of the winter of 1916-1917, with which the new Government was called upon to deal.

Labour in France accepted at the outbreak of war the abolition of all restrictions, and France in the first two years of war was entirely free from any strike movement of importance in any large industry. It was not until the spring of 1917 that this fine record was broken, and then it was as the direct result of increased



French official photograph.

A STREET MARKET IN PARIS.




IN DARKENED PARIS : BUYING FLOWERS ON THE WAY TO THE THEATRE.

cost of living, coupled with failure on the part of employers to recognize in advance the very hard position of their workpeople. The industries affected were also those which had least to do with actual war-work, and also were the least organized for fighting purposes.

It was estimated that in the third year of war the general rise in wages had amounted to just over 50 per cent. This increase had in the main benefited the war-labouring and agricultural classes. The luxury trades and industries which played such a large part in the economic life of the country, and in particular

badly paid. A strike movement for better pay began with the *midinettes*; the dressmakers, seamstresses, cotton workers, chocolate, gas-mask makers, military cleaning establishments, military button, paper bag and box makers, jewellers, electric and chemical trades, aeroplane motors, bank clerks, harness makers, shoe makers, shop girls, toy makers, laundresses, telegraph boys, brush makers, tailors, railway workers, grenade makers, were all to some degree affected by the agitation.

Its progress can best be likened to that of a Chinese cracker. Owing to the complete lack



ICE ON THE SEINE.

of the capital, had not participated in this increase.

When the war broke out these industries were of necessity completely disorganized. The big money-spending clientèle of the dressmaker, the milliner, and the jeweller fled from France, and it was long before a return to more or less normal conditions was made and the Paris luxury trades began to take their part of the new fortunes made out of munitions. Slowly, too, Paris was able to rebuild a good deal of her Transatlantic trade. The position of the workpeople, however, underwent no modification, and they were on the whole very

of any big organization either of employers or of workpeople, no general settlement affecting all the trades involved could be made. No sooner was the dressmakers' strike settled, through the intervention of the Government, than the hatmakers went on strike, and so on through the whole field of trouble. The movement lasted for several weeks in this spasmodic fashion. At the beginning public sympathy was undoubtedly with the striking dressmakers who were the first to leave work. The *midinette* has always been a popular figure in Paris, and the passers-by smiled good humouredly upon the procession of young girl strikers

which during this period became a feature of the streets of Paris. They struck very gaily and in a very orderly manner, and more than one banner in their procession showed that there was nothing whatever unpatriotic in their intentions. The British Guards Band was in Paris at the time, and the strikers lined up in crowds to cheer them and to shower flowers upon them as they passed. As, however, the movement grew and some of the minor munition factories became affected, and as the type of striker became increasingly rough and rowdy,

continually increasing demands of politicians had brought the State Budget in 1914 up to 5,191 million francs, and an internal loan was decided upon at the end of June. It was opened on July 7, for the amount of 805 million francs (£32,200,000)* and was covered 40 times over. The old French custom whereby the Government placed its loan directly with the public had given way to the more modern and easier method of distributing the loan through the big banks. Thus the public had subscribed but very little for the loan, and



MIDINETTES' DEMONSTRATION IN THE RUE DE LA PAIX.

scuffles with the police became more and more frequent and the sympathy of the public less and less pronounced.

The professional agitator, in a great many cases a foreigner, became more and more noticeable. The movement spread to the big provincial cities and was at one time distinctly menacing. Thanks, however, to the firm but tactful action of the authorities, and the reason and moderation displayed by both parties in the disputes, the movement never at any time became political or pacifist. It ended in the strikers, in nearly every instance, obtaining recognition of the justice of their demands.

Financially the war found France in an unusual condition of congestion. The con-

when war broke out the banks were gorged with the loan which they had not yet had time to sell to their customers.

M. de Medlsheim, of the Ministry of Finance, thus describes the situation resulting from this state of affairs: "The surprise of events found us in this financial muddle, 1,608 million francs (£64,320,000) of floating debt, the greater part of the bank deposits engaged in French Treasury Bonds and in bonds of foreign Governments, mainly Balkan or Turkish, which were neither able, nor some of them willing, to free them. A large stock of loan paper which had not been placed, and for which the Treasury

* Exchange is here calculated at the nominal rate of 25 francs per pound sterling.




THE GUARDS' BAND IN PARIS.

Drum Majors at the Trocadero, including one from the Garde Républicaine.

demanding payment in immediate and in close-dated instalments."

The Government, to meet the difficulties of this situation and to prevent anything like a general financial panic, proclaimed a moratorium covering a variety of operations. For its

immediate money requirements it turned to the Bank of France, and by increasing the advances of the Bank to the State, and by an extension of the Note issue, as well as by a large issue of Treasury Bonds, the immediate necessities of the first month of war were met. On



THE GUARDS' BAND IN PARIS.

The Visit to the Vendôme Column.

September 13, 1914, the creation of special National Defence Bonds was decided upon. These bonds had a success which surpassed the expectations of the Ministry of Finance. The idea underlying the issue was to make a larger appeal and a more direct appeal to the public. The Treasury Bonds, of which there were at that moment not more than 350 million francs' worth (£14,000,000) in circulation, were reserved to the restricted clientèle of banks, chambers of commerce, and other credit establishments, whose resources were for the most part locked up. The Bonds were made easily available to the public through the post offices and banks, and were for three, six, and 12 months, the nominal interest being five per cent., and the actual yield 5.26 per cent., free of income tax. The holders of these bonds were assured priority of subscription for any future loan, and the Bank of France agreed to discount the bonds when they had at most three more months to run. The Bank also agreed to make advances of 80 per cent. on the value of bonds for any term. The success of this issue was quite remarkable, and no feature of it was more pleasing than the number of small subscribers who applied for bonds. Thus in

three and a half months of 1915, 600,369 of the 100-franc bonds had been taken up, and in 1915 5,577,918 of the same bonds had been applied for.

The very success of the operation filled the Government with alarm. It was clear that in the event of the war going unfavourably to the Allied cause, the holders of bonds might refrain from renewing them, and in the same way, in the event of a speedy peace, people might have been anxious to withdraw their capital in order to obtain a higher rate of interest elsewhere. It was therefore decided to consolidate this issue, and as the money market had not yet recovered from its indigestion, the idea of a loan was rejected in favour of an issue of Obligations de la Défense Nationale.

These new bonds were issued at 96.50 francs, and bore interest at the rate of five per cent. They were redeemable in 1925, but the Government reserved to itself the right to redeem them any time at par after 1920. The rate of interest was actually five and a half per cent., which rose to nearly six per cent. in the event of redemption before 1920. The issue, therefore, offered a slight advantage over the



WAR LOAN POSTERS AT THE BANK OF FRANCE.



WAR LOAN QUEUE: APPLICATIONS FOR SUMS OF LESS THAN 10,000 FRANCS.

three and a half per cent. loan and over the Treasury Bonds, and the issue absorbed a large part of the 1914 Peace Loan, which had for so long hung heavy on the market

By these Treasury methods France was enabled to continue financially without having recourse to a loan until the middle of November, 1915, and on November 12 the first French National Défense loan was voted almost without discussion by both Houses of Parliament. At that time the Bons de la Défense Nationale amounted to 8,353 million francs (£334,120,000) and the Obligations de la Défense Nationale to 3,659 million francs (£146,360,000). It was therefore no immediate Treasury necessity which led M. Ribot, Minister of Finance, to the issue of a loan. M. Ribot, in supporting the Bill for the loan before the Chamber, said :

Everyone knows why we are making a loan. It is because we do not wish our short-dated debt, which the country itself has swollen by its subscription to Bons and Obligations, to grow indefinitely. We hope that by a loan of perpetual Rente we shall be able to consolidate a good part of those issued. There are great reserves in the country. There is much available capital at the present moment. Some of that capital is in hiding. I hope that in response to the appeal which is made it will come out of its drawers and cupboards. The enormous expenditure for national defence does not entirely represent lost capital. We are paying hardly anything in cash abroad. We are paying by means of the credits we have obtained. Nearly everything we

spend in France should come back to the Treasury in the shape of subscriptions to the loan or to the National Defence bonds. This money must again help national defence. That is the aim of our loan. We place it clearly before the country, and we appeal to the country's reserves. We hope that at least a part of those reserves will come to us, and we do not wish to limit in advance the amounts which will be brought to the Treasury. The country itself shall determine its contribution to the war with the conviction it has of the necessity of supporting the war not only with arms but also with what is the sinews of war—money.

The success of the loan was organized by means of a propaganda both by Press and poster which, although quite novel in France, was as nothing compared to the publicity effort of Great Britain in the recruiting campaign. Naudin, Poulbot, Abel Faivre, and many other artists contributed with brush and pencil to familiarize the public with the terms and the patriotic necessity of the loan, but since the Loan Bill was passed on November 16, and the subscription lists were opened on November 25, there was no time to organize any intensive system of loan lectures and meetings throughout the country, nor was full advantage taken of the organization of the insurance companies, co-operative societies, and trade unions. Nevertheless, without the support of such efforts, the Loan was a gigantic success, and by February 29 the net yield of the Loan amounted to 11,460,430,000 francs (£458,417,200). In

this issue the Bank of France again played an important part, receiving nearly a fifth of the total subscriptions.

Abroad the Loan also had a great success. as, quite apart from reasons of sentiment, the Allies and friends of France were offered in the Loan an investment of an unusually advantageous character, owing to differences of exchange. Thus the Loan, issued at 87.25 francs in reality cost 76 francs to the Swiss, 74 francs to

£69,000,000. Shipping statistics were equally satisfactory. Arrivals and departures showed an increase from 16,167,000 tons (17,521 vessels) in 1915 to 16,968,000 tons (21,764 vessels) in 1916, and this in spite of Austro-German submarine warfare and the tremendous rise of freights. The Cardiff to Marseilles coal freight in July, 1914, was 7s. 10d. a ton, and in June, 1916, it had reached 92s. Railway receipts also clearly showed rising trade activity. The



[French official photograph.]

PARIS IN WINTER: BARGAINING FOR WOOD FUEL.

the British, and 73 francs to the Americans. The British exchange was reckoned at 27.30 francs and Great Britain's share in the Loan was 602,000,000 francs (£24,080,000).

It was not until a year later that the Government again had recourse to borrowing. They did so in extremely encouraging circumstances. During the first half of 1916 there were growing signs of a return to the old buoyancy of French trade and economic condition.

Taking the great indexes of national prosperity, this increasing buoyancy is clearly seen. Thus in the first half year of 1914 French exports were valued at £135,000,000. In 1915 the corresponding figure was only £56,000,000, whereas in the first half year of 1916 it had made a gain of over 21 per cent., and amounted to

four great systems of the Ouest-Etat, the Paris-Lyons-Mediterranean, the Orleans, and the Midi showed receipts amounting to £29,000,000 for 1916, as against £24,750,000 in 1915, and £26,000,000 in 1914.

Although the country had nine of its richest Departments invaded, and although millions of its most active workers had been with the colours during the first two years of war, no less than 78.07 of the normal revenue had been collected, and in these taxation returns also is to be seen proof of growing economic strength. For while there was a falling off in the first year of nearly £48,000,000, in the second year of war that drop had been reduced to just over £24,500,000. That there was money available in increasing quantities in the country, in spite

of the great effort of the War Loan, was shown in the increase in the quotations for various big securities on the Paris market.

Expenditure was, of course, increasing at a terrible rate. In 1915 it amounted to £908,224,680; in 1916 to £1,294,035,800. War expenditure had increased by £336,094,564, or nearly 50 per cent. The average monthly expenditure throughout 1915 was £75,680,000, and in 1916 during the first three-quarters that monthly expenditure had risen to £107,840,000. Purely war expenditure since the beginning of the war to June, 1916, amounted to £1,809,297,768, or nearly 75 per cent. of the total public expenditure since August 1, 1914.

M. Ribot, speaking to the Paris Correspondent of *The Times* on the prospects of the Loan, said:

We look forward to the future with buoyant hope and serene confidence. The financial situation at home is in no way disquieting. This country has an immense capacity for work, and it will know how to restore the balance of exchange in our favour. Our burdens will no doubt be heavy. We are determined to introduce an income-tax in due course. This would already be an accomplished fact had it not been for the war. Thanks to the elasticity of this form of taxation, which has stood England in such good stead, we shall be able to meet a good part of our liabilities, but undue haste

in taxation would only disturb and scare the country. The confidence of Frenchmen in the future is absolute. The strongest proof of this is the loan we raised last year, which furnished us with a capital of 600 millions sterling, and still stands three points above the issuing price.

The point which is occupying our serious attention at the present moment is how to devise ways and means to pay for our purchases abroad and to ensure greater latitude on the American market in the matter of trade. We are endeavouring to enlarge the basis of our commercial credit, which is somewhat hampered by the methods in practice in the United States. In this matter we hope shortly to secure a definite improvement.

I may mention that a very satisfactory arrangement was arrived at during the last meeting I had at Calais with Mr. Asquith and Mr. McKenna on August 24. England is anxious to strengthen her gold reserve in order to maintain her gold standard and enlarge the scope of her credit in the United States. Now the Bank of France has, even at this stage of the struggle, a gold reserve exceeding 160 millions sterling. We were therefore in a position to promise England a considerable sum out of our abundance. Russia has also promised a certain amount of gold, and Italy, likewise, in proportion to her capacity. Thus the Allies are, if I may say so, pooling their gold in order to render their collective financial position still more solid.

We are placing this gold at the disposal of the British Treasury as a loan, and the Treasury will open a credit in pounds sterling in our favour in London. The arrangement, as you see, cuts both ways, and is altogether in the common interest of the Allies. The gold "loaned" by us will return to the coffers of the Bank of France after the war.

The last point I have to mention is that we propose to issue our second War Loan early next month. As previously, it will not be for any specified sum, but this time no portion of it will be diverted by the conversion



[French official photograph.]

A BOULEVARD RESTAURANT PROVIDES CHEAP MEALS.

of the Three per Cent. Rentes. Subscriptions will therefore be in hard cash or Treasury Bills and short-term Exchequer Bonds, of which only 40 millions sterling are outstanding. This second War Loan will not be redeemable at any given date—that is to say, we shall only have to provide for the interest on it. I expect it to yield important results, but we must not nourish excessive hopes. This time the Germans will not succeed in launching the absurd fable that we hope for 30 milliards in order to make capital over our deception with neutrals.

This Loan, subscription to which was opened on October 5, 1916, was issued at the actual price of 87.50 for 100 francs, the interest, as in the case of the previous Loan, being 5 per cent.

The lists remained open for 25 days, when the magnificent total of £454,400,000 had been subscribed, of which 54½ per cent. was new money. One of the most satisfactory features of the Loan revealed by an analysis of the subscriptions received was the truly national character of the operation. The average amount of subscriptions was for 10 francs of rente, representing a nominal capital value of £8. Analysis showed that cash represented 54½ per cent. of the total subscribed, as compared with 47 per cent. in the previous Loan. Bills stood for 25 per cent., bonds for 8 per cent., and the remaining £280,000,000 were furnished by conversion of 3½ per cent. rente. The greatest proportion of cash came from the provincial *bas de laine*, which furnished 150,000,000 francs in gold pieces.

M. Ribot pointed out that the 1915 Loan only exceeded the 1916 issue owing to the fact that in the previous operation the 3 per cents. were admitted to conversion. He concluded by saying: "We shall press on to victory by closer union with our Allies, by employing the growing superiority of our effective and armaments, and thanks to the moral force with which the world's sympathy endows us."

The suggestion that France drew her moral strength in part from the "world's sympathy" contained an element of truth; but it would be wrong to imagine that the steadiness of French resistance under unprecedented strain was due to anything save the innate qualities of the French character. The staying-power of the nation surprised even the shrewdest and most experienced foreign observers. Nothing, in fact, is more difficult than to form a clear and comprehensive judgment of the state of French feeling at any given moment. The opinion of the Capital is no safe guide. Paris is often

depressed or elated while other parts of the country are normal. The extreme South or the extreme West may show signs of weakness to which no counterpart can be found in other regions. Views expressed in conversation are apt to be misleading, because Frenchmen rarely tell their deeper thoughts to foreigners, and when speaking to each other take much for granted. The only sure criterion of French feeling is to be found in the conduct of the nation; and the more its conduct under the strain of war was examined, the stronger grew the conviction that the spirit of France remained as firm as it was at the outbreak. The first winter in the trenches was faced unflinchingly, despite the terrible hardships inflicted on the Army by lack of preparation for prolonged trench warfare. The prospect of a second winter inspired fears that proved groundless; and, at the beginning of 1916, many prophets predicted that a third winter in the trenches could not be faced. The third winter passed, and yet a fourth winter was bravely faced. The real mind of the Army and of the people was perhaps most truly expressed in November 1916 by an experienced officer, who had taken his full share of danger and hardship: "It is a great nuisance, and we all hope that this next winter may be the last. But if the Germans can stand further winters, so can we—and a little more besides!"

The apparent oscillations of public feeling naturally bore some relation to military prospects. The comparative failure of the Champagne offensive of September 1915 was followed by a wave of depression which grew into keen anxiety after the first German attack upon Verdun. This mood lasted well into the summer of 1916, and became acute in June, before the beginning of the British offensive on the Somme. In the late summer and autumn the situation improved, but depression tended again to spread after the overthrow of Rumania. Pacifist and "Defeatist" propaganda (of which the sources were not revealed until later) tended to advertise discouragement; but early in 1917 a strong reaction set in, even before the encouraging tidings of the intervention of the United States.

To some extent, France "got used" to the War and settled down to "see it through." The resilience of the French temperament, in circumstances which countries that had not been invaded were hardly able to appreciate, could only spring from deep-seated vitality.



CHAPTER CCXV.


THE WAR AND NATIONAL EDUCATION.

DESTRUCTION AND RECONSTRUCTION—GOOD AND BAD EFFECTS OF THE WAR—EFFECT OF FORMER WARS ON EDUCATION—NATIONAL PHYSIQUE—EDUCATION IN GERMANY—AND IN FRANCE—UNIVERSITIES AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND RECRUITING—THE FIRST HUNDRED THOUSAND—CADET CORPS—WOMEN'S WORK—CHILDREN OF SCHOOL AGE AND WAR WORK—JUVENILE "CRIME"—BOY SCOUTS AND GIRL GUIDES—VOLUNTARY RATIONS—NEW IDEALS IN EDUCATION—"BABY WEEK"—SECONDARY SCHOOLS—THE UNIVERSITIES—STATE POLICY—MR. HENDERSON'S STATEMENT IN 1916—MR. FISHER'S EDUCATION BILL, 1917.

BOTH the effect of the war on National Education and the contribution of a national system of education to the effective conduct of the struggle formed subjects of profound interest during practically the whole course of the Great War. On the one hand, it is important, if we are to bring into narrow compass the information on the subject, to realize how the war itself revealed social conditions among children and adolescents and recruits which demanded stringent measures of legislation and administration; how the war was found to affect every degree of childhood, to necessitate, at first through economic disturbances, the increased supply of school meals, to secure subsequently by high war-wages such better conditions as practically to abolish the need for such meals; how the war was found to affect the elementary schools by the military occupation of school premises, by the calling to the colours of teachers and by the substitution of women teachers; how the preparatory and secondary schools were similarly affected and had a stern but successful struggle to keep up the ideals and standard of public school life; how the universities, university colleges, training colleges, medical schools, law schools

and technical colleges, in pouring out their young men without stint or hindrance into the service of the State at the first call of national necessity, nevertheless remained effective parts of normal national life. These results were the direct actions of a unique state of war on the national system of education.

On the other hand, these facts also revealed the direct reactions of the educational system on the conduct of the war. The schools, without exception, gave to the Army and Navy, both in the combative and the administrative departments, large numbers of highly trained teachers who brought special abilities to their work; the secondary schools supplied throughout the war a large proportion of new officers and kept the Officers Training Corps crowded with young men of the highest ability and promise; the universities and other places of higher education having, at the outbreak of war, given their all, given with almost reckless prodigality the pride of English youth, devoted themselves thenceforward not only to putting their colleges and buildings at the disposal of the Government for military purposes but also to placing their professors, and especially their science professors, at the service of the State. And, if the university laboratories were



Hills and Saunders.

OXFORD'S PART IN THE WAR: CADETS DRILLING IN THE QUADRANGLE OF BALLIOL COLLEGE.


of the highest service in promoting the application of science to war, there was here another reaction, since this very fact tended to stimulate creative science work in the universities. The Great War did more, in this indirect fashion, for science than can be measured in these pages.

Destructive though the war was on an almost unimaginable scale, yet it also created the capacity for reconstruction on an equal scale; and in that sense the reaction of the war on National Education was entirely to the good. Nor was that reaction limited to the fields of applied science, or to the investigation of chemical phenomena, or to the development of the mechanism of propulsion under conditions of stable equilibrium in the air and under the sea. The war not only made it clear that the whole educational system needed revision, revolution, or reconstruction, but it brought out the elements of permanent value in the old system and showed how they were to be perpetuated in the new. The war proved that the principles of patriotism, self-sacrifice, and idealism which had permeated the schools, as the direct product of an ancient system that made Christian teaching a pervasive element in school life, must also be controlling principles in a new system which would give for the first time full training to the body, mind, and personality of every child in the nation. The war made it clear, in its demand for efficient manpower and woman-power, that the children of a nation are its real reserve capital, and that physical neglect and imperfect education were waste of capital on a prodigious scale.

The Great War, in common with earlier wars in English history, had a very definite effect on English education in the classroom, in the sphere of administration, and in the economic relationship of the school to almost every field of national life. Any adequate history of English education would trace these results in successive wars. The Roman invasion and occupation of Britain supplied a new economic basis to society and laid the foundations of a system of education that survives to this day. The great educational period which culminated in the age of Alcuin closed with lamentable swiftness amid the Danish wars, only to be more than restored by King Alfred in his reconstruction of English life. The Norman invasion brought with it not only new economic factors to repair the wastage of war but the means and the men to crown a living educational system with universities which were

in 1914, after the lapse of nearly eight centuries, in the vigour of perennial youth and not the least vigorous of the forces that prosecuted the Great War. The medieval system survived the national strain of famine, plague and war, and gathered new strength from the splendour and fury of the Renaissance and the Reformation. This fact was not forgotten when Germany opened her criminal campaign by the obliteration of the University of Louvain. It became at once plain that the educational systems of France, Belgium and England, as represented by Lille, Louvain, and Oxford, would have to fight for their place in civilization. What Elizabeth and her Ministers did in recognizing the economic side of education the age of George V. had to complete. The great Queen strengthened the elementary schools and made apprenticeship in husbandry, arts, occupations, crafts and mysteries a part of the national system of education and achieved her goal after she had dispersed all the formidable forces of Spain. What the sixteenth century could achieve was open to the twentieth in the stress of a great war. At the end of the Elizabethan age the universities had a greater percentage of the rising manhood of the nation than they have ever since secured. The educationists of the second Georgian age, even in the spasm of war, looked for a goal not less noble, and for one that gave to women opportunities that the sixteenth century limited to men.

The Great Rebellion can scarcely be said to have checked the progress of English education. Though both universities were "disaffected," Cromwell blessed them with a new endowment, and out of the bloodshed and turmoil of the Commonwealth period we see dimly emerging, as the product of unrest, new educational ideas which took effect on either side of the Atlantic. A class of educational enthusiasts, both in the Church and in the ranks of Dissent, kept educational idealism alive in the darkest days, and laid down the principle of education for the poorest which illuminated the social misery of the eighteenth century. Through long periods of war, economic distress and public indifference the schools fought the battle of national character and made the almost unintermittent warfare from 1756 to 1815 a period of national glory. But before the Battle of Waterloo the needs of the people in the matter of education and industrial training had become urgent indeed. The shock of the French Revolution



[Hills and Saunders.]

CADETS PARADING AT WORCESTER COLLEGE, OXFORD.

had awakened our best educational thinkers, as the shock of the Russian Revolution more than a century later, while the Great War drew towards its climax, once more stimulated the educational thinkers of Great Britain. The Sunday schools and the monitorial schools of Raikes, Bell and Lancaster were the product of this age of war; and in 1802, during the lull of the Peace of Amiens, an Act was passed for the education and the preservation of the health and morals of apprentices in the mills.

This Act was the first recognition of the very evil that for a century the country strove fruitlessly to end, until, after the South African War, Mr. Balfour's Act of 1902 came to lay a new administrative foundation to national education. If the Napoleonic wars showed the necessity of a new system of education, the industrial revolution that came to a crisis after 1815 and the political revolution which gathered its first fruits in 1833 made an educational revolution impossible. Neither mill-owners nor politicians wanted an educated proletariat in 1817; and some of them did not want it in 1917. But the industrial system throughout that century was in fact eating the


soul out of the nation and was destroying its capacity for physical regeneration. The Crimean War revealed these facts, and after the close of the war a new educational effort was made; the universities and the endowed school came down to the doors of the people and there was a swift development of all forms of technical instruction. Between 1868 and 1878 far-reaching educational legislation touched every grade of society, from the factory child to the university fellow, and threw open the widest educational facilities to women. This wave of advance had achieved its full effect in 1899 at the outbreak of the South African War.

It was during, and in the years immediately following, this war that the next great advance came. The war and the recruiting sergeant had revealed the physical inefficiency of a large percentage of the race. The school child was suffering, not so much from the sins as from the thoughtlessness of his forefathers and of the statesmen who had governed them. But during the period of the Boer War statesmen and administrators were busily at work reconstructing on an immense scale the machinery and the organization of our schools. The far-

reaching changes included the abolition of *cul de sac* higher elementary teaching, the substitution of a county and borough system for innumerable small and ineffective educational authorities, the elaboration of a highly organized system of secondary schools, and the creation of one central authority, the Board of Education. The close of the war found England in possession of educational machinery that rendered it possible to grapple in some effective measure with the conditions disclosed by the recruiting sergeant and the army doctor and the new agencies for social relief. Those conditions were definitely attacked in the year 1899, when Sir William Robson's Act raised the minimum age for children in factories and workshops to 12 years. This provision was made effective by the war-time Factory and Workshop Act of 1901, which in many cases made it impossible for a child to be a "full-timer" under 14 years of age. The Children Act of 1903 empowered the local authority to check other forms of child labour and forbade all street trading by children under 11 years. These deterrent measures left, however, the real evils

untouched. The physical conditions of children were recognized to be in evil case; but how evil was not fully realized till the Interdepartmental Committee on Physical Deterioration demanded that "a systematized medical inspection of school children should be imposed as a public duty on every school authority," and should be supplemented by some system of feeding ill-nourished children. The Education (Provision of Meals) Act, 1906, passed by Mr. Birrell, met the first demand, while an Act of 1907 created the great school medical service which was busy recreating the life of the nation when the Great War broke out.

The work of this new department of the Board of Education revealed the most serious conditions of physique among children. Disease was rampant and something like one million children out of the seven millions of school age were found to be in a condition that made it impossible for them to take anything like sufficient advantage of the educational system. The opening of the Great War emphasized the conclusions of Sir George Newman, the head of the Department. The effect of years



CAMBRIDGE O.T.C. RETURNING FROM A FIELD-DAY.

of neglect was visible in a great percentage even of the voluntary recruits, and the percentage was, of course, larger when conscription was introduced.

The Great War had civilian aspects that must be estimated if anything approaching a complete



[Bassano.]

SIR GEORGE NEWMAN, M.D.,
Chief Medical Officer, Board of Education.

appreciation of the war as a social phenomenon of extraordinary complexity is ever to be secured. National education was one of those aspects. The education of the people and of their leaders during the previous century must be appreciated as a social fact if we are ever to arrive at a true estimate of national psychological conditions that not only rendered the war inevitable but made the definite destruction of German militarism the only possible end to a war launched as much by the schoolmaster as by the statesman. The war showed at grips products of various kinds of what the Germans called *Kultur*. These different forms of organized State life were direct products of educational systems acting on national characteristics. In Germany the system of education originally devised, after the crowning disaster of Jena in 1806, to resuscitate the German peoples and to recreate the State as an entity that should be an immortal "thing in itself," had been so used as to create a people who as individuals had been prepared to sacrifice not only life and honour but all that distinguishes man from the incarnation of evil for the purpose of magnifying the State. The German educational system, efficient within narrow limits but very largely governed by rule of thumb, cursed with class prejudice, and very

inelastic in application, had been used, and especially had the university professors and the school teachers been used, to magnify autocracy and war, to set up the State as an idol, to pervert the mind of youth with such Nietzschean doctrines as "War and courage have accomplished greater things than love for one's fellow man"; "War is the great educator." It had not been patriotism in the ordinary sense that had been taught. National education in Germany had been for years a deliberate and highly organized machine for converting an industrious people into worshippers of material force as represented by the State. The teaching of religion had been made part of the process, the religion of a tribal god, the cloudy counterpart of an earthy and materialistic autocracy. German education, good, bad and indifferent, for years had had one common quality, the teaching of a cult that subordinated body, mind, character, personality and even private thought to the purposes of the State.


It is this fact that explains so many phenomena in the war: the organized brutality of a soldiery for the first time tasting licence at the will of its leaders, the brutality of the ferret out of the bag; the cruelty and callousness of the civil population in regard to prisoners of war; the frequent absence of honour among German officers; the lack of any sense of conscience among statesmen and politicians; the total disregard of the moral code in war; the exclusively materialistic outlook; the low view of women; the high standard of obedience to commands, however intolerable; the "mass-bravery" in the field; the lack of initiative; the ingenuity, indeed the genius, in developing the original thought of other nations; the power of tolerating terrible social conditions and the want of power to rebel. These and many other qualities that the war exhibited at best and worst were direct products of an educational system operating during more than a century on a people to whom fear of foreigners was already a mental obsession.

In France education had had very different effects to this, though the educational system introduced by Napoleon might with a different people have had as evil an effect as the doctrines of Hegel and Nietzsche had had on German schools under State guidance. In fact, Roman Catholicism in matters of education has always appeared at its best in France; and, during the kaleidoscopic century during which Napoleon's concordat with the Pope was operative, religion

divorced from political considerations was a living force in the schools. The example of Dupanloup, Bishop of Orleans, carried on a great Catholic tradition; and when from 1882 religion was excluded from the public schools, the clergy and the religious houses, until but a comparatively brief period before the war, were able to supplement the secular with religious teaching. Despite all appearances to the contrary, the heart of France was sound, and, in fact, during the dark decade that preceded the war there had been a great revival in religious matters which was destined to play a

schools of the nation became the hearths of organized patriotism. The educational policy of France during the war was both sane and inspired. It is not too much to say that it reacted upon the position in England and stimulated the English teachers and administrators—not least by the French scheme produced during the war for the provision of continuation education for adolescents up to the age of 20 years.

It is, however, with England that this chapter must deal, keeping always in mind that English educational ideals were at one with those of



[Hills and Saunders.]

ETON COLLEGE O.T.C. PROVIDES A GUARD OF HONOUR.

notable part in the effort that France made from August, 1914, onwards in repelling and overcoming her barbaric invaders. The call to arms rapidly drew off the flower of the teachers from the schools and the parish churches throughout the land; but the school work was not only kept going with the aid of able and devoted women but the highest educational schemes were at once evolved, and not for one moment was there any movement towards the employment of young children in industrial work to supply lack of labour. The French were ever logical. They saw at a glance that the hope of the future, after a devastating and lengthy war, resided in the schools, and the

France, and indeed with those of America, despite the German influence on American education, and diametrically opposed to those of Germany. The long delay before the United States of America took her natural place in the war was not entirely disconnected with the German influence in the universities. That influence was fought for two long years by President Butler, of Columbia University, and his first action after America had definitely entered into the lists was to purge his university of the pacifist taint.

The outbreak of war on August 4, 1914, found all the English schools and the universities

in vacation and the earlier stages of the year's harvesting in full swing. The boys from the public schools and endowed schools had been home a week; and those who were not going to return, who were going shortly to begin a

Oxford and Cambridge in the great days of the Civil War. But those men had left to join opposing sides; in 1914 they left to join an army with one goal, the destruction of German militarism. From the schools masters vied



[Watfield, Epsom.]

UNIVERSITY AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS BRIGADE DIGGING TRENCHES.

new life in business or at the universities, watched the papers with excitement. On August 7 Lord Kitchener, the new Secretary of State for War, issued his appeal for the famous First Hundred Thousand, for men between 19 and 30 years. "Never," wrote the Editor of *The History of the Royal Fusiliers University and Public Schools Brigade*,—

Never in the history of recruiting had such a boom been witnessed. In all parts of the country and in all classes of the community young men laid aside their peaceful vocations at their country's call. In those first few days many public schools and university men, uncertain how they could best help their country, and not realizing that a greater increase in the commissioned ranks than the military establishments could provide for must necessarily accompany the increase in the non-commissioned ranks, flocked to the colours. This was only for a couple of days. On August 10 the first advertisements appeared in the Press calling for junior officers. Two thousand temporary commissions were offered by the War Office to young unmarried men between the ages of 17 and 30. The offer was extended to cadets and ex-cadets of university O.T. Corps or members of universities, and to other young men of good general education. The public school class now saw the particular form of its duty in the national emergency more plainly before it, and the two thousand vacancies were very quickly filled from this source.

The rush of the university and public school men was without parallel in the history of education, exceeding even the exodus from

with the elder boys in joining up. A sixth form master from one famous school found himself in the ranks with one of his boys as his second lieutenant. The story of the public schools was an inspiring one. The rolls of members serving mounted up with amazing rapidity. School after school had a thousand old boys, mostly youths, serving, and in this matter schools of fame and leading were almost outrun by schools that had been hitherto little known, some modern, some ancient, but schools that had hitherto led the even tenor of their way without an aspiration to join the "Sacred Nine."

It was a wonderful record. The schools poured out their life, and, unlike the universities, who gave their all at one great moment, the schools continued throughout the war giving their boys, almost ready trained before leaving school for the deadly work that lay ahead. The cadet corps system proved invaluable during the Great War. Before the war these school corps, which were something more than mere military training corps and strove to give full physical and disciplinary training, had rapidly multiplied and had been affiliated to the


Territorial Force County Associations initiated by Lord Haldane in 1907. In the hour of emergency they further multiplied and became of the greatest service in providing the officers so badly needed by the New Armies. Before the end of August a voluntary movement was started to form a University and Public Schools Brigade, and by September 12 it was found that no less than 5,000 old university and public school men had attested. It was a small but important instance of the spirit of that particular class, a spirit that indeed was moving in all classes and in both sexes; for it would be impossible to overrate the work for the war and indeed in the war done by secondary school girls and university women. The "Girls' Patriotic Union of Secondary Schools," under the patronage of the King's daughter, Princess Mary, carried out work of the most useful kind, administrative work (such, for instance, as the raising of funds in the schools for the Star and Garter Home for totally disabled soldiers and sailors, for Red Cross work, hospitality for destitute Belgian girls, and so forth), volunteer service, the making of garments, the cultivation of land,

and indeed innumerable forms of industry directly related to the war. Large numbers of school girls and university women took up voluntary aid work in connection with hospitals, Red Cross work, direct work in the driving of motors in England and elsewhere, science work in relation to war factories, work in the factories in actual production, canteen work, welfare work among munitioners. The part played in the war by women of this class was admirable and effective.

But what was true of elder girls in specially advantageous circumstances was equally true of the girls who normally left school at the age of 13 or 14. These children, and indeed many younger children, were soon after the war taking a direct part in the organization of the nation for war purposes. Gradually the factories of the nation were taken over for the innumerable needs of the Services, and into these factories the children poured. There was loss and great sacrifice in this work, which was soon seen to be heavier in many cases than young children and adolescents could undergo. These children, under the law as it stood at the outbreak of the Great



MARCH OF THE CHURCH NURSING AND AMBULANCE BRIGADE OF YOUNG WOMEN AND GIRLS PAST THE NELSON COLUMN.



AN OPEN-AIR CLASS IN WINTER.

War, were free to work. Soon the question of the welfare of these children arose, and the factories became an object lesson that determined the Government to secure, at the earliest possible date, educational control over all children up to the age of 18. But meantime the factory work had to go on, and so welfare work among the children became a new profession, and more was learnt during the Great War of the conditions that must govern effective child labour than in a century of previous experience. It at last became possible to realize that half-time labour of school children must be abolished, while half-time education of adolescents must be introduced. The experience among children in the war factories laid the foundation of the system of higher education in body, mind and character which was incorporated in Mr. Fisher's Education Bill.

This reference to the war work of children of school age has a place here, since the question of the position of those children who ought to have been at school was the subject of various inquiries of an educational character during the war and, in fact, precipitated the movement which led to the introduction of Mr. Fisher's Bill on August 10, 1917. In the spring of 1916 the sense of anxiety as to the conditions of children at work was growing apace. A Return of the Board of Education as to children under 12 specially released from school for

employment in agriculture showed not only that 7,934 boys and 92 girls were so employed, but that the figures had rapidly risen from 1,388 boys and 25 girls in the last quarter of 1915, and that out of 62 counties only nine had granted no exemptions. These figures were straws showing how the wind, which proved to be a hurricane, was blowing. Children of school age were pouring into industry as a result of the policy of the Board of Education early in the war, by which Local Education Authorities were allowed to suspend the enforcement of the attendance bye-laws. Many towns such as Birmingham, Hull and Bradford refused to take advantage of such a policy. Bradford stood firm despite local pressure which was officially supported by the Home Office. The results of such a policy and the ever growing demands for labour in works carrying out Government war contracts were disastrous from the educational point of view, and the Government was not strong enough to insist that adult labour should be exclusively employed in work that was in most cases entirely unsuited to school children. But something was done; welfare workers were appointed and canteens provided and the conditions and hours of labour were carefully watched. Moreover the Government appointed a Departmental Committee in the spring of 1916

to consider what steps should be taken to make provision for the education and instruction of children

and young persons after the war, regard being had particularly to the interests of those (1) who have been abnormally employed during the war; (2) who cannot immediately find advantageous employment; (3) who require special training for employment.

Here for the present it will be convenient to leave this question of children of school age who were employed in war work, with the comment that the difficulties that arose made educational reform inevitable. One of these difficulties must be referred to here, as it undoubtedly reacted on the efficiency of school

life throughout the war. The restlessness among the children of all ages that inevitably arose when the war began became, in a considerable percentage of cases, more than restlessness when the homes were depleted of the younger adults, the men on military service, the women on war service of various kinds. There was, in fact, what might have been expected in the circumstances, a good deal of rowdyism, in some cases passing into hooliganism, and a notable increase in what may be called




AIR-RAID DRILL: SCHOOL-GIRLS PRACTISING CARRYING A WOUNDED SCHOOLFELLOW.

minor crime, such as stealing fruit from orchards, and some increase in serious crime, such as robbery from the person. The limited accommodation in the reformatory and industrial schools was entirely taken up and the Children's Courts had many cases to decide. There was, at one period of the war, a tendency to exaggerate both the character and the amount of the unrest among school children and young adolescents; but the fact remained that it was substantially prevalent in some areas and was not entirely absent from any area. The cause, however, was obvious and the result was due to this cause and not to criminality in any real sense of the term. The children, from the age of, at any rate, 14 upwards, had no restraint, oversight, or mental or moral or physical training other than was supplied by their own homes or by voluntary clubs. They were cut adrift when they left school at 13 or 14 years of age from all the educational influences that were available in the case of children in the middle class. Unless they belonged to the bodies of Scouts and Guides, Boy and Girl Brigades or clubs of some kind, they were without any system of control. The wonder was that things were not

very much worse than was in fact the case. The new freedom of money and the loss of parental control might indeed have meant the widespread demoralization of children. This result did not take place. On the whole the children behaved well throughout the war, and especially in the exciting times of air raids. The younger children, when the air raids and the indiscriminate throwing of bombs by Zeppelins began, were very nervous, but this nervousness almost entirely passed away. The dreadful destruction of child life due to the bomb that struck a Poplar school in the summer of 1917 was not followed by any general nervousness among children, though the facts were well known to them. Observers said that in the raid shelters during the nights in 1917, when London was continually attacked by aircraft and was protected by a terrifying barrage, the children in the din of the guns and within sound of crashing bombs were not only cool but entirely indifferent and full of talk about their own affairs. They typified the spirit of London as a whole and showed how entirely wrong in this as in much else was the German estimate of British psychology.

It is certain that the amount of juvenile



A RAID REHEARSAL: MARCHING TO SHELTER.



INFANTS ON THE WAY TO A RAID SHELTER.

"crime" in this difficult time was kept within narrow bounds by the excellent work of the various Scout and Brigade Corps. They produced a general spirit of discipline among the children and a desire to turn their energies into channels that would help the nation to carry on the war. This is not the place in which to discuss the admirable work done by the various corps, but a word of tribute must be paid to the manifold activities of the Scouts and Boys' Brigades—work for wounded soldiers, farm work, making of sandbags, hospital and ambulance work, despatch riding, air raid calls, and so forth—activities that made the elder lads fit for service, with much the same effect as the Cadet Corps secured in the secondary schools. A special word must be said for the Girl Guides, who throughout the war worked to become efficient in numbers of subjects (such as nursing, signalling and telegraphy) of direct war use. They did excellent hospital work, including washing up, washing and bandage work after school hours. They collected £2,000 for an ambulance in France. A matron wrote of them: "The Girl Guides are simply splendid; they stick to the work when other people do it for a few days and then leave off." It is proper to



THE DUG-OUT.

place on record the work of one girl guide who received an award for courage and devotion to duty while tending school children who had been killed and injured in an air raid on London. This girl was a typical instance of a fortitude and determination that augured well for the future of England. But the main ground for referring to all this child-club work is the fact that Mr. Fisher's Bill of 1917 recognized it as an essential element in any organized reconstruction of English education. The unrest among children made the Bill a necessary measure; the capacity of the children for self-organization made it in respect to continued education a possible measure, since that education could not have become fully effective without taking the club movement into adequate account in the local schemes of



GIRL GUIDES LEARNING SIGNALLING.

education that were a main feature of the Bill.

One other reference to school children generally is necessary, the question of rations. The earlier stages of the policy of voluntary rationing deliberately ignored the school children, and no doubt they suffered in some slight measure in consequence, as in rationing for the household there was in many homes and certainly in many boarding schools a reduction for all members of the household. In some boarding schools, where better knowledge might have been expected, the children were deliberately put upon comparatively low war rations in order that they might feel the effect of the war. It was a foolish policy, which unhappily was coupled with financial profit. An eminent doctor stated in the pages of *The Times Educational Supplement* that he had known cases where real injury to health had been caused by this deplorable method of combining patriotism for the children with personal saving. Early in 1917 it was publicly stated by Captain Bathurst that the system of voluntary rations was not to apply to children. At the beginning of December it was decided by Sir Arthur Yapp, Director of Food Economy, after consultation with various schools, to issue a system of rations for children. To do so was really a protection for all children, since it gave public information as to the amounts and character of food needed for children of various ages, and thus made it difficult for child life to be exploited in this new way. At the same time the scale of rations issued, while being ample (e.g., 6 lb. of bread, 2 lb. of meat, 10 oz. of fat, 8 oz. of sugar for boys

between 13 and 18, girls having four-fifths of this allowance; and $4\frac{1}{2}$ lb. of bread with the above amounts of other substances for all children between 9 and 12 years), was definitely intended to prevent waste and to secure the use of the most effective foods at special ages.

It will now be convenient, after noticing the new idealism in education that synchronized with the war, to consider, not in detail but with some fullness of reference, particular grades of school children and students; then to pass on to the position and work of the teachers; next to consider in chronological order the educational policy of the Government in war time; and lastly to record the genesis and progress of one of the most interesting of war measures, the great Education Bill introduced by Mr. Fisher, a Bill intended to be the keystone of national economic reconstruction after the Great War.

The idealism to which reference has been made was to be noticed from the early days of the war as dominating the policy of those who clamoured for drastic reforms in national education. Many references from the multitudinous publications of the time might be given here, but it will be sufficient to refer to the successive conferences on New Ideals in Education that were held by a select body of educational thinkers and idealists during the war. The papers read at these conferences were subsequently published, and revealed a passionate determination to do justice to all classes and ages of children in the matter of education, to secure for them the best physical, mental and spiritual training in all

grades, whether in town or country life, with the four-fold goal of enlarging their personalities so that all potential powers for good could be realized, of making them efficient in their capacities as thinkers and workers, by rendering them useful servants of the State, and, above all, by making them what Mr. Frank Roscoe called "humane in the broadest sense of that term."

Ideals could not be brought down to earth unless babyhood was given health and trained in habits or habitudes that make for health, unless the elementary schools were schools of preparation, unless the secondary schools gave an outfit for life, unless all children between the ages of 14 and 18 years were given health and capacity to take up the multitudinous duties that lie waiting for the hands of the young adults of a great and an aspiring nation. This New Idealism lay behind and enveloped all educational progress during the Great War. The fact was one that gave to the whole of that sad period an aspect of hope and an outlook of victory in the spiritual as well as the material aspect of things. Perhaps this side of educational development during the war was best described by an officer writing in *The Times*, who likened the Educational Revival to the

foundation of All Souls' College, Oxford, after the great French wars of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. That foundation memorialized the dead for ever, and the English Revolution in Education might do the same. This idea was set forth differently by Mr. Fisher, the Minister of Education, speaking at the New Ideals Conference in August, 1917. He said :

I will . . . conclude with one reflection, which you will pardon me for making because I make it in my character of the historical pedant. I remember in old days reading the story of the foundation of the University of Leyden. The University of Leyden was founded in the year 1574 by the Prince of Orange to commemorate the triumphant issue of the great and heroic siege of Leyden, when, as you will remember, the gallant burghers of that starving and beleaguered city managed to hold out against the overwhelming forces of Catholic Spain. The memorial of that heroic event was the foundation of a University, a University which in the course of a generation achieved for itself the renown of being one of the most famous centres of light and learning, the University of Scaliger, the University of Grotius, and I suggest to you, ladies and gentlemen, that our memorial of this war should be a great University of England, which should be the means of raising the whole population of this country to a higher level of learning and culture than has hitherto been possible.

This conception of an educational system that should, in fact, form a University for the whole nation, and that this ideal *Studium Generale* should be the memorial of the self-



GIRL GUIDES LEARNING COOKING.

sacrifice that the Great War had imposed upon the land struck the note which was needed at that hour. It was at this very time that the public schools throughout the country began to cast about for war memorials that should celebrate eternally the dead who had died for England. Vast sums in the aggregate—Eton alone raised £100,000—were gathered together to secure in the case of each school something that should add to the glorious tradition of the school, and at the same time help future scholars to profit from the very events that had seemed at first so heroically fruitless. But Mr. Fisher's conception was even loftier than that of local school patriotism, the idea of making the reorganization of national life through the schools the everlasting memorial of the myriads who had fallen in the Great War.

The infant grade of education might at first sight seem to have little to do with the war; but in fact it suffered heavily from the war, and the hardships and dangers of the infant were factors that made it possible to insist on the passage of Mr. Fisher's Bill during the war. The demand for economy in national service was brought home to the

local education authorities as to all the other departments of national life, and some of these authorities rose to the deceptive lure without delay. Those who advised national economy meant one thing; to those who were advised it meant another. Economy means the best use of available resources and the elimination of waste. Most people who tried to be economical in the early stages of the war thought that the principal object of economy was to make the subject uncomfortable or inefficient. Thus some of the local authorities reduced essential branches of work, such as the medical service, without in any way securing real economy. Whether it was economical to exclude children under five years from the schools as a war economy was very doubtful, since at this very time the mothers were more and more being engaged in war work, and the homes, the only alternative to the schools, were inevitably neglected. It was, and is, certainly a question whether a school is at all a good place for a child under five; but at any rate during the war it was a better place than a neglected home.

At the very time that the local educational authorities decided to exclude these children a



BABY WEEK: PRIZE BABIES OF DUBLIN.




BABY WEEK AT WEST HAM: A PARADE.

great outcry was being raised as to the waste of child life, the potential capital of the kingdom during a war that was using up so many of the best lives in the nation. Consequently, the period of the Great War saw the arrival of the "Baby Week" Movement, in aid of child life, a movement that was intensified by the bad conditions under which the children lived and by the Report issued by Sir George Newman in 1917 as the head of the School Medical Service. That Report not only showed the dangers to the nation of neglecting little children but the very grave outlook involved in the fact that something like 12 per cent. of all school children were physically unfit to take full advantage of school work. It had, however, become plain that a system of nursery and open-air schools was needed by the nation. The experimental schools of Miss Margaret Macmillan and others showed the line of advance. The new policy reacted on the position with extraordinary rapidity, and the death-rate among young children reached the lowest recorded figures in 1916 and 1917. The higher rates of wages, despite the substantial increase in prices and the lack of parental care, were factors in this social advance.

The elementary schools proper, dealing with

children from the ages of 5 to 13 or 14 years, were chiefly affected in the war by the changes in the teachers; but the change by which women teachers in the lower standards for boys were substituted for men was not, on the whole, one that militated against educational efficiency. The same cannot be said of the check that took place in respect to the School Medical Service and to the ambitious plans for reducing the size of classes, especially in London, that were in contemplation and partially in operation in 1914. The demand of the army for doctors, and the necessary restrictions on new buildings, certainly affected the elementary schools very seriously. But every effort was made by the reduced medical staff to keep the school service efficient within restricted limits, and the teachers strove, with a great measure of success, not only to assist the medical service but to grapple with the difficulties of large classes in a period of very considerable unrest among children. In particular may be noted the fine service, from the point of view of the teaching of sound principles of patriotism, that was done by the teachers. Mr. Pease in the early days of the war issued, as President of the Board of Education, a circular to his "Colleagues in the National Service of Education," in



[G. G. Lewis.]

AN OUTDOOR LESSON IN GEOLOGY.

which he struck an inspiring note. He wrote :—

What can we do? We can keep the system of education going . . . If we can keep the schools open and effective, and have ready against the hour of distress our organization for feeding school children, we shall have done much to guard a vital point. . . . Scholars of every age can be trained to feel, as the teachers must be feeling, that this is, above all, a time for the most exact, punctual and willing discharge of every duty of daily life at home or at school. Let us seize the chance of giving to the children . . . a larger education, a fuller training for the work by which, when peace is restored, the wastage of war may be supplied and the wealth of nations renewed. . . . We are trustees for posterity. . . . Let us be able in after years to tell them that we did our best.

Of the secondary schools we have already spoken. In 1860 the basis was laid for the great cadet corps movement which played so substantial a part in the supply of subalterns in the Great War. The public schools and secondary schools throughout the country were a continual source of supply during the course of the war; crowded were their lists of men serving, and crowded were the rolls of honour that they recorded. These rolls of honour were, of course, a feature of all schools, from the smallest village school to the greatest public school. In some cases they were the continuation of a tradition of national service going back for centuries, in others they were perhaps the beginning of a tradition that will go on for centuries. The great work of supplying men for the army, women for war service, was not only the pride

of the regular schools; the Poor Law schools and philanthropic institutions, such as Dr. Barnardo's Homes, vied with the proudest schools in their ample self-sacrifice and service. It is, indeed, but right to place on record the fact that over 10,000 "Barnardo Boys" served on sea or land during the Great War, of whom 242 had laid down their lives before the end of the year 1917. "Ten thousand orphaned and destitute boys have been converted into 10,000 fighting men," wrote Dr. William Baker, the Honorary Director, proudly during the war. Indeed, it would require a new Xenophon to record their achievements, which included a recommendation for the Victoria Cross for one who died before he could receive it.

Perhaps the work of the schools during the Great War can best be illustrated by some specific cases. We may note, for example, the work of two very populous middle-class endowed secondary day schools, the school for boys and the school for girls belonging to the foundation of John Roan created in the time of Charles I. The boys' school, which had existed since the seventeenth century, contained during the war some five hundred boys, with a proportionate Roll of Honour and an active old boys' association. The school carried out the type of work common to all the secondary schools; it had its cadet corps, which supplemented the normal work of such a corps

with allotment work in term time and farm work in vacation. The large scout troop was not less active in similar duties, in the collection of waste paper and in post-office work. It was more difficult for the girls' school to find direct war work, but it achieved, as indeed most schools of this type achieved, an ample measure of success. By February, 1917, the girls had purchased War Loan Stock and War Savings Certificates to the amount of £1,318. From September, 1914, onwards, there was a regular collection of money, knitted garments, and gifts in kind for the purpose of an organized transmission of parcels to the battalions of the local regiment. The work was carried out by a Troops Committee elected from the various forms. For the same regiment 400 rifle-lock covers were sent abroad in 1915. All this work was specially commended by the colonel of the regiment. Kit-bags, fitted with necessities, were made for Belgian soldiers in English hospitals returning to the front. Woollen garments were sent to prisoners of war, to Belgians at the front, and to the crews of mine-sweepers. Similar work was carried out by the Old Girls' Association. In addition to this work many special collections were made, 330 books were sent to the Y.M.C.A.

Red Triangle Library, and other books to the local hut, which was managed, *inter alia*, by an old pupil. Five footballs were sent for the use of French recruits in the Cherbourg Collège, a fact acknowledged by the colonel in his *Ordre du Jour*! This school of 400 girls also printed a Roll of Honour containing the names of all relatives of the girls on active service. There was nothing unusual in the efforts of these schools, though, no doubt, the naval and military associations of the district stimulated the work. But the scholars were, for the most part, rich only in patriotism, and the record shows what a rather poor school could do. But masses of work of the same type were done by schools all over the country, among which should be mentioned the girls' schools of the Public Day School Trust. One of these schools at a single fête collected £400 for the Star and Garter Hostel Fund.

If the sense of self-sacrifice and service was true of all grades of schools, it was not less true of the universities and university and technical colleges, young and old. At the outbreak of war the old Universities of Oxford and Cambridge instantly took up war work of the greatest importance. The Oxford colleges became in effect barracks and recruiting



[G. G. Lewis.

A "SCHOOL JOURNEY" CLASS AT MILTON'S COTTAGE, CHALFONT ST. GILES.


stations. During August, 1914, the Oxford Military Committee sat every day, and in a short time recommended over 1,100 men for commissions. By October, when term began, over 1,500 men had gone. At Cambridge the Vice-Chancellor appointed at once a special war committee of the Military Board, consisting of Col. H. J. Edwards, C.B. (Tutor of Peterhouse), and others, who sat daily from August 5, and by September 26 had forwarded to the War Office 2,000 applications for commissions, 735 being for the New Army.

What was true of the elder universities was equally true of London and of the provincial universities. They poured out their men in circumstances really more difficult than those faced by Oxford and Cambridge, since a large proportion of the students were less able to join at a moment's notice. In the extract given below from Mr. Henderson's speech in the House of Commons on education in war time the work of the universities and colleges is brought into relief. Here we may mention as well the work done by the colleges for women at Oxford and Cambridge in very many fields. The service of these highly trained women in scientific work

directly related to the war needs to be placed upon record, as well as their work in war-time factories, hospitals, and in the field of war itself. These colleges deepened the tradition of half a century of national service and opened the day of the full franchise for women.

Some more detailed reference to the work of the universities during the Great War may be added here, though such reference is of necessity illustrative rather than exhaustive.

It would be difficult to guess from the outward form of the "Oxford University Calendar," published in the height of the war, that any war was in progress. Everything appears as usual, colleges, fellowships, prizes, lists of honours men, lists of men at the various colleges. It is only on examining the last that the reader is set wondering, for he finds attached to thousands of names the letter "A," which well might be Chaucer's "crownèd A." This letter meant "engaged on military or other public service." That is the sole reference to the war, a reticence that is both pleasing and expected, but nevertheless likely to confuse a man engaged in historical research in the fifteenth millennium, A.D. The "Cambridge University Calendar" contained a



A POLYTECHNIC CLASS IN PIANOFORTE MAKING.

special section on the war consisting of some 23 pages, but quite disassociated from the general plan of the Calendar. The Oxford "A" system was not adopted, but in the college lists the use of a little "a" indicated that a certain scholar had been "admitted but not yet matriculated," that, in other words, he had gone to the war. The section on the war showed that of the 13,395 men on service up to August, 1917, 1,734 had been killed, 2,405 had been wounded or were missing or prisoners, while five had been awarded the Victoria Cross, 12 the D.S.C., 199 the D.S.O., and 628 the Military Cross. The undergraduates had been reduced by the war to about one-sixth of the usual number: in the Easter term, 1914, there were 3,181 undergraduates; in the Easter term, 1917, there were 491. On All Saints' Day, 1916, a service was held in King's College Chapel in commemoration of the members of the university who had fallen in the war in the past year. During the same year a number of lectures by Belgian professors were delivered in the university in what were then known as the New Lecture Rooms, near Pembroke College.

In connexion with the effect of the war on the University of Cambridge passing reference may be made to certain war legislation that referred to and was intended to relieve the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge and Durham and the colleges therein, and the Colleges of Winchester and Eton: the Universities and Colleges (Emergency Powers) Act, 1915. This Act rendered possible modifications in the due course of university or college life made necessary or desirable during the war, such as the postponement during the emergency period of the election or admission to any professorship, readership, lectureship or university office, and the interim application of the moneys so saved to university purposes; and the similar postponement with similar results of any university studentship, scholarship, prize, or similar emolument. The Act also enabled a university to continue after the emergency period, for the same period as that of the postponement, scholarships so postponed in cases where the holder had been doing national service. The Act also enabled money to be borrowed for the purpose of making good deficiencies in revenue due directly or indirectly to the war. The University of Cambridge made statutes under this Act which

were duly sealed on December 3, 1915. It is interesting to note that it was under this legislation that it was decided to postpone election to the Dixie Professorship of Ecclesiastical History, which became vacant on the death of Professor Gwatkin. The Cambridge war record contains all the Graces passed to adjust university life to the conditions of the war. On December 8, 1916, the Vice-Chancellor published a Memorandum, signed by



SCHOOLBOYS GATHERING HORSE CHESTNUTS FOR MUNITIONS.

135 members of the Senate ordinarily in residence, suggesting, in view both of general and special demands which might be expected to be made upon the university as a consequence of conditions prevailing after the war, longer university terms, simplification of the arrangements of examinations, provision for short courses of study and the possibility of a more economical standard of living. The Council of the Senate dealt with this Memorandum on January 29, 1917, and indicated that these important questions would be dealt with by the Council, the General Board of Studies and two syndicates. On the subject of the cost of residence the Vice-Chancellor proposed to consult representatives of the colleges. These decisions were important in view of the large place that the pre-eminence of the University of Cambridge in mathematics and science promised to give the university in developments after the war.

The Calendar of the University of Manchester was almost as reticent as to the war as that of the University of Oxford; but it prints as a preliminary to the Index the Annual Statement of the Vice-Chancellor, which showed

that in the summer of 1917 over 1,700 members of the university past and present were with the colours, while over 460 students were absent on military, naval or other service, in addition to 68 members of the teaching staff. Over 80 distinctions had been gained. Practically all the members of the Science and Medical Staff were wholly or partially engaged on war service. The ordinary research work of the scientific departments had been abandoned, and they had devoted themselves to special service, both advisory and experimental, in connexion with the war. This research work

Cadet Battalions), as well as the four Scottish universities, had records not less distinguished than this during the war; distinguished in the war service of their members and the applied work of their professors. Birmingham, for example, had in all from its staff, students, past students, officials, and savants over 950 serving, of whom at the end of 1917 115 had been killed, while 71 were missing. The roll of honour of the University of Liverpool contained at the end of the year 1917 the names of at least 1,465 members and servants of the university, of



ROYAL MILITARY ACADEMY, WOOLWICH: RAW RECRUITS LEARN TO SALUTE.

was destined to have lasting effect in the development of British industries after the war and to secure permanently certain industries that had formerly become a monopoly in Germany as a result of resourceful German developments of British inventions. The universities during the war rendered any further monopolies of this type improbable. It should also be noted that the Manchester University Officers Training Corps secured well over 1,000 commissions in the period before September, 1917.

The Universities of Liverpool, Wales, Leeds, Sheffield, Birmingham, Bristol (which like Oxford and Cambridge entertained Officers

whom 132 had died on service. Four members had been awarded the Victoria Cross and one secured the bar to his Cross. The small University of St. Andrews, possessing in 1914 508 students, of whom 200 were women, had a remarkable record: in all 691 students and graduates had gone on service by the end of 1917, and of these 83 had been killed and 54 were members of the teaching staff. Extremely important work was done by the chemistry departments. Dr. Robert Robertson, F.R.S., of this university, was head of the Chemical Research Department at Woolwich, from which many important inventions and discoveries emanated during the war. The work of the

other Scottish Universities was not less remarkable. It may perhaps be noted that the Edinburgh University roll included about 5,000 names, including graduates, students, alumni, cadets of the O.T.C., members of the staff, and university servants. Of the teaching staff over 20 member were engaged in other forms of direct war service, while the departments of engineering, natural philosophy, chemistry, physiology, pathology, and bacteriology were all engaged in various forms of war work.

The University of Wales, and its constituent colleges of Aberystwyth, Bangor, and Cardiff did notable work. At Aberystwyth the history of military activities dated from the year 1900, when a College Volunteer Company, attached to the 5th Battalion of the South Wales Borderers, was formed, which in 1908 became a contingent of the O.T.C. In October, 1914, this was recruited to its full strength and from that time to December, 1915, a constant stream of cadets was sent out. The formation, on the suggestion of Mr. Lloyd George, of a Welsh Division proved very popular in the university, and various units of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers benefited by the work of the colleges. Every battalion of the Welsh Division when it went on service had some member of the various colleges on its list of officers. Up to the end of 1917 450 cadets had passed through the Aberystwyth O.T.C. contingent alone. The activities of Aberystwyth were rivalled by those of Bangor and Cardiff, as was shown by the respective rolls of honour. In the case of each college were to be found the names of between 400 and 600 men on the roll of service with the inevitable heavy lists of casualties. But the activities of the university were not limited to services in the field, and special mention may be made of the work of the chemical department at Aberystwyth. The war service of Welsh students and school children was fully as valuable as the services of the same classes elsewhere in the United Kingdom.

The war certainly reacted on university life in a remarkable fashion and gave a new outlook to applied science. Some special reference should be made to the work of the University of London in addition to that of the provincial universities during the Great War. In the annual reports of the Vice-Chancellor of the University of London striking figures were given. Thus in the year 1915 there were 2,209 cadets in training in the University Contingent

of the Officers Training Corps. At the end of that year the total number of commissions granted to cadets or ex-cadets since the outbreak of war was 2,031 in addition to 273 commissions to other members of the university. On December 31, 1916, the Military Education Committee had in all recommended 3,111 graduates and students for commissions, and about 21,000 members were or had been serving with the colours. Among the 493 men who died on service in 1916 were Sir Victor Horsley and Dr. T. G. Brodie. But the work of the university in the war was by no means confined to service with the colours or the training of officers. Work was done by members of the university "of the highest importance both for the direct prosecution of the war and for the assistance of national industries affected by it." Premises, laboratory and other accommodation were provided by the university itself and by several of its schools and institutions for various forms of war activity. Important services were rendered to the Government in the departments of physics, chemistry, physiology, pharmacology, bacteriology, metallurgy, and civil, mechanical and electrical engineering. Many of the women students devoted their vacations and other spare time to work on farms and in factories that suffered from deficiency of male labour.

In May, 1917, London University welcomed a number of professors of French universities and showed in detail the war work that was then being carried on. The Vice-Chancellor, Dr. A. P. Gould, in recording the satisfaction of his guests stated his belief that the visit would strengthen in no small degree the solidarity of the alliance which had been so happily established between the two countries for the security of that civilization which was their common heritage and which they were working together to preserve.

This reference to the work on the land performed by women of the University of London should be recorded together with the war work carried out by students and past students from Girton College, Cambridge. Ten doctors served abroad in France, Serbia, Greece, Roumania, Russia. About 30 students specialized in applied science, as, for example, the inventor of anti-gas machine, researchers in pathology and chemistry, radiographers, bacteriologists, computers, etc., the superintendent

in engineering works. Educational work was taken up by over 100 students, of whom 14 were in university posts, and about 70 in boys' schools. About 80 were at work in various Government offices, while many were occupied in munition works as testers, chemists, inspectors, supervisors, welfare workers, heads of hostels. The college was well represented in W.A.A.C. and Y.M.C.A. work and in the sphere of nursing had representatives on every front. Important work was also done in agriculture and in many civil capacities, replacing men on war service. We should here also note the valuable farming work carried out by about 70 students or past students of Newnham College, Cambridge, at Belvedere in Kent and at Wingland in South Lincolnshire. At Wingland on time work these ladies were paid 15s. a week for a working day of 7½ hours and 4½ hours on Saturday. On piece work wages ranged higher and by working as a gang and pooling wages each worker on time work had 3s. 6d. a week pocket money after living was paid for. The members of the Newnham College Club did much other war work in various Government Departments, including the National Physical Laboratory, in factories, as teachers in boys' schools, and, of course, in nursing and medical work. Work was also

done for the Ordnance Board of Royal Artillery.

At Somerville College and at Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford, as elsewhere, the members of the staff and the students realized from the first that the normal college work was work of national importance, and not lightly to be thrown aside for exclusive war duties. Three students only left the Hall to take up nursing before completing their university course. It was not until March, 1917, that a visiting lecturer accepted a post as assistant director at the Ministry of Munitions. From 1914 onwards the students assisted a committee formed in Oxford to organize relief for Belgian refugees, and in September, 1915, some members of the staff organized the clothing department of this work and remained responsible for the purchase and distribution of clothes. In July, 1915, a member of the staff organized a camp for training workers in connexion with a Belgian repatriation scheme, which was attended by several of the students. A good deal of farm-work, such as hoeing and fruit-picking, was done in vacation. In term time part of the Hall ground and also a plot of land near by were dug and planted with potatoes and other vegetables, and the students took the place of the college gardener. A war savings association



INNS OF COURT O.T.C. AT BAYONET PRACTICE.

[Newman, Berkhamsted.]



[Newman. Berkhamsted.]

INNS OF COURT O.T.C. AT MACHINE GUN PRACTICE.

was formed in 1916 and reached a membership of about 70. At the suggestion of the Board of Education a large number of books were dispatched for the use of the civilian prisoners interned at Ruhleben Camp. Prisoners of war were also "adopted," and parcels of food and clothing sent out regularly. Help was given by both staff and students when required at a depot for military stores. Bandage-rolling was done regularly by students, and sweaters, mufflers, socks, gloves were knitted in great numbers. A good deal of time was given in vacation to helping in canteens and munition works, V.A.D. hospitals, in Government and other offices and in compiling the National Register. In term time wounded soldiers were taken out in bath chairs, and entertained at the Hall. Various entertainments were given for war funds and for hospitals, and collections were made in chapel on Sunday evenings for various funds. Voluntary rations were, of course, here, as in other colleges, adhered to from the first.

This reference to university work may fitly conclude with a picture of a college chapel in war time. In the college itself were but a handful of undergraduates, men unable to serve, and therefore doing the best service by making themselves fit for other fields of work; or mere boys taking a term of university life while training in the university O.T.C. But

the college was nevertheless full to overcrowding. The ancient hall that for centuries had seen the assembly of men preparing for various fields of life, a hall that had heard the echoes of many wars from the days of Agincourt to the days of Ladysmith, is now full of men many times a day, full of men in khaki, young men full of keenness and yet stern in a fashion unknown to the undergraduates of peaceful days. These men form a cadet battalion, composed partly of youths training for war work and partly of older men home from France and recommended for commissions. All classes of the community are to be found in the battalion: men who would naturally have been undergraduates, men who would have been shopwalkers, clerks, small shopkeepers, artisans, farmers, from all over England. The battalion represents that perfect mingling and amalgamation of classes that the universities saw so much of in mediæval times. This morning the college chapel is crowded with a battalion, and the short, simple service is gone through with a heartiness that was not always the main feature in earlier days. The chaplain is proud of his chapelful; and the "painted windows" of historic memory that so many generations of undergraduates have watched, and especially the wonderful East window of the crucifixion, look down on the earnest crowd of worshippers and seem to register in



A LONDON SCHOOL FOOD-CONTROL COURT.

Trying a prisoner for wasting food.

endless memory this new phase of college life, the forerunner of a new life for England. There is one dramatic moment in the service when the chaplain reads out in clear, resonant voice the list of members of the college who are serving. Each of those names is the name of a man who has worshipped here, and the very reading of the names means to the congregation an appreciation of the steady continuity of college life. After the Benediction the National Anthem is sung and the men disperse. One said—a man who had fought for two long years in France—“This is something new, wonderful. What a chapel, what a service!” The short service amid surroundings of an immemorial tradition of quiet learning and scholarship had touched the heart of this man, a small tradesman from the North. Such a picture deserves to be put on record, for it brings the endless traditions of the elder universities, which are essentially a possession of the people, into touch through the sad magic of the Great War with the inner lives of many hitherto denied such privileges.

The long record of school and university service during the war was well recognized by Parliament, as the teeming pages of Hansard show.

Mr. Arthur Henderson, President of the Board of Education, in moving the Education Estimates in the House of Commons on July 18, 1916, gave the Committee “some idea as to how we stand after nearly two years’ experience of a great war.” He denied that efficiency had been prejudiced, except in isolated cases, “by a process of unwise economies. . . . The first year of the war, 1914–15, saw our expenditure on education greater than in the previous year. In the second year of the war this level was maintained, and in the third, as the figures show, we expect to do likewise.” In the year ending March 31, 1916, the local authorities had raised their expenditure by about £300,000. Normally the rise would have been £1,000,000. Building operations had been necessarily suspended through the war, and this reduced the estimated expenditure. The evening classes for low grade technical instruction had been closed down and also the training colleges for men, since these had proceeded on military service. “There has only been,” said Mr. Henderson, “one serious and substantial reduction in the expenditure on education strictly speaking, namely, the exclusion from the elementary schools of children

under five years of age." The absence of school inspecting officers of the Board had restricted inspection and incidentally had reduced the Estimates.

Mr. Henderson, turning to the question of child labour, said that it was estimated at the outbreak of war that considerably over 500,000 children under 14 years of age were employed as wage earners in the United Kingdom. In July, 1916, the number of children liable to attend school who were employed in agriculture had during the year nearly doubled, the figures being 15,750, of whom 546 were under 12 years. The Kent Education Authority had exempted 1,668 school children, while Devon had found it necessary to exempt only 159. Huntingdonshire had excused from school attendance 122 boys between the ages of 11 and 12, or one-fourth of the total number of that age excused in England and Wales. Bedfordshire, Lincoln (Kesteven and Lindsey), West Sussex and Worcestershire were also offenders in this respect; but a strong remonstrance had been addressed by the Board of Education to the worst offenders, and it was the intention of the Board to take the necessary power "to prevent any further abuse of the concession which was granted under the strictest conditions only to meet a very special emergency."

Mr. Henderson proceeded to explain the reduction in the Vote with respect to Grants in Aid for supplementing the practice of feeding school children introduced to meet special war difficulties in 1914-15. In 1912-13 19,500,000 meals were provided; in 1913-14, 14,500,000; in 1914-15, 29,500,000, including the first months of the war; in 1915-16, 11,500,000, with further reductions in view. During the first two months of the war the number of meals given rose until they reached 1,200,000 in the last week of September, 1914; in April, 1915, 427,000 meals, and in April, 1916, only 157,000 meals were provided. The Grants in Aid had "had a beneficial effect, far better food being served and greater cleanliness and more orderly habits resulting." It was found that if school feeding was to be effective it must be continuous, and so the Provision of Meals Act, 1914, enabled meals to be given in the holidays. In July, 1915, the Board of Education had issued a pamphlet on economy in food, asking the local education authorities to grant instruction on the subject.

The grant for the school medical service had not been reduced. "Down to March, 1915, the school medical service was practically unimpaired. By March, 1916, out of 850 school medical officers no fewer than 300 had joined the forces." Any further release of officers would in some areas "involve the total



STARTING OUT TO THE SCHOOL ALLOTMENTS.

abandonment of the school medical service, and can only be regarded as deplorable." The supply of teachers was alarmingly low, though the position was not so bad as in 1912-13, when the number of entrants sank to 5,232. In 1915-16 the number of entrants was 7,270, but in 1916-17 it was expected that the number would fall by 1,200. The causes were the great demand for young people in other fields and the low emoluments offered.

Mr. Henderson noted with respect to the secondary schools that the increase of the number of pupils, "after a sharp drop at the beginning of the war," had been maintained and enlarged. There had been "a great development during the war period in officers training corps and cadet corps, a movement which the Board has always regarded with sympathy." Mr. Henderson dwelt on

the part which the technical schools have taken in ammunition work and in the training of ammunition workers. In July, 1915, at the request of the Minister of Munitions, I called upon the technical schools to develop training classes. They responded so readily that in a few months 1,700 men and women were in training and 400 were waiting for vacancies. This has continued; and apart from this many of the schools actually used their machinery for the manufacture of munition details and others transferred their machines to munition works. Nearly all the reports I have received show that the services rendered by the schools have been of the highest possible value. What I have said of the technical schools applies in even greater measure to the universities. It is well

known that they have supplied to the New Army some of their finest fighting material. Next to that, ever since the outbreak of the war their scientific staff has been occupied on special work, mostly of a very confidential and technical nature, for the Admiralty, War Office, and Ministry of Munitions. Indeed, the services they have rendered to the State during the war period have undoubtedly been of incalculable value, though not, I think, greater than the services they will render when peace comes—especially, I hope, during the period of reconstruction. There is, I believe, a growing recognition on the part of manufacturers of the importance of applying science to all industrial problems, and in the growing intimacy between the university and the industrial world I see the promise of incalculable developments in the future.

In this important statement Mr. Henderson had the good fortune to strike the note that Mr. Fisher was destined to strike again in more hopeful tones in April, 1917. Mr. Henderson noted in July, 1916, one or two other matters that should be recorded here. The military authorities up to May 31, 1916, had occupied in all some 200 schools. They were taken only when it was absolutely necessary, and this was chiefly in the North of England, where there had been large concentrations of troops. Schools were particularly suited for the purposes required. No child had in consequence remained unprovided for, "though in some cases the school hours of the younger children have been unavoidably reduced."

Mr. Henderson noted that some 20,000 teachers were, or shortly would be, serving



CAMBRIDGE O.T.C. BRIDGE BUILDING.



CAMBRIDGE O.T.C. MOUNTED INFANTRY AT AN INSPECTION.

with the colours, and he took the opportunity of paying a tribute to their patriotism. Teachers and students not fit for general service were not taken into the Army, while teachers who were fit for general service but were held by the local authority and the Board to be indispensable were also retained, whether temporarily or permanently, in order to carry on the work of the schools. But the teachers were invaluable in the Army. "Their high standard of education, physical training, and practising organization have made them specially valuable as soldiers and officers." The loss of men teachers had, of course, involved the increased employment of women teachers. The authorities largely adopted the practice of placing younger boys up to 11 under women teachers. Superannuated teachers had also returned or had been retained, and the local authorities had been allowed to make temporary appointments of persons possessing good general education, though without any special qualification. Finally, Mr. Henderson pointed out:—

There are two things which the war has clearly demonstrated. First, I think that the war has demonstrated the general soundness and solidity of our educational system, which, in spite of heavy disadvantages, is steadily developing. The war has, I think, also shown and the demeanour of the people has dispelled the fallacy that education was sapping their moral strength. Such stories of heroism as that which was displayed by Jack Cornwell give striking testimony to the patriotism produced by the teaching of our public elementary schools. What the Army owes to the universities and public schools is almost universally recognized; what it owes to the elementary schools is not so often recognized. I have particular gratification in quoting the judgment of a distinguished officer to a former member of my staff. He says: "If it had not been for the discipline and influence of the elementary schools it would have been impossible to have raised and trained the New Armies. Thirty years ago nothing of the kind could have been done." At the same time the war has brought

home to the people what had long been common knowledge amongst those who concern themselves with education, and that is that our national prosperity and security demand greater concentration of trained intelligence on problems of industry, of commerce, and of public administration. I have felt during the year I have been at the Board of Education that there was imposed upon us a two-fold duty. The first is to maintain, as far as possible in the midst of great difficulties, the standard which had been reached before the war. In some respects it was a very high standard, and in others it was low, and I think that the war has demonstrated that in some respects it was almost dangerously low. Then our second duty was—and when the time comes to declare our plans for the future I think it will be found that we have not failed in it—to prepare not only for a reconquest of any ground we have lost, but for an advance which will carry us far beyond. The Committee will remember that the late Government, under my right hon. friend, had actually announced and were taking the first steps to effect a general reorganization of our educational system when war broke out; and, as the Prime Minister has stated, the present Government are again instituting a general inquiry into our education. The Committee may rest assured, therefore, that the plans prepared before the war will not be wasted, but will be reviewed in the light of the experience and, I hope, prosecuted with the energy derived from the war itself.

Some further reference must be made here to the part played by teachers in the Great War.

It was estimated that some 22,000 teachers from schools in England and Wales joined the forces, and many women teachers served as nurses. At least 1,300 of the men teachers gave their lives, and large numbers were wounded or otherwise disabled. Up to the end of 1917, 265 were awarded honours for gallant services, and among these awards were three Victoria Crosses. In addition to contributing to all the national and local relief funds, the members of the National Union of Teachers established a War Aid Fund for the benefit of widows and other dependants of teacher-soldiers and sailors. That fund in December, 1917,

stood at £116,000, which was raised entirely by the contributions of members of the Union. In 1914-15, 300 Belgian teacher-refugees received sums of money from the union's central office, and homes were found for them with English teachers; while help was also afforded in the case of 130 Russian teachers stranded in England as a consequence of the outbreak and operations of the war. In great



BOY SCOUTS BUILDING HUTS FOR THE WAR OFFICE: TIGHTENING BOLTS IN THE FRAMEWORK.

numbers men teachers who were not able to enlist in the early days of the war gave their services in other capacities; as drill instructors, special constables, interpreters, in munition work, and in connection with the National Register. Teachers also took a very notable part in public activities, such as the War Savings Campaign, acting on local relief committees, and numberless other works for the benefit of the country generally, while carrying on with wonderful efficiency the work, ever growing heavier, of the schools.

The depletion of staff in the schools owing to enlistment occasioned temporary dislocation, though this was in great measure met by the return of women teachers who had left the profession. It was estimated that approximately 17,500 women teachers were directly replacing men in July, 1916, of whom 1,400 were in London alone. On the other hand, many women gave up school duties to undertake work as nurses, while hundreds of others gladly gave part time service, as well as service out

of school hours. A great amount of relief work was also being quietly performed by women teachers in the different localities, their continual contact with the children enabling them to ascertain where help was really needed and in what directions it might be applied to the greatest advantage.

The National Union of Teachers, consisting of over 94,000 members, inaugurated for purposes of protection and defence as well as for mutual assistance in 1870, did much to make these results possible. To the efforts of the union and the pressure of public opinion may also be attributed the improvement of the position of teachers in salary and importance that took place during the Great War. Moreover, the union worked hard, as it had always worked, to secure better educational conditions, and its support certainly made the passage of Mr. Fisher's Bill more easy.

But the work of the National Union of Teachers by no means stood alone during the War. In 40 years the teaching profession had become in all its branches very highly organized, though unfortunately the various branches were inadequately correlated. The stress of war conditions brought the numerous organizations into touch and enabled progress to be made in educational life through the many schemes of reform that the various teachers' associations, such as the Headmasters' Association, the Head Mistresses' Association, the Associations of Assistant Masters and Mistresses, of Uncertificated Teachers, of various educational committees, and so forth, brought before the public.

When the war broke out the British Association was meeting in Australia and considering the future of education among English-speaking peoples. Probably no speaker at the meetings under the Southern Cross had any idea of the almost tumultuous changes in education that were at hand. The Great War, instead of deadening educational effort, as was in fact anticipated, had exactly the reverse effect after the people of England had stolidly settled down to war conditions. *The Times Educational Supplement*, at an early date in the war, struck a definite note calling for reform, for "a necessary revolution" in education; and it soon became evident that there was much support for this policy. Before the war considerable reforms had been in contemplation, but there was no doubt that the German model had been too largely in the picture. It was plainly felt that there must be reform on a large scale, but there

was a long struggle between the advocates of "scientific" education and "humane" or classical education, which lasted until it was seen that there were common elements to both that must underlie all reform in curricula and reorganization of classes.


It is not proposed here to enter into the details of this long struggle as to the character and internal organization of education that in fact arose out of the war conditions. But it is necessary to draw attention to the fact, as it illustrates the new and widespread interest in national education that arose at this time. One proof of this interest is shown by the fact that at a time when the national attention was fixed on the swaying course of the war it was found desirable, and indeed necessary, in September, 1916, to turn the monthly *Educational Supplement of The Times* into a weekly newspaper.

We must now turn, again in brief detail, to some aspects of Government action in education in the days when Mr. Pease, Mr. Henderson, Lord Crewe and Mr. Fisher were successively Ministers of Education during the Great War. On March 12, 1915, the Board of Education, aware of the serious dangers arising from the

indiscriminate employment of children, issued a circular calling the attention of the Local Education Authorities to the conditions which in the view of the Government should be satisfied before any children were specially exempted from school attendance. It was to the effect that:

1. The employment of children of school age must be exceptional.
2. The education authority must be sure that all reasonable efforts to secure adult labour had been made.
3. Every case was to be considered on its merits and no general relaxation of the bye-laws as to school attendance was to be allowed.
4. The employment was to be light in character.
5. The permission to work as given was to be of a temporary character only.

This policy at once put the local authorities in a strong position; it laid down the lines that should govern child labour if it were allowed at all; it enabled the clearer thinkers on the Education Committees to resist the pressure of employers of labour and of the reactionaries to be found in every county. But it did more than this. It in effect condemned the indiscriminate use of child labour all over the country and laid upon the Government the duty of overseeing in a new fashion the tasks of children at work and of dispensing with this work at the very earliest period. In fact it made legislation



A CLASS IN STEERSMANSHIP.

abolishing child labour a logical necessity as soon as conditions rendered this possible.

In fact both the Government and the local education authorities had recovered from the first reactions of the war. The local authorities were no longer prepared to reduce expenditure on education. The danger of such a policy was clearly seen, and early in 1916 Mr. Herbert Lewis, of the Board of Education, while announcing that Mr. Pease's scheme of educational reform, in view before the war, had had



BOYS' BRIGADE AMBULANCE CORPS.

to be abandoned, stated that the Board had formulated a scheme to bring science and industry into touch through a new Committee of the Privy Council for Scientific and Industrial Research. The inquiry of the Teachers' Registration Council, early in 1916, into the war retrenchments of the local authorities showed that a large number had said that reduction of expenditure was impossible, but that some had attempted to make savings by the reduction of evening classes, technical schools, and even medical inspection. The report brought out the fact that retrenchment only meant reduction in local rates and was in no sense a direct contribution to national funds.

In the summer of 1916 Lord Crewe announced, at the Imperial College of Science and Technology, that "it had been thought wise that the Prime Minister's Reconstruction Committee should undertake the general supervision and review of the changes which might be required in our national system of education rather than that the inquiry should, as some had recommended, be entrusted to a Royal Commission." The demand for educational reform by the autumn of 1916 had become universal. It was a public demand in no sense limited to professional circles, though it was supported by the leaders of all grades of education, and the need for it was proclaimed by

specialists and politicians alike. It was, however, felt with some reason that a Royal Commission might only delay reform, and as special Government committees, including committees on modern language teaching and science teaching and reconstruction in education and on education after the war were already sitting, it was desirable that the work of these committees should be co-ordinated and the proposals that were then being made in various authoritative quarters should be considered by a practical body that had immediate legislation in view.

In December, 1916, Mr. H. A. L. Fisher, an Oxford historian, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Sheffield, joined Mr. Lloyd George's Cabinet as Minister of Education. The appointment was the result of the universal demand for reform during the war. The appointment was welcomed as that of a specialist who could be trusted to place education before politics. Great things were hoped of Mr. Fisher, and the country was not disappointed. He appeared at an early date to grasp the problems of national education as a unity and the relations of those problems to the difficulties of national life in war time. The appointment seemed at last to lift education into the position of first-class importance in national affairs.



BOYS' BRIGADE COLLECTING PAPER FOR THE PRINCE OF WALES'S FUND.

On April 19, 1917, Mr. Fisher introduced the Education Estimates in a full and able speech, in which he laid down the policy that he proposed to follow. The war, he said, had directed attention to every circumstance which might bear upon national strength and national welfare. The Trade Unions were demanding educational reform and employers were actively promoting it. The combination rendered possible such reform as would enable the rising generation, despite the calamitous losses



REST HUT FOR SOLDIERS AND SAILORS ARRIVING IN EDINBURGH.

Provided and partly staffed by the Boys' Brigade.

of the war, to furnish an adequate measure of service to the community. He asked for a large increase of expenditure on education, the largest ever known. The normal expenditure by the nation of £40,000,000 annually on education was inadequate to the position. He pointed out that the work done by the schools during the war had been wonderful. The New Army "was largely recruited from the elementary schools," and to the schools was due the credit of this "sudden and brilliant" military improvisation.

Mr. Fisher told of a naval commander who said "the way those fellows picked up the job seems to me perfectly marvellous. There is something in your damned Board School education after all." He also dwelt on the wonderful rolls of honour in the elementary schools throughout the country. Such a system needed all the support and development possible. That was the logical outcome of Mr. Fisher's tribute to the elementary schools, and he went on to describe how he proposed to improve the existing position by new grants amounting to £3,420,000 for elementary education and so to secure well-paid teachers and better upper standards in the schools. To this

he added provision for strengthening the secondary school system.

He then sketched out his scheme of education reform, which granted many or indeed most of the reforms demanded by a "Draft Bill" that had appeared in *The Times Educational Supplement* in the previous March: the abolition of child labour, the co-ordination of all grades of education under the administration by way of local schemes by the local education authorities which had been created by Mr. Balfour's Act of 1902 and for fourteen years had worked out the system of education that had done so much for England during the long years of the Great War.

Mr. Fisher adopted the argument that the children are the reserve capital of the nation, and that in days when war was eating up the youth of the people every little child must be preserved and made by education and care to be worthy of his country.

Mr. Fisher's proposals, which were proposals for war legislation of the wisest type, touched the imagination of both Parliament and people. The terms of his proposed Bill were, of course, unknown; only his general policy had been disclosed. From that moment until August, 1917, proposals for educational reform poured



WAR SAVINGS AT FRIERN BARNET SCHOOL.

out from all quarters. Almost every association of men and women who had any touch with education drafted schemes of reform. The Board of Education and the educational journals were flooded with schemes, good, bad and indifferent.

On August 10, 1917, Mr. Fisher produced his own scheme in the House of Commons. His proposals to provide nursery schools, to check child labour, to establish compulsory part-time day continuation schools up to the age of 18, to provide the machinery for educational co-ordination, to extend the school medical service, to secure the physical fitness of all children and young persons, aroused no surprise. Such action had become absolutely necessary. The losses of the war made it not only necessary but urgent that there should be no more waste of child life, that the disease and sickness rate should be further decreased, that children should be so supervised, physically, mentally and morally, as to secure a nation clear in mind, healthy in body and wise in outlook. The physical problem was the basic one. The physical conditions of child life must be transformed. Until that was done it was plain that England must remain an unstable nation, and increasingly unable to face the complex labours that must arise after the war.

Every social thinker felt this to be the truth

of the position. The fact had been preached through the length and breadth of the land, and Mr Fisher's Bill was the answer to a demand that all classes of the community were making, and not least, the industrial classes. The only fashion in which the vast losses of the Great War could be retrieved was by the creation of such a system of national education as would secure for children and adolescents alike the best physical, intellectual and spiritual training that the energies of the country could provide.

Mr. Fisher, in introducing his Bill, said that, as it was a measure of far-reaching social importance introduced by a Coalition Government in the height of a great European war, it was necessary to assure the House that it was urgently demanded by and connected with circumstances of the war. He admitted that the Bill would not enable them to beat the Germans in 1918. Even many years must elapse before its provisions could bear full fruit. But the measure was absolutely connected with the circumstances of the war. It was prompted by deficiencies that had been revealed by the war, it was framed to repair the wastage which had been caused by the war, and should it pass into law before peace was sealed it would put a prompt end to an evil which had grown to alarming proportions during the

previous three years, the industrial pressure upon the child-life of the country, and would greatly facilitate the solution of many problems of juvenile employment which would certainly be affected by the transition of the country from a basis of war to a basis of peace. The measure was not controversial in the political sense. The question of education should be considered in the light of educational needs, and those alone. He was not afraid of the denominational question. He hoped and believed that, in the generally improved atmosphere which had been created by the war, parties might be brought closer together and a settlement of outstanding issues reached. The Bill would adhere to the administrative groundwork of the Act of 1902. Its object was to provide, under the better operation of the existing machinery, enlarged and enriched opportunities of education for the children of the poor.

In the three years of war some 600,000 children had been withdrawn prematurely from school and immersed in industry. They were working on munitions, in the field, and in the mines. In a thousand different ways these children were contributing to success in the war. Though they were earning in some

cases high wages these children were offering up a real sacrifice, the effects of which, in many cases, would be felt to the end of their lives. Mr. Fisher asked the House to consider whether the nation had not incurred a special responsibility towards the children who had been brought in to help in the war, often in circumstances most adverse to the formation of stable character. There could be only one answer, that some special means must be found, either by administrative action or otherwise, whereby the administrative responsibility might be adequately discharged. An increased feeling of social solidarity had been created by the war. When there was a state of affairs under which the poor were asked to pour out their blood and to be mulcted in the high cost of living for larger international policy, then every just mind began to realize that the boundaries of citizenship were not determined by wealth, and that the same logic which led them to desire an extension of the franchise pointed also to an extension of education. There was a growing sense, not only in England, but through Europe, and especially in France, that the industrial workers of the country were entitled to be considered primarily as citizens and as fit subjects for



WAR WORK AT BRADFORD: A BOYS' CLASS MAKING BOXES FOR SOLDIERS' PARCELS.

any form of education by which they were capable of profiting. Mr. Fisher then proceeded to trace in detail the proposals contained in the Education Bill. He laid great stress on the need to abolish or mitigate child labour, especially in the intervals of school work.

There was, he said, an overwhelming mass of evidence to the effect that the health of children suffered from premature or excessive employment. The evil effects could be traced in diminished height and weight, in curvature of the spine, in cardiac affections, and in deficiency of the senses, especially the sense of vision, and in the bad dentition of the working classes. He described clauses that would meet the evil of too early employment. The proposed continuation schools for children between 14 and 18 years would work in with the boys' and girls' clubs, Boy Scouts, Girl Guides and other such wholesome associations, carrying with them intellectual and social advantages. The Bill, moreover, also enabled the local authorities to form school camps and provide social training. It gave physical training a place in the schools; it empowered the local authorities to establish nursery schools, playing fields, school baths, school game centres and equipment for physical training. The Government felt that, in the new circumstances, the life of the rising generation could only be protected against the injurious

effects of industrial pressure by a further measure of State compulsion, which would be the essential condition of a larger and more enlightened freedom.

The speech and the Bill were received with acclamation in the House and in the country. It was felt that the proposed legislation opened a new era for the nation, and from August onwards continual pressure was put upon the Government to expedite a measure so necessary to the interests of the people and the conduct of the war. The facts were brought by a great deputation of the House, drawn from all parties, before the Prime Minister in November, 1917, and the Government agreed to pass the measure at the earliest possible date. On December 14 the Bill was withdrawn for the purpose of meeting somewhat acute criticisms by local education authorities as to certain administrative clauses which stood apart from the educational reforms that formed the substance of the Bill. A new Bill with the necessary changes was promised before the end of the Session, and a Bill giving Scotland in effect all the advantages offered to England by Mr. Fisher's Bill, with special local variations, was brought in on December 17, 1917. With the introduction of these Bills the year 1918 promised to be one of great moment in the history of British education and of England herself.





CHAPTER CCXVI.

THE FIRST BATTLES OF GAZA.


THE SITUATION IN SINAI AND PALESTINE AUGUST, 1916-JUNE, 1917—SIR CHAS. DOBELL TAKES COMMAND OF THE EASTERN FORCE—CAMPAIGNING IN THE DESERT—SECURING A WATER SUPPLY—CAPTURE OF EL ARISH—NAVAL AID—THE ENEMY DEFEATED AT MAGDHABA—DESERT COLUMN'S VICTORY NEAR RAFA—THE TURKS CLEARED FROM SINAI—PLANS FOR THE INVASION OF PALESTINE—ENEMY RETREAT TO THE GAZA-BEERSHEBA LINES—GENERAL MURRAY'S ANXIETY TO FORCE A BATTLE—THE FIRST ATTACK ON GAZA, MARCH, 1917—CAUSES OF ITS FAILURE—LINE OF THE WADI GHUZZE GAINED—TURKS HEAVILY REINFORCED—THE SECOND ATTACK ON GAZA, APRIL, 1917—ADVANCED POSITIONS CAPTURED AND HELD, BUT THE ATTACK REPULSED—SIR CHAS. DOBELL RELIEVED OF HIS COMMAND BY GENERAL MURRAY—GENERAL MURRAY REPLACED BY GENERAL ALLENBY.

AFTER their defeat at Romani in August, 1916, a defeat which marked the collapse of "the second invasion of Egypt," the Turks withdrew to the eastern borders of Sinai. From the places they still held in Egyptian territory they were ejected in December, 1916—February, 1917. The Egyptian Expeditionary Force, then under the command of General Sir Archibald Murray, had attained its original objective; Egypt, and with it the Suez Canal, "the jugular vein of the British Empire," was freed from the menace of the enemy. A new objective now presented itself to Sir Archibald Murray, the conquest of Southern Palestine. The Turks had been severely handled and were temporarily demoralized. There were signs that they did not intend to defend Gaza, the outpost of Syria on the immemorial route to and from Egypt. Had it been possible immediately to follow up the victories on the Palestine border (at Magdhaba and Rafa) Gaza might well have fallen at once into the hands of the British. But an advance across desert country is dependent upon the creation of adequate means of communication and the provision of water and food supplies. There was, therefore, an inevitable pause while

the railway from the Suez Canal along the coast of Sinai was completed to Rafa, and it was not until late in March that Gaza was attacked. The troops engaged were under command of Sir Charles Dobell, who inflicted losses on the enemy at least double the 4,000 casualties sustained by the British. The assailants gained positions which enabled them to continue the railway along the coast, but though at one period very near success, they failed to take Gaza. Their apparently unexpected success led the enemy to send strong reinforcements to that town. Sir Charles Dobell gave battle again on April 17-19, but again the defenders beat off their assailants, though the British, at the cost of 7,000 casualties, captured and held the enemy advanced posts. Immediately after this battle (on April 21) Sir Charles Dobell was relieved of his command by General Murray, while at the end of June General Murray was himself replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Expeditionary Force by General Sir Edmund Allenby. At that date the Turkish front, strongly held, well sited and well entrenched, extended from the Mediterranean near Gaza, to a point south and east of Beersheba. It was not until the end of

October that General Allenby, his preparations completed, opened his offensive. Then in a period of eight days (October 31-November 7) the whole Turkish front was crumpled up and both Beersheba and Gaza were in British possession. A month later Jerusalem surrendered.

During the pause which followed the British victory at Romani the force in Sinai was



THE SINAI-PALESTINE BORDER-LANDS

increased and reorganized. Major-General the Hon. H. A. Lawrence had been in local command of all the troops engaged in the Romani operations, and their success was largely the result of his dispositions. With the new arrangements a new commander was chosen—Lieut.-General Sir Charles Dobell, who had earned distinction as chief of the Anglo-French Expeditionary Force in Cameroon. General Lawrence, whose services were rewarded with the C.B. (November, 1916) and the K.C.B. (January 1917) left Egypt for Europe. Sir Charles Dobell formed new Headquarters at Ismailia on October 23, 1916. (His command was known as the Eastern Force, to distinguish it from the

troops in Western Egypt engaged against the Senussi.) During November the cavalry were pushed forward along the caravan route to Palestine, and on the 26th of that month the railway from the Suez Canal reached Mazar, 21 miles west of El Arish, where the Turks then had their advanced headquarters. Their nearest post to the British was Masaid, five miles west of El Arish. On December 7 Lieut.-General Sir Philip Chetwode assumed command of the mounted troops of the Eastern Force. They were known as the Desert Column, and included the Anzac Mounted Division under Major-General Sir H. Chauvel. In mid-December General Chetwode moved his headquarters 27 miles forward, from Bir el Abd to Mazar.

By this time everything was ready for an advance on El Arish, except for the one thing indispensable—the provision of water for the striking force. If in general an army fights as it feeds, in particular an army in the desert fights as it drinks, and while from Romani to Bir el Abd there were local supplies of water—even if brackish—east of Bir el Abd no water was to be found except within the enemy lines. So that, even if it took only two days to turn the Turk out of his Masaid-El Arish lines it would be necessary to carry forward very large quantities of water on camels both for man and horse. It had indeed entailed long continued, unremitting and intense work to maintain the Eastern Force in Sinai. In the long record of the armies which since the days of the Pharaohs have traversed the route which the British were taking there is no known instance of a large body of troops spending so many weary months in the desert. But since February, 1916, a considerable and increasing army had been kept in Sinai, and it was now December. General Murray's dispatch of March 1, 1917, gives a picture of the work this sojourn in the wilderness involved.

To regain this peninsula (he wrote), the true frontier of Egypt, hundreds of miles of road and railway had been built, hundreds of miles of water piping had been laid, filters capable of supplying 1,500,000 gallons of water a day, and reservoirs had been installed, and tons of stone transported from distant quarries. Kantara had been transformed from a small canal village into an important railway and water terminus, with wharves and cranes and a railway ferry; and the desert, till then almost destitute of human habitation, showed the successive marks of our advance in the shape of strong positions firmly entrenched and protected by hundreds of miles of barbed wire, of standing camps where troops could shelter in comfortable huts, of tanks and reservoirs, of railway stations and sidings, of aerodromes and of signal stations and wireless installations, by all of which



YEOMANRY ENCAMPED AT EL ARISH.

the desert was subdued and made habitable, and adequate lines of communication established between the advancing troops and their ever receding base. Moreover, not only had British troops laboured incessantly through the summer and autumn, but the body of organised native labour had grown. The necessity of combining the protection and maintenance, including the important work of sanitation, of this large force of workers, British and native, with that steady progress on the railway, roads and pipes which was vital to the success of my operations, put the severest strain upon all energies and resources.

By December 1 the railway had reached a point east of Mazar and the pipe line was delivering water at Bir el Abd, but it was not till December 20 that enough water was accumulated to enable the Desert Column to strike. Meantime the enemy had become nervous. The Bavarian officer in command of the Turks, Kress von Kressenstein, had not failed to grasp the meaning of the British preparations, and in the middle of December he was building new defences and calling for reinforcements from Palestine. He had, as it happened, delayed action too long. At the last moment he decided to avoid combat and hurriedly withdrew his troops—some 2,000 men—from Masaid and El Arish. This retirement was reported by the Royal Flying Corps on December 20—the day that General Dobell's preparations were completed—and the Anzac Mounted Division* and the Imperial Camel Corps (composed of Imperial, Australian and New Zealand units) set out for El Arish the same night.

* Such was at first its official title (see Vol. X., p. 374). In later dispatches the title Anzac is dropped and the phrase "Australian and New Zealand mounted troops" substituted.

They had a march of over twenty miles across the desert in the moonlight and made good going. At sunrise patrols of Australian Light Horse entered El Arish; and the next day, December 22, Scottish infantry, after a most arduous march over the sand dunes, were in the town.

The re-occupation of El Arish, which had been in the hands of the enemy just over two years, was of considerable importance. It is a town of some size—the largest in Sinai—and was regarded as a key position for the defence of Egypt. Moreover, it is a port of sorts. An open roadstead, strong currents, a shelving and shifting beach, to which add heavy surf, and it will be seen that the attractions of El Arish for shipping are limited. Yet it proved of great use and relieved the strain on the Sinai railway. Throughout the operations the squadron under Vice-Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss* gave whole-hearted support to the Army and as soon as El Arish passed into British hands mine-sweeping began. Under the energetic direction of Capt. A. H. Williamson, R.N., the roadstead was cleared of mines in 48 hours, and on December 24 ships from Port Said began to unload stores. Supplies were also conveyed to El Arish by the Camel Transport Corps, a valuable unit raised in Egypt during the war. In this way supplies were soon accumulated at El Arish in sufficient quan-

* Sir Rosslyn Wemyss returned to England in August, 1917, on his appointment as Second Sea Lord of the Admiralty; in the following December he succeeded Admiral Jellicoe as First Sea Lord.


tities to give the Desert Column a further radius of action.

At the same time the railway department was hard at work. Despite seemingly endless difficulties caused by heavy sand and the lack of water, railhead reached El Arish before the end of January, 1917. This was a fine achievement, reflecting great credit upon Col. Sir G. Macauley, Director of Egyptian Railways, and his staff and a testimony to the strenuous endeavours of the workmen. A special word of praise is due to the Egyptian Labour Corps. Recruited early in 1916 its officers were found among the British residents in Egypt, men speaking Arabic and familiar with the customs of the fellahin. Over 30 men belonging either to this Corps or the Camel Transport Corps received decorations for bravery under fire.

When Kress von Kressenstein evacuated El Arish he retired south-east up the Wadi el Arish with a view to reaching El Auja, just across the Egyptian frontier, and the terminus of the strategic railway from Beersheba. The Turks halted at the wells of Magdhaba, 21 miles from El Arish, whither they were immediately pursued by General Chauvel with the Anzacs and Imperial Camel Corps. The enemy was strongly posted on both sides of the wadi, in a rough circle of 3,000 to 3,500 yards diameter. The chief defences were five large closed works, between them being well-built concealed trenches and rifle pits.

General Chauvel, Brig.-General E. Chaytor and their staffs on the arrival of the column within four miles of Magdhaba at 4.50 a.m. on December 23 (the force had left El Arish at 12.45 a.m.) personally reconnoitred the enemy's position. It was decided to attack the enemy simultaneously in front, right and rear. The frontal attack was made by the Imperial Camel Corps; that on the right and rear by New Zealand Mounted Rifles and Australian Light Horse, under General Chaytor. The attack developed about nine o'clock. Progress was rather slow but at ten o'clock airmen reported to General Chauvel that there were indications that the enemy would try to break away. Thereupon mounted troops in reserve were pushed in. Advancing at a trot they came under shrapnel fire, whereupon they broke into a gallop. The Turks replied with heavy machine-gun and rifle fire and the horsemen were compelled to gain the cover of the wadi. Dismounting there they went forward on foot to attack the left of the enemy position.

By half past one in the afternoon the Turks were almost surrounded, but they were holding their own. The ground of approach was absolutely bare of cover while a mirage added to the difficulties of the assailants. In particular the mirage bothered the gunners—Territorial horse artillery batteries, the constant companions of the Anzacs. The horses too were becoming exhausted—they had had no water since the previous night and there was none at Magdhaba, except in the enemy lines. For a while it appeared that this lack of water would compel the breaking off of the engagement, but this



[Official photograph.]

RECRUITS FOR THE EGYPTIAN LABOUR CORPS POLICE.

misfortune was spared the gallant men. About two o'clock Australians captured one of the enemy outworks, and by three o'clock the whole attacking force had reached to from 600 to 200 yards of the enemy trenches. The pressure on the enemy was intensified and at 4 p.m. one of the main redoubts was carried, the prisoners including the Turkish commander. The end came when Australian Light Horse, with bayonets fixed, charged right into the enemy lines.

Practically the whole of the enemy force was accounted for. Some hundreds of dead were lying on the field and 1,282 prisoners were taken, as well as four mountain guns, one machine gun and over 1,000 rifles. The British casualties, killed and wounded, were 146, including twelve officers. Within the enemy lines was found a permanent and well-equipped hospital, to which the wounded were taken.

in front of the trenches being perfectly open and "in their immediate neighbourhood almost a glacis" (Gen. Murray). It was held by about two battalions, with mountain guns. The ever-present difficulties of supply prevented General Murray from attempting at the moment permanently to occupy Rafa, but, on January 7, 1917, he instructed Gen. Dobell, if possible, to repeat the Magdhaba operation and surprise, surround and capture the Magruntein position. This difficult task was successfully accomplished by the Desert Column.

Sir Philip Chetwode left El Arish at sunset on January 8, having with him the Imperial Camel Corps, the Australian and New Zealand mounted troops, Territorial Artillery and a



EGYPTIAN LABOUR CORPS UNLOADING STORES AT EL ARISH.

Kress von Kressenstein, though he had withdrawn the El Arish garrison towards the Auja-Beersheba railway, rightly surmised that the British advance would not be by Magdhaba, Auja, Beersheba, but by the coast road through Rafa (close to the Turco-Egyptian frontier) to Gaza—a road not only shorter, better known and easier going than the Auja route, but along which the Eastern Force would have its left flank protected by the Mediterranean and be aided by warships. Undismayed by the Magdhaba reverse he sought to delay the British on the Rafa road. A very strong entrenched position, dominated by a central redoubt, was prepared at Magruntein, two miles south-west of Rafa, the ground

force of Yeomanry. Between them and their objective was a stretch of 30 miles, the first 10 across soft sand, the rest harder going, and near to Rafa rolling cultivated country, where some Bedouin were with their herds, indifferent apparently to Turk and Briton alike. The column marched swiftly and, taking advantage of a brushwood road over the sand made by the enemy, by dawn on the 9th Magruntein was almost surrounded, while aeroplanes came up to help the gunners by spotting. The main attack, delivered by Gen. Chauvel, began about 10 a.m. and within an hour Rafa itself was captured. The small enemy force in the town tried to escape by the road to Gaza; they were intercepted by the New Zealand Mounted



A WELL AT EL ARISH.

Rifles, who took 171 prisoners, including six Germans. By the seizure of Rafa the position of the Turks was weakened, as from it Magruntein was at once attacked in rear. The Yeomanry and part of the Australian Light Horse, hitherto held in reserve, were now put into the fight and the circle round the enemy completed by 2 p.m. The engagement had then lasted four hours, and as the assailants had no cover their losses had been not inconsiderable. However, the excellent work of the artillery, which pushed forward in the open within range of the Turks' guns, kept down the enemy fire. The cordon round the trenches having been drawn closer, General Chetwode ordered a concerted attack on the central redoubt by the New Zealand Mounted Rifles and all other available Anzac troops, the Yeomanry co-operating. After the attack on the redoubt had begun the Royal Flying Corps reported a large enemy force marching from the east to relieve Rafa. Gen. Chetwode replied by ordering the attack to be pressed with greater vigour.

The troops (wrote General Murray), admirably supported by the artillery, advanced with great gallantry and at 4.45 p.m. the New Zealand Mounted Rifles captured the redoubt with brilliant dash, covering the last 800 yards in two rushes, supported by machine-gun fire. By this achievement they were able to take the lower lying works in reverse, and these soon fell to the Camel Corps, the Yeomanry, and the Australian Light Horse. By 5.30 p.m. all organized resistance was over, and the enemy's position, with all its garrison, was captured.

The fight had lasted ten hours. Not a man of the enemy force escaped. The commander and over 1,600 unwounded prisoners

(including about 20 Germans) surrendered, while the enemy killed and wounded numbered nearly 600. Four Krupp mountain guns, seven machine guns, and much other material, as well as camels and mules, were captured. The British casualties were 71 killed, 415 wounded and one missing. The enemy force which had started to the relief of Magruntein achieved no success. As soon as perceived it was attacked by airmen with bombs and machine-gun fire, and was afterwards forced to retreat by a detachment of Australian Light Horse.

General Chetwode withdrew the same evening to El Arish, taking with him all prisoners and booty. A regiment and a light armoured car patrol left to clear the battlefield retired, unmolested, the next day. The enemy made no attempt to reoccupy Rafa, but concentrated a considerable force not far to the east of that place. Except for the attentions of the Royal Flying Corps, they were there left alone, for the time, as their new positions were outside the striking distance of the Desert Column.


Up to the time of the fight at Magdhaba the Turks had kept small garrisons in central Sinai—namely, in the Maghara Hills, at Nakhil, on the Darb el Haj (Pilgrim Road) from Suez to Akaba, and at the wells of Hassana. All these posts were evacuated in the closing days of 1916. However, as the weeks passed after the Rafa fight and the British made no move, the Turks, towards the end of January, 1917, to regain prestige in the eyes of the Bedouin, re-established small posts both at Nakhil and Hassana.

To destroy that prestige it was necessary to deal promptly with these small posts, though their presence did not affect the military situation. To "deal with" Hassana and Nakhel involved much hardship and many weary miles of marching through waterless and mountainous desert. Hassana is 50 miles south of El Arish and was dealt with by a column of cavalry and camelry sent from that place. The column reached Hassana on February 18, rounded up the garrison of 22, and secured 2,400 rounds of small arms ammunition and some camels. The force sent against Nakhel had the harder task. The operations were organized and executed by Brig.-General P. C. Palin. Two columns were employed, the northern

to find that the Turks (about 100 horsemen) had made good their escape along the Akaba road. The main northern column reached its rendezvous at dawn on the 18th, the Suez column arrived at 9 a.m.—a good record. Though only 11 prisoners were taken, a field gun, with 250 rounds of ammunition, 16,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, and a quantity of explosives and stores were found. But the chief value of these operations was the demonstration, to Bedouin as to Turk, of the power of the British to strike home, however apparently inaccessible might be the objective.

Thus Sinai was cleared of the enemy.

For this achievement (wrote General Murray in his dispatch of March 1, 1917) I am greatly indebted to Lieut.-General Sir Charles Dobell and his Staff for their



Official photograph.

SORTING OUT PRISONERS FROM MAGDHABA AT EL ARISH.

starting from Serapeum Station on the Suez Canal, the other from the town of Suez (this column including Indian infantry). They were timed to converge on Nakhel, 60 miles from Suez, on February 18, the day on which the El Arish column was to reach, and did reach, Hassana. Across mountain and plain, in burning heat by day and cold by night, the columns pushed their way. The northern column was held up by an enemy party for a time on the afternoon of the 17th. Darkness came, and when a squadron of Australian Light Horse entered Nakhel it was

unremitting efforts to make our advance, as it was, rapid and decisive. To them are mainly due the excellent organization and disposition which ensured success without delay, and, above all, the perfection of arrangements for maintaining the troops in a waterless district far ahead of the railway, without which the dash and endurance of our troops would have been of no avail.


General Murray as Commander-in-Chief had the supreme direction of the operations, and their success was marked by the conferment upon him of the G.C.M.G. He received many official congratulations, the most significant being the telegram from the War Cabinet, made public in Cairo on January 15. "The opera-

tions," said the War Cabinet, "promise to give you further successes in the future." Plans for the conquest of Palestine had been approved, and there was an expectation, almost a belief, that Jerusalem would be in British possession before the summer. It was at this time that the Grand Sherif of Mecca, whose troops were then moving north towards the borders of Sinai, assumed, with the recognition of the British and French Governments, the title of King of the Hedjaz. In the desert regions south and east of Palestine the Meccan forces during the following months gained various successes, and did much damage to the Hedjaz railway.

A campaign which would result in the conquest of Palestine involved religious and political as well as military considerations. The interest of the Christian Churches in the freeing of the country from Turkish rule was very great. The campaign also raised the question of the return of the Jews to their ancient land, it being well known that the British Government regarded with favour the aspirations of the Zionists. This question of the Jews and Palestine is dealt with fully in the succeeding chapter. But the British Government, by their attitude to the Sherif of Mecca, and in many other ways, showed that the forthcoming operations in the Holy Land were not directed against Islam, but against the Turks and their German masters. The special interests of the Allies in the struggle received military recognition by the welcome

given to French and Italian contingents, which joined the Expeditionary Force on the eve of its invasion of Turkish territory. These detachments were commanded respectively by Colonel Piépage and Major da Agostino.

General Murray hoped to deliver his next blow at the enemy in the positions they had occupied close to the Turco-Egyptian frontier. That frontier is almost entirely artificial—it is a practically straight line drawn across the desert. The true defensive line between Egypt and Syria (of which Palestine is the southern part) is the Wadi Ghuzze, or River of Gaza. Rising in the Judean Hills it passes through Beersheba (where it is known as the Wadi es Seba) and sweeping thence east and north it reaches the Mediterranean some five miles south of Gaza. Usually dry, it has well defined steep banks, and after the winter rains comes down in a flood for a short period. At a point 15 miles due east of Rafa it has a sharp fall, and this place is known as El Shellal (the Cataract). It is only 12 miles from Sheria, the nearest station on the Beersheba-Damascus railway. The enemy force was concentrated at Shellal, and the Turks had strongly fortified the line Weli Sheikh Nuran—El Shauth, a position, west of Shellal, with a front of fully three miles. They also garrisoned Khan Yunus, six miles north-east of Rafa on the caravan route to Gaza. Khan Yunus (*i.e.*, John's Tavern) is a large village in a small oasis, and has a fair supply of well water. A reconnaissance by the




UPHILL WORK WITH THE ARMOURD CARS.

New Zealand Mounted Rifles on February 23 showed that Khan Yunus was strongly held, but "continuous pressure" in the neighbourhood caused the Turks a few days later to withdraw the garrison. The headquarters of Sir Philip Chetwode's Desert Column were at the end of the month advanced to Sheikh Zuweiyid, 20 miles along the coast road from El Arish, and an attack in force upon the Weli Sheikh Nuran—Shauth lines, another 20 miles distant, was being prepared. But before the preparations were completed the Turks had disappeared. "The enemy," said General Murray, "had retired while he was still out of reach."

It was on March 5 that airmen found that the Turks were evacuating the position at which they had laboured incessantly for two months. General Murray instructed General Dobell to do all that was possible either to make the enemy stand or to punish him while retreating. Owing to the distance between railhead and Weli Sheikh Nuran nothing effective could be accomplished, though aircraft plentifully bombed the enemy lines of communication. The Turks, estimated at that time to be about two divisions strong, withdrew to a line running from Gaza to Sheria, with a small garrison at Beersheba, further east. There were, however, says General Murray, writing of the situation in mid-March, "distinct indications" that the enemy intended to withdraw his troops without a fight from the Gaza-Sheria-Beersheba line, "a move which it was highly important to prevent." Measures were taken to hasten the British preparations, General Murray's plan being to present the enemy with the alternative of fighting where he stood, or having cavalry on his flanks and rear should he attempt to retire. In the result the Turk fought where he stood and beat off the British attack.

In considering the circumstances of this battle the principal point is as to whether or not the attack was premature. Railhead reached Rafa, nine miles beyond Sheikh Zuweiyid, in the middle of March, and on the 20th of that month both General Dobell and General Chetwode moved their headquarters to that town. Was Gaza, 20 miles away, beyond the radius of action of the Eastern Force? It must be remembered that the attack was to be delivered not as at Magdhaba and Rafa by mounted troops only, but by infantry as well, and all supplies, including water, must be drawn from Rafa as the force

advanced. Obviously General Dobell had to gain the battle quickly or he would be forced to withdraw. It does not appear that the possibility of non-success had been sufficiently taken into account. Had it been practicable, at the critical moment, for General Dobell to advance with his whole force, "I have no doubt," wrote General Murray, "that Gaza could have been



THE KING of the HEDJAZ, and Grand Sherif of Mecca, who proclaimed his independence of the Turkish Government in 1916.

taken." But the fight had then lasted nearly two days and, General Murray adds,

The reorganization of the force for a deliberate attack would have taken a considerable time, the horses of the cavalry were very fatigued and the distance of our railhead from the front line put the immediate maintenance of such a force with supplies, water, and ammunition entirely out of the question.

This, in brief, gives the principal cause of the failure to take Gaza at the first attempt, though errors on the battlefield may have been a contributory cause. At the same time there were other objects than the capture of the town, and these other objects, as defined by General Murray, were attained. They were, first, to obtain possession of the Wadi Ghuzze, and, secondly, "at all costs," to prevent the enemy retiring without a fight*—the costs


* A *communiqué* issued by the War Office on April 2, 1917, attributed to Sir Charles Dobell the decision to attempt to capture Gaza by a *coup de main*, in order to force the enemy to stand. It is clear from Sir Archibald Murray's despatch that the decision was his (Sir A. Murray's).

incurred in casualties on the British side were something under 4,000, of which a large proportion were only slightly wounded. The killed numbered fewer than 400.

As stated, the condition governing the British attack was how long it could be sustained in a desert region 20 miles from rail-

attacking force to secure the wadi as it passes south of Gaza.

On the evening of March 25 the whole of the Desert Column (General Chetwode) was concentrated at Deir el Belah, a village three miles from the nearest point of the wadi. This column had been reconstituted and new



THE GAZA-BEERSHEBA FRONT.

head. The condition was fully realized by General Murray, and with him lay the decision "when it would be wise to abandon the methodical advance and to push out to its full radius of action a considerable force into a country bare of all supplies and almost devoid of water." The decisive consideration with the commander-in-chief appears to have been his belief that if he harried the enemy would evacuate Gaza—and probably take up a much stronger position in the Judean Hills in defence of Jerusalem. For the methodical advance, that is the pushing on of railhead, possession of the Wadi Ghuzze was sufficient. The wadi itself forms excellent cover, and strong, easily defended positions were afforded by its steep banks. On either side of the wadi is a rolling, grassy plain, above which rise sandy ridges, but by some extraordinary chance the Turks neglected to hold the ridges nearest the wadi. It was the first task of the

consisted of two cavalry divisions (each less one brigade): that is, the Australian and New Zealand Division under General Chauvel, and the Imperial Mounted Division under Major-General H. W. Hodgson; the 53rd (Infantry) Division (under Major-General A. G. Dallas), and some light armoured car batteries. The Imperial Mounted Division was largely yeomanry, and included the Worcesters, Warwicks, and Gloucesters, which had fought all through the Sinai campaign. Besides the Desert Column General Dobell had at his disposal the Imperial Camel Corps, the 52nd Division (Major-General W. E. B. Smith), the 54th Division (Major-General S. W. Hare), R.H.A. batteries and armoured cars. All this force was employed except the 52nd Division, held in reserve at Khan Yunus. The 53rd and 54th Divisions had not been seriously in action for fifteen months, not since they left Suvla Bay, Gallipoli, at the end of 1915.

Kress von Kressenstein, who continued in command of the Turkish force, had, as stated, neglected to hold the banks of the Wadi Ghuzze, and early in the morning of March 26 it was crossed without opposition by the cavalry divisions and the Camel Corps. They were followed at dawn by the 53rd division, and at 7 a.m. the 54th Division also began to cross the wadi. These preliminary movements were successfully accomplished, but the progress of the mounted divisions, as well as of the infantry, was considerably delayed by a very dense fog, which came on just before dawn and did not entirely clear till 8 a.m. "This unavoidable delay," wrote Sir Archibald Murray, "had a serious effect upon the subsequent operations." It was the belief of the men that but for this delay Gaza would have been taken that day. The fog, too, prevented the airmen from reconnoitring the enemy positions, and several of the machines which went up came to grief.

The plan of battle was for the cavalry and camelry to push east and north of Gaza—thus cutting off the enemy's line of retreat—while the 53rd Division attacked the town in front. It was, however, owing to the fog, 9.30 before General Chauvel's Division reached its assigned position, Beit Durdis, five miles east of Gaza. From that place it sent detachments north, east and west, the 2nd Australian Light Horse closing the exit from Gaza and resting their right on the

sea. A detachment of these troops made a notable capture, that of Musa Kiasim Pasha, Commander of the 53rd Turkish Division, with his staff and escort. The incident was thus narrated by a correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*:—

This officer with some of his staff was very calmly driving along in a "gharry," the Eastern equivalent of a "victoria," on the way to his battle headquarters. Suddenly an undreamed of troop of Australians swooped down. The gharry horse bolted and overturned the vehicle, and amid shouts of Australian laughter the general, his gharry, his horse, and his officers became prisoners, ignominious and absurd. But it was a serious loss to the Turks. I saw this unhappy gentleman on his way back, handsome, dignified, and infinitely crestfallen.

The Imperial Mounted Division took up position at El Mendur, some eight miles due south of Gaza, and sent thence a squadron to gain touch with the Australians and New Zealanders at Beit Durdis, and two squadrons of Yeomanry along the Beersheba road. This division and the Camel Corps were chiefly engaged with the enemy forces farther east, for it quickly became apparent that Kress von Kressenstein had numerous reserves available and had no intention of leaving the garrison of Gaza to fight a lone hand. The nearest reserves were at Hereira, seven miles east of El Mendur, and at Sheria (Tell esh Sheria) five miles farther on—and Sheria, it will be remembered, was on the railway, and by the railway troops were brought from the north. The Turks also



AUSTRALIAN ARTILLERY.

launched troops from Huj, east of Beit Durdis, and sent cavalry from Beersheba and Hebron. Thus General Hodgson's Yeomanry early became engaged with both Turkish cavalry and



[Bassano.]

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR PHILIP CHETWODE,

Took command of the Desert Column of the Eastern Force, Dec. 7, 1916.

infantry on their right flank; they were also exposed to the fire of heavy guns at Hereira.

General Dallas with the 53rd Division advanced to the attack of Gaza from the south, occupying the ridges of El Sheluf and Mansura. The Gloucestershire Hussars, with a battalion and a section of 60-pounders, occupied the sandhills between El Sheluf and the sea, and successfully covered the left of the division. During the morning one brigade of the 54th Division joined the right of the 53rd Division at Mansura; the two other brigades of the 54th Division were posted farther to the south-east, on the Sheikh Abbas Ridge, and did not come into action. The deployment of General Dallas's leading brigades began at 10 minutes before noon, and the final advance at one o'clock. The immediate objective was Ali Muntar, the hill, a mile south-east of the town, traditionally the spot to which Samson carried the gates of Gaza. Part of the troops had to advance right in the open. They were well supported by their artillery and by long-range machine-gun fire. The final advance was very steady. The enemy offered a very stout

resistance both with rifles and machine guns from concealed pits, heavy shrapnel fire being also poured on the assailants. All the infantry acquitted themselves as became veterans, but Welsh Territorials, upon whom fell some of the hardest fighting, were specially distinguished. The Kent, Sussex, Hereford, Middlesex and Surrey (Territorial) Regiments were also named in the official reports for their conspicuous gallantry.

While the infantry attack was in progress General Chetwode decided that the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division should be thrown against the north and north-east of Gaza and by half-past three General Chauvel had begun to move on the town. The 2nd Australian Light Horse attacked on the right—towards the sea, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles in the centre, and the Yeomanry on the left. Thus the Turks were assailed both in front and rear, and they began to give ground. Shortly after 4.30 the 53rd Division had carried most of Ali Muntar and the last positions on the



[Swaine.]

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR H. G. CHAUVEL,
K.C.M.G.

Commanded the Anzac Mounted Division and succeeded Sir Philip Chetwode in the command of the Desert Column.

hill were most gallantly carried by Brigadier-General W. Marriott-Dodington's Brigade of the 54th Division. By that time General Chauvel's mounted troops had fought their way



ENGINEERS IMPROVING A CROSSING OF THE WADI GHUZZE.

to the thick cactus hedges on the outskirts of the town. Some Australians and New Zealanders pushed into Gaza itself, where there was lively bayonet fighting. But in the streets they came under cross fire from machine guns placed in, and on the flat roofs of, the houses, and suffered as well as inflicted serious losses. Outside the town the Somerset Battery R.H.A. silenced two enemy guns and the New Zealanders captured two 4.2 inch Austrian howitzers and 20 prisoners. The guns they turned on the enemy and retained in the face of desperate counter-attacks. The Australian Light Horse under Brigadier-General G. de L. Ryrie also greatly distinguished itself.

By five o'clock the Turks in Gaza were hemmed in, though still full of fight. But night was coming on, and now the British longed for the two hours of daylight lost in the early morning by the fog. The majority of the cavalry horses had had no water during the day, and unless the town fell at once the mounted troops would have to withdraw. And the Turkish reinforcements from Huj, Sheria and Hereira were now pressing hard on the right flank of the British. They had already seized, and held, a prominent position east of Gaza, though by prompt action and skilful leadership the 3rd Australian Light Horse under Brigadier-General J. R. Royston, aided by batteries of armoured cars, had denied them any further advantage. General Murray suggests that it was "perhaps possible," if General Dobell had then pushed forward his reserve

(the 52nd Division) the positions won might have been consolidated, though "the difficulty of supplying water for men and horses would have been immense." In fact General Chetwode, with General Dobell's concurrence, ordered the 53rd Division to fall back from Ali Muntar: the mounted troops also retired during the night. Some 200 of the men who had got into the town of Gaza were cut off and made prisoners by the Turks. Of these over 150 were wounded. Two light armoured batteries (eight cars) which found themselves at dawn in the middle of a large body of the enemy—estimated at 5,000—brilliantly extricated themselves. Their losses were one killed and four wounded and they put about 350 of the enemy *hors de combat*.

The battle was not over. Early the next morning patrols of the 53rd Division reoccupied Ali Muntar. During the night, however, the Turks had been heavily reinforced, and all the morning additional enemy troops poured in to Gaza. Before the patrols could be reinforced a strong counter-attack drove them off Ali Muntar. From this point the offensive was with the enemy, and when another body of Turks, coming from the Beersheba direction, seized the Sheikh Abbas ridge, the situation grew more serious, as from Sheikh Abbas the enemy fired on the rear of the British position on Mansura ridge. Several counter-attacks were made by the British, and the Imperial Camel Corps practically annihilated the 3rd Turkish Cavalry Division, which

had charged them. The British troops remained throughout the day "staunch and cheerful," but it was impossible to hold the position permanently. It was waterless and exposed on three sides to the fire of the Turks' artillery. It was equally out of the question for General Dobell to try and reorganize his force "for a deliberate attack." However, he held on to his ground the whole day, shattering a strong attack made at 4 p.m. During the night the force was withdrawn, and by daylight on the 28th the whole of the infantry had been brought to the western bank of the Wadi Ghuzze. The cavalry followed the next day, the enemy contenting themselves with reoccupying the defences of Gaza.

If the Turks had gained a success they had paid for it. Their losses in killed were very heavy, their total casualties being officially estimated at 8,000. They lost 950 in prisoners (among them four Austrian officers and 32 Austrian and German other ranks) and the two Austrian guns taken by the New Zealanders. They had also lost the Wadi Ghuzze. General Murray claimed the battle was for the British "a most successful operation." Certainly there was no dissentient voice to Sir Archibald's further statement that all ranks fought with the utmost gallantry and endurance. By the authorities at home the fight was hailed as a victory, and the Imperial War Cabinet sent cordial congratulations to General Murray "on


the striking and important success achieved near Gaza."

Immediately after this first battle arrangements were made for a second attack. Rail-head reached Deir el Belah on April 5, and there General Dobell established his headquarters. To meet the most urgent requirement of the troops tanks were set up in the Wadi Ghuzze and rail-borne water from Deir el Belah was pumped into them—well sinking in the wadi not having then been fully developed. All preparations* were complete by the middle of the month, and April 17 was fixed for the renewal of the contest. Kress von Kressenstein, whose headquarters were at Beit Hanun, five miles north of Gaza, had employed the three weeks' interval to good purpose, and General Dobell was aware that he had before him a harder task than in the March battle. That battle had decided the Turks definitely to hold Gaza. The defences of the town had been greatly strengthened, and more big guns had been brought up. Altogether the enemy had five infantry and one cavalry division on the front. Some of the reinforcements had been recalled from Galicia, some from the Caucasus. These fought in their heavy winter equipment. The Turks had also fortified the Atawina Ridge, situated half-way between

* Besides rail and camel transport magnificent draught horses were used for bringing up heavy guns, as many as 20 horses dragging one gun.



SOME OF THE PRISONERS CAPTURED AT GAZA, MARCH 26, 1917.



GAZA.

Gaza and Hereira, and their occupation of this position prevented General Dobell from attempting an encircling movement by his mounted troops.

It was decided that the new attack should be in two stages—on the first day the ridges south of Gaza were to be seized, and the final assault delivered after an artillery preparation from those ridges. General Dobell's force was increased by one division, the 74th, which was the reserve division. The attack was to be made by the infantry, the mounted troops to act as a protection to their right (east) flank, and also to hold in check the enemy force at Hereira and Sheria. In addition General Dobell had the use of more heavy artillery and of Tanks, while British monitors and the French battleship *Requin* were to shell enemy positions with long-range guns.

The first day's programme was carried out according to plan, and without serious opposition, the 52nd and 54th Divisions, both under General W. E. B. Smith, seizing the Sheikh Abbas-Mansura ridges by 7 a.m. on April 17. When the main attack was delivered on the 19th it was soon apparent that the struggle would be severe. The mounted troops, acting against the enemy centre and left, began a "containing" attack at dawn,

and this attack, discontinued in the afternoon, met with "all the success anticipated." The Imperial Mounted Division, dismounted, made a gallant assault on the Atawina Ridge; the Anzacs spread farther east and beat back bodies of Turkish cavalry. Describing the attack on Atawina Ridge, the correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* already quoted said:

Our troops advanced over ground that was ranged to a foot by the Turks. Every movement was signalled to the enemy by their aeroplanes, which at least on this part of the front were in the ascendant. It is a kind of fighting to which mounted men are not trained, and in a dismounted action at least one man in every five must be left behind as a horse-holder. Nevertheless these [Yeomanry] regiments pressed on unperturbed by their losses. They might have succeeded; but . . . the Turks were able to send reinforcements, estimated at 6,000. These troops were backed by 5.9 in. guns, which poured in a deadly fire of shrapnel and high explosive. We had few heavy guns in this sector, and the 13- and 18-pounders of our field artillery were completely outranged.

The Turks had rails prepared for their heavy guns, which were thus rendered almost as mobile as field artillery, and of this they took the fullest advantage. One battery of the H.A.C. was located by the Turks, and shell after shell burst right in its midst. Yet they got away with only seven wounded and one gun damaged, thanks to the imperturbable coolness of all ranks. Late in the afternoon the attack was abandoned. . . . Our retirement was perfectly orderly.

For the main attack the bombardment began at 5.30 a.m., and between 7.15 and 7.30



EGYPTIAN LABOUR CORPS LEVELLING GROUND FOR THE RAILWAY.

the infantry advanced. The 53rd Division (now under the command of Major-General S. F. Mott) had for objective Samson Ridge, the ridge nearest the Mediterranean. After very severe fighting—some of the Turkish trenches being filled with dead—the ridge was carried early in the afternoon. The division then advanced north to Sheikh Ajlin and up to the coast less than three miles from Gaza. To the 54th and 52nd Divisions was assigned the assault on the formidable Ali Muntar defences. The 52nd Division was on the right of the 53rd, and still farther to the right was the 54th Division, to which was attached the Imperial Camel Corps. On the right of the Camel Corps was the 4th Australian Light Horse. With these divisions were several Tanks, two of which were hit by shells and burnt out. As the troops advanced they were met by heavy and accurate rifle and machine-gun fire, and despite most gallant efforts they made little progress; the line of advance became ragged, and some brigades suffered from enfilade fire. The Turks had the range of all the positions, and the attackers would have fared worse than they did but for the fire of the warships off Gaza. The ships made excellent practice, both on Ali Muntar and on the enemy troops as they left their shelters to attack the British.

By ten o'clock a brigade of the 52nd Division had captured the strong work known as Outpost Hill, but from this hill they were shelled out. "The position," writes General Murray, "was most gallantly retaken on his own initiative by Major W. T. Forrest, M.C., King's Own Scottish Borderers (subsequently killed), who collected a few men for the pur-

pose." Nevertheless "all further attempts by the brigade to launch an attack from Outpost Hill were shattered by fire at their inception, and the brigade in rear was forced to remain in the open under a heavy fire." Unfortunately the formation of the ground was such that the attack could only be made on an extremely narrow front, and as the day wore on it became evident that success could only be gained by the British if the 52nd Division made progress. This, as has been seen, it could not do. The 54th Division and the Imperial Camel Corps made some headway, the camelry, in conjunction with the 4th Australian Light Horse, entering the enemy trenches at Khirbet Sihan, between Ali Muntar and the Atawina Ridge. The enemy retired about 800 yards north, and this new position they kept, all further attempts to advance failing. About noon part of a brigade of the 54th Division was forced back by a furious counter-attack—throughout the battle the Turks fought with great gallantry and steadiness. Later the brigade regained its lost ground, but the Turks then attacked farther east, against the 4th Australian Light Horse. This brigade was in turn driven back, and with the 3rd Australian Light Horse, posted next on the right, suffered heavy casualties. The Imperial Camel Corps, though left at Khirbet Sihan in a very critical position, held on stubbornly till a Yeomanry brigade came up and gallantly made good, occupying the positions from which the Australian Light Horse had been driven.

Such was the situation at 3 p.m., and General Dobell, to quote Sir Archibald Murray's dispatch, "in view of information received

that our attack had not yet succeeded in drawing in the enemy's reserves, decided that the moment had not yet come for an attempt to force a decision by throwing in the general reserve." At this hour (3 p.m.), General Murray states, "it is possible" that if General Dobell had thrown in his reserves the key of the Turkish position might have been taken "with the further loss of 5,000 to 6,000 men, but this would have left my small force, already reduced, with a difficult line of front to hold against increasing reinforcements of the enemy, who owing to the conformation of the *terrain* could attack from several directions." The fight continued, and at 6.20 p.m. the brigade on Outpost Hill was forced to evacuate its

The fight was not renewed on April 20. In the opinion of General Dobell, of General Chetwode, and of all the divisional commanders, which opinion was conveyed to General Murray during the night, a resumption of the battle did not offer sufficient prospect of success to justify its being undertaken. "In view of this strongly expressed opinion," says General Murray, he concurred in General Dobell's recommendation, which was to hold the ground gained and to prepare for an attack, later on, upon the enemy lines between Gaza and Hereira. The enemy made several local offensives, but no general counter attack, and the ground gained was consolidated on the 20th.



A PATROL OF THE IMPERIAL CAMEL CORPS.

position. Meantime, at four o'clock, General Murray, who was at Advanced G.H.Q. at Khan Yunus, instructed General Dobell to hold all ground gained, with a view to resuming the attack on Aii Muntar, under cover of a concentrated artillery bombardment, at dawn the next day. At nightfall the engagement was broken off. It had been a day of unrewarded gallantry on the part of the British forces, whose casualties—specially heavy among the Scottish and Welsh infantry—had amounted to some 7,000.

One counter-attack was nipped in the bud entirely by our aircraft; a reconnaissance machine having detected about 2,000 infantry and 800 cavalry gathered in the Wadi near Hereira; four machines immediately attacked this force, which they found in massed formation, with bombs, and the entire body was dispersed with heavy casualties.

From that time onward for over six months there was no change in the position round Gaza. A period of trench warfare supervened. To this the troops quickly adapted themselves. The most notable incident of the next two months was a very successful cavalry raid (May 23-24), when a great part of the Turks'



TURKISH SOLDIERS BRINGING IN LEVIES FROM JERUSALEM.

railway from Beersheba to Auja was destroyed.

On April 21, the second day after the fight just described, General Dobell visited General Murray at Khan Yunus and repeated his reasons for not continuing the battle.

In the meantime (writes General Murray) it became apparent to me that General Dobell, who had suffered some weeks previously from a severe touch of the sun, was no longer in a fit state of health to bear the strain of further operations in the coming heat of summer. To my great regret, therefore, I felt it my duty to relieve him of his command. . . . Accordingly on the morning of the 21st I interviewed General Dobell and informed him of my decision, in which he concurred.

General Murray appointed Lieut.-General Sir Philip Chetwode to command the Eastern Force in place of Sir Charles Dobell. Major-General Sir H. Chauvel succeeded General Chetwode as commander of the Desert Column, and Major-General E. W. C. Chaytor took General Chauvel's place as commander of the Anzac division. The cavalry work in both the battles of Gaza had been brilliant, and these leaders well deserved promotion. That the equal valour of the infantry had not met with success may have been due to faults of leadership. General Dobell's reports were not published, and he kept silence on these episodes. But responsibility lay ultimately with General Murray, who did not discover that General Dobell's health would unfit him

"to bear the strain of further operations" until after the failure to take Gaza on April 19.

The War Office at the time slurred over the battle as if it were but a minor operation, in which the advanced positions round Gaza were taken and the British came "in touch" with the enemy main position. "About 200 Turkish prisoners were captured on the 19th inst.," said the official *communiqué* of April 22, but of British casualties there was no mention. Not until General Murray's dispatch was published on November 20 following were the magnitude of the battle and the number of casualties known publicly. Yet that the results of the spring campaign called for further changes was, apparently, the official opinion. Ten weeks after Sir Charles Dobell had been relieved of his command Sir Archibald Murray was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. The officer chosen to succeed him was General Sir E. H. H. Allenby, the commander of the Third Army in France. Sir Edmund Allenby sailed for Egypt and took over the command there on June 29. The success which attended his autumn campaign was made the occasion of a public declaration by the British Government in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.

CHAPTER CCXVII.

THE JEWS IN PALESTINE.

PALESTINE INVOLVED IN THE WAR—THE HISTORY OF THE JEWS—THE SEPHARDIM IN TURKEY—THE ASKENAZIM—THE RUSSIAN PALE—THE COURSE OF JEWISH EMIGRATION—THE RETURN TO PALESTINE MOVEMENT—JEWISH EFFORTS IN PALESTINE—BARON EDMUND DE ROTHSCHILD—THE JEWISH COLONIZATION ASSOCIATION—THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT—THEODORE HERZL—ZIONISM AND ASSIMILATIONISM—ZIONIST CONGRESSES—PROPOSED COLONY IN BRITISH EAST AFRICA—SETTLEMENT OUTSIDE PALESTINE ABANDONED—GERMAN CONTROL OF ZIONISM—THE LANGUAGE QUESTION—GERMAN OR HEBREW—TURKISH OPPRESSION OF JEWISH NATIONALISM—THE “PAN-TURANIAN” POLICY—ABORTIVE SCHEME OF DEPORTATION—THE ALLIES AND ZIONISM—MR. BALFOUR’S PLEDGE, NOVEMBER, 1917.

ONE after another, the great latent social and national problems of the world were raised by the war, and with the advance of the British forces from Egypt came the turn of Palestine and the Jews. The land and the people had reached one of the most eventful moments in their history.

For eighteen centuries and a half, since Titus took Jerusalem house by house and sowed its site with salt, the Jews and Palestine had been strangers to each other. Resisting to the last, almost exterminated by Roman methods of pacification, at feud with their Gentile neighbours (for Jews and non-Jews have always shared Palestine between them), the Jews had no choice but to abandon their home, and follow in the steps of their brethren who had already emigrated to the West. They could not escape from the dominion of Rome, for Rome ruled everywhere where there was civilization, but they tended to settle in the borderlands of the Roman World, especially in Spain and in the German provinces of the Rhine frontier.

In these “new countries”—for Spain and the Rhineland were in the same stage of development in the first centuries after Christ

as Russia and America are to-day—they were tolerated by the Roman Government, and found scope for their commercial ability, but they were only at the beginning of their wanderings. During the following eighteen centuries it was the tragic destiny of the Jews to introduce one country after another to civilization, only to be driven out as soon as the native Gentiles had become capable of keeping their own house in order without Jewish assistance. When this stage was reached the Jew came to be regarded as a hateful intruder in the young nation’s field, economic jealousy was transmuted into the more savage passion of religious fanaticism, and the Jew had to wander on into another land, and start his tragic cycle again.

The Spanish Jews remained in the Peninsula more than a thousand years, but at the end of the fifteenth century they were expelled, like the Moors, by the victorious and bigoted Christian monarchy. Some were scattered abroad to Holland, Italy, Morocco, but the majority found refuge in the Ottoman Empire. This age, the most intolerant in Europe, was the most enlightened period of Ottoman government. The Moslem was delighted to welcome the victim of Christendom, and the

Turk saw the advantage of strengthening his newly-won dominion over the Balkan Christians by introducing another alien element besides himself.

In European Turkey the Spanish Jews, or Sephardim, as they came to call themselves,



[After Rembrandt.]

A JEWISH RABBI.
(Sephardi.)

found the two conditions essential for their prosperity—a benevolent government and a country in a low state of economic development. They settled in the chief commercial centres—Constantinople, Uskub, Sarajevo and, above all, Salonika—and rapidly supplanted Greeks, Venetians, Genoese and Ragusans. The settlement of the Sephardim in Rumelia was a noteworthy epoch in the history of the Jews, for it marked the first retracing of their steps in the direction of Zion. But these Sephardim never girded themselves for the final stages of the road. Salonika, with its 80,000 Jews speaking their inherited Spanish dialect, was already a Jewish home; and who could expect a Jew, with his history of wanderings behind him, to abandon lightly so fair an asylum? Loyalty and material interest combined to make the Sephardim stay where they were and stand by the Turks. They became linked to the Turks more intimately through a crypto-Jewish Moslem community, the Dönmé, descended from Sephardim converted in the seventeenth century. The Dönmé were represented by Djavid Bey, the financier, on the Com-

mittee of Union and Progress, and through Oriental Free Masonry, which they controlled, the Salonika Sephardim were associated from the beginning with the Young Turkish movement. In Turkey, as in Hungary, and from the same mixed motives of gratitude and ambition, they threw in their lot with the ruling race, and they supplied the intellectual element in the new Turkish Nationalism. The author of the standard exposition of the "Pan-Turanian Movement," who called himself by the pure Turkish name of "Tekin Alp," is believed to have been a Salonika Jew; and there is also reason to suppose that the secularizing, anti-Islamic tendency which is so remarkable a feature in Pan-Turanianism was partly the effect of this Jewish influence.

The Sephardim were the aristocracy of modern Jewry, yet the future lay rather with the Jews of the Rhineland, who wandered north-eastward across Europe till they became Askenazim—"The Dispersion of Scythia." In some respects the history of Askenazim and Sephardim has been parallel. Each acquired a provisional national language in the land of their first, and longest, sojourn—the Sephardim their Spanish dialect and the Askenazim Yiddish or *Jüdisch-Deutsch*, which is Rhenish German saturated with Hebraisms and written in Hebrew characters—and each found a provisional modern home, the Sephardim at Salonika and the Askenazim in the Russian Pale. But here the parallel ends. The Sephardim were a small privileged community, favoured by the Government under which they lived, and content with their lot. The Askenazim numbered millions, and have been one of the most oppressed peoples in the world. Yet the greater rôle was prepared for them by their numbers and their sufferings. The Yiddish dialect was spoken at the outbreak of the war by perhaps 90 per cent. of the Jews in the world, and the Russian Pale was the reservoir from which a Jewish population was flowing back to Palestine.

The Pale is a vast belt of territories conquered by Russia during the 18th century from Lithuania, Poland and the Ottoman Empire. Before the Russian conquest these territories were the borderlands of Western Europe, and the Jews had drifted into them as Western European civilization pushed its borders eastward, to the Vistula and the Dniester, from the Rhine. The replacement of the more or less

friendly Polish and Turkish Governments by the Russian Tsardom had a very adverse effect on the position of the Askenazim. The medieval restrictions upon the Jews, which had never existed in Turkey, and had been abolished in Western Christendom after the French Revolution, were perpetuated in the Pale under the Tsarist régime. The reforms introduced during the 'sixties and 'seventies of last century by the Tsar Alexander II. held out to the Russian Jews for a moment the prospect of emancipation. But the Russo-Turkish War, the Treaty of Berlin and the assassination of Alexander in 1881 threw Russia back into a political reaction of which the Jews were the victims. It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the persecution of the Jews by the Russian Government after this date was the most terrible phase in their history since the destruction of Jerusalem. Never, since the fall of the Roman Empire, had a single persecuting Government held so large a proportion of the Jewish race in its power, and unfortunately the Rumanian Government followed the bad example of its neighbour. In Rumania, where Askenazim had settled while it still belonged to the Turk, it was the old story of a young nation casting out the Jew when he had ceased to be indispensable to its development. From 1882 onwards the Pale and Rumania, which between

them had harboured the great mass of the Jewish people for hundreds of years, became no longer tenable for them even as a temporary abiding place, and a new Jewish migration set in, which from the numerical point of view became the largest in Jewish history, and also proved, in its outcome, to be the most important of any for the Jewish future.

The main stream of emigrants flowed west, attracted by the small, but wealthy and powerful Jewish communities in Western Europe, who had long enjoyed complete emancipation, and lived on terms of legal equality with their Gentile neighbours. Tens of thousands settled in London; hundreds of thousands crossed the Atlantic to New York, seeking the two Jewish requirements of a friendly government and an undeveloped land. It was a momentous migration, entailing consequences for Western Civilization and for Jewry which will appear in this chapter at a later stage, yet it was not really so significant as the tiny stream of pioneers which began, at the same period, to flow south-east from the Pale to Palestine.

This return to Palestine from the Pale, which began in 1882 and steadily increased in volume, was one of the most daring colonization movements in history. The Jewish race had been uprooted from the soil of Palestine for more than eighteen hundred years, transplanted to



JEWS AT SALONIKA.


regions in Europe with a totally different climate, and confined there to sedentary life in the towns. The only Jews in Palestine when the new colonization began were urban communities in centres like Jerusalem and Safed, who were as completely divorced from the land as their brethren elsewhere, and were not even economically self-supporting in their urban environment, but dependent on the alms of the Dispersion.

The new colonists were determined not to sink into this condition, but rather to raise the position of Jewry in Palestine by their own example and aid, and they proposed to achieve this by settling on the land and making their living out of Palestinian agriculture. In this heroic task they had nothing to help them but

their faith and energy. They were students and shopkeepers, unused to country life, ignorant of agricultural methods even as practised in Europe, ill-fitted physically to stand the Palestinian climate, and with no one to instruct them in the special conditions of agriculture there. Even for the native peasantry it was hard to win a livelihood, for the land had been neglected and half-desolate for hundreds of years—ever since, in fact, its original Jewish husbandmen had been exterminated or driven out. The Jewish townsman of the Pale, returning to the land of his forefathers after a cycle of wanderings, was looked upon with suspicion, as a European, by the Arab fellahin, and as a Russian (ironically enough) by the Ottoman Government. For the Tsardom, which had



JEWISH VENDORS OF VEGETABLES AT LODZ.



SHIPPING WINE AT JAFFA.

[A. M. Hyamson's "Palestine."]

denied the Jews in the Pale the rights of human beings, would not forego its sovereignty over its "Jewish nationals" when they had settled on Ottoman territory, and the Ottoman Government not unnaturally feared that the Russian consular authorities would use the colonists as an excuse for intervention in Turkish affairs. At one moment there was even a danger that Turkey would on this account prohibit the purchase of land by Russian Jews and stop their immigration.

But these difficulties were overcome. The immigrants acclimatized themselves; their children grew up healthily as natives of the land; and the land, responding to their industry and intelligence, gave proof of a fertility such as it had probably never shown since it was laid waste by Titus. At the outbreak of war there were more than 15,000 Jewish agriculturists in Palestine, distributed in over 40 settlements ranging from Dan to Beersheba and from the Maritime Plain to beyond Jordan. They owned already 110,000 acres, which was something between 8 and 14 per cent. of the total area in Palestine then under cultivation, and vast uncultivated tracts lay waiting to be developed by them without any disturbance of the existing non-Jewish population.

In the profoundest sense, the colonists

reconquered the land for their race. Where they found malaria, they banished it by drainage and eucalyptus plantations. Where there was too little water, they built dams across the wadis, or sank artesian wells. They distributed the water by irrigation channels. They studied the nature of the soil and experimented in specialised production—vines, oranges, silk-worms, tobacco. They formed cooperative unions for the placing of their produce on the foreign market. Of course, there were mistakes—mistakes in the choice of site, method of farming, and estimate of the market. The wine industry, in particular, was developed at one moment considerably beyond the foreign demand, and the colonists who committed themselves to it were faced with ruin. But instead of despairing, or resigning themselves to farming at a loss, they uprooted their vines and gave their land over to corn and fodder-stuffs. The victorious struggle of the colonists with the Palestinian soil is typified in careers like that of Mr. Alexander Aaronsohn. The son of Jewish parents who had emigrated to a colony under Mount Carmel from a Rumanian town, he grew up in Palestine and was educated there; went to study agriculture in the United States; was appointed an official of the Federal Department of Agriculture; conducted important


experiments in dry-farming in the Western States; and then—instead of pursuing the brilliant career that lay open to him in America—returned home to Palestine, to give his countrymen the benefit of his experience. In 1910 he was made director of the Jewish Agricultural Experiment Station at Atlit, and before his work was interrupted by the war he had bred varieties of cereals, grapes, cactus and other crops especially adapted to Palestinian conditions which in some cases surpassed in value by 100 per cent. the unspecialized varieties grown before.

The scientific achievements of Jewish agriculture in Palestine pointed the way for all regions in the world of similar soil and climate to increase their productiveness; and, small though the number of colonists still was, they had already increased the prosperity of Palestine itself. At Petach-Tichveh, the oldest of the colonies, founded on the banks of the River Auja, north-east of Jaffa, in 1878, and developed under innumerable difficulties, an acre of irrigable land was worth £3 10s. in 1890 and £36 in 1914. Again, between the years 1904 and 1912, the annual volume of trade at the port of Jaffa rose from £760,000 to

£2,080,000—principally through the increased imports and exports of the Jewish colonists.


But the colonists could not have achieved these results without the support of their brethren who remained in the Dispersion. The pioneers were financed by the "Chovevé Zion," or "Lovers of Zion," Movement, which sprang up in all the big cities of the Pale, and was coordinated, in 1890, under the direction of the Odessa Committee. When the resources of Russian Jewry fell short, the emancipated Jews of Western Europe stepped into the breach. Baron Edmund de Rothschild, of Paris, practically took upon himself the financial responsibility for the colonies from 1884 to 1899, till the work was taken over by the Jewish Colonization Association, an organization endowed by Baron Hirsch.

The Jewish Colonization Association did the colonists as much service by its statesmanship as by its funds. It found them at that critical period, which always occurs in the history of colonization, when patronage has done the most it can, and the colonists must choose between loss of initiative or the risk of standing by themselves. The Jewish Colonization Association discovered how to guide the Palestinian



PACKING ORANGES AT JAFFA.

[A. M. Hyamson's "Palestine."]



[A. M. Hyamson's "Palestine,"

SETTLERS AT WORK IN PALESTINE.

colonists along the latter path. It encouraged the cooperative movement among them, granted them loans on business terms and for objects tending to increase their ultimate independence, and set an example of the way in which capital should be employed. The chief financial difficulty for the individual colonist was the purchase of land, which could seldom be bought from the native owners in small allotments. A "Palestine Land Development Company" was therefore founded, which cooperated with the Jewish Colonization Association in the purchase of large estates and re-sold them in lots to individual settlers. And its work was supplemented by an "Anglo-Palestine Bank," which advanced money to the settlers for building houses, buying plant and stock, and starting agricultural operations. But it was not only necessary to make the individual colonist independent of support from the Pale. The communal administration of the colonies had to be made as far as possible independent of the Ottoman Government. Social services which European Governments provide as a matter of course, such as education, police, and the building of roads, were neglected altogether by the Turkish authorities, while the taxes, which in Europe are collected by the Governments, directly and also honestly, were farmed out to extortioners over whom the Turkish Government exercised no control.

The Jewish Colonization Association therefore made loans to the communal authorities to enable them to execute public works and to farm the colonists' taxes themselves, and this had the social advantage, beyond the financial saving, of fostering self-government in the colonies to a high degree. On the eve of the war a typical Jewish colony in Palestine was governed by an elective council of inhabitants, with committees for education, police, and judicial arbitration. The communal police force consisted partly of paid, permanent watchmen and partly of the citizens themselves, who in certain colonies were under an obligation to do a number of hours' service every week. The judicial arbitration, which enabled the colonists to dispense with the corrupt and inefficient Turkish courts, had, of course, no sanction behind it, but it was a point of honour with the colonists to abide by its decisions, and even the Arab population in the neighbourhood of the colonies had begun to carry its disputes to the Jewish arbitration committees. Self-governing within, connected by its own road with the railway or the coast, in direct touch through its own cooperative society with its foreign markets, and financed, when necessary, by Jewish capital, each of the forty and more Palestinian colonies had become, on the eve of the war, a miniature State, asking nothing of the Turkish State, except that it

should refrain from interference. If the war had not intervened, the number of colonies would gradually have grown, more and more of the uncultivated land would have come into Jewish possession, new trade and industry would have been called into existence by Jewish enterprise, and a process of peaceful penetration would have transformed Palestine into a Jewish country. But this process, fruitful and essential though it was, would never by itself have accomplished the National Restoration. It was too individualistic, too economic, too negative in character. Its stimulus came from the anti-Jewish policy of the Russian Government in the Pale, not from the national instinct of the Jews themselves. And the motive of those who guided it was to find an asylum from persecution for individual Jews, rather than to reunite the Jewish nation with its home. The Jewish Colonization Association, which made a practical success of the Palestinian colonies, was more largely interested in schemes in South America, where Jewish colonization seemed to have better prospects from the material point of view. If one compares the Jewish revival in Palestine with the revival of other peoples and lands once entombed in the Ottoman Empire, the period of pure colonization will be found to correspond to the economic recuperation of the Greeks in the late eighteenth century and the Bulgars in the early nineteenth—a preparatory phase which preceded and made possible, but was not in itself the cause of, the national awakening.

The Jewish national movement, or the Zionist movement, as it is more commonly called, was started in Western Europe, far away both from Palestine and from the Pale, and its prophet, Theodore Herzl, of the Dispersion in Vienna, who settled in Paris and became a popular journalist there, was a typical emancipated Jew. The causes of his becoming a nationalist are obscure. One of them may have been the wave of anti-Semitism which spread in the 'nineties from Russia to Austria, Germany and France, and cruelly disillusioned the prosperous Jewish communities there, which had enjoyed emancipation for a century past. But this anti-Semitic movement was itself the product of an intensification of national feeling all over Europe, which reached its climax in the Great War, and it is more probable that Herzl—writer, publicist, cosmopolitan and assimilated Jew as he was—was directly influenced by this political tendency in his Gentile environment. Herzl's discovery was, in effect, that the Jews were a nationality in the same sense of the word as the Gentile nationalities who had attained self-expression in Europe, or were struggling to attain it still. The homelessness of the Jew, which had been his distinguishing characteristic for eighteen hundred years, was for Herzl neither a crushing handicap nor a supernatural dispensation, but rather one of those practical obstacles which reawakening nationalities have always to overcome. To secure for the Jewish people a national home



YEMENITE JEWISH BOYS AT WORK IN PALESTINE.

[A. M. Hyman's "Palestine,"

was the first object of the political movement which he initiated. Herzl's Zionism, modern alike in the freedom and in the limitations of its point of view, was combated in Jewry from two opposite quarters. There was a conservative Rabbinical element which regarded as impious any attempt to compass by human endeavours the Return to Zion, which God had promised, just as it treated as sacrilege the effort to revive Hebrew, the sacred language of the Scriptures, as a living tongue. And there were the Assimilationists, whose view of the Jewish future was determined by the emancipation in Western Europe, just as the Rabbinical view was determined by the Ghetto régime which prevailed in Europe till the eighteenth century, and was in existence in Russia still.

The Rabbinical opposition soon ceased to count—it was really the opponent of Assimilationism, and the issue between them had been fought out before Herzl appeared on the scene—but the Assimilationists fought all the harder as the Zionist Movement grew, and the struggle was never so sharp as at the moment when the Zionist hopes were on the verge of fulfilment.

It is a delicate matter for Gentiles to discuss this controversy, which is eminently one that must be decided between the Jews themselves. But we may take satisfaction in the fact that both Zionism and Assimilationism have been made possible by the tolerance which the Jews obtained (albeit tardily) in Western Europe, and that both show the influence of European political ideas. The Assimilationist feels that the emancipation has been a decisive event in Jewish history, accepts whole-heartedly the gift of political and social equality from the State in which he lives, and offers that State his whole-hearted allegiance in return. His watchword is "Jewry not a race but a religion." When he saw the Jews of the Pale being persecuted by the Russians on racial grounds he waited for the fall of the Tsardom (which, in fact, arrived), and was confident that, in an enlightened and democratic Russia, the Jews of the Pale would be emancipated too. When he saw anti-Semitism raise its head in Western Europe he bore it patiently as a passing aberration. When he opened his purse (as he did very generously) for the settlement of Jewish refugees in South America, Palestine or elsewhere he looked on it as a provisional measure of relief, an amelioration

of individual hardships till such time as the Jewish problem should be solved, almost automatically, by the general progress of mankind. The Assimilationist, in fact, was a nineteenth-century Liberal, and his optimism was derived from the Liberal point of view.

The Zionist would perhaps maintain that while the Assimilationist is under the influence



THEODORE HERZL.

of the immediate past and the orthodox reactionary under the ban of the Middle Ages, he himself lives in the present, yet sees the position of Jewry in the world in the light of the whole Jewish tradition. The Zionist points out (and no Gentile will venture to contradict him) that the legal equality secured by emancipation, inestimable boon though it is, has not, after all, solved the problem on its spiritual side. It has given the Jew a career, but it has not given him—assimilation. He may carry off the highest honours at the University, the Bar, or in Parliament, but he remains a Jew, and never becomes the "Englishman of Jewish religion" which is the Assimilationist's ideal. The Zionist does not attribute this failure to Gentile jealousy or prejudice. He sees in it a confirmation of his theory, that the real differentia of Jewry is not religion but race, and he believes that he can set it right by giving the Jew a national status of his own. The modern civilized world is essentially a community of nations, and the Jew

will become assimilated to it much more profoundly if he enters it, like the Englishman or the Frenchman, in his own national garb, than if he renders himself self-conscious and conspicuous by throwing his own nationality aside and copying the dress of the other members."

This is a very rough and tentative account of the two points of view. Only Jewry can decide between them, but the Gentile may suggest that they are not so incompatible as in the heat of the controversy they appear to be. The same problem was raised a century ago by the national revival of the Greeks, who, like the Jews—though for a shorter span of centuries and to a lesser degree—had been scattered abroad and had taken root in alien lands. The Greek national movement, like Zionism, was started among the "emancipated" communities of the Hellenic Dispersion. They supplied the political ideas, the first leaders, the funds, and when the time came for the national restoration to be carried out there was a similar tension between the "assimilated" Hellenes, whose hearts were in Odessa, Trieste, Constantinople or Alexandria, and those who were anchored in the soil of Greece itself. But when a free Greek State was established, the crisis passed, and the Greek Dispersion in Europe and the Greeks of the kingdom rendered mutual service to each other and common service to the Greek race. We are beginning, in fact, to realize that the principle of nationality cannot be carried out in full except on the basis of some international organization. Nationalism and internationalism are two aspects of the single problem of the self-determination of peoples, and Jewry was likely to need the standpoints of both Zionism and Assimilationism for its orientation in the new world which had been called into existence by the war.

After this preface we may trace briefly the development of Herzl's idea. He made it public first in 1896 in a book called "A Jewish State." Much of what he advocated here had already been suggested by Jewish writers of the Pale, but it is characteristic of Herzl that the "Jewish State" shows no acquaintance with their works. Unlike these works, however, the "Jewish State" made a sensation in Europe. It gave utterance to the latent national feeling of the emancipated Jews. Herzl was called to place himself at the head of a movement, and though he had probably

written the book without any intention of following it up by action, he accepted the call and showed himself a gifted diplomatist, organizer and inspirer of men.

The organization took visible form in the Zionist Congress which met at Basel in 1897, and was followed before the war by ten others, the eleventh Congress having been held at Vienna in 1913. The idea of the movement was embodied at the first Congress in the famous "Basel Programme":

Zionism strives to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law.

The Congress contemplates the following means to the attainment of this end:

1. The promotion, on suitable lines, of the colonization of Palestine by Jewish agricultural and industrial workers.

2. The organization and binding together of the whole of Jewry by means of appropriate institutions, local and international, in accordance with the laws of each country.

3. The strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment and consciousness.

4. Preparatory steps towards obtaining Government consent, where necessary, to the attainment of the aim of Zionism.

The insistence upon a home in *Palestine* in the first clause of this programme marked already a modification of Herzl's personal point of view. Herzl primarily desired a national home for the Jews in order to give them, like their Gentile contemporaries, a national status. It was only a secondary consideration with him that this modern *pied-à-terre* should be identical with the territory which the ancestors of the Jewish race had occupied eighteen centuries before. He laid great stress on the "preparatory steps towards obtaining Government consent," and positively discouraged further colonization work in Palestine, as an unwarrantable risking of national capital, until the Ottoman Government should have vouchsafed some definite political guarantee. Herzl himself was in constant diplomatic negotiation with the Sultan on the subject of Palestine, and placed a confidence in Turkish promises which appears naïve in the light of the event. But he was equally ready to negotiate with any other Government which offered speedier or more certain facilities for a Jewish home elsewhere.

Herzlian Zionism thus started in positive opposition to the "Chovevé Zion" movement, and though the branches of the "Chovevé Zion" in Western Europe and America went over to Herzl almost in a body, the main movement in the Pale, which was just reorganizing



[A. M. Hyamson's "Palestine."]

YEMENITE CHILDREN OF JERUSALEM.

itself under the Odessa Committee, remained aloof for several years. Herzl's first attempt to secure a national domain was in the nature of a compromise between the Palestinian and the purely territorial ideas. He obtained the approval of the English and Egyptian Governments, in 1900, for the foundation of an autonomous Jewish community in the El Arish district, which lay within the Egyptian frontier and might theoretically be regarded as part of Palestine, though it only represented the extreme south-western corner of the

Palestine of history, and was a barren tract, hemmed in between the desert and the sea. A survey commission was actually sent out, but the El Arish project fell through, and the next concrete proposal, which took shape in 1903, raised the geographical question in an uncompromising form.

This was no less than an offer, made by the British Foreign Office, on Mr. Joseph Chamberlain's suggestion, to the British representatives of the Zionist movement, of facilities for the establishment of a Jewish home in British East

Africa. The scheme outlined in Lord Lansdowne's letter comprised "the grant of a considerable area of land, the appointment of a Jewish official as the chief of the local administration, and permission to the colony to have a free hand in regard to municipal legislation and as to the management of religious and purely domestic matters, such local autonomy being conditional upon the right of His Majesty's Government to exercise general control."

This proposal held out to the Zionists the certain prospect of an ample and fertile territory, complete self-determination in their internal affairs, and the protection of a tolerant and powerful Government—of everything, in fact, that they desired except Palestine itself. It was laid before the Sixth Zionist Congress, and it at once became apparent that the literal return to Zion, which had been so subordinate an element in the founder's original idea, was the emotional inspiration of the movement



JEWS IN JERUSALEM.

which he had created. The Congress was unanimous in its gratitude to the British Government, but only a tiny minority was in favour of accepting the offer, and it was significant that the delegates from the Russian Pale, where the Jews were in the most urgent need of an immediate material refuge, were the most emphatic in their refusal to build on any but Palestinian soil. It was resolved to send a commission to East Africa to investigate, but the expenses were not to be paid out of Zionist funds, and when the commission reported to the Seventh Congress in 1905, the principles of the Basel Programme were unanimously reaffirmed, and any territorial arrangement outside Palestine was specifically ruled out, whether as a temporary or a permanent solution. The decision was so important that the few dissentients parted company with the Zionist movement altogether. Herzl was spared the pain of this crisis by his death, which occurred between the dates of the Sixth and Seventh Congresses—in 1904.

The renunciation of the East African offer broke down the barrier between Herzlian Zionism and the "Chovevé Zion" movement in the Pale; while at the same time the death of Herzl left the leadership in the hands of his lieutenants in Germany, and led to the transference of the Zionist headquarters from Vienna to Berlin. There was a latent antagonism between these two tendencies which came to light over the question of the Hebrew language.

The revival of Hebrew as a living tongue was a natural result of the Palestinian colonization. Where Jews are scattered among Gentiles they are bound to speak the local Gentile language. But where they form a community by themselves they must have a common Jewish language, which need not be identical with that of the surrounding populations. The 80,000 Jews of Salonika, descended from immigrants who came *en masse* from Spain, preserved the Spanish dialect of their ancestors in the midst of the Greek and Slavonic-speaking natives of the land. For the modern colonists in Palestine the language question was less simple. They had flowed in in dribblets and had come from almost every Jewish community in the world—Jews from the Pale and Rumania, Sephardim from the Balkans, Moroccans and Bokharans, Caucasians and Yemenis. It is true that the Russian and Rumanian Jews preponderated, but it would have been impossible


to create a common Jewish language in Palestine out of their Yiddish speech; for the Askenazim were regarded with a certain aristocratic disdain by the Latin and Oriental Jews, and Yiddish had no emotional appeal in it, no consecration in the tradition of the Jewish race, by which this aversion might have been



PALESTINIAN GRAPES.

overcome. For the common Jewish language in Palestine only Hebrew was possible, and its revival was practicable because it had never been dead.

During the eighteen centuries in which the Jews had been divorced from Palestine and forced to learn the tongues of the lands where they sojourned, the writing of Hebrew had never died out. It had always been the language of theology and of Rabbinical commentary on the law; there were outbursts of secular literature in Hebrew in the Middle Ages; and in the eighteenth century it was deliberately employed for didactic and journalistic writing by the pioneers of emancipation in Germany, who hoped by this medium to carry their propaganda into the Ghetto. With the Jews of Western Europe this adaptation of Hebrew was only a transitory stage, and as soon as their emancipation was completed they abandoned it for the various "culture languages" of their adopted countries. But they had started the modernization of the written language, and their work was carried



THE BEZALEL SCHOOL OF ARTS AND CRAFTS AT JERUSALEM.

on by the Jews of the Pale, whose emancipation was delayed for a century and then superseded by persecution. The settlers from the Pale in Palestine brought Hebrew with them as a modernized written language.

The next stage was to make it a medium of living communication with their polyglot fellow-colonists. A generation grew up in



WEAVING CARPETS IN THE BEZALEL.

Palestine to whom Hebrew was their mother-tongue; primary education in Hebrew was started to meet their needs; but the great step was taken in 1906, when an association of Palestinian teachers was formed with the object of founding a Hebrew Secondary School. In the face of formidable difficulties—lack of Hebrew text-books and deficiency of Hebrew terminology—the new gymnasium was opened at Jaffa in 1907, and proved a complete success. Its numbers increased from less than a hundred pupils to seven hundred within seven years,

and the use of Hebrew was established for Palestinian higher education. The schools already supported in Palestine by the emancipated Jewish communities of Western Europe, which had naturally taught in the various adopted languages of their patrons—English, French or German—began to give Hebrew its place. The German-Jewish schools, which were mostly of later date than the others, but soon outstripped them in the Palestinian field, seemed especially conciliatory in their attitude towards the Hebrew revival, and the language question was apparently in process of solving itself when the foundation of a Jewish Polytechnical Institute in Palestine suddenly brought on a crisis.

The funds for this foundation came from every quarter of Jewry—from Russia, from America, from the Jewish National Fund, which is the financial organ of Zionism, and from the *Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden*, the society through which the German Jews carried on their Palestinian educational work. But the *Hilfsverein* took the initiative, and its governing body was practically left in charge of the scheme. At this juncture, however, the directors of the *Hilfsverein* began to reverse their policy towards Hebrew in their own schools, and insisted, for certain subjects of instruction, on its replacement by German. The result was a secession in Palestine of teachers and pupils, who started new schools in the Hebrew language. But instead of heeding this warning the *Hilfsverein*, as representing the trustees of the new Polytechnical Institute, decided at a meeting in the autumn of 1913 that the Institute should have no official language, but that natural science and technical subjects should be taught in German.

When this was carried, the nationalist trustees present at the meeting resigned, and the Actions Committee of the Zionist Movement then took the momentous step of supporting the secessionists from the *Hilfsverein's* schools, and helping them to found a normal school and two boys' schools in Palestine on a purely Hebrew basis.

Early in 1914 another and more representative meeting of the trustees of the Polytechnical Institute was held, and the American delegates brought the opposing parties to a compromise. It was resolved that mathematics and physics should be taught in Hebrew from the beginning; that the teachers should undertake, in their contracts with the governing body, to acquire a competent knowledge of Hebrew within four years; and that after the first four years of the Institute's existence the question of what subjects were to be taught in Hebrew should be considered afresh.

The struggle was thus postponed till it was suspended indefinitely by the war. But though this contest over the language of instruction in a polytechnical institute may seem a small thing compared with the issues which the war raised, not only for the world as a whole but for Palestine itself, it really marked a vital moment in the history of the Jewish national

movement. Jewry in Palestine had fought for the recognition of Hebrew as its national language, for higher culture as well as for daily use; Zionism had officially identified itself with this cause; and the German Assimilationists, in their efforts to impose the German language, had the secret backing of the German Government. At one of the meetings of the trustees, which was held under the roof of a Jewish leader in Berlin, Herr Zimmermann, afterwards Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was actually waiting in another room of the house to hear the result of the voting. And the policy which led such a high German official to take a personal interest in Jewish affairs was revealed during the war by Dr. Davis-Trietsch, a German-Jewish publicist, in a pamphlet* which is so illuminating that it deserves quotation:

According to the most recent statistics [he writes] about 12,900,000 out of the 14,300,000 Jews in the world speak German or Yiddish (*Jüdisch-Deutsch*) as their mother-tongue. . . . By its language, cultural orientation, and business relations the Jewish element from Eastern Europe is an asset to German influence. . . . In a certain sense the Jews are a Near Eastern element in Germany and a German element in Turkey.

... Hitherto Germany has bothered herself very little about the Jewish emigration from Eastern Europe.

* "Die Juden der Türkei": "Länder und Völker der Türkei" series, No. 8: Leipzig, 1915.




[A. M. Hyamson's "Palestine,"

THE JAFFA GYMNASIUM EN FÊTE.

People in Germany have hardly realized that, through the annual exodus of about 100,000 German-speaking Jews to the United States and England, the empire of the English language and the economic system that goes with it is being enlarged, while a German asset is being proportionately depreciated. . . .

In view of the difficulties which would result from a wholesale migration of Eastern Jews into Germany itself, Germans will be only too glad to find a way out in the emigration of these Jews to Turkey—a solution



LORD ROTHSCHILD,

To whom the British Foreign Secretary addressed his letter of encouragement to the Zionists.

extraordinarily favourable to the interests of all three parties concerned. . . .

The German-speaking Jews abroad are a kind of German province which is well worth cultivation. Nine-tenths of the Jewish world speak German, and a good part of the remainder live in the Islamic world, which is Germany's friend, so that there are grounds for talking of a German protectorate over the whole of Jewry. . . .

There are possibilities in a German protectorate over the Jews as well as over Islam. Smaller national units than the 14½ million Jews have been able to do Germany vital injury or service, and, while the Jews have no national State, their dispersion over the whole world, their high standard of culture, and their peculiar abilities lend them a weight that is worth more in the balance than many larger national masses which occupy a compact area of their own.


Germany thus had a place—and a notable one—for the Jews in her schemes of ambition. Because the Jews were "dispersed," because they "had no national State," no "compact area" of their own, they seemed to Germany eminently suitable instruments for her policy, which was to build Germany's greatness on the disintegration or arrested development of other peoples. Just as Serbia and Belgium were to lose their independence and the subject

nationalities of Austria-Hungary were to remain under their oppressors, so the Jews were to be maintained, as a "German asset," in the state of denationalization under which they had suffered torments for eighteen centuries, in order that they might once again be hewers of wood and drawers of water for a Gentile nation, only, no doubt, to be persecuted and cast out once more when they ceased to minister to Germany's selfish purposes. Such a destiny was at the opposite pole to the hopes which Herzl had awakened in the Jewish people and which the colonists in Palestine were bringing to fruition; and the conflict between the Hebrew and German languages in 1913-14 is important precisely because it was the first clash between these opposing purposes. In this conflict, though it broke out before the war, the Jewish national movement had already ranged itself on the side of the Allies, for the claim of the Jews in Palestine to the freedom of their national language in their native land was an expression of the right of peoples to determine their own destiny, which was the war aim of the Allies and the negation of Germany's will to domination.

Because of the stand which they took on this occasion the colonists in Palestine had to suffer during the war. Some of their hardships, such as the requisitioning of animals and produce, or the privations due to the blockade, were doubtless incidental to the state of hostilities, and they were visited, like other inhabitants of Turkey, by a terrible locust plague in 1915. But they also drew upon themselves the malevolent attention of the Ottoman Government, which had translated the German doctrine of racial domination into a "Pan-Turanian" policy of Turcification within its local sphere. The revival of Hebrew made the Palestinian Jews as noxious to the Committee of Union and Progress as the Arabs, Armenians and Greeks; they did not forgive the Palestinian refugees who enlisted in the Zion Mule Corps in Egypt, a combatant unit which fought through the Gallipoli campaign; and when the British Army established itself before Gaza in the spring of 1917 orders came down from Constantinople that the Jews in Palestine should be dealt with as the Greeks had been in 1916 and the Armenians the year before. The procedure opened with the deportation of the Jewish element from Jaffa and its neighbourhood, and the Armenian and Greek precedents

left no doubt as to what was to follow. But the complacency of the Jewish community in Germany towards Turco-German policy did not extend to the extermination of their Palestinian compatriots, and they made such urgent protests to the German Government

Army at Gaza in the autumn of 1917, followed by its rapid advance, released a large part of the Jewish colonies from the Turkish dominion. The British Government was now in a position to renew its offers of 1900 and 1903 in a form that satisfied every condition of the Basel



TRAVELLING IN PALESTINE.

that the latter was compelled to intervene. Berlin conferred with Constantinople, and the deportations were discontinued.

Whether the Committee of Union and Progress would have seized some later opportunity of carrying out their purpose will never be known, for the blow struck by the British

Programme, and on November 2, 1917, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs addressed the following letter to Lord Rothschild, as the representative of the Jewish community in England :

DEAR LORD ROTHSCHILD,—I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Govern-



TEL AVIV, THE NEW JEWISH COLONY IN JAFFA.

ment, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet :

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR.

With Mr. Balfour's letter this chapter may fitly close. It was received with enthusiasm wherever there were Jews in the world. The Zionists in the British Empire and in Allied and neutral countries expressed their gratitude in showers of telegrams to the British Government ; and the Zionists of Germany and Austria-Hungary, who could take no overt action, were so little able to conceal their emotion that they elicited voluminous exhortations, both argumentative and minatory, from the German Press. The Pale signified its feelings by a great demonstration at Odessa, the port where the pioneer colonists had embarked in faith thirty-

five years before. "Our declaration," a member of the British Government remarked to a representative of Zionism, "has brought us in a quick return."—"That is the first time," the Zionist retorted, "that a Gentile has got interest out of a Jew."

It does not fall within the scope of this history to discuss the future, but at the date at which Mr. Balfour's letter was written two factors of importance had already appeared. The devastation of the Russian Pale, which Fortune, by a last stroke of cruelty, had chosen for one of the principal theatres of the war, had uprooted the Askenazim on a far greater scale than the former Tsarist persecutions, and made it likely that, when peace returned, the return to Palestine would recommence in far greater volume than before. And the common sufferings of all the non-Turkish nationalities in the Ottoman Empire at the hands of their "Turanian" rulers had impressed upon their leaders the necessity for cooperation in their struggle for independence. The future of Western Asia was shaping itself in the form of an entente between Arab, Armenian, and Jew.





CHAPTER CCXVIII.

THE ARMY MEDICAL SERVICE AND THE NEW MEDICINE.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE R.A.M.C.—EARLY DEFECTS—NEW IDEAS—MILITARY HOSPITALS—HOW THE WOUNDED WERE BROUGHT OUT OF BATTLE—THE “RACE AGAINST INFECTION”—MODERN HOSPITAL TRAINS—BARGES—AT THE BASE—KINETIC MEDICINE—“FITNESS” UNDER THE TEST OF WAR—MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS—A HOSPITAL EXPERT’S TOUR IN FRANCE—“SOLDIER’S HEART”—FRENCH AND BELGIAN HOSPITALS—MEDICAL RESEARCH COMMITTEE—NATIONAL HEALTH.


IN an early chapter of this History a description was given of the Hospital System of the British Expeditionary Force in 1914 and of the manner in which that system was enlarged and reorganized to meet the demands of modern warfare both in respect of altered conditions and of increased numbers.* In subsequent chapters the evolution of the scientific side of medicine which took place during the first years of war was traced, and it was shown how great a part so-called pure science played in enabling physicians and surgeons to cope with the deadly infections of the battlefield itself and with the equally deadly epidemics which invariably constitute a threat to armies in the field. Finally, the various measures adopted to improve the comfort of the men and to conserve their well-being both physically and mentally were described; and in a recent chapter that aspect of the subject was dealt with further from the point of view of the soldier discharged from the army as disabled or unfit.

In order to correlate these accounts of so many diverse efforts and achievements it is now necessary to take up the story of the general evolution of the Medical Service from

the point where that story was interrupted and to describe in detail the remarkable progress of what had by the autumn of 1917 become the most gigantic, the most effective and the most highly organized work of mercy which the world had ever seen.

It has been stated already, and may now be emphasized, that the medical equipment of the Original Expeditionary Force was very far indeed from being a complete one. The Royal Army Medical Corps had a somewhat stormy origin, and it had not, before the outbreak of the Great War, been entirely successful in convincing the authorities of its supreme importance and of its urgent requirements. There were, needless to say, most able administrators and most distinguished men of science in its ranks—it is only necessary in this connexion to mention such names as Sir Alfred Keogh, Sir Wm. Leishman, Sir David Bruce—but in spite of the efforts to awaken interest and arouse enthusiasm much that might have been done was left undone. The Service, too, was not entirely attractive, because the average young medical graduate did not believe that he would find sufficient scope in the Army for the practice of his profession, unless, indeed, he proposed to

* Vol. IV., Chapter LXVI.



A BRITISH HOSPITAL SHIP AT A LANDING-STAGE.

devote his life to the study of tropical diseases. Thus the cream of the Service was engaged in the great work of preventive medicine in hot countries—and the record of the R.A.M.C. in this field is exceedingly brilliant—while the work of attending to the sick soldier at home was work in which doctors could scarcely hope to gain a very wide experience, the army being a carefully selected body of young men.

The result of this state of matters—and it is not easy to see how, granted the difficulties, a better state of matters could have been secured—was that when the war broke out the Corps found itself deficient in equipment and to a great extent devoid of experience. The conception of a military hospital as that institution is now understood simply did not exist. The idea of a great Service of the Sick and Wounded working through its own channels and having, so to speak, its own point of view of war was but just formulated and still lacked effective demonstration. The doctor was too largely regarded as the servant of the officer in command, as a subsidiary person whose duty it was to receive orders, not to issue them, and whose chief merit consisted in his capacity to refrain from interference. The old-world horse ambulances which “rumbled” over the pavé

of the French towns during the early days of August, 1914, expressed the situation exactly. They were and they looked a bad compromise between two opposing ideas. The doctors attached to them seemed to feel that they occupied a position which still awaited definition. They began to see what was wanted, but they were unable to see how the reform was to be brought about.

Events solved their difficulty with a thoroughness that no one could have foretold. The roadways of France leading from the battlefields of Mons and the Marne soon became a shambles. Thousands of wounded men lay out upon these roads, and there was no adequate means of collecting them. Terrible rumours passed from mouth to mouth in England that the Ambulance Service had broken down and that help was urgently required. The British Red Cross Society hurried to the assistance of the Army Medical Corps. The American residents in Paris founded and endowed a great new hospital, the Lycée Pasteur, at Neuilly, thousands of pounds were rapidly subscribed to *The Times* Fund for the Sick and Wounded, ambulance motor cars were called for and supplied, and certain changes were made in the personnel of the Corps, by far the most

important of which was the recall of Sir Alfred Keogh to the position of Director-General which he had occupied some years earlier and from which he had retired into private life.

From this moment the old order changed and what can only be described as a new conception of military medicine was brought into being. The basic idea underlying this new conception was the welfare of the Army as a whole and not merely the treatment of wounded men. Indeed, the treatment of wounded men, which had so monopolized medical attention in other campaigns, was by no means the most important function of the new war doctor. The prevention of disease and the prevention of wounds was his chief duty, the former by means of such measures as preventive inoculation, the latter by the use of protective measures like the steel helmet, the use of which found its first advocates among French surgeons. Prevention, indeed, became the watchword of the Medical Service. It was recognized at last that an epidemic prevented from arising or mastered in its first stages represented a far greater achievement than an epidemic successfully treated in its full maturity. It was recognized, too, that the danger from wounds lay not so much in the wounds themselves as

in the infections occurring secondarily. The prevention of wounds thus assumed a twofold importance: it was important to reduce their actual numbers as far as possible by means of suitable mechanical devices; it was also important to reduce the incidence of inflammation occurring in those wounds which were sustained.

The meaning of these changes in attitude was not apparent at once, but some severe object lessons calculated to impress this meaning upon all observers were furnished during the course of the campaign, when, for example, in Serbia failure to prevent disease brought disaster quickly. It was seen that a single epidemic which has escaped from control may quickly upset the whole system of medical care of any army, that indeed it may so heavily tax the means of communication, the transport and supply as to threaten the safety of the force as a whole. Nothing saps the *moral* of armies so quickly as unchecked infectious disease; nothing militates so effectively against the return of wounded men to the ranks as inflammation in wounds.

The Military Hospital became, therefore, much more than a mere clearing house for the injured. It became a kind of detective bureau



A REGIMENTAL AID POST.

[Official photograph.]



BRITISH RED CROSS DOG.

Dogs are used in all modern armies to search for wounded men in outlying positions.

for the discovery of the first indications of epidemic disease; it became also a centre for the study of disease, for the elucidation of difficult problems of prevention and treatment and for the application of new remedies to old conditions and for the dissemination of knowledge newly acquired to all the members of the Army Medical Corps. It served further by collecting statistics of disease and of treatment, sifting these and correlating them, so that the value of new methods might be tested and

proved or disproved by records of actual results obtained. This statistical evidence was also made available far and wide; and its use, as may readily be imagined, was at once recognized on all hands.

Moreover, just as the hospital itself became transformed, so did the method of bringing the sick and wounded to the hospital undergo evolution and transformation. Attached to each regiment were certain men known as Regimental Stretcher Bearers. After a battle these men as soon as possible went out to pick up the injured and get them back to the trenches. Just behind the trenches and connected with them by a communication trench was the Regimental Aid Post. As a rule it was situated in a dug-out. The wounded came to it both from the No Man's Land and the trenches themselves, and it thus constituted the first stopping place—the first place at which medical attention could properly be given. This attention took the form of "first aid," *i.e.*, attention to urgent matters like severe bleeding. The wounded were then carried on stretchers to the Advanced Dressing Station a mile or more away. Here again more care could be given, and here the observer who had followed the process of evolution might remark how well experience had been utilised and how good and practical benefit had been derived from it. Of all the work carried out on behalf of the



FRENCH RED CROSS DOG AT WORK IN THE FIELD.

wounded the most dangerous was this journey from the Regimental Aid Post at the trenches back to the Advanced Dressing Station. The bearers had to pass through the enemy's barrage,



PETTY OFFICERS OF THE BRITISH NAVAL ARMoured CARS IN GALICIA ATTENDING A WOUNDED RUSSIAN.

and at this point most of the casualties of the R.A.M.C. occurred. Those who witnessed the splendid heroism of the bearer parties in passing the barrage could find no praise too high to bestow upon it.

So far conveyance was by stretcher, but at the Advanced Dressing Station motor ambulances were met. Very different these from the old horse-ambulances of the days of Mons. Every car bore unmistakable evidence of having been built for its work by men who knew what the requirements they had to meet were and just how to meet these requirements.


The motor ambulances conveyed the wounded to the Casualty Clearing Station, huge tented hospitals of perhaps 800 to 1,000 beds with expert staffs of Surgeons, Radiographers, Anæsthetists and others ready to ensure that every man should have the benefit of all the knowledge and experience gained during the campaign. The Casualty Clearing Station indeed represented, in concrete form, one of the great new doctrines of military surgery—the doctrine that a stitch in time saves nine. At the beginning of the war, before the scientific worker had proved that the real danger to the wounded is not his wound but the disease germs ready to enter it or already implanted in it, the casualty clearing stations were comparatively unimportant places. So soon as the new idea became recognized they developed into places

of first-rate importance, and it was speedily found that upon the efficiency of the staff employed in them the whole future history of the patient depended.

This truth cannot be grasped unless it is understood in what manner the average wound of modern warfare affected its recipient. Generally speaking, if a man was able to recover from the immediate dangers of his injury—the danger of "shock" and the danger of bleeding—he might be expected to recover so far as the injury itself was concerned, exception being made in the case of grave abdominal or chest injuries with destruction of important organs. But hard upon the heels of these immediate dangers came a new horde of assailants more deadly by far. Chief of these was blood-poisoning. Since every wound almost without exception was a "poisoned wound" in the sense that it contained fragments of clothing or pieces of dirt, every wound must in the course of a few hours become the seat of inflammation and suppuration. The germs causing this inflammation were of a peculiarly virulent order, and in untreated cases the inflammation tended to spread with great



Official photograph.
GERMAN PRISONERS CARRYING A WOUNDED BRITISH SOLDIER.



Official Photograph.

SCENE AT AN ADVANCED DRESSING STATION DURING A BATTLE.

rapidity, so that a state of general poisoning with high fever resulted, and the patient was placed in extreme danger of losing his life—or at the very least a limb.

The first idea, when this state of affairs was realised, was to hurry all wounded men to the base, so that they might be placed in good hospitals and receive the best possible attention. The idea underlying this procedure was the familiar one that the best treatment could only be obtained in specially equipped institutions and that, as the wound was already infected, no harm was likely to result from a short delay in dealing radically with it. There was undoubtedly much to be said for this view, and without question the improved methods of dealing with wounds which were rapidly introduced into the base hospitals were the means of saving an enormous number of lives.

Nevertheless certain surgeons and investigators felt that, good as this system was, a better might, so far at any rate as some of the cases were concerned, be devised. They therefore resolved to begin the radical treatment of wounds much nearer to the firing line, and so eliminate the period of time occupied in the journey to the base, arguing that by this step they would afford the germs of blood-poisoning a shorter period in which to develop their evil activities. If the infection was checked at an early stage the strength of the patient would be conserved; he would retain in greater measure his "will to recover" and the destruction of tissue from a spreading inflammation would be prevented.

This idea of a "race against infection" was very soon found to be of the highest importance. One of its first great exponents was undoubtedly Professor Carrel, the distinguished French surgeon, though it would be quite wrong to imagine that the British Medical Service was behindhand in appreciating and putting into operation the new method. Professor Carrel was granted a hospital at Compiègne by the French authorities, and, as Compiègne was then immediately behind the lines, he was able to receive his patients within an exceedingly short period after they had been wounded. His results astonished all those who saw them, and though, no doubt, the antiseptic methods employed by him and by Dr. Dakin, who helped him, were responsible for a great part of the benefit secured, yet Professor Carrel himself laid strong emphasis upon the fact that the situation of his hospital contributed in

great measure to its success. He was able to declare that time was of the very essence of the work and that with every hour gained the patient's chance of recovery was enormously increased. Loss of time, no matter how careful might be the subsequent treatment, meant irreparable loss, irreparable wastage.

In the course of a short time this doctrine passed beyond the realm of dispute, and at once the importance of the casualty clearing station

labours. Brave and devoted men and women gladly took the extra risk involved for the sake of the extra benefit they were able to confer, and within a short period had their full reward in the shape of an increased recovery rate and a diminished rate of mortality and disability. Indeed, the nursing sisters displayed most wonderful self-sacrifice in these hospitals situated no more than from five to ten miles behind the fighting line. And thanks to their



[Official photograph.]

OUTSIDE AN ADVANCED DRESSING STATION.

as the greatest of all the means of fighting inflammation in wounds became established. Because it was "always too late to mend" in respect of a war wound the surgeon who saw his cases early and treated them early possessed a great advantage over his fellows. His patients began the race with inflammation on good terms and with a reserve of strength. Their wounds were less dangerous, healed quicker and left less permanent damage behind them. They were disabled for a shorter period, and so could be expected back at their duties in a shorter period. The consequent effect upon the strength of the fighting force was manifest.

So high-class surgery, with its contributory services of X-ray workers, and anæsthetics, gradually came "up the line" and established itself as close as possible to the field of its

bravery the most serious abdominal operations could be safely carried out.

Another of the secondary dangers of a wound was the possibility that the germs of tetanus, or lockjaw, might be hidden in it. During the period of the retreat from Mons this disease occasioned terrible suffering, but happily it was found that if an injection of anti-tetanic serum was given as soon as a wound was sustained the chances of the disease developing were reduced to an enormous extent. Here again the importance of early treatment was soon made evident, and so it became a routine custom to give the wounded man his dose of anti-tetanic serum at the casualty clearing station.

These changes converted this station from a hospital for mild cases which did not seem to




[Canadian official photograph.]

CANADIAN MOTOR TRAIN IN THE LENS SECTOR.

require treatment at the base into a hospital for the most serious cases which evidently required immediate treatment. The result was a revolution in administrative methods. For manifestly, if the serious cases were to be received and treated at the station, less accommodation would remain for the more trivial injuries. These latter cases therefore merely passed through the casualty clearing stations, at which they remained, unless at once able to return to

duty, for a brief space only. They received their dose of serum, were diagnosed and sorted out, and were then placed in the hospital trains at railhead or in the hospital barges.

The hospital trains of 1917 were very different from those met with in the early weeks of August, 1914. The first hospital trains were merely French railway wagons with straw on their floors. There were no conveniences of any sort; there were no air-brakes on the



TRANSPORTING WOUNDED ON A FRENCH MILITARY LIGHT RAILWAY.

wagons; there was no means of passing from one wagon to another after the train had begun to move. The hospital trains of 1917 were so nearly perfect that improvement in them seemed to be an impossibility. Perhaps their most striking feature was the splendid kitchen with which each was furnished and the excellent arrangements for affording the wounded beef-
tea and soup and other articles of diet which were so precious during the hours of recovery from the first shock of injury. Each train had its operating theatre for emergencies, its dispensary, its doctor's offices, its nurses' quarters.

in the early autumn of 1914 and came at first from Poitiers, where a committee of Frenchwomen equipped and designed the first floating hospital. The barge was moored at one of the quays at Paris and was inspected by representatives of the British Red Cross Society and others. It was fully described in *The Times* at that period, and a strong plea was made for an extensive use of this new means of conveyance.

The hint was not wasted, and soon a regular fleet of these useful little hospitals sprang into being. They passed along the quiet waterways of France from the very front right back



[Official photograph.]

DRESSING STATION NEAR ROSE FARM ON THE MENIN ROAD.

The springing of the carriages had been the subject of anxious care, and a pitch of excellence had been achieved which left absolutely nothing to be desired. The men lay in long, sweet wards, protected from every jolt of the line, at an even and comfortable temperature, with medical and surgical care at their sides day and night, with every one of the small luxuries and amenities which mean so much during hours of pain and stress.

No less wonderful were the hospital barges. The idea of using barges for the conveyance of the wounded originated with our French allies

to the base. They were about the size of a Thames lighter, perhaps a little longer. They were roofed in, but some of the hatchways were movable. The centre was fitted up as a ward, like a perfectly arranged and equipped ward of a permanent hospital, except that it lacked windows and was lighted from the roofs. It held about thirty beds. It was fitted with electric light and operating table just as in the case of the trains. In the bows were the kitchen and stores and in the stern the Sisters' quarters in one barge and the medical officer's quarters in another, a medical officer being in

charge of two barges. Patients travelled in these barges in the greatest comfort, and were always sorry to leave them. They proved, as might be imagined, invaluable for cases requiring very careful and steady transport. In the barge, except for the sound of the rippling water, you could not tell that you were moving.

On arrival at the base the soldier found himself in a world of hospitals complex beyond the powers of the most lively pre-war imagina-

which was wrought in medical practice during the first three years of war will not be comprehended. The doctor of 1914, so far as Europe was concerned, was a man who spent his life attempting to cure rather than to prevent disease. The diseases of which he saw most were exactly those which he knew were beyond the hope of cure—diseases like tuberculosis, Bright's disease, diabetes, cancer, and so forth. The diseases which he was able to influence came to him "in single spies," and




AMERICAN HOSPITAL TRAIN AT ST. PANCRAS.

tion, and expressing as a whole a degree of efficiency so remarkable as to be worthy of detailed consideration.

The great, the supreme, difference between these military hospitals and the civil hospitals of peace time was the fact that, whereas in the latter disease in its chronic forms predominated, in the former the disease met with was not chronic. Both as regards wounds and sickness the doctors found themselves face to face with splendid youth, in the fullest enjoyment of its recuperative powers, and with all the factors of circumstance in its favour. The great importance of this may not at first be apparent, yet unless it is understood the vast revolution

he was often too busy to study them. At the beginning of the war European medicine was static. It was felt that old methods had been largely worked out. The study of disease in its advanced stages—which was the only stage of disease seen in great hospitals, and so the only stage of disease upon which detailed and careful study was possible—had yielded only meagre results. The beginning of disease—the early departures from health which led to final breakdown—had not been, and could not be, studied, because those who possessed the opportunities of study—the general practitioners—were overworked men, with neither the necessary time nor the necessary means at their disposal,



HOSPITAL BARGES ON THE SEINE.



INTERIOR OF A HOSPITAL BARGE ON THE SEINE.

[French official photograph.]



A WARD IN A HOSPITAL BARGE.


while those possessed of the time and means were divorced from the opportunities.

The result was that at the beginning of the war there was almost no fund of available knowledge in regard to the diseases or even the wounds of our fighting youth. Not only had medical administration to be built up from

the foundations; medical knowledge had also to be built up. The doctors simply did not know where they stood, as was made evident to everybody by the great and real difficulties encountered by the Medical Boards in charge of the examination of recruits. The public heard of the mistakes of these Boards—and the mistakes were much fewer than might have been expected—with alarm and anger. Many very unjust strictures were passed upon the doctors composing them. The real truth which the public did not grasp, because it could not grasp it, was that these recruiting doctors were face to face with an entirely new problem—the problem of physical fitness in youth, the problem of the meaning and value of so-called “disease signs” in youth, the problem of the probable course of illness in youth and its effect upon physical efficiency. This many-sided problem had simply not been touched before because the only circumstances in which it ever presented itself was life insurance work, and in these circumstances there were no Flanders trenches, no mud and blood and iron to put the doctor’s opinions to the test forthwith, and either prove or disprove his estimate in such a manner that all men might see the proof.



LOWERING A PATIENT INTO A HOSPITAL BARGE.




MOTOR-CAR FIELD HOSPITAL FOR FLANDERS, PROVIDED BY BELGIANS IN ENGLAND.

It comprised operating car, X-ray equipment, ice-making machinery, kitchen, etc., with electricity as the motive power. See the illustration below.

The truth was that for the first time in its history the medical profession found the basis of its faith and teaching assailed by the iron of events. The proof of the pudding had suddenly become the eating. Was a man fit for military service or was he not fit? Did the abnormal sounds heard in his heart signify anything or nothing? Would he break down under the stress of the trenches or would he not? Was he worth the trouble of training him and the expense of moving him from one place to another or was he not worth? These were the questions that had to be answered.

And, on the other side of the channel, a series of questions no less deadly in their simplicity and urgency were being propounded. "What is the degree of incapacity likely to result from this wound? Can the degree of incapacity be lowered by treatment? What does the condition of this man's heart signify, and is the disability permanent or curable?" And so on. The doctors were forced to make answer.

At first, and very naturally, the answers were framed in terms of the old knowledge—that is to say, of the knowledge gained from



THE MOTOR VANS ARRANGED TO FORM A FIELD HOSPITAL.


the study of advanced and often incurable disease. It was accepted, for example, that a man with a so-called "murmur" of his heart was unfit as a recruit, or, if recruited already, as a soldier. Consequently a very large number of otherwise apparently healthy young men were rejected at the recruiting stations, or, on discovery in the ranks, turned out of the Army. After a time, however, mere laymen began to point out that the number of men so disposed of was very great, and further that these men in civil life appeared to be fit to perform active duties and generally to live on a high plane of physical endurance.

It then gradually became clear that the whole question of heart disease must be reconsidered from the point of view of the young man. The knowledge possessed about advanced heart disease was evidently of much less value than had been supposed, and was certainly not trustworthy when applied to those who, whatever else might be wrong with them, were certainly not suffering from advanced disease.

In like manner the question of kidney disease was found to be insoluble in terms of earlier belief; and so was the question of nervous diseases and the question of digestive diseases and the question of diseases of the lungs

and other organs. The Socratic maxim that the first knowledge is the knowledge that one is ignorant was taken to heart. The medical profession stood on the threshold of a new era.

Happily everything was favourable to the seekers after enlightenment. In the first place the Royal Army Medical Corps possessed in Sir Alfred Keogh, the Director-General, a man of very exceptional ability and of imagination. To the common sense of the soldier was added the zeal of the scientist. Sir Alfred was among the very first to recognize that methods and standards by which large numbers of evidently and manifestly healthy men were lost to the Army were not, from the point of view of the soldier at any rate, practical methods and standards. Early in the day he showed his readiness to afford every facility to those willing to, and capable of, re-examining the great problems of medicine and surgery. The study of antiseptics—which had been regarded as a closed book—obtained his enthusiastic support, and like support was given to the study of a large number of other problems, including those of heart disease, of kidney disease, of nervous disease, of tetanus, of plastic surgery and of orthopædic surgery and the treatment of the disabled. Sir Alfred placed



A WARD IN ENDELL STREET HOSPITAL.
This hospital was staffed entirely by women.

the whole medical profession in his debt by recognizing that there was no time to be lost and that "research" was not only no luxury in war but was an absolute necessity. He reaped his reward.

Happily, too, the means to the end were



ENDELL STREET HOSPITAL: IN THE LABORATORY.

immediately available. In former chapters it has been told how, in order that the study of disease might proceed apace, large special hospitals were set aside and equipped for particular objects. In these hospitals numbers of men suffering from the same kinds of complaints were collected together. The most able of specialist-observers were posted to the hospitals to study the diseases *en masse*. As soon as knowledge was acquired it was disseminated throughout the services, so that, immediately, it might be tested and put to use.


The broad result was a new conception both of surgery and of medicine, a conception kinetic rather than static. The rigid ideas of "disease" became softened; in their place grew up a conception of health "with variations" determined by place and circumstance. It was seen that in youth at any rate disease is always "functional"—that is to say that it is expressed in failure to do rather than in failure to be. So-called signs of disease which did not limit a man's capacity were recognized to be in the majority of cases of small account in young men, whereas limitation of capacity even in the absence of all "signs" of disease was an indication of very great moment and was in itself a sign deserving of careful consideration.

This point of view will be the more easily understood if we take the case of an ordinary wound. From the static point of view the

character of the wound, its situation, its cleanness or uncleanness, its depth, its extent, were the points to be considered. Much was known about all these aspects of the matter. Much was known, too, about the relative mortality of wounds—*e.g.*, the mortality of infected wounds as compared with the mortality of clean wounds, and about the accidents and complications which might occur during the process of healing.

But in a war of millions, where the increasing strain on man-power was a constant difficulty to all the belligerents, this knowledge suddenly became quite insufficient. The wounded man was no longer to be regarded as permanently *hors de combat*. His future was no longer a matter of indifference—in a military sense—to the Army. He was no longer able to take his own time in recovering somewhere far from the scene of action.

On the contrary, the wounded man belonged still to the Army, was still of a high potential value to it, and was reckoned upon as a future source of strength. The Army was deeply interested in him and was fully committed to the care of his health. There was but one really important question: "How soon and how soundly could the man be healed?"



ENDELL STREET HOSPITAL: THE X-RAY ROOM.

This was the kinetic point of view. It was not the wound which the Army as a fighting force was interested in, but the man himself. The one and only test of success was the rapidity of healing and the effectiveness of it. Beautiful surgical methods, elaborate technique, fine points of diagnosis were alike valuable or valueless according as they contributed to or did not contribute to the one great end—the restoration of function.

The entire hospital system as it had been



OPEN-AIR TREATMENT AT ST. THOMAS'S HOSPITAL.

evolved up till the autumn of 1917 was founded upon this idea, and every improvement introduced could always be traced to the advance of this idea along some new path. The truth was that the idea worked. It yielded results. It restored to the Army its man-power; it saved health from being confounded with disease and spared real disease the disaster of being classed as health. Itself essentially practical, it appealed to men rendered practical by the stress of the times they lived in. The fogs of many superstitions were dissipated. The soldier as a man gained enormously both in respect of the kind of tasks set him and the kind of treatment given him when he fell sick.

It would not be possible to leave this aspect of the Medical Service without a reference to the Instructions which were issued to Recruiting Medical Boards in December, 1917, and which amount to a demand that the functional or kinetic view of a man's fitness shall be a guiding principle of the examiners—that, in short, a man shall be graded according to the measure of his capacity to work. The

Instruction deserves to be quoted at some length:

"Often a man's occupation, such as that of blacksmith, navvy, or miner, or the exercise he takes, such as football, cycling, walking, or the distance he covers by walking or cycling in a day's work, will show that he will be able to do the physical work of Grades 1 and 2. But sometimes the Examiners will have no such guides and then they may be doubtful as to the man's capability for physical exertion. Under these circumstances it may be well to see how he responds to such exertion as can be performed before the Board. The most suitable form is hopping, carried out in the following manner:

"1. The man's pulse-rate is taken while he stands at rest;

"2. He hops 20 times with the right and then 20 times with the left leg, always lifting the foot about 9 inches from the ground without a pause;

"3. Immediately after this the movements of the chest and of the *alæ nasi* should be observed while the man's attention is distracted

by conversation. In health there should be no noteworthy breathlessness and no pallor nor anxiety of expression ;

"4. The rate of the pulse is taken two minutes after the exercise and while the man still stands. In health it should not be more than five beats more than it was before the exercise. . . . In young subjects albumen in the urine is not in itself a disqualification for Grade 1, but care should be taken to determine that it is not due to organic disease. . . . Cases of well-verified genuine spasmodic asthma in which the attacks occur monthly, or more frequently, should not be placed higher than Grade 3, but if they occur at longer intervals and there is no evidence of shortness of breath, bronchitis or emphysema, the man may be placed in Grade 2."


Returning now to the hospital system of the Army and keeping in mind the idea of the speedy restoration of function upon which it was built up, it becomes evident that this system not only afforded the soldiers as good treatment as they could possibly have secured at home. It secured them very much better

treatment—so much better, in fact, that, while in the summer and autumn of 1917 our armies enjoyed the very acme of surgical and medical ability, the civilian population was still largely treated and advised upon the old lines and in accordance with the old standards. The health of the Army in France, making all due allowance for its youth, was so good as to astonish even the most sanguine, the percentage of preventable disease was reduced almost to vanishing point, of incurable disease to a minimum.

On arrival at the base the patient was placed under observation in order that one of several possible courses of treatment might be selected for him. All these courses of treatment led to the same goal—the restoration of the man as a fighting unit. The question was : which would be the most practical, the most utilitarian course in this particular case. The vast complexity of the hospital system was complex no longer when one came to regard it from this point of view. Yet in order that the amazing variety of it may be realized an account written by a layman with very special knowledge of hospital requirements, who was privileged to



HOSPITAL OF THE JAPANESE RED CROSS MISSION NEAR PARIS.



MOTOR-CYCLE AMBULANCE.

see the whole system at work, may be quoted *in extenso* :

"On arrival in France," he wrote, "I was directed to the office of the Director of Medical Service in one of the medical areas. No trouble was spared and a great deal of trouble was taken to show me everything connected with the Medical Service which could be of interest. Guides and motor cars were always at my service. I was taken to see a hospital in the first instance by the Consulting Ophthalmic Surgeon to the whole of our armies. He showed me over his own department first. It is splendidly equipped—no ophthalmic hospital has better equipment; he has beds for officers and for men; a fine out-patient department; operating theatre with magnet; a laboratory and dark room and every possible convenience. The organization for providing spectacles is perfect; men are examined in the refraction room, and are supplied with spectacles in one hour; every conceivable kind of lens is sent from England and every size of spectacle frame; the lenses, according to the prescription, are fitted into the frames by trained orderlies 'while you wait.' The removal of foreign bodies from the eye—pieces of steel—is, as one can readily imagine, a very important part of an ophthalmic surgeon's duties at the front, and therefore a 'travelling magnet' fitted into an operating theatre on wheels is used which can run to any part of the front where it may be specially needed. I wonder how many eyes have been saved to our men through their having such a surgeon at their service?

"After he had shown me his Department he introduced me to the Commanding Officer of the Camp, who showed me over the rest. It is a hutted hospital. There are flowers everywhere; and everyone notices this, that wherever a hospital 'pitches,' whether hutted or tented, there the Britisher plants a garden. Every hut or every tent is surrounded by a bed of blazing flowers; broad gravel paths lead from hut to hut, and beautifully kept lawns are usually to be seen at the entrance to the camp; every convalescent patient before leaving does something to beautify his hospital, and I was told that some of the poor French peasants had found a fresh source of small income in their distress in supplying Mr. Atkins with seeds and flowers for his hospitals and camps. There is not a flowerless hospital in France.

"The equipment of this hospital is perfect, and nowhere have I seen in any civilian hospital

in England anything as good. The electrical department has a great deal more apparatus for electrical massage or for applying radiant heat than, for instance, the London Hospital, which may be taken as representative of civilian hospitals. The X-ray department is fitted on a cement floor to obtain greater steadiness for fine work, and the department here, as everywhere else, is fitted with the stereoscopic arrangement for viewing radiographs, so that not only the lateral position of a foreign body but its depth can be located; a bullet in the head, for instance, looks as if one were looking with both eyes at a bullet in a globe of glass—its depth can be seen. Even the travelling X-ray cases have this appliance. The theatres are well lighted and are in every way exactly like a theatre in any hospital in London; there is no makeshift in any part of the treatment of the sick.

"We drove to another hospital . . . like the last in its splendid position, its flowers and its lawns, and its broad walks. It has made a name for itself on account of its specializing in the treatment of compound fractures of the femur" (thigh bone). "Its motto is 'Save the leg and no shortening.' Here the greatest living authority on splints of every conceivable kind works. He was absent at the time of my visit, being in England on a lecturing tour on the subject. His work is being carried on by a subordinate who showed me cases in all stages—from their arrival from the casualty clearing stations at the front up to the cured and sound men in the garden walking without a limp. Some of them, out of curiosity, I myself measured, and the claim of 'no shortening' was justified.

"War surgery is very special surgery, and it is not a workable plan, as has been suggested, that surgeons in England should be rushed out to France to operate right and left whenever there is an extra push. I had this many times confirmed in my short stay in France. Experience alone, bought at fearful cost, can tell when, for instance, a 'foreign body' should be left alone and when removed, when a wound should be left wide open and when closed, for the surgeon's foe, gas gangrene, is ever at hand to take toll from the inexperienced man; when to amputate at once to save the man's life; when not to amputate in order to save his limb; how and how not to deal with a gunshot wound of the abdomen which cuts through several folds of intestine, not always transversely. These, and a hundred difficulties like them, are only

mastered by long apprenticeship, and men are certainly saved to-day who would have been lost at the beginning of the war, but they are saved by men who have worked all through."

This latter statement contains, as the reader should now understand, the whole truth about the medical service of the war, and so it



SURGEON-GENERAL SIR ARTHUR SLOGGETT, K.C.B.,

Director-General of Medical Service in France.

deserves to be emphasized by every possible means. This war stood by itself. Only those who had "worked all through" were competent to act and to decide. Medicine and surgery were reborn on the fields of France and Flanders. This view, it will be seen, impressed itself very strongly upon the mind of the observer quoted above. As his narrative proceeds and he describes the means adopted to restore weary and sick men by outdoor exercises and by new interests, such as gardening and games, the impression deepens.

"In the summer time," he continues, "there is very little sickness, and the work of another hospital which I visited chiefly consists in treating gas cases—of which there are a good many—and gunshot wounds of the chest. German wounded are treated here, and I was told they are good patients, quiet and courteous and thankful for what is done for them, and

thankful to be away from the turmoil of the Front. They are treated exactly as the British patients in every way. . . .

"I was received at another hospital by General Sir Arthur Sloggett, the Director-General of Medical Service in France. He hoped in a few days I would come to him and stay at General Headquarters. . . . After leaving General Sloggett I was shown over the hospital by the Commanding Officer. . . . This hospital is half house and half tent. A magnificent hotel has been converted into a hospital. . . . The C.O. spoke of the shortness of the staff. They ran to 60 and 70 operations a day, and when a 'push' was on and cases were coming down fast from the casualty clearing stations they had to work night and day until exhausted. He was very angry at the suggestions made in England that they were overstaffed. He expected that the complaints arose from men who had given up a private practice to go to the Front, and, finding that they were not given the work they had expected, wrote home complaining. . . . What was wanted was men who would work hard at whatever came along.

"The D.M.S. then took me to a beautiful house standing in its own grounds, set apart for the treatment of sick nurses. There is very little illness among the nurses, septic fingers are the commonest. . . . Then we went to an Anglo-American hospital for officers. . . . There are pleasant two-bedded rooms for the officers, but many of them are nursed night and day in the open air on a balcony.

"I next saw the arrival of the hospital train from the casualty clearing stations at the Front. Two trains had just arrived and were unloading. Everything worked like clock-work. While at the station we saw a troop train—men going back from leave—starting for the Front. Mr. Atkins is an extraordinarily cheery person. He sings all the time. . . . Then to a convalescent camp. This place delighted me. It is situated on high ground not far from a pretty little French village; pines were there and heather and bracken, and steep slopes of sandy cliff, and many little streams. The Commanding Officer the 'right man in the right place.' He has a genius for making men contented and happy—a tall, spare Irishman, an R.A.M.C. man.


"The camp is, of course, 'under canvas.' It takes 2,000 Tommies who need, after wound or sickness, a thorough and complete rest with no loafing about. Each man stays in this sunny,

happy land at least three weeks. The C.O. likes to have them for a month. He has organized a 'labour bureau' of his own, and when a new draft arrives he finds out what each man has been in private life—a blacksmith? a music-hall artist? a gardener? a sail maker? a schoolmaster? a golf professional? a gymnastic instructor? a carpenter? a tinsmith? He interviews each newcomer personally, and each patient contributes something to the good of the camp. By this means it has become a home, and a very happy one, to many a man back at the front. A golf course has been made where Tommy can have his round, borrow a bag of clubs and two balls for 3d., and have the services of an instructor. 'I make my men play, not simply look at games,' the C.O. said. And so there are two Rugby 'Footer' matches every day, and two 'Sokker' matches, and cricket matches, and there is hockey and la crosse and baseball. There are monthly gardening competitions, and as a result each tent is the centre of a great nosegay, and there are kitchen gardens. Sergeant Smith, or Jones, or Robinson, who was one of Suttons' or Carters' landscape gardeners, advises on the laying out of a difficult hillside and the best


way of utilizing a little stream. And so we have landscape gardens and artificial lakes and rock gardens, and a Japanese garden; there is also an open-air swimming bath. Streams down hillsides are carried out horizontally in home-made troughs, and therefore end in a waterfall, which makes a delightful open-air shower bath. There is boxing, and there are short route marches; there are evening entertainments and classes for those who like to draw and paint. There is a tent church and a peal of bells, also home-made—they are not bells really, but bits of railway line cut up and hung in a row; the 'note' depends on the length of the rail. The blacksmiths do the cutting and the musician decides on the true-ness of the bell's note. . . . The padre is bell-ringer, and rings with a big hammer.

"There is, of course, the Y.M.C.A. Recreation Tent for writing and reading, and there is an excellent lending library; hillsides for those who prefer to sleep in the sun, and beautiful home-made lawns for those who care for tennis. There is not a slack moment in the day for these men; every day sees something attempted and something achieved."

The contrast between this new form of



INTERIOR OF A CAR ON A LONDON & NORTH-WESTERN HOSPITAL TRAIN.



LIFE-SAVING DRILL ON BOARD A BRITISH HOSPITAL SHIP: SWINGING OUT THE LIFEBOATS.

convalescent camp and the older form of convalescent home is very striking. It illustrates in an exceedingly vivid way the difference between the static medicine that belongs to the years before 1914 and the new living conception. The writer of these impressions was immediately struck by it, for he declares:—

"I have seen men at convalescent homes at home lounging and slacking about, utterly bored and weary, in to meals and then more lounging until bedtime, and I could not help contrasting their dull and weary time with the life and fun and organization of this splendid camp."

His experience of a rest camp, which lies, so to speak, on the outskirts of the hospital world, was very similar. He says:

"On our way back we passed a rest camp into which a draft of 2,000 men was just going. A rest camp is run on precisely the same lines as a convalescent camp except that the men have not come from a hospital but direct from the fighting line. All men are sent in turn to one or other of these rest camps for a fortnight's complete and thorough rest. . . . After we got back we chatted on many things: the future of voluntary hospitals, and especially

whether, after the war, the hut system of treating the sick in open spaces, inexpensive to erect, and which could be enlarged at will by the simple building of more huts as occasion demanded, would be adopted; the improvement of the system of motor ambulances so that there might be a scheme of treating the sick in England somewhat akin to the army system of advanced dressing station, casualty clearing station, and base hospital; how this could be worked with the necessities of medical education, and how, under such a scheme, out-patients would be treated, and so on."

The writer was next taken on a tour of the Front, and thus describes it: "At Abbeville we stopped for tea and to pay our respects to the officer in charge of the medical arrangements on the lines of communication. To him is daily reported the number of beds in every base hospital in France; to him is also daily reported the number of casualties at the fighting line; it is he who decides that two hospital trains must run to one place, three to another, and so on. He is director of the transport of wounded by ambulance, by barge, by train. Every wounded and sick man ever seen in England has passed through his hands.

A man overworked, and pressed and worried, but courteous and obliging and glad to help and advise as all these wonderful men are.

"Next morning to an officers' hospital . . . a Jesuit training school. It is in the form of a hollow square with cloisters all round. . . . Recently Bairnsfather was a patient there and has beautified the mess with some pictures on the wall; he also painted a picture on one of

the panels of his bedroom door. It is interesting to note that this same building was a German hospital in the war of 1870. The hospital has admitted 14,000 officers since it was opened and they have had 135 deaths, less than 1 per cent. . . .

"We were taken over a hospital ship lying at the quay side, and which had just loaded up. One hospital ship is much like another.



COT CASES ON A HOSPITAL SHIP.

She is usually a great liner and is converted into a floating hospital. She contains exactly what a hospital contains—wards and theatres and X-ray departments and kitchens and laundry and offices and quarters for medical and nursing staffs. The cots for the patients are of the swing pattern, moving with the movements of the ship. Hospital ships used to be painted white with a wide green band all round and red crosses, six feet in size, painted on the sides and the bows. The red crosses were illuminated at night and she travelled a blaze of light. A hospital ship used to be safe anywhere and she made herself as conspicuous as she could for her own safety. Thanks to the Germans all this is changed. She is now painted a dull inconspicuous grey. She carries no red cross. She is dark: all portholes are screwed up and she travels in the dark. The ship was ready to start; a second was loading up, the awaiting patients lying in long rows on their stretchers on the quay side, keenly interested. The ships carry about 400 cot cases and, of course, many more 'sitters.' . . .

"Soon after leaving Albert we left the car to search for a mine crater. It is a basin.

the sides of which are of white chalk and into which you could put a cathedral. I suppose it is about 100 yards across and as deep as one of the hospital wings. When the mine underneath exploded it must have seemed as if the end of the world had come. . . . This is all sacred ground. Some of the crosses have little scraps of paper on them—'Sergeant John Harrison, of the Northumberland Fusiliers.' I wonder who he was? There they sleep and the place which so recently was as nearly like hell as man could make it is now a garden of wild flowers—scabious and cornflowers grow there and little creeping plants with purple flowers and loose-strife and poppy. And there they sleep. . . .

"I had the pleasure of meeting Miss McCarthy, matron-in-chief in France. We had a long talk on the nursing arrangements, and she was very much distressed and worried because the Germans were shelling and bombing casualty clearing stations. She had just come in from one such, and they had had a Sister killed the previous day, and at others Sisters had been injured. . . . The next day I visited casualty clearing stations working under full pressure. It was a great delight,



[Official Photograph

WOUNDED GERMAN PRISONERS AT A BRITISH DRESSING STATION ON THE WESTERN FRONT.




[Official Photograph]

THE DOCTOR WRITES A LETTER FOR A WOUNDED MAN.

naturally, to be allowed to visit places with names familiar to our lips as household words. . . . The casualty clearing stations have perhaps 800 beds in each, in tents, each tent taking about thirty cases. As the wounded are brought in they are taken at once to the receiving tent, which stands at the entrance to the camp. Here patients are seen at once and sorted. Those needing operation are passed into the tent adjoining. The damaged limb is 'cleaned up,' the part painted with iodine, and the patient awaits his turn for the operating table. The operating tent communicates directly with the 'Prepare for Operation' tent. In the operating tent I saw five tables side by side—all in use. To one coming from a civilian hospital in England this side-by-side operating seems unpleasant. At a civilian hospital the patient never sees the horrors of the operating theatre; he is anaesthetized in an adjoining room. But you must remember that at the Front the operating theatre has no horrors at all for the wounded soldier. It is a haven of peace. He has *left* the horrors. I was much interested in the individual care given to each patient by the surgeon. The patient was very far from being

simply a 'case.' You see, the fighter and the healer had such great and mutual respect for each other. There were no 'airs and graces' in that operating tent. The fighter and the healer were in partnership. The surgeon looks at the smash: 'It's very nasty, sonny, but I'll do my best to save your leg.' 'Leave it to you, doctor.' And that's all. Absolute and complete mutual respect and confidence. I wondered how those waiting their turns outside on the stretchers were feeling, and I went to have a chat with some of them—not to cheer them up, they did not need that, but to try and find out what their feelings were. But they were sound asleep. . . .

"The equipment of these casualty clearing stations is magnificent, and a patient suffers nothing through being in a tented hospital. X-ray outfits for detecting foreign bodies or fractures are as complete as at 'Guy's,' 'Bart's,' or the 'London.' They have arrangements for dealing with the 'pushes' which seemed to me to work wonderfully. Movable 'teams' are in existence. An operating team consists of a surgeon, an anaesthetist, a sister, and an assistant (an orderly). These teams, which do not consist of



DUCHESS OF WESTMINSTER'S HOSPITAL AT LE TOUQUET.

A "converted" golf course.

novices in war surgery, but of old hands, are rushed off to any point where there is sudden and great pressure, and then removed when the pressure is over. One casualty clearing station had six of such teams assisting on the day I was there. Since the Hun has taken up the habit of shelling and bombing the casualty clearing stations, the staff have arranged for the safety of those not actually at work—they, of course, carry on. Trenches are provided and dug-outs in the sisters' quarters. I saw an advanced medical supply dépôt. There are three of such dépôts, close up to the lines, for each army. Here are kept all possible supplies for all the neighbouring casualty clearing stations."

These impressions have added weight, as has been remarked, from the fact that their author knew and understood the problems of the care of the sick from first to last. But in France he discovered, nevertheless, an entirely new body of knowledge bought, as he declared, at a "fearful price."

Turning now from the general impression of the hospital system to its particular applications, we find that by the third year of war certain great pathways had been opened up for wounded and sick men after the first days of examination, diagnosis and sorting were ended. These pathways represented specialist treatment; each had been opened up and founded

by a vast amount of study, research and labour. Along each were posted men who had themselves "gone right through," and whose knowledge and experience belonged to them in the most intimate manner—first-hand knowledge and experience.

So far as surgery was concerned these special pathways concerned rather the man with healed wounds than the new case, and descriptions have already been given in this History of the work on behalf of soldiers with facial injuries and soldiers suffering from the loss of limbs. That aspect of the matter need not be further dealt with. In regard to medical cases, however, it is necessary to explain the new system in some detail.

At the beginning of the war medical cases found their way as a rule to the "medical wards"—as opposed to the "surgical wards"—of the military hospitals and were dealt with *en masse*. This was the approved method in every hospital. But by and by, as knowledge advanced, and as the special studies to which reference has been made advanced, patients afflicted with diseases of the same type were gathered together

The three most important groupings were heart diseases, nervous diseases and kidney diseases, to all of which men exposed to great stress and strain are very subject. It would be impossible to exaggerate the importance of

proper handling of these conditions, for the fact that they are known to be dangerous and debilitating has surrounded them for years with a mysterious atmosphere very terrifying to the afflicted.

In the case of a soldier with an affection of the heart an early examination was carried out to determine the nature of his condition. Necessarily, if the heart was the seat of progressive disease he was at once sent home to England and removed from the Army. But if the disease was merely an incidental disturbance of the heart's function quite a different line of treatment was now adopted. Instead of being frightened by the idea that he had a fatal illness and classed with men really in that predicament, the patient was put in the hands of doctors who had made it their business to estimate the exact extent of his disability. The first step was to disabuse his mind of the idea that he was a "heart" case, or that his symptoms arose from disease of that organ.

This was not always an easy process because a fear once implanted takes firm root. But means to the desired end had been designed and tested. For example, if a man was placed upon a system of graduated exercises he necessarily concluded that his heart was all right. The

fact that specialist medical officers in whom he could place absolute trust recommended this "treatment" gave him added confidence in it. Then, too, he found himself in the company of others who had shared his fear as regards themselves but who were losing it: an atmosphere of cheerfulness surrounded him, of activity, of hope. He began to forget his disability; he began to think less of the things he felt unable to do and more of the things he felt able to do.

And all the time his general health was improving, thanks to rest and good food and suitable recreation, so that the symptoms which had alarmed him were passing away. The idea of recovery grew in his mind, replacing the idea of an "incurable disease" which had been his bogey day and night. The load was removed from his shoulders. And so the "Heart Hospital" became a place of encouragement and healing—a strength to the fighting force instead of a weakness to it, as a heart hospital would certainly have proved three years before, when the old ideas of medicine were still unassailed.

In this respect the report of the Medical Research Committee on "Soldier's Heart" which was published in 1917, and which owed its origin to the co-operation of this body with




FIELD OPERATING THEATRE FOR ITALY.

the Royal Army Medical Corps, may be quoted :

That a man's observed capacity to accomplish work of a given order (runs the report) is the only dependable test of such capacity would seem self-evident ; yet it is the experience that medical officers rely more upon physical signs obtained while the subject is at rest. A final sorting cannot be accomplished efficiently in this manner. In selecting a candidate for a post as a typist it is not by questionings, it is not by examining the configuration of the hands or the electrical responses of the muscles that the desired knowledge of deftness and accuracy in working is to be attained. The decisive test is an exercise upon the machine which will be used. It is true that specific anatomical defects may divulge incapacity ; but it is equally true on the one hand that anatomical imperfections do not necessarily unfit ; and on the other hand that seeming anatomical perfection is no criterion of manipulative power or skill. The

and bringing them together into a hospital of exceptional cheerfulness added nothing to the cost of their hospital treatment. Without sacrifice of money or efficiency clear light was secured and benefit brought not only to the Army and the men but also to the general progress of medical knowledge.

Sufferers from kidney diseases formed a second class of sufferers for whom a special avenue of progress was opened up. "Trench nephritis" was a common disease of all armies in Europe and proved a very puzzling condition. Only one thing seemed to be certain ; the old knowledge of kidney disease could not usefully



RUSSIAN AMBULANCE ON THE FRENCH FRONT.

heart provides no exception from these clearly sound rules.

This system of treating heart cases was widely accepted and many centres were established for the purpose on the lines of communication in France. Not only so, but on the outbreak of war between the United States and Germany copies of the report already mentioned were sent to America. In June, 1917, Professor F. Mariani, of Genoa, visited one of the hospitals "with a view to his reporting upon the system to the Italian authorities." The benefits of the system of classification and treatment of heart cases cost nothing to the country, but, on the contrary, saved a great deal of money. Gathering these numerous cases of "soldiers' heart" from long sojourn in scattered beds elsewhere

be applied to this condition. New knowledge was accordingly sought for.


In the third annual report of the Medical Research Committee an account of the manner in which the work was carried out is given. The first step taken was to find out how much kidney disease exists ordinarily among young soldiers apparently in good health, for in the absence of any exact knowledge on this point it was plainly impossible to decide whether cases of "war nephritis" were simply exacerbations inflicted by the strain of actual warfare of previously existing if unsuspected disease or deficiency, or whether, in the absence of any traceable relation of the kind, it was necessary to look for some specific new factor acting under the conditions of trench warfare upon the men exposed to them.

Many thousands of fit men were accordingly examined at the end of their military training and before taking part in the operations of active service. Results of great interest were obtained and new light shed upon the problem. Once again it appeared that the later stages of disease with which consulting physicians were familiar were no criterion of the early stages with which no one was familiar. A new medicine was needed here as in almost every other direction.

The cases of nervous disease were also dealt with in a special way. Some account of this has already been given in this History.

stand the stress of the trenches or as not fit. So that a new study of these nervous disorders—the nervous diseases of a constitutional character and the nervous diseases produced by war—was absolutely necessary. It had to be a thorough study, too, because in every case the results and conclusions arrived at would be put to severe practical test.

The study, it is no exaggeration to say, revolutionized this department of medicine and taught how great are the penalties exacted by “nerves,” how crippling their effects and how far-reaching their disturbances. It opened up a better and more humane era for the highly



EMBARKING FRENCH WOUNDED AT SALONIKA.

The basis of the new work was, of course, the intense value of “nerves” to an army. While it is true that a man “fights upon his stomach,” it is true also that he fights with his nerves. An army of neurotics, no matter how well found in all other directions, could not be a good army.

This fact was soon evident. In civil life nervous people are able to adapt themselves to circumstances, and indeed often succeed very well. Physicians were in the habit of regarding so-called “functional nervous disease” lightly and of passing off the patients suffering from it with a few words of encouragement or admonition. It did not very much matter in any case.

But this method was clearly useless in war, when a man must be classed either as fit to

strung and neurotic, who otherwise might have been classed with the unwilling; it spared the weak and so saved many a good man to the State who would otherwise have been lost either in hopeless depression or by the imposition of work beyond the powers of endurance.

The true test of the value of an opinion is the practical test. War medicine differed from civil medicine in that almost as soon as the opinion was expressed the test was applied. And that not in one case, but in thousands of cases. Opinion was weighed in the most exact balances: in large measure during the first days of war, it must be confessed, it was found inadequate. But the deficiency was made good by a new study undertaken in the light of the new, imperative needs. Doctors began to teach their



TRANSPORTING BRITISH WOUNDED TO A HOSPITAL IN FRANCE.

Similar light carriages on which stretchers can be placed were used in transferring wounded from hospital train to ambulance in London.

patients how to live instead of showing them how a little longer to avoid dying.

This profound truth was impressed upon everyone who visited a military hospital during the war. The rigours of the old-time hospital life were not maintained in those institutions because it was clear that in the case of the sick that method simply did not succeed. The plan which did succeed was the plan which regarded a man's stay in hospital as a time of refreshment and restoration of mind as well as body.

Accordingly, from the moment when the great white hospital trains with their red crosses gleaming on their panels ran into the City stations to the time when, uniformed and accoutred, the soldier set out again for the Front, no effort was spared to act upon his mind and brace it. Those who saw our wounded arrive from the Front were always filled with admiration of the splendid organization which at the great termini ministered to their wants. The speed with which hospital trains were emptied was equalled only by the comfort to the sufferers of the means employed. There was no jolting and jarring as in the early days. The trains glided to a standstill. Then the long cars could be seen to be filled with cheery faces—men warmed and fed and attended to, men with good hope in their faces. No sooner had the train stopped than the stretcher parties got to work and in an incredibly short space of time the ambulances were on their way to the various hospitals. The nurses in charge of

these ambulances played a heroic part, never sparing themselves, and even during air raids going on quietly with their work as if nothing was happening. In the hospital itself life was made as agreeable as possible. The man was able to see his friends and they might visit him. So far as his health allowed he had opportunities of going out and enjoying himself. Concert parties and theatre parties were organized almost daily for his benefit.

The excellence of these British war hospitals was a matter of universal congratulation. But it must not be supposed that our Allies had not made similar provision for their sick, or that they had fallen short of our standards. The French war hospitals, both in Paris and throughout the country, aroused universal admiration, and their great system of the care of the disabled was the model upon which our own system was built up—a system in the truest sense of the words kinetic and practical. Indeed, the new medicine which the war produced found in French minds a soil even better prepared for it than it found in English minds. Of all European nations the French were first in that field. They alone, before the war, in medicine as in philosophy, had been turning away from the old, fixed standards to more living conceptions. The Bergsonian dictum, "that is true which works," was the forerunner of the modern conception of physical well-being, "that is healthy which works."

Our Belgian Allies, too, registered notable

progress during the war. The credit for this belonged largely to General Melis, the Inspector-General of the Medical Service, and to such well-known surgeons as Dr. Depage. The Belgian Army during the retreat from Antwerp suffered a most severe loss in the shape of practically the whole of its medical equipment. At the very time when this loss took place the heroic remnant of the army made its splendid stand on the Yser and suffered terrible casualties. Behind the Yser was the little town of Furnes, which was soon filled with wounded men, for whom there was neither accommodation nor help nor equipment.

The situation was one to chill the stoutest heart. But it was met by hearts the stoutness of which is now known to the whole world, and in the end order and comfort were evolved out of chaos. In the first place the Hôtel de l'Océan at La Panne was taken over and transformed into a hospital by the Belgian Red Cross and began work immediately. The splendid situation of this hospital, built on the sea front as it was, lent it a special value as a place of recuperation for weary and worn men. Moreover, the hospital stood on Belgian soil and it was near the Front. The

command was given to Dr. Depage, and he had a band of able and devoted surgeons working under him. During the early days of the war the hospital rendered splendid service, and along with English and French hospitals which had been opened farther south undoubtedly saved the situation on this part of the line of battle.

After the Hôpital de l'Océan had been established, a second Belgian hospital, l'Hôpital Cabour, was opened, and this institution was of the most modern and perfect character, as the following description of it, written by a specially well-qualified observer, shows :

"The rays of the sun fell on beds of wonderful whiteness, giving the great rooms a note of actual gaiety. The spotlessness of the woodwork, the symmetry of the beds, arranged side by side and separated from one another only by small tables, the air of simplicity, brought comfort to the sick men removed at last from the fierce ordeal of the Front. The atmosphere indeed is all repose . . . a vivid contrast with the fury of battle, the shriek of bullets, the cannonade. Portraits of the King and Queen surrounded by knots of ribbon in the national colours decorate the walls and also souvenirs of



FLOWERS FOR THE WOUNDED AT CHARING CROSS STATION.

the Belgian towns, destroyed and profaned, recalling the atrocities committed by the enemy. The lightly wounded occupy themselves by amusing their more severely injured comrades. . . . The operating room is simple and is fitted with a special apparatus for removing foreign bodies . . . the method of Ombredane—Ledoux—Lebard. The surgeon lays his patient on a special radiological table and operates in the presence of the X-ray specialist, who gives him indications as to how to find the foreign body. The whole X-ray installation is of the most modern description. The compass of Hirtz, for instance, which is in use guides the operator to deeply seated pieces of projectile, while specially mounted X-ray tubes allow of the taking of so-called 'geometric' and also of stereoscopic pictures.

"There are rooms for nose and throat work, for eye work and for research into the electrical responses of muscles . . . another installation permits of vibratory massage, hot air baths and galvanization. . . . A mechanotherapeutic installation enables stiff joints to be dealt with.

"Every day bacteriological analyses are made of the germ-contents of war wounds, and on these opinions regarding the patients' outlook are founded. . . . A photographic department serves to procure documentary records of the cases. A 'Cabinet d'art dentaire' or laboratory of constructive dental surgery exists to allow of the treatment of jaw injuries. Splendid results have been obtained by this work in restoring badly disfigured men to a normal appearance and so allowing of them resuming their places in the world.



THE HÔPITAL CABOUR AS SEEN FROM AN AEROPLANE.



THE OPERATING ROOM AT THE HÔPITAL CABOUR.

"The cooking for the patients is under strict medical supervision. . . . An immense installation supplies the wants of 1,000 persons daily. Milk is obtained from cows saved from Ypres, where they were abandoned after the bombardment of the town."

From its opening in April, 1915, to December, 1916, this hospital housed no fewer than 3,120 soldiers, and in spite of the gravity of the wounds encountered only 219 deaths occurred, or 7 per cent. In Belgium, however, as elsewhere, the need for hospitals right up at the Front was recognized as the war went on, and so the system of casualty clearing stations which has already been described was instituted. The base hospitals became in a sense less important than the hospitals of the line.


Needless to say, the value of the knowledge gained in the military hospitals was recognized at an early date and an effort made to secure for it a wide publicity within the Services. From this arose one of the most interesting and important features of the system—the so-called general records. The machinery of these records in France was closely locked with that of the Medical Research Committee at home, and the help of the Committee was accepted in improving certain details of the system. Improvements were continually being introduced, all of them designed to make the records more

immediately useful and of more permanent worth.

Thus during 1917 the index card of the Medical Research Committee was brought into use in France and an arrangement made whereby the so-called army field medical card became a continuous diary of each man's clinical history while overseas. This card, from June, 1917, was transmitted with the soldier to the United Kingdom for the information of any medical officer into whose hands he might pass on arrival in hospital at home. These cards were then filed for reference.

The Medical Research Committee further suggested other cards designed to be sent backwards up the lines of communication to medical officers, who in this way were able to learn the progress of particular cases and so, by checking their results, to improve their knowledge and methods. In its third annual report the Medical Research Committee thus commented on the statistical methods in use:

The extensive series of records which are being collected, classified and stored in an easily accessible form will serve a double purpose. Not only will they constitute the basis of the statistical treatment of the medical history of the war, both for military and scientific purposes, but they will also provide a permanent and potentially complete national register of persons who have been wounded, injured, or ill as a result of military employment during the war—a register from which information concerning individuals may be rapidly extracted. That this information should be trust-



A HAPPY CROWD WITNESSING A PLAY AT THE HÔPITAL CABOUR.

worthy and readily available is clearly of the first importance in view of the countless claims for pensions or allowances which are arising now and which will arise in the future, and perhaps long after the war among civilians who may assign subsequent ill-health to alleged previous disability inflicted by war service.

It would be impossible to close this record of the upbuilding of a vast new Medical Service and of a vast new edifice of knowledge without a reference to the effect produced upon the



THE THEATRE, HÔPITAL CABOUR.


mind of the nation as a whole—that is to say, without a reference to the permanent effect upon the whole problem of national health. Even at the end of a year of fighting that effect was becoming evident. At the end of three years it was apparent that the effect amounted to a social revolution. In the first place the whole young manhood of the country had been medically examined—for that matter the whole young manhood of Europe had been medically examined. This was in itself a piece of work of sufficient importance to be epoch-making. In the second place the whole manhood of the country had learned to appreciate the meaning of health and the value of it. Millions had been subjected to courses of instruction designed to improve their physique; they had learned the laws of hygiene, both personal and communal. They had listened to lectures on health topics; the dangers of disease had been explained to them, urged upon them indeed. Elementary laws of infection and its prevention had become the property of everybody.

Again, thousands of men were brought into contact with scientific facts like inoculation, the prejudice against which rapidly declined and disappeared in face of the immunity of the troops from typhoid fever and other scourges. It began to be asked why what had been accomplished for the Army was not

accomplished for the civil population also. Surgeons also were able to impress the laity with the immense value of their services, and so to win a wider recognition of their work and wider sympathy for it. The need of medical research began to be appreciated; money spent upon this object was no longer regarded as money wasted.

Then the presence of severe scourges like venereal disease was forced upon public attention. The ravages of these diseases among soldiers and the consequent weakening of the effective forces of the nation roused a national campaign against them and did much to end the attitude of false modesty which had regarded the discussion of them as indecent. Men were told frankly about them and were warned of their danger. Efforts were made to secure prevention of the diseases as far as possible and to afford facilities for treatment.

Moreover, not only was the young manhood of the country enlightened in regard to the value and importance of health measures. Similar enlightenment came to the young womanhood of England. Thousands of women found a vocation in the military hospitals and in the Voluntary Aid Detachments.



STERILISING CHAMBER, HÔPITAL CABOUR.

They were trained as nurses, as laboratory workers, as sanitary officials. They learned quickly how much yet remained to be done, to be learned, to be discovered; and their sympathies were strongly enlisted in the good cause. They became apostles of a new faith, the deep human interest of which bound them to it.

Soon demands for improved health conditions began to be made all over the country. Attention was called to the fearful waste of infant life in the great cities, and it was declared

not only by doctors but by social workers and by mothers that the waste was preventable. What was to be said of a city district in which the mortality among young children exceeded the mortality among troops in the most severe fighting? Demands were made for better medical attention—"the kind of medical attention the soldiers get"—for better housing conditions, for better sanitation, for cleaner food, and especially cleaner milk.

The agitation rapidly grew during 1917, and an immense impetus was given to it when, early in the year, Lord Rhondda, then President of the Local Government Board, announced his belief that 50,000 children could be saved annually to the State by improved medical and sanitary arrangements, and his desire to institute a Ministry of Health in connexion with his Department. The proposal met with a most remarkable welcome. The medical profession, especially that part of it which was in touch with the work in the Army, expressed strong approval. These doctors had learned the value of cooperation and had ceased to regard their professional brethren as competitors. In this calmer atmosphere the urgent need of improvement in civil practice had been brought home to them. They asked nothing better than to see the multitudinous medical activities of the State gathered under one central department. The working classes, too, welcomed the measure in the name of the children, and almost without exception sociologists wrote or spoke in favour of it.

Unhappily the pressure of other matters caused Lord Rhondda's proposal to be deferred when it was finally brought to the notice of the Cabinet. Yet it could not but be regarded as a significant fact that when announcement was made of postponement a strong protest was raised both in the Press and in Parliament, and indeed throughout the whole country. The need for a health army at home, like the health army in the field, was clearly present to the public mind.

Nor was this awakening confined to Britain. France and Germany were also, as nations, aroused to the vital importance of preventive medicine as a factor in national strength. It was seen that just as an army perishes with its health, so a nation during or after such an ordeal as this war must be more than ever dependent for its restoration upon its physical

well-being. Children had become the greatest of all national assets. In every country in Europe the cry, "Save the children," was heard.

The movement took shape in England in the formation of a so-called "Baby Week Council," and the holding, early in July, 1917, of "Baby Week," during which a serious attempt was made throughout the country to reach the mothers and arouse them to a sense of their political responsibility.* The campaign was waged with great activity, and was successful beyond the hopes of its promoters. It was found that the women appealed to were already alive to the importance of the measures urged upon their notice and were as eager as those who addressed them for the inauguration of a better system. These women, as the mothers and wives of British soldiers, had already learned something of the efficacy of the new medicine; often they had seen its effects with their own eyes during visits to military hospitals or in the bodies of their relations. They had begun to apply their new knowledge, and a wholesome anger against the dirt and indifference which allowed precious lives to be sacrificed in city slums was stirring within them. The lesson of the Army Medical Service had not been wasted.

Indeed, this Service presented at the end of the third year of war a very perfect example of what can be achieved, given imagination and sympathy in the direction and zeal in the workers. The critics of the Army Medical Service almost without exception failed to realise that a new era in medicine had been inaugurated. The fundamental error lay in supposing that the old wine of theory could be put into the new bottles of practical need. Happily those in command knew better. They demanded of their medical staff a high standard of achievement. They demanded a common-sense view of disease founded upon a man's capacity rather than upon his approximation to a remote standard of physical perfection. They asked for results rather than for records of treatment or diagnosis. In short, they made the health of the troops their one and only criterion of success or failure, refusing all other criteria. And by the supreme fact of the health of the troops their method and inspiration were justified.

* See page 269 of this volume.



CHAPTER CCXIX.

RUSSIA, AUGUST-NOVEMBER, 1917: KERENSKY AND LENIN.

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN "COALITION" AND BOLSHEVISM—FAILURE OF THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE—REVOLUTION CHAOS DISCLOSED—ARMY REFORMS DELAYED—SUSPICION AND CONFLICT BETWEEN KERENSKY AND THE GENERALS AND COSSACKS—PARLEYS WITH THE BOLSHEVISTS—ALLEGED DISCOVERY OF "PLOTS"—KORNILOFF BETRAYED—KERENSKY'S FATEFUL "ALLIANCE" WITH LENINITES—THE DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE—REPUBLIC PROCLAIMED—A "MOCK" PARLIAMENT—LENIN AND TROTSKY ORGANIZE A SUCCESSFUL "COUP"—THE BOLSHEVIST "GOVERNMENT"—SUKHOMLINOFF TRIAL DISCLOSURES—GERMANS CAPTURE GULF OF RIGA—NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ARMISTICE.

DURING the four months ending in November, 1917, the Russian Revolution passed through a series of changes that rivalled in political and dramatic interest all that had gone before, and introduced further developments in the international situation. The events to be recorded in this chapter turned mainly upon the protracted struggle between the Extremists under Lenin and the Coalitionists under Kerensky.

M. Kerensky had gradually widened the breach between himself and the Soviets as these bodies came more and more under the influence of the Bolsheviks or Leninites. His persistent association with *bourgeois* parties from the outset of the Revolution, tolerated at first as a tactical measure calculated to place the onus of administration upon the non-Socialists, became objectionable when the Bolsheviks, feeling themselves strong enough to take over the Government, encountered Kerensky's opposition to an anti-*bourgeois* and purely Socialist Ministry. As one of Kerensky's supporters correctly enough

defined the situation: the Revolution had been a *bourgeois* revolution; they had the alternative of continuing the Coalition or of swerving to the right or left—to Reaction or Bolshevism. The latter courses would, he contended, be equally disastrous to the Revolution.

There were elements in Russia favourable to one or the other of these departures, but Bolshevism had the countenance and support of the ignorant masses, and with their aid was bound, for a time at least, to impose its sway. M. Kerensky imagined he could successfully play off extreme tendencies to their respective discomfiture.

With this object he summoned a conference of all parties at Moscow in August and there proceeded to browbeat the non-Socialists and the Extremists into subjection. His tactics were, however, destined to go wide of their mark. The conference developed a conflict on a totally different issue—viz., the means of continuing the war. Prominent generals, notably Alexeieff, Korniloff, and Kaledin, emphasized the necessity of abjuring party-



A LENINITE DEMONSTRATION IN THE WINTER PALACE SQUARE.

play and adopting a clear-cut policy of army reform based on discipline.

The Leninites had clearly shown their attitude towards the war by systematic propaganda among the troops, which led to the retreat of the Russian armies from Galicia, and by organizing a revolt in Petrograd in order to achieve this object. The revolt had been suppressed with the aid of the Cossacks, and the Bolsheviks temporarily withdrew into the background; but their power was by no means diminished. Among the 8,000,000 demoralized reserve troops assembled in the cities and towns of Russia the Bolshevik appeal against the war became even more enticing after the Galician disaster, while their wholesale offers of plunder and spoliation to the millhands and poorer peasants grew more convincing as the long promised division of lands was still deferred by the existing régime.

Two conflicts were imminent: one between Kerensky and Korniloff on account of the delay in army reform, another between Kerensky and Lenin on account of Kerensky "coquetting" with "militarism." Kerensky hoped to put himself right with the masses by assembling a "Democratic" conference at Petrograd, from which the *bourgeois* element was excluded. Meanwhile events suddenly assumed a critical form.

As Kerensky had committed himself to a war policy, abjuring the Bolshevik scheme of "democratic" peace which he had pursued in his earlier pre-revolution days, it was obvious that he would have to introduce measures for restoring the fighting efficiency of the Army on the lines laid down by the generals at the Moscow Conference. On the other hand, he had good reason to anticipate the most desperate methods of resistance to such measures on the part of the pacifist Bolsheviks. Unfortunately he temporized and thereby misled the generals into the belief that he was playing them false, without at the same time disarming the suspicions of the Bolsheviks. Moreover, the delay in complying with Korniloff's "demands" for the introduction of disciplinary laws among the reserve troops only afforded the Bolsheviks time to organize and strengthen their position.

When at last he approved the scheme put forward by Korniloff and Savinkoff (in the beginning of September) the Bolsheviks were already too strong. Kerensky therefore commissioned Savinkoff, the acting War Minister,

to go to Headquarters and ask General Korniloff to send troops to Petrograd "to suppress the uprising that he feared would take place when the army reforms were promulgated."

Such was the state of affairs that by a series of misunderstandings and—it may be added—a lack of straightforwardness amounting almost to duplicity on the part of Kerensky, brought



VLADIMIR ULIANOFF-LENIN,
Chief of the Bolshevik Government at Petrograd.

about the so-called "Korniloff revolt." The Commander-in-Chief had information that an uprising of the Bolsheviks was imminent. He complied with the Government's request to send troops, and invited Kerensky and a number of public men to come to Headquarters, where they would be safe from Bolshevik influence and aggression, and to form a strong authority "free from the influence of irresponsible elements" (the Soviet and its leaders, the Bolsheviks). M. Kerensky promised to come, but at the last moment, acting on the spur of the moment upon messages exchanged between him and Korniloff through the medium of a former Minister, M. Vladimir Lvoff, decided to dismiss General Korniloff and to brand him as a traitor.

This episode is dealt with at greater length in this chapter. Sufficient has been said in this preliminary review of the events under treatment to indicate the disastrous consequences of the misunderstanding upon the army and upon the ignorant masses. It



LENINITES MARCHED TO PRISON BY THEIR COMRADES LOYAL TO THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT DURING THE JULY RISING.

served the Bolshevik cause admirably. Lenin and his supporters were, of course, not disarmed by the denunciation of the Korniloff "revolt" by Kerensky, and later, when the full circumstances of Kerensky's previous arrangements with Korniloff came to be known, the affair was exploited by the Bolsheviks and led to a complete loss of Kerensky's credit among the masses.

For a time, however, Russia and the world at large were deceived and misled by Kerensky's virulent denunciations of Korniloff as a "traitor," and Kerensky took advantage of this interval to carry out his plan of rallying his Socialist supporters by convoking a "Democratic" conference in Petrograd.

While heaping abuse upon the hapless Genera'issimo, who, on realising that he had been betrayed, loyally surrendered his office to General Alexeieff without interrupting the responsible task of directing operations—now at a critical stage owing to the German advance on Riga—the Minister-President addressed the assembly in impassioned strains, appealing to his supporters to defend Russia from the German invaders, then already in possession of the city and the islands in the Gulf of Riga. It was evident that the gathering was more intent upon Socialist party considerations than upon the prosecution of the war, but

Kerensky's prestige was still high, and he succeeded in impressing upon them the necessity of upholding the Coalition idea against the determined opposition of the Bolsheviks.

To conciliate the Socialists he proclaimed Russia a Republican State without awaiting the decision of the Constituent, which had not yet been elected, and obtained the assent of the Conference to the creation of a temporary Parliament composed of nominees of all classes and parties.

Pending the organization of this body, which was designated under the name of Provisional Council of the Republic, M. Kerensky formed another Coalition Ministry, retaining some of his former colleagues and including representatives of the *bourgeoisie* and the wealthy merchant class of Moscow. The Korniloff imbroglio had thoroughly alarmed all the moderate elements in the country. They rallied to Kerensky as their only hope of weathering the coming Bolshevik storm.

Lenin and his partisans chose this moment to make an open bid for power. The Petrograd Soviet had come entirely under their influence. They organized a Military Committee, which openly defied the War Office. Fuel had been added to the Bolshevik flame by an attempt to send troops from Petrograd to the sadly weakened Northern Front and by


Kerensky's orders to disband the Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet. The troops at Vyborg had carried out atrocious reprisals against their officers for alleged complicity with Korniloff, and more murders of officers had taken place on board the warships at Helsingfors on political grounds. Lenin felt sure that the reserve troops would support him. He was also encouraged by news of agrarian atrocities in the province of Tamboff, where the peasants had risen against Kerensky's Land Committees for not having "divided up" the property of the landlords, and had wreaked their vengeance in sanguinary fashion. The Bolsheviks concluded that the time was ripe for them to seize the reins of government and carry out their preconceived designs of a "democratic" peace and social cataclysm.

The Bolshevik uprising of November—the third that they had organized since the outbreak of the Revolution—was a complete success. Kerensky had few if any supporters among the masses, who were now convinced that he had connived at Korniloff's march on Petrograd. The "Red" Guards, whose formation he had permitted in order to resist Korniloff's cavalry, now turned against him. The sailors came in warships to support Lenin.

Kerensky was deserted by the troops, excepting the officer cadets and the Women's Battalion. Faithful to their duty, they bore the brunt of the Bolshevik hordes and suffered the greatest losses. Kerensky still had one hope—the Cossacks.

But he had antagonized them and tried to ride rough-shod over their elective institutions, and had carried on a regular campaign of slander against their beloved Ataman, Kaledin. They had no reason to like him, and, moreover, they mistrusted him for his "duplicity" in the Korniloff affair, and for the unwarrantable charges of disloyalty that he had brought against Cossack organizations. The Cossacks had saved Kerensky and incidentally the Soviet from the Bolsheviks in July. They had no motive for supporting the Soviet any longer as it was a Bolshevik body from which Kerensky had himself resigned, and could see no valid reason for saving Kerensky.

A secret midnight consultation was held by Kerensky with the Cossack representatives while there was still hope of crushing the Bolsheviks. They told him in plain words that they would not support him, and gave him their reasons. Thereupon Kerensky secretly fled from the city, hoping to return



THE CRUISER "AVRORA" ON THE NEVA AT PETROGRAD,
With guns trained on the Winter Palace.

at the head of troops that had been hurried up from the front. He found them at Gatchina, but after a brief effort they went over to the Bolsheviks and Kerensky's reign was over.

Lenin and his associates signalized their usurpation of power in Petrograd by imme-



KORNILOFF AND SAVINKOFF.


diately opening negotiations with the enemy for an armistice of three months, in the hope that the "democracies" of other countries would similarly overthrow their respective governments and proclaim an international "democratic" peace, thereby putting an end to war for all time, and issued decrees confiscating all lands excepting small holdings belonging to soldiers, peasants, and Cossacks. This bid for the Cossack suffrage did not, however, produce the slightest effect upon the staunch warriors of the Don and other Cossack armies. The "negotiations" at Brest-Litovsk with the enemy representatives were successful in bringing about a suspension of hostilities on the Russian front and enabling the Germans to release a certain number of divisions for service elsewhere, particularly in the West.

Before the operations on the Russian front could be stopped by Lenin, his nominee to the High Command, Ensign Krylenko, had to capture Headquarters at Mogileff. General Dukhonin, who had succeeded Korniloff, declined to give orders suspending operations or to surrender to Krylenko. He was brutally murdered by the Bolshevik sailors and soldiers. His staff, together with the Allied Military Missions and General Korniloff, had left on the previous day for Kieff by invitation from the Rada.

The Ukrainian movement had during the

preceding months assumed a popular and national form. The Little Russians, by their proximity to the enemy borders, appreciated, more clearly than their Great Russian kinsmen, all the speciousness and the dangers of a separate peace with the enemy, and were not disposed to lend their support to the Bolsheviks.

Already before the Moscow Conference assembled some of Kerensky's Socialist colleagues decided for tactical reasons to leave the Ministry. The most important change was the departure of the Social Democrat leader Tseretelli, who considered that his mission in the Provisional Government was at an end, and that he would be more useful in the Soviet, there to combat Bolshevik influences. It indicated, if not a cooling of the Social Democrat enthusiasm for Kerensky, at least the growth of misgivings among the Menshevist section of



M. NIKITIN,
Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in Kerensky's
reconstructed Cabinet.

the party as to Kerensky's ability to cope with the Bolshevik peril. The new Cabinet as reconstituted (August 6) contained three Socialist Revolutionaries (Kerensky, Avksentieff and Chernoff), an equal number of Menshevist Social Democrats, including Skobelev, four Constitutional-Democrats, two Radicals,



THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN PETROGRAD.

one Populist (Moderate Socialist), and three non-party members. Savinkoff remained Acting Minister of War, and Tereshchenko Minister for Foreign Affairs; Chernoff and Skobelev represented Agriculture and Labour.

The Conference was assembled under the superintendence of M. Nikitin, a Menshevist, holding the post of Minister of Posts and Telegraphs.

A few days before its meeting rumours had gone forth that a dangerous conspiracy against the Revolution had been discovered; some arrests were made, and the Government secretly removed the Tsar and his family from Tsarskoe Selo to Tobolsk. It was announced in the papers (August 19) that "for reasons of State the Government had decided to transfer the former Emperor and Empress, now in custody, to another place of sojourn, which place is to be Tobolsk, whither the former Emperor and Empress have been dispatched under proper convoy. Together with the ex-Emperor and Empress have been sent to Tobolsk, in accordance with their wishes, their children and certain members of their entourage." These developments were treated at the time with a certain amount of suspicion on all sides, as they were only too obviously exaggerated, but subsequent events showed the wisdom of the move. The withdrawal of the

ex-Sovereigns beyond the sphere of Bolshevik influence obviated the natural anxiety that would have been felt by other parties had they remained at Tsarskoe Selo. The "conspiracy" rumours, strengthened by the removal of the former Sovereigns, created a propitious atmosphere for the impending act in the Revolutionary drama known as the Moscow Conference.

It was opened by Kerensky on August 25. Representatives of the four Dumas and of all existing revolutionary organizations, civilian and military, and also of the officers, the Knights of St. George, and the Cossacks filled the great hall of the Moscow Theatre.

The Ministry occupied seats on the stage, while the body of the hall was occupied by the delegates of the Soviets on the left and by the deputies of the Dumas on the right. Kerensky wore semi-military dress, and two A.D.C.'s stood behind his chair. In welcoming the members of the Conference the Minister-President explained that he had called them together in order that they might hear the truth about the condition of affairs, so that no one might afterwards plead ignorance as an excuse for acts tending to the ruin of the State. He warned all who might be contemplating counter-revolutionary designs that they would be suppressed "with iron and blood." More

especially he warned those who thought to overthrow the Revolution with the aid of bayonets. After this open threat to the generals—it was so understood by the Socialists, who cheered accordingly—and particularly to Generals Korniloff and Kaledin, who were known to favour the restoration of discipline and authority by strong means, M. Kerensky having gained the ear of the Left, proceeded to tell them unpalatable truths.

He described the situation as extremely perilous. Famine, dislocation of transport, the industrial and financial crises were overtaking the land, and a general feeling of



M. PROKOPOVITCH,
Kerensky's Minister of Trade and Industry.

terror benumbed the nation. The *débâcle* in the army had extinguished the best hopes that had animated the nation with regard to the triumph of democracy, the speedy advent of peace and the success of the Russian Revolution.

This faithful account of grim realities was, however, followed up with another series of threats, directed this time against the Left as well as against the Right. He warned the few Bolsheviks and the Generals who were in attendance that he would know how to break them to the supreme will of the Government. (The Bolsheviks were feebly represented, but they had shown their power in Moscow by enforcing a general strike of the tram and restaurants.) After this reiterated thrust at the generals M. Kerensky said a few

consoling words about the officers. The mistrust displayed towards them was, he thought, unjustified. The whole nation was suffering from an inherited disease of lawlessness and of mistrust for all authority, which partly accounted for the treatment of officers. But the Government was trying to bring the men and their leaders together by means of Committees.

He thought the main task at present was to save the army. Had the army not been weakened Russia and her Allies would not have been subjected to a German offer of peace such as the Pope had proposed, and there would not have been a separatist tendency among the Ukrainians and the Finns.

Addressing the army delegates he assured them that the Government would know how to protect them from Bolshevik intrigues, and would go to the extent of applying the death penalty pitilessly to suppress demoralization, cowardice and treachery, and assaults on peaceful citizens.

M. Kerensky was followed by his Minister of the Interior, Avksentieff, who outlined a series of measures for the organization of local government, and by MM. Prokopovitch, Minister of Trade and Industry, and Nekrasoff, Minister of Finance, who gave a tragic picture of the economic and financial position of the country as caused by the war and the Revolution.

According to M. Prokopovitch, the war expenditure of the first year had been Rs. 5,300,000,000*, in the second year Rs. 11,200,000,000, and in the third year Rs. 18,000,000,000. He pointed out that in 1913 the total national earnings (agriculture and industry) did not much exceed Rs. 16,000,000,000. In his opinion Russia had in the third year of the war expended from 40 to 50 per cent. of the accumulated wealth of the country.

This presentment was by no means accurate, inasmuch as it does not take into account the value of unencumbered property (land, mills, etc.), which was variously estimated at many times the amount of the annual earnings. But from a Socialist Minister's point of view this item was perhaps a negligible one; the consequences of revolutionary activities and

* As the exchange in sterling had risen during the war from about Rs. 10 to Rs. 25 (in August) and later to Rs. 35 per £, no attempt has been made to give equivalents in sterling, which would be misleading.

schemes of ownership tended, indeed, to undermine and even completely to destroy all property values.

With this reservation we may take M. Prokopovitch's figures as an indication of the strain upon Russia's resources produced by the war. He justly pointed out that the situation was aggravated by the isolation of Russia from the world's markets. Almost everything had to be obtained at home. Only 16 per cent. of what was needed for the war could be imported. No wonder that the country had been depleted of all stocks, that the rise of prices had been enormous, that the profits of capital and land had been rising enormously. On the other hand, the earnings of the working class had been reduced. M. Prokopovitch did not explain this statement. He meant probably that many of the workers had been taken away for service in the army. The wages of those that remained had, however, risen enormously.

He argued that Russia saw a great prosperity among the propertied classes and a grave deterioration in the condition of the labouring masses. The first statement was correct, the second unfounded, except in so far as it was the result of Socialist experiments; but he made it to justify what he called "the energetic intervention of the State"—in other words, Socialist legislation.

On the food position he gave some startling facts and figures. They needed for the current year over 10 million tons of corn and forage, about 140,000 tons of fats and 1,000,000 tons

of meat. Yet in many places there was not sufficient bread. Eight provinces in the centre were suffering from an acute lack of food. The stocks in Petrograd and Moscow had fallen to a minimum. At the front the position had somewhat improved. There was a six-weeks supply at the beginning of July, but the recent disasters in Galicia had created great shortage.

The Socialist Minister complained bitterly about the unwillingness of the commercial classes to help in combating the food crisis, and praised the Food and Land Committees instituted by the Provisional Government. He urged the necessity of increasing the output of mills and factories and the coal and iron industries. He was in favour of securing a fair profit on capital, but also a fair wage for the workman. He was taking drastic measures to put a stop to war-profiteering, but would also introduce a compulsory minimum working day. He would also proceed ruthlessly against outrages and anarchy.

In conclusion, he gave no hope of an improvement in the situation owing to the dislocation in traffic. In July alone the deficiency of loading had attained the colossal figure of 250,000 cars. There was not much to be expected from American aid in cars and engines in the near future. The waste in locomotives was enormous—over 25 per cent. being "invalided."

M. Nekrasoff dealt more with the influence of the Revolution in devastating the country's resources. By January 1, 1918, the amount



QUEUE AT A BOLSHEVIST FREE FOOD DEPÔT IN PETROGRAD.



THE KREMLIN, MOSCOW.

of paper money not secured by any metallic currency would, according to his calculations, aggregate Rs. 15,000,000,000. The Revolution had enormously increased expenditure, as shown by the issue of paper money. During the war months of 1914 the average had been Rs. 219,000,000; in 1915 it rose to Rs. 223,000,000; in 1916 to Rs. 290,000,000; and during the revolutionary months of 1917 to Rs. 832,000,000. Evidently the country could not go on at this rate.

He explained some of the causes of this phenomenal rise. They may be aptly ascribed to the insatiable appetites of the Soviets, the Committees and the revolutionary soldiery. Thus, according to M. Nekrasoff, the extra allowances to the troops were swallowing up an amount equal to Rs. 11,000,000,000 for the year 1917. The organization of the Food Committees required Rs. 500,000,000, of the Land Committees Rs. 140,000,000. The demands of the workers employed by the Government imposed an additional burden of Rs. 19,000,000 per annum. The military budget for the war up to date showed an expenditure of Rs. 49,000,000,000 against a revenue of Rs. 35,000,000,000, while the

ordinary budgets for 1914-1917 showed an aggregate surplus of Rs. 1,179,000,000. The Treasury contained only unpaid bills. Retrenchment was absolutely indispensable not only at the front but also in the rear. The revenue had begun to decline immediately after the Revolution, and was fast reaching a vanishing point. They could hope to raise money only by indirect taxation. It was absurd to talk of recourse to seizure of private property for revenue purposes. The Government would never embark on such risky experiments.

The first day of the Conference thus brought before the assembled members, and through the Press before the whole country, a picture of gloom and menace. It was not relieved by M. Kerensky's somewhat theatrical threats to the Right, which everybody understood to be in the nature of a tactical move to curry favour with the Left. The Conference had not heard a calm, statesmanlike exposition of constructive policy such as the situation demanded. On the contrary, the trend of the proceedings had been diverted from the terrifying exigencies of the hour to a personal conflict between M. Kerensky and the generals. Thus the very aim

and purpose of his patriotic appeal for union to carry on the war was being frittered away by his personal resentment against men who were sincerely and devotedly pursuing his own purpose.

The whole of the following day was devoted to private conferences of various groups, the largest being that of the four Dumas, which was attended by 250 deputies and ex-deputies of all parties. Almost unanimously they adopted a resolution drawn up by M. Miliukoff on behalf of the Fourth Duma. It set forth some of the necessary conditions of policy that M. Kerensky, for party and personal reasons, could not have devised or endorsed. On the first point—the

should maintain complete independence of the decisions of any international Socialist conference. Three other points dealt with internal policy: complete independence of the Government as regards the Soviets and Committees; establishment of regular administrative organs; suspension of autonomies pending the Constituent, and avoidance of class warfare as advocated by the Socialist parties.

The considerations set forth in support of the last-named point deserve fuller notice.

It is to be observed that the Food and Land Committees were recruited exclusively from revolutionary elements and afforded a convenient means of providing them with remunera-



GENERAL KORNILOFF.

need of carrying on the war—they were at one with Kerensky. On the second point—the urgent need of restoring discipline—they insisted that the scope of the Army Committees should be confined to domestic affairs, leaving the High Command in undisputed control of the fighting efficiency of the army. The third point insisted that the tendencies of international Socialism should be excluded from the Russian and Allied war aims, that no outside interference should be permitted at international conferences and that the Government

tive occupation in a business of which they often knew little and in which, owing to their incompetence and party bias, they were causing the greatest prejudice to the public interest, besides absorbing huge sums for maintenance. Incidentally these Committees had almost completely dispossessed the Zemstvos, many of which had been disrupted, and were instrumental to the spread of anarchy and excesses rather than of public order and conservancy.

While the representatives of the Four Dumas—i.e., persons who had been duly elected by the

nation—were voicing their views on the situation and laying down with singular unanimity the lines of a constructive governmental policy, the representatives of the revolutionary democratic organizations were engaged in venting their party differences. The Bolsheviks naturally demanded the transfer of all power to the Soviets, which would enable them to usurp the government. The Socialist Revolutionaries were not united even on the policy of continuing the war. Their Internationalist wing had much in common with the Bolshevik Social Democrats, while the Menshevist Social Democrats split on the question of coalition with the bourgeoisie, Tseretelli leading a faction which was favourable to it, while Bogdanoff led another that was distinctly hostile and saw in the Cadets a strain of reactionary influence.

The political complexion of the Conference was thus clearly manifested: a constructive policy on the Right, chaos on the Left, and apparently no prospect of a working arrangement between them.

General Korniloff reached Moscow on the eve of the second sitting. He was enthusiastically acclaimed. A picturesquely garbed Turcoman

escort accompanied him everywhere, even when he drove to the Iberian chapel adjoining the Kremlin to make his devotions at the holiest shrine in Russia. M. Kerensky drove out at the same time in one of the ex-Tsar's smartest cars from the Grand Palace where he was staying amid surroundings of imperial comfort and demonstratively evaded a meeting with General Korniloff. Late that evening he summoned the Generalissimo to the telephone and requested him to abstain from addressing the Conference. To this extraordinary request Korniloff replied that he considered it to be his duty as well as his right to address the representatives of the nation as the spokesman of the whole army, inasmuch as this right was not withheld from the representatives of other organizations. He was, however, ready to promise that in his speech he would confine himself strictly to military affairs. This remarkable conversation unhappily confirmed the inference that everybody had drawn from Kerensky's speech that he wished to display a marked animus against the generals and more particularly against Korniloff. And among the initiated this attitude was ascribed to Korniloff's insistence upon army reforms, whence it



GENERAL KORNILOFF AND SOME OF HIS BODY-GUARD.



SOME OF KORNILOFF'S TROOPS: CAUCASIAN NATIVE HORSE (THE "SAVAGE DIVISION"),

was generally inferred that Kerensky was opposed to them.

So the appearance of these two men at the Conference next day naturally gave rise to demonstrations and counter-demonstrations, according to the respective attitudes of either side to the continuance of the war, which was equivalent to the prompt introduction of army reforms. Kerensky, however, invited the assembly to rise in honour of Korniloff as the first soldier of Russia's army. The representatives of the army committees nevertheless remained seated, which gave rise to stormy altercations.

Alexinsky, a Labour member of the First Duma, spoke eloquently in favour of continuing the war till the enemy had been expelled from Russian territory. For this purpose they must establish a strong coalition Government free from doubtful elements. The defeat of Russia would, he argued, establish the domination of German capital in the country and render a solution of the land question impracticable. These arguments were applauded, but they could not convince the Socialists, who were wrapt up with their respective party doctrines and conflicts.


General Korniloff delivered a long indictment against the destructive influences that had demoralized and weakened the army. He cited a long list of appalling instances of insubordination, murder of officers, desertion and dereliction, all directly traceable to agitation. The *débâcle* in Galicia had been an object

lesson. The enemy was now knocking at the gate of Riga, and if the condition of the army did not enable them to hold their positions on the coast and in the Gulf of Riga the road to Petrograd would be opened. The army was badly organized under the old *régime*, but at least it fought. But a whole series of measures introduced since the Revolution had quenched its fighting spirit. The army would have to be restored at all costs or there would be no free Russia and the country would perish. He had laid a programme of measures for the restoration of discipline before the Government. The authority and prestige of the officers must be re-established and they must have compensation for the contumely that had been unjustly meted out to them since the Revolution.

He was not opposed to committees if they were kept within normal limits of domestic activity. The army could not exist without its Rear. Discipline must be introduced equally among the reserve troops and order in the transport service and munition works. The output of the latter had declined 60 per cent. owing to the Revolution and the aviation factories 80 per cent. As Korniloff left the hall the whole assembly excepting the representatives of the Soviets and army committees rose and cheered vociferously.

General Kaledin made an equally impressive speech in behalf of the Cossacks. They would hail with enthusiasm a move on the part of the Provisional Government to eschew the evil domination of parties that had brought the

country to the verge of ruin. The Cossacks had ever been free men and were not drunken with the new wine of freedom that had gone to the heads of other people. Their regiments knew no deserters. They would follow their historic course of defending the country in the hour of peril. They had no sympathy with counter-revolution and would work for the consolidation of a democratic republican régime. But the salvation of the country demanded first of all the bringing of the war to a victorious conclusion in complete union with



GENERAL KALEDIN.

Russia's Allies, and only on the condition that the Provisional Government accepted that watchword would it enjoy the support of the Cossacks. There could be no room in the Government for those elements that saw salvation in the defeat of the country.

This pointed allusion to the Zimmerwaldian sympathies of M. Chernoff caused some sensation in the hall.

General Kaledin proceeded to enumerate a series of measures which agreed in all military particulars with those of General Korniloff. He formulated them as being the "demands" of the Cossacks, and added that Russia needed firm authority, free from all party programmes, and exercised by experienced hands. It would have to be a

united and indivisible authority, both in the centre and the provinces, and an end must be put to all separatist tendencies. The strictest economy was required, and standard rates of wages and profits must be fixed without delay both in agriculture and in manufacture. Industrial compulsion must be introduced, and a Constituent Assembly summoned to take place in Moscow. He warned the Government that the patience of the people was ebbing out, and that it was necessary to take drastic measures to save the country.

To this blunt statement, carrying behind it the weight and influence of nearly 5,000,000 Cossacks, the staunchest and best organized element in the country, M. Kerensky retorted that he did not permit anybody to put forward any demands to the Government. This remark was, of course, greeted with applause on the Left benches. Such was ostensibly its purpose. M. Kerensky here made another tactical blunder, for which he was to pay dearly in the future.

M. Chkheidze, the Georgian deputy, leader of the Mensheviks and Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, spoke in the name of a whole array of Democratic organizations, skilfully dressing up, according to his wont, the exorbitant schemes of his followers under a guise of moderation and plausibility. He declared they were all firmly resolved to save the country and the Revolution. The democracy had acted in the interests of all classes, he contended. The salvation of the country was inseparable from the Revolution. Only with the support of the masses could the Government cope with internal and external dangers. (This *dictum* was shortly to be grimly applied against Chkheidze himself by the Bolsheviks.) He enumerated a series of measures, economic, military and political, such as a grain monopoly, the stimulation of industries, reorganization of transport, compulsory syndication, labour conscription for all classes, a drastic income tax, compulsory loans, control over banks, a democratic reform of local government based on non-intervention by the central Government, complete equality and autonomy of all nationalities, etc. Many of his proposals were afterwards adopted by the Bolsheviks, and led to the complete paralysis of trade and industry.

The voice of the peasants was heard from several members of their organizations. The important point was that they were in favour

of bringing the war to an end in agreement with the Allies, that they deplored class and party strife as the greatest of the present evils, and advocated the continuation of the coalition form of government.

M. Guchkoff, with his usual acumen, pointed out that the real cause of the continued crisis was to be sought in the fact that the Government had in reality no authority whatever,

being under the domination of a portion of the democracy. M. Shulgin, like the preceding orator, blamed the Government for its surrender to democratic committees. M. Maklakoff stigmatized the committee system in the army as machinery to carry on revolutionary agitation which had nothing in common with the proper aims of the Army.

M. Tseretelli, the Menshevist bard of the



DEMONSTRATION IN FAVOUR OF "EDUCATION FOR THE PEOPLE."

Revolution, argued that the democratic organizations had saved the country from anarchy, and that there were no more determined opponents of a separate peace. His contention was sadly disproved two months later, when the Soviet, of which he himself was a leading member, helped Lenin to usurp the Government. After speeches from M. Rodzianko and M. Miliukoff and the representatives of the Zemstvo employees—the so-called Third Element—who had nothing of importance to add, the Conference on its closing day heard an eloquent address from General Alexeieff.

He admitted that even in those days (before the Revolution) there had been cases of insubordination and desertion, mostly due to the insufficient military preparation of the men composing drafts. But those cases, at the same time, had been exceptions, and both the men and officers had discharged their duty in full accordance with the glorious traditions of old. Even the defeats which the army had sustained had been no disgrace to it, being due not to lack of moral strength or internal discipline but chiefly to deficiency in technique. But now came the Revolution, and the conditions changed immediately. A poison was quickly introduced into the body of the army in the form of the famous Order No. 1, which at once split and separated the two most important elements composing the army—namely, the mass of soldiers and the mass of officers.

"It is said," General Alexeieff continued, "that this act corresponded to the needs of the moment. May be. But did it correspond to the millions of moments of the future through which our country has to pass? Impartial history will very soon allocate to that act its proper place, and show whether it was an act of misunderstanding or a criminal act."

Nevertheless he was of the opinion that that poisonous pill might have been digested by the healthy organism of the army had not a turbid wave of agitation been let loose in its ranks. German spies and German agents, official and unofficial, poured into the camps, bringing with them demoralization and disruption. The wind had been sown which was soon to blossom forth into a whirlwind, to the great joy of those who had been discharging the behests of the German General Staff and in whose pockets clinked musically the German marks. As against that agitation even the noble endeavour of Kerensky proved impotent. Then followed, without any authority, the famous Commission under

General Polivanoff, whose activity in drawing up the Soldiers' Charter would be remembered as evil by the historian of the Russian army. That charter had deprived the officers of their disciplinary authority and had suspended the operation of the general military laws. The masses grew suddenly conscious of their impunity, the officers in the eyes of the soldier became an enemy, and outrages followed of which the victims were the best men among the officers.

Alexeieff proceeded to criticize severely the Committees, as well as the Commissaries, and quoted a few incidents at the front, showing the spirit of insubordination among the soldiers. He singled out a case of an attack which was carried out by 28 officers, 20 non-commissioned officers, and only two soldiers of a certain regiment. The commanders had become, owing to the constant interference of the Committees and Commissaries, a sort of daily labourers, who only had to execute tasks set before them by somebody else. It was no exaggeration, he declared, that the Russian army had at present no infantry, and he demanded the immediate restoration of discipline, both at the front and in the rear, by the application of the most drastic measures, including the death penalty. Every day's delay, he wound up, was like unto death.

Kerensky then called upon Mme. Breshko-Breshkovskaya, Prince Kropotkin and Plekhanoff to address the Conference, as veterans of the Revolution. Catherine Breshko-Breshkovskaya appealed for the restoration of discipline both in the interior and at the front, and invited all those present to lay aside their internal dissensions. At the same time, she could not refrain from reproaching the capitalists for their selfishness, and invited the Government to turn its attention to them.

Plekhanoff made a long and eloquent appeal for national unity.

He had always been, and still was, a revolutionary, and he hoped that the Conference would have enough tolerance to listen to the frank confession of a Russian revolutionist. He, first of all, asked the Conference to remember the Duma had taken part in, and supported the Revolution, and that it would be an act of ingratitude if its services were forgotten. At the same time he pointed out that without the long and previous work of the revolutionary democracy no revolution would have taken place. Hence the services of that democracy must also be constantly remembered. He

accordingly appealed to the representatives of the commercial and industrial classes to seek an approximation with the proletariat, with whom they were united on one essential point—namely, that the country must develop its productive forces if it was to make economic, political and social progress. On the other hand, he assured those classes that the revolutionary democracy was as much opposed to the idea of separate peace as they were, and, seeing that without that democracy it would be impossible to rule the country, he argued that it would be

an agreement the country would be so strong as to become invincible. On the other hand, if they were to continue their quarrels the tale of the Kilkenny cats would come true, and only the remnants of a tail would be left of Russia, to the great joy of German capitalists.

Kropotkin also spoke, calling upon the Russian people to break away from Zimmerwaldism, and to stand up for the defence of the country and the Revolution.

Using as an illustration the political psychology of France since 1871, when, owing to



REVOLUTION IN PETROGRAD: GUARDING THE TELEPHONE OFFICE.

best for the bourgeoisie to come to terms with the proletariat. Addressing then the representatives of the proletariat, he poured ridicule on the idea of transferring the entire authority to the representatives of the working class and the peasantry, since neither of those classes was ripe for the exercise of power and since the country was on the eve not of a Socialist but of a capitalist revolution. If so, it would be in the interests of the proletariat to come to terms with the bourgeoisie. If the proletariat were to make an attempt to capture power it would only discredit itself and the Socialist cause, and the entire nation would turn away from it. If the two classes, he concluded, were to come to

her defeats, she had become subservient to the Tsardom, he argued that nothing could be worse for Russia than defeat. At the same time he was of opinion that mere repressive measures would be of no avail. What was necessary was education and organization. In his opinion, yet another thing was wanted—namely, that Russia should proclaim itself a republic on federal lines such as was represented by the United States. In conclusion, he passionately appealed for unity in order that they might no longer be separated into a Left and a Right, and might not sit in different segments of the same hall.

Spokesmen of the Army Committees naturally



THE TRIAL OF GENERAL SUKHOMLINOFF.

supported the theory that they and they alone could restore the fighting efficiency of the troops. Similar declarations were made in behalf of the Sailors' Committees.

The bourgeois elements were represented by a whole series of speakers, who dwelt upon the disastrous effects of the Revolution upon commerce and industry, agriculture and capital. M. Riabushinsky, a well-known Moscow millionaire, who was later arrested by the Soviet at Yalta in the Crimea, denounced the self-appointed committees that had usurped authority throughout the land. He warned the Government against dangerous Utopias that would bring Russia into the abyss. M. Guchkoff, speaking for the War Industrial Committees, declared that capital was willing and ready to make sacrifices, but they must know for what purpose they were to be made. It could only be for the interests of the State as a whole, not for one particular section. An alleged Cossack representative got up to denounce General Kaledin, claiming to be chairman of the Cossack section in the Soviet. It afterwards transpired that he represented only himself. He was subsequently branded as an outcast from Cossackdom. This fellow was backed up by Kerensky—another evidence of his animus against Kaledin and the Cossacks for which retribution would come in the not distant future.

This "incident" and a dramatic hand-shaking between M. Bublikoff, a representative of industry, and M. Tseretelli brought the proceedings to a close.

All parties and classes had talked themselves out, but still there was no evidence of that union which Socialists of the old school so eloquently advocated. Plekhanoff, the life-long adversary of Bolshevism and immediate application of extreme doctrines, was to Lenin and his crew a mere idealist devoid of a sense of political realities. And Kerensky, who had thought to gather strength from this assembly of parties and classes, had shortsightedly incensed some of the best and staunchest elements on the Right without disarming for one instant his enemies on the Left. Yet with the naïve self-sufficiency that had characterized his brief career he imagined that he had somehow scored a victory at Moscow. His whimsical antagonism to General Korniloff was soon to bear deadly fruit. His overbearing demeanour towards the Cossacks was destined later to bring about his downfall.

Simultaneously with the Conference, a Congress of the Church was proceeding at Moscow at which prelates, priests and laymen discussed the new conditions of church life emancipated from the thralldom of the Holy Synod and the Grand Procurator.

Another important event was in progress at Petrograd, the trial of General Sukhomlinoff to which brief allusion has been made in a previous chapter. The proceedings were of singular historic interest, owing to the light they cast upon the circumstances of the outbreak of war. As the German Press did not fail to twist the evidence round to suit the legend that the Tsar did not want war, but was hoodwinked into it by unscrupulous officials, a correct version of the principal depositions on this point is given below.

General Yanushkevitch, then Chief of the General Staff, and General Sukhomlinoff, at the time Minister of War, were the chief witnesses. General Yanushkevitch deposed as follows:

On July 29 we had decided to mobilize. The Emperor instructed me to convey assurances to Count Pourtales, the German Ambassador, that in proclaiming a mobilization Russia intended no hostile act towards Germany. I informed Sazonoff; the Minister for Foreign Affairs had a poor opinion of Pourtales. He said that Pourtales would misconstrue my words in his own way, and advised me to have a talk with the German Military Attaché who was more competent in such matters. Major—— answered my summons at the General Staff. He had usually come in uniform and punctually at the time appointed and spoke in Russian. On this occasion he kept me waiting a whole hour, appeared in plain clothes and spoke only in French. I pointed out that Russia had not aggressive intentions towards Germany. The Major replied that, unfortunately, Russia had already begun to mobilize. I assured him that the mobilization had not begun. He then declared with aplomb that on this point he had more precise information. I gave him my word of honour as Chief of the General Staff that, at that precise moment, 3 p.m., July 29, the mobilization had not yet been proclaimed. He still remained incredulous. I then offered to give him a written pledge. He politely declined it. At that moment the Russian mobilization had not commenced, although the ukase ordering the mobilization was in my pocket.

From the Attaché's behaviour (continued the witness) I understood that Germany had decided beforehand to have war with us, and that no power on earth could avert war. I understood, and afterwards I definitely ascertained, that at that moment Germany had already mobilized, but had managed to do so in secret, and the German Press afterwards asserted that at that moment Germany had not mobilized and that Russia had begun to mobilize. I categorically affirm that the first day of mobilization in Russia was July 30.

Proceeding with his account of what transpired on July 29 and 30, General Yanushkevitch deposed:

It was first decided to order a partial mobilization, affecting only the south-western military districts, in order to frighten Austria-Hungary. Then this

matter was reconsidered, and on July 30, after I had made a report to the Emperor, the ukase to the Senate, ordering a general mobilization, was signed. In urging a general mobilization, I had pointed out to the Tsar the necessity of defining our attitude quite clearly, not only towards Austria, but also towards Germany, who stood behind Austria's back. We knew quite well that Germany desired war, that, indeed, she was incapable of deferring a conflict because she was aware that our enlarged programme would be ready in 1918, and that she must needs use her opportunities before the programme was completed. From Peterhof I came straight to the Council of Ministers, then sitting, and read out to them the ukase that had been signed by the Emperor. But



GENERAL YANUSHKEVITCH,
Former Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

late that same day (July 30), about 11 p.m., I was summoned to the telephone by the Emperor. He asked me what was the position of the mobilization. I answered that it was already in progress. Another question was then put to me: "Would it not be possible to substitute a partial for a general mobilization, so that only Austria-Hungary should be affected?" I replied that it would be exceedingly difficult, that such a course would entail a veritable catastrophe, that mobilization had already begun, that 400,000 reservists had been summoned. Then it was explained to me by the Emperor that he had received a telegram from Wilhelm in which Wilhelm pledged his word of honour that if a general mobilization were not proclaimed by us the relations between Germany and Russia would remain "as hitherto," friendly.

After the conversation with the ex-Tsar (continued General Yanushkevitch) I hastened to Sazonoff, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and convinced him that it was not possible at that hour to recall the general mobilization. I implored him to give his support. He promised me to report to the Emperor in the morning. He did so, and at half past four in the afternoon of July 31 a conference was held at the Palace at which Sazonoff, Sukhomlinoff, and myself were present. In

10 minutes we had decided that it was impossible to withhold a general mobilization, as such a course would be fatal to Russia. Sazonoff had reported to the Emperor in this sense. At 5 p.m. the question was definitely settled in favour of the general mobilization.

But it transpired afterwards that General Yanushkevitch's telephone conversations during those days with the Tsar and other personages were immediately reported to the German General Staff, which knew precisely the day, the hour and the substance of every such conversation. General Yanushkevitch noticed the ominous click which betrays the "tapping" of a "through" call and immediately gave orders to put up a direct wire to Peterhof.

Resuming his account of the earlier conversation with the Tsar, General Yanushkevitch added:

I ventured to retort that I had no faith in Wilhelm's word of honour, because I knew definitely that Germany had already mobilized. And, as a matter of fact, I had received sufficiently reliable information at that time to show that Germany had mobilized. There is a difference between Russian and German methods. In Germany the mobilization is carried out by orders from the Minister of War, but with us it has to be preceded by the promulgation of a ukase through the Senate.

This narrative was borne out by the statements of General Sukhomlinoff. He deposed as follows:

On the night of July 30 I was "rung up" by the former Emperor and told to cancel the mobilization (the ex-Minister of War in his further deposition showed—as General Yanushkevitch had explained—that the Tsar wanted to revert to a partial mobilization). It was a direct order, not admitting rejoinder. I was overcome, knowing that it was impossible to cancel the mobilization for technical reasons, and also because it would provoke frightful confusion in the country. . . . Half an hour later General Yanushkevitch telephoned. The Emperor had told him to suspend the mobilization. He had replied it was technically impossible to do so. Then the Tsar had said: "All the same, suspend it." General Yanushkevitch asked me what was he to do. I replied: "Do nothing." He heard General Yanushkevitch utter a sigh of relief, saying, "Thank God."

Next morning I lied to the Emperor. I told him that the mobilization was proceeding *partially, only in the south-west*, although I knew that the mobilization was a general one and that it was impossible to stop it. Fortunately the Emperor changed his mind that day, and I was thanked instead of being censured.

Personal dislike and mutual suspicion between Kerensky and Korniloff, the two protagonists in the political arena, assuming an intense form after the Moscow Conference, boded ill for Russia. Within one week of its dispersal, General Korniloff's warning about the imminent fall of Riga was justified by events. The Germans occupied that city, the key of the Baltic provinces, September 3 without encountering much resistance, having previously by a series of concerted movements turned the Russian flank on the Dvina. These

operations, and the subsequent occupation of the islands in the Gulf, demonstrated afresh—if any additional proof were necessary—that the committee-led army and navy was incapable of defensive, much less of offensive effort, and forced Kerensky to waive his hesitancy and vacillation in the introduction of the measures insisted upon by General Korniloff.

On September 5, M. Savinkoff, the acting War Minister, came to Headquarters and promised General Korniloff an early promulgation of these measures. M. Savinkoff further declared that the Bolsheviks were preparing an uprising for September 10 or 11, chiefly with a view to preventing the restoration of discipline in the army and that it would be necessary to have reliable troops in the vicinity of the city against such a contingency. General Korniloff was therefore requested to send a force of cavalry to be held in readiness to crush the Bolsheviks. At the same time M. Savinkoff discussed with the Generalissimo the broad outlines of a cooperation between him and Kerensky for the organization of a strong Government.

As the Korniloff "revolt," so miscalled, was

destined to play a leading part in the history of the Revolution we may here cite the written depositions of the Generalissimo and the minutes of the meeting between him and M. Savinkoff. They will enable us to arrive at an impartial view of circumstances and events. For the sake of historical perspective and grasp of these and subsequent developments it may be considered that Korniloff's "revolt" was a natural and logical consequence of the national desire to continue the war and to make peace side by side with Russia's Allies just as the subsequent Bolshevik uprising and the usurpation of authority by Lenin and his partisans was a consequence to be expected from the anti-national and pacifist tendencies of International Socialism—reacting upon the ignorant Russian masses—to proclaim a separate armistice with a view to forcing the Allies to abandon their armed struggle with the enemy. Kerensky, having too long vacillated in taking a firm line of action, was bound by the force of circumstances to be crushed between the upper and nether millstones represented by these two conflicting and opposing tendencies.



WOMEN'S BATTALION OF DEATH DRILLING UNDER INSTRUCTORS FROM THE GUARDS.



RIGA: THE CASTLE.

General Korniloff's deposition retraces his experiences and observations as commander-in-chief at Petrograd in the early days of the Revolution and during the tenure of his commands at the south-western front at the time of the abortive offensive of July, 1917. He emphasizes the harmful influences of the Soviet upon the garrison of Petrograd, the destruction of discipline in the army which was there initiated under these influences, and its obvious intention of converting the soldiers into tools for the attainment of its political aims.

Having realized the impossibility of retaining office under such conditions General Korniloff applied for service at the front. The part played by him during the Russian offensive and retreat has already been described in Chapter CCVIII. After Korniloff's appointment as Generalissimo he unceasingly pressed his demands for army reform. On August 16 he went to Petrograd to confer with the Minister-President in person. M. Kerensky displayed a certain coolness and remarked that General Korniloff was giving his representations too much the character of an ultimatum. But when the Generalissimo explained that they were instigated solely by the critical position of the army and the country, M. Kerensky suddenly warmed towards him and asked Korniloff's opinion whether he (Kerensky) should remain at the head of the Government. Korniloff replied that he thought Kerensky's influence had noticeably declined, but as he was still the acknowledged leader of the Democracy he ought to remain, and he (Korniloff) saw no other course.

At a meeting of the Provisional Government held that afternoon, the Generalissimo explained his views on the urgency of restoring discipline, and pointed out the imminence of a German offensive at Riga and the Gulf. Measures had been taken by him to forestall the enemy, but the deterioration in fighting efficiency among the Russian troops, and more particularly on the Northern front, was such that in all probability it would be impossible to hold Riga. When General Korniloff proceeded to set forth his views as to the possibility of a counter-offensive in another quarter, he was interrupted by the Minister-President who whispered to him that on that question he must be guarded in his words. A few moments later M. Savinkoff handed him a note conveying a similar warning. He was dumbfounded. Later M. Savinkoff made it clear to him that he had in view the Minister of Agriculture, Chernoff.

Curiously enough the Left Press immediately began a campaign against the Generalissimo, and on August 20 he was informed by one of the Army Commissaries that it had been decided to dismiss him. That same day a telegram was sent by Kerensky to apprise Korniloff that his presence would not be required at the further discussion of Army reforms, but Korniloff had already arrived in Petrograd at M. Savinkoff's invitation. M. Kerensky received the Generalissimo with marked coldness, and intimated very broadly that he should not have left Headquarters. He manifested surprise that M. Savinkoff should have invited him to come to Petrograd. The Generalissimo noticed an estrangement

between the two men, which he attributed to Savinkoff's anxiety to accelerate the reform measures. He was informed that the Government was favourable to his scheme in principle but nothing definite was said as to the time when it would be put in practice. On his return to Headquarters General Korniloff learned that Savinkoff was retiring, and sent a telegram to Kerensky urging his retention in office.

Describing Savinkoff's visit to him at Headquarters (September 6) General Korniloff disposed:

He (Savinkoff) came to me from the train. Together with him arrived the Chief-of-Staff, General Lukomsky, and Philonenko, the commissary attached to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, who had met him at

state of the country, I agreed in the end that, under the existing relations of political parties to one another, the participation of Kerensky in the Cabinet was undoubtedly desirable. I then added that I was ready to support Kerensky in every way if it were necessary for the good of the Fatherland. In reply, Savinkoff told me that he was happy to hear me speak these words. All this was corroborated by Savinkoff in conversation with me by direct cable on September 9 at 5.50 in the afternoon.

The further course of events on September 6 and my conversations with Savinkoff are reported in the "Protocol of the Visit of the Acting Minister of War, Savinkoff, to Mogileff." In it is recorded, according to my recollection, and by Generals Lukomsky and Romanoffsky, all that I said to Savinkoff in their presence.

The protocol is reproduced below:

On September 6 Savinkoff came straight from the train to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

The private conversation of Savinkoff with Korniloff was on the establishment of close relations between



THE RUSSIAN DÉBÂCLE: RUSSIANS CAPTURED BY THE ENEMY.

the station. Savinkoff said that he would like to speak with me alone. The Chief-of-Staff and the commissioner left my room. Savinkoff explained that he considered of all tasks the most important was to prepare a way for an agreement between me and Kerensky in order to base the formation of a strong and firm Government on this cooperation.

I stated that, although I did not pretend to have an influence on the composition of the Cabinet, yet once an interest was taken in my name I considered it possible to say openly that I considered Kerensky a man of weak character, easily subject to outside influence, and, of course, not knowing the business at the head of which he stood. Personally, I had nothing against him: I thought that another Cabinet, without Kerensky, might also be able to set things right. After long consideration of the question, in connection with the

General Korniloff and the Prime Minister, Kerensky, because Savinkoff considered that both these persons, being leaders of different parties, ought to work hand in hand. Then Savinkoff showed General Korniloff those projects of law, which had been worked out for the consideration of the Provisional Government on the basis of the demands made by General Korniloff. On the same day after dinner, about nine o'clock in the evening, there gathered in General Korniloff's room, besides the host, Savinkoff, Lieutenant-General Lukomsky, and Philonenko.

After considering the question of defining the boundaries of the territory under the jurisdiction of the Military Governor of Petrograd, Savinkoff turned to General Korniloff and said the following, almost word for word:

"And so, Lavr Georgievitch, your demands will

be satisfied by the Provisional Government in the next few days: but in this connexion the Government fears that serious complications may arise in Petrograd. It is, of course, known to you that about September 10 or 11 a serious rising of the Bolsheviks is expected. The publication of your demands as carried out by the Provisional Government will serve as the occasion for the Bolsheviks to make their demonstration, if for any reason it should be delayed. Although we have sufficient troops at our disposal, yet we cannot entirely depend on them, all the more as it is not known what will be the attitude of the C.W.S.D. (Soviet) to the new law. The latter may turn out to be against the Government, and then we cannot count on our troops. Therefore I beg you to arrange that the 3rd Cavalry Corps be drawn up near Petrograd about the middle of September and be placed at the disposition of the Provisional Government. In case the C.W.S.D. parties rise as well as the Bolsheviks, then we shall be obliged to act against them also. I only beg you not to send General Krymoff at the head of the 3rd Cavalry Corps, as he is not particularly desirable for us. He is a very good military man, but hardly suitable for such operations. . . ."

Then Savinkoff again turned to the question of the possibility of crushing with the help of the 3rd Cavalry Corps a rising of the Bolsheviks and the C.W.S.D. if the latter should rise against the Provisional Government. In this connection Savinkoff said that action ought to be of the most resolute and merciless character. To this General Korniloff replied that he did not understand any other way of acting, that instructions in that sense would be given, that his attitude to the question of employing troops for crushing disorders was always a grave one, and that he had already given orders that those commanders who allowed firing in the air should be committed for trial; that in the present case once there was a rising of the Bolsheviks and the C.W.S.D., it would be crushed with the utmost energy.

After this, Savinkoff, turning to General Korniloff said it was necessary, in order that there should be no misunderstanding and in order not to provoke a premature rising of the Bolsheviks, first of all to concentrate a cavalry corps on Petrograd, then at the same time to proclaim martial law in the military government of Petrograd, and to publish a new law establishing a whole list of restrictions.

Signed: GENERAL KORNILOFF, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL LUKOMSKY, MAJOR-GENERAL ROMANOFFSKY.

In proof of the agreement of General Korniloff with the Acting Minister of War, Savinkoff, about bringing the 3rd Cavalry Corps to Petrograd, there may be adduced the text of the following telegram, sent to Savinkoff in cipher on September 9 at 2.40:—

"To the Acting Minister of War: The corps will be concentrated in the neighbourhood of Petrograd in the evening of September 10. I beg you to declare martial law in Petrograd on September 11. No. 6394. GENERAL KORNILOFF."

Savinkoff left Mogileff September 7. The same morning M. Vladimir Lvoff, former Grand Procurator of the Holy Synod in the Provisional Government, and therefore a colleague of Kerensky, called to see the Generalissimo, announcing that he had been sent by Kerensky. He was almost a stranger to General Korniloff, who had not seen him since

April. Lvoff stated that Kerensky was ready to leave office if he could not count on receiving support. General Korniloff stated his opinion that the only way out of the crisis was the institution of a dictatorship and the immediate proclamation of martial law. He (Korniloff) did not seek the dictatorship for himself, and was ready to submit to anyone on whom the authority should be conferred, be it Kerensky, Kaledin or Alexeieff. Lvoff replied that the Government would no doubt agree and offer the dictatorship to Korniloff. Thereupon, in the presence of his orderly officer, V. S. Zavoiko, General Korniloff repeated to Lvoff the gist of what he had said.

On the following day (September 8) General Korniloff commissioned Captain Philonenko, Zavoiko and Aladyin, a Labour deputy of the First Duma, to draw up a plan of government under the name of "Council of National Defence" with the Generalissimo as President, Kerensky as Vice-President, and Savinkoff, General Alexieff, Admiral Kolchak and Philonenko as members. This Committee should resolve itself into a collective dictatorship because it was not deemed advisable for one person to hold the office alone. Ministerial posts were to be assigned to MM. Takhtamysheff, Tretiakoff, Pokrovsky, Count Ignatieff, Aladyin, Plekhanoff, Prince G. E. Lvoff and Zavoiko.

Such was the stage-setting of the so-called Korniloff "revolt." The general himself was obviously animated by patriotic designs and had the moral support of all the sound elements in the country. But he was mistrustful of Kerensky and not sufficiently conversant with party and political actualities in Petrograd. Given a plain though exceedingly capable soldier, on the one hand, and a well-intentioned but amateurish and capricious statesman, torn by doubts and fears for the safety of his beloved Revolution and subjected to fierce pressure from a resourceful and unscrupulous faction of his revolutionary associates, on the other, and we have all the elements of misunderstanding and conflict. Vladimir Lvoff was the unconscious instrument that brought about a rupture between the two men. His message from headquarters was either misstated or misconstrued. Kerensky appears to have jumped to wrong conclusions. A conversation between him and Korniloff over the telegraph wire (September 8) failed to clear up the misunderstanding, both men speaking at cross-

purposes, but Korniloff obtained from Kerensky a promise to come to Mogileff on September 9 to discuss matters and invited a number of prominent public men to meet him not later than the 11th. In the morning of the 9th he, however, received a curt message from Kerensky



M. BORIS SAVINKOFF,
Acting-Minister of War under Kerensky.

ordering him to hand over the High Command to General Lukomsky and come to Petrograd. Kerensky had arrested Lvoff and dismissed Korniloff without even consulting his colleagues.

Later, a telegram came to Headquarters signifying the appointment of General Klembovsky as Generalissimo. None of the nominees would, however, agree to supersede General Korniloff, who decided to remain at his post.


On September 10 the Government proclaimed General Korniloff a traitor and at the same time ordered him to recall the cavalry sent to Petrograd. Kerensky was meanwhile directing operations against Korniloff's troops with the aid of the Soviet and Chernoff.

What had brought about this remarkable *volte face*? The causes have been indicated at the commencement of this chapter. Bolshevik tendencies gathered force as soon as the Petrograd garrison learned that it would have to go and fight in the trenches. The sailors at Kronstadt had always remained on the Bolshevik side and were ready to support their Petrograd comrades against the Government. Kerensky lost his grip at the last moment and went over to the Soviet against Korniloff, agreeing even to the enrolment of a Red Guard recruited for high pay among revolutionary workmen and making his peace

with the Kronstadt mutineers. He explained afterwards that he had been compelled to side temporarily with the Extremists because they had collected huge quantities of explosives and would have blown up important bridges and communications.

General Korniloff's narrative—the only authoritative statement of the events under discussion—gives some interesting details:

Having accepted the office of Commander-in-Chief, and being occupied with the necessity of securing our position on the roads leading to Petrograd, the capital, I commanded my General Staff to go into the matter. I signed the order about the formation of a Petrograd army on August 26, but it was not circulated in view of my intention not to remove these troops or unite the fronts, until forced by circumstances to retreat



M. VLADIMIR LVOFF,
Formerly Procurator of the Holy Synod.

from our positions in the Wenden district. The office of commander of the Petrograd Army I intended to assign to General Krymoff, Commander of the 3rd Cavalry Corps, one of the best, most energetic, and most determined generals in our army. General Krymoff was summoned to Headquarters, and was requested to make himself thoroughly acquainted with all the considerations to be taken into account regarding the defence of the approaches to Petrograd, through Finland or from the shores of the Gulf of Finland, and to appoint a staff. It was proposed that the Petrograd army should be comprised of the troops then in Finland, the garrison of Petrograd, the troops of the fortified district of Reval, two army corps from the right flank of the 12th Army, and those cavalry divisions which I had transferred from the South-Western front to reinforce the North-Western front—namely, the Cauca-



GOVERNMENT TROOPS LEAVING PETROGRAD TO MEET KORNILOFF'S ADVANCE.

sian Native Cavalry Division and the 3rd Cavalry Corps. The necessity for transferring these cavalry divisions to the Northern front had been apparent ever since the possibility of a German advance on Riga had become evident. All these divisions were not drawn from the front line, but from the reserves of the army, and the South-Western and Rumanian fronts. Thus the fighting line was in no way affected or weakened by the transfer of these troops. Besides, in view of the probable German advance in the Riga direction, orders had likewise been issued for the transfer of an infantry division from the South-Western to the Northern front. I had chosen to transfer the Caucasian Native Cavalry Division, and the 3rd Cavalry Corps to the Northern front, for disposal along the rear-line of the Northern front, and in the neighbourhood of Petrograd, because I wished to have troops able to withstand the demoralizing influence of the Petrograd Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies.

Krymoff proceeded to the district where his detachments were situated in the evening of September 8. Before his departure, in addition to instructions with regard to the Caucasian Native Division, I gave him the following direction:

(1) In the event of tidings being received either from me or from any other source regarding the commencement of a Bolshevik rising, to march his troops on Petrograd without delay, occupy the town, disarm those parts of the garrison of Petrograd which had joined in the Bolshevik movement, disarm the populace of the town, and disband the Soviets.

(2) Upon the accomplishment of this task, General Krymoff was to dispatch a brigade, with artillery, to Oranienbaum, and, on his arrival there, to demand the disarming of the garrison of Kronstadt, and their removal to the mainland.

The Prime Minister had consented to the disarming of the Fort of Kronstadt, and the removal of the garrison on August 21, and a report to this effect, from the Naval

General Staff, with the resolution of the Prime Minister, had been sent to the Director of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, with a letter from Admiral Maximoff. I did not see General Krymoff any more. I ascribe his failure to accomplish the task set before him to the fact that communication between us was severed, and he could not receive my last instructions. No particular steps were taken to keep in communication with him, because his corps marched on Petrograd at the demand of the Provisional Government, and I could not foresee the development that his communication with Headquarters should be severed by order of the same Government. On September 11 I instructed him to continue his movement, and in case of any further severance of communication to act in accordance with the circumstances, bearing in mind the tenor of my original instructions. This letter was entrusted to a flight officer, whose name I do not remember, but whether it was ever delivered I do not know. On September 12, having received direct telegraphic information regarding the death of General Krymoff I took measures for the liquidation of the collision that had taken place between the Prime Minister and myself, in such a way as to avoid bloodshed and all possible harm to the country and the army.

The Soviet, alarmed by the advance of the Korniloff detachment, made common cause with the Bolsheviks, who, in their turn, thoroughly frightened by the prospect of reprisals, abandoned their plans for an uprising. All the revolutionary elements united with Kerensky, not knowing at the time that he was privy to the coming of the troops to Petrograd and willing to overlook his obvious approval of the transfer of the Petrograd

garrison to the trenches, news of which had been somehow conveyed to the Soviet, provided he took their side against Korniloff. The utmost confusion and consternation prevailed in the revolutionary ranks. Nothing, indeed, could have saved them had Krymoff resolutely marched on the capital, but his orders were to cooperate with the Government against a revolt of the Soviets. His communications with Korniloff were intercepted in the rear by Bolshevik agencies. His men saw no sign of an uprising. Betrayed by the Government, he found himself in an impossible position. Soon the emissaries of the Bolshevik host that marched under Chernoff out of Petrograd to meet the Korniloff detachment, without any stomach for a fight, succeeded in disseminating a lying report among them: that Korniloff was a traitor, that he had committed suicide, and that there was no uprising or trouble.

By this means, without fighting, the Kerensky-Bolshevik combination secured complete immunity. General Krymoff coming to Petrograd to report to Kerensky, and finding how he had been trapped, shot himself, and his men, repudiating the slanderous reproaches levelled

against them in common with Korniloff, that they were betraying the country and the Revolution, affirmed their fidelity to the Government, and the whole movement came to an inglorious end.

It now remained for the loyal and patriotic elements to try their best to settle the conflict so that it should not react upon the army. The Cossacks offered their mediation, but were again treated with suspicion. M. Miliukoff was consulted and recommended the dispatch of General Alexeieff to Mogileff. This was done, and thanks to the willing and loyal disposition of General Korniloff the management of headquarters was some days later transferred into Alexeieff's hands. But he did not remain there because, as he afterwards explained, the Government, which had been taken over by a Council of Five—without the Cadet ministers—persisted in a policy of repression among the High Command. The branding of Korniloff and other generals as traitors by Kerensky had led to renewed atrocities in the army against generals and officers. Korniloff and other members of the Headquarters Staff were placed under arrest and afterwards removed for trial to a neighbouring town, Bykhoff. The



THE SMOLNY INSTITUTE, PETROGRAD, HEADQUARTERS OF THE BOLSHEVISTS,
Guarded by Red Guards and Militia-Police.

soldiers guarding them showed the greatest respect for them, and they were well treated.

In the interests of strict impartiality it would have been desirable that Kerensky should have caused his own depositions before the Court of Inquiry that examined Korniloff and other persons connected with the "plot" to be given a wide publicity, but that is precisely what he did not choose to do . . . and for good cause. Only on two scores could he try to clear himself: by proving that Savinkoff had acted without his knowledge and authority and that Vladimir Lvoff had no grounds for presenting himself to Korniloff on his (Kerensky's) behalf. Yet, regarding these two points there could be no disavowal. That Savinkoff was in disfavour with the Minister-President before the Moscow Conference is true. Savinkoff himself afterwards explained that it was due to Kerensky's unwillingness to carry into effect the programme of military measures put forward by Korniloff with Savinkoff's approval, but this disfavour vanished when Kerensky changed his mind, and after Korniloff's "plot," knowing full well all that had transpired between the Generalissimo and Savinkoff, Kerensky continued to display the fullest confidence in Savinkoff, who even filled the triple posts of Minister of War, Marine, and Commander-in-Chief at Petrograd. Only later their relations became strained, owing to Savinkoff's continued insistence on the military reforms, and finally he broke with Kerensky, resigned all his offices, and even withdrew from the Socialist Revolutionary party, of which he had been a life-long member.

It should be noted that Savinkoff, in a statement issued to the Press, exonerated General Korniloff from any malice prepense or counter-revolutionary design, but at the same time he maintained that a movement against the Revolution had undoubtedly been organized, and that its discovery before the Moscow Conference had ill-disposed Kerensky towards the Generalissimo, whom he suspected of complicity. The conspiracy was, it seems, discovered by Philonenko, an irresponsible, but well-meaning hot-head, associated with Savinkoff at the front and later attached to Headquarters as Chief Commissary of the Government. Philonenko had to "watch" the conspiracy. No evidence was, however, produced by him. The arrest of General Gurko, effected at the time of the alleged discovery of the conspiracy,

was based on a letter written by him to the ex-Tsar shortly after the Revolution. General Gurko was released by Kerensky's order and permitted by him to go abroad.

The Cossacks having held aloof from the Kerensky-Soviet-Bolshevist combination became the object of renewed attacks and insinuations. General Kaledin was accused of having connived at and aided the Korniloff "plot." He was summoned to appear before the Court of Inquiry. The Cossacks would not permit him to go unless they were represented on the Bench. After a long and acrimonious exchange of messages between the Government and the Cossacks the latter received an apology. The Council of the Cossack Union early in October passed the following resolution:

The pseudo-rebellion on the Don has been proved to be a mischievous and treacherous provocation which has shown to the full extent the frightful ignorance of local conditions on the part of the Provisional Government and its representatives, nearly causing a fratricidal war. The gradual disclosure of the circumstances of General Korniloff's rebellion, and the contradictory statements of individual members of the Provisional Government and its assistants, have created the impression that the Korniloff affair also may prove to have been the result of a systematic and treacherous provocation of responsible and irresponsible persons and organizations struggling for power. The conscience of the people, awakening as the obscure circumstances of the case are becoming clear, is more and more perplexed by a doubt in the inviolability of the official version of this complicated affair and is gradually arriving at an estimate of this incident of its own. The people's conscience demands an impartial and independent investigation, since the smallest error of justice in a case in which grave accusations are raised against one of the foremost popular heroes of the present war may easily have fatal results and lead to a popular disappointment in the advantages of the new revolutionary régime of Russia. More than anybody else, the disclosure of the whole truth, whatever it may be, is awaited by the Russian Cossacks, since General Korniloff is a son of a simple Siberian Cossack, enjoys a great military fame and wide popularity among the Cossacks, and because Cossack troops have been implicated in his affair. Hence the conference of Cossack troops, while insisting upon the utmost publicity in the inquiry of General Korniloff's affair, insists upon the inclusion in the judicial commission of representatives of Cossack troops, since otherwise the Cossacks would inevitably arrive at their own conclusions with regard to the affair. (This suggestion was, however, disregarded.)

After the Korniloff affair all the Cadet Ministers withdrew. The Government was reduced to a Council of Five, including Kerensky, Tereshchenko, and the new Ministers of War and Marine, Admiral Verderevsky, whom Kerensky suddenly released from prison where he was awaiting court-martial, and General Verkhovsky, a semi-Bolshevist visionary who had commanded the troops at Moscow. Some of the Socialists who had been in the Ministry and were probably acting as Kerensky's spokes-

men propounded the scheme to convoke a Democratic Conference, the object of which was to rally the Socialists once more to the waning prestige of the Minister-President. But M. Skobelev, who had learned some practical lessons during his tenure of the portfolio of Labour, warned them to beware of trying to carry on the Government without the help of the *bourgeois* class. He astonished and dismayed his Socialist hearers by declaring that the Revolution was a *bourgeois* movement, not as they imagined a purely "democratic" phenomenon, and predicted misfortune to the democracy if they attempted to work alone.

estates of landlords and the houses of the small farmers, murdering all who offered any show of resistance. The Germans did not further press their military operations, although it was evident that the Baltic Fleet, like their revolutionary army, was incapable of effective resistance. The lateness of the season may have been the motive, combined with the expectation of an early usurpation of power by the Bolsheviks in Petrograd and the prospect this contingency offered of effecting a separate peace with Russia. Moreover, the food crisis in the capital did not encourage the Germans to hasten their advent.




THE RUSSIAN RETREAT FROM RIGA: DESTROYING AMMUNITION DUMPS.

The German onslaught upon Riga, predicted by General Korniloff, began September 1 and within three days the 8th Army, under General von Hutier, had crossed the Dvina, crumpled up and routed the 12th Army, under General Parski, and taken possession of the city, capturing a huge quantity of booty abandoned by the fleeing Russians. "Death" battalions valiantly covered the retreat. The disorganized and undisciplined "revolutionary" soldiers never had a chance against the enemy. Within a month the Germans had developed their operations in the Gulf and captured the commanding island of Oesel and a fortnight later (October 18) they took Moon Island, threatening Reval. Meanwhile the Russian troops on the mainland were pillaging the

Conditions in the distressed metropolis were steadily going from bad to worse, but after the first outburst of Soviet fury against the Korniloffites, in other words, against the *bourgeoisie* and especially against officers and Cossacks, and the arbitrary suppression of newspapers that had supported the former Generalissimo, matters resumed their former disheartening monotony. The rule of the Soviet became more absolute, that was all. Soon the imprisoned editors and other civilians suspected of sympathy with Korniloff were, however, released as there was no evidence to convict them, the Court of Inquiry sitting at Mogileff having been unable to find any tangible proof of Korniloff's "treachery"

Symptoms of the coming "democratic"



GERMAN TROOPS IN RIGA.

revulsion against Kerensky began to appear towards the end of September after the publication of documents, notably the Orders of the day issued by Korniloff, which had been withheld or suppressed by the Government. (The *Novoe Vremya* was closed and its editor, E. A. Egoroff, thrown into prison for publishing one of these incriminating orders.) Later, the written depositions, of which extracts are reproduced in this chapter, made their appearance in M. Burtseff's paper, and the clouds gathered ominously round M. Kerensky's head. On September 26 the official organ of the Reval Soviet launched an open accusation against him of complicity with Korniloff in an attempt to suppress the Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates. Before that (September 18) the sailors of the Baltic Fleet had shot in cold blood a number of their officers on suspicion of their favouring Korniloff, and the Vyborg garrison, a nest of Bolshevism rivalling Kronstadt and Helsingfors, had thrown dozens of their officers into the river for similar reasons. The Fleet Committee passed a series of pacifist resolutions, demanding an armistice, etc., on Bolshevik lines, at the very moment when the German squadrons were operating a short distance from their base. Kerensky ordered the Committee to be dissolved (October 3), and sternly rebuked the Vyborgers. These measures proved to be mere palliatives. Lenin now came forth with a series of articles

published in a Kronstadt paper. He had not been molested all this time, although his whereabouts did not constitute an impenetrable secret. The Government simply did not venture to enforce the order for his arrest which had been outstanding since the traitorous Bolshevik revolt of July 19 and 20.

The *bourgeois* parties had been much alarmed by the consequences of the Korniloff affair and were quite disposed to coalesce with any Government that offered a prospect of tiding over the crisis. They appreciated the danger and the strength of the Bolshevik movement, based as it was on the darkest and least responsible elements among the soldiers and proletariat. But Kerensky had at all costs to obtain the endorsement of the Left. The Democratic Conference was, therefore, hurriedly called together. It met in the early days of October. Its proceedings were characterized by verbiage and confusion. On the main point, the revival of a Coalition Government, it voted for five hours without coming to any comprehensible decision. Then Kerensky ascended the rostrum and put the issue before them: either they would agree to a Coalition or he would resign. The Bolsheviks were not yet ready to challenge him with arms, and the point was gained. And it was further agreed that a provisional Parliament, under the style of Council of the Republic, should be nominated from various parties and classes

(the *bourgeoisie* to have about 25 per cent. of representatives) to act as a temporary legislature, pending the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. It was hoped thereby to obviate the interference of the Soviets and Committees with legislative and administrative work. How slim and specious were these hopes, on which Kerensky relied, was soon to be shown. The Democracy, alive to the inherent intention of the scheme, had decided at the same time to convoke another Pan-Russian Congress of Soviets. Another source of confusion was thus imminent.


M. Kerensky proceeded to form his Coalition Ministry. It was composed (October 8) as follows:

Premier and Generalissimo, Kerensky; Interior and Post and Telegraphs, Nikitin; Justice, Maliantovich; Food, Prokopovitch; Agriculture, Avksentieff; Labour, Gvozdeff; Foreign Affairs, Tereshchenko; Commerce and Industry, Konovaloff; Finance, Bernatsky; Education, Salazken; Religion, Kartasheff; Public Relief, Kishkin; Control, Smirnov; Economy, Tretiakoff; Railways, Liverovsky; War, Verkhovsky; Marine, Verderevsky.

The Ministry included four leading Cadets.

The Moscow industrials were strongly represented by Konovaloff, Kishkin, Smirnov, and Tretiakoff.

With such heavy backing Kerensky made his appearance before the Council of the Republic (October 20). That body was not destined to live many weeks. Its relations with the Ministry were not cheerful from the outset. Verkhovsky announced that one-third of the army must be demobilized, because the State could not feed them; General Alexeieff declared that under existing conditions the Front could not expect any help from the Rear and that only one thing remained for the men at the Front: to try to save themselves if they could. Kerensky came forward with a bitter denunciation of the Bolsheviks—so soon had he tired of the alliance with them against Korniloff. He accused them of betraying the army in Galicia, of fomenting excesses and pogroms in the provinces. The responsibility of anarchy and disorganization fell not upon that section of the democracy that he represented or upon the uneducated masses, but upon those who corrupted them. He believed that his scheme of co-ordinating the General Staff, the Army Commissaries and the regimental committees



RUSSIAN REFUGEES FROM RIGA ENCAMPING IN A WOOD.

would restore the army. From these words it was to be inferred that Korniloff's programme had been definitely abandoned, and that the plans of an amateur civilian were to be applied in its stead. Yet the programme of policy which the new Government had adopted included the restoration of the efficiency of the army.

The Council of the Republic was composed of 308 members of the Democratic Conference, 126 representatives of the propertied classes, 20 of the Cossack organizations, 3 of the clergy and 15 of various national groups. From the outset the Bolsheviks would have nothing to do with it. Trotsky (Bronstein) denounced it as a "Council of Counter-Revolutionary connivance." Five days later he had perfected his organization for the third and final Bolshevik coup.

Having captured the Petrograd Soviet the Bolsheviks made Trotsky its President some time earlier. From this coign of vantage he had been working to assemble a Bolshevik General Staff, which became known as the Military Revolutionary Committee. It was, like the Petrograd Soviet, obviously contrary in spirit and purpose to the so-called Democracy of Russia as represented by the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, voicing the aims and ideas of the great majority of the

Workers of Russia and the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Council of Peasant Delegates, which similarly stood for the rural (just as the Central Committee represented, more or less, the urban population of the country. But such trifling considerations did not weigh with the Bolsheviks. They felt sure of carrying the dark masses with them, and the very evils that they had stimulated—cowardice, treachery, violence, and plunder—were so many omens of coming success in their enterprise. The Military Revolutionary Committee consisted of the presidential bureau of the Petrograd Soviet with Trotsky at the head, the presidential bureau of the Soldiers' Section of the Petrograd Soviet, representatives of the Central Committee of the Navy, "delegates" from the Vyborgh District Committee, the Railwaymen's Union, the Postal and Telegraph Servants' Union, the Council of Petrograd Shop Assistants, the Military Section of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets and the Labour Militia (Red Guards), etc. The plan of forming this body was broached at a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet on October 25. Its orders were to be obligatory on all the military authorities of Petrograd. Some days later an All-Russian Committee of the Salvation of the Country was formed by the Petrograd Municipal Council,



TROTSKY ADDRESSING A CROWD IN PETROGRAD DURING A POPULAR DEMONSTRATION.

of anti-Bolshevist Socialists, and of delegates from the front with the object of forming a new Provisional Government on Non-Coalition lines to frustrate the Bolsheviks.

Before proceeding to recapitulate the events of the Bolshevik uprising it will be interesting to cite the views of their leader on the subject. Vladimir Ilyitch Ulianoff, writing under his pen-name of N. Lenin, made them clear in two articles, one of which appeared in No. 8 of the *Rabochiy Put* (November 1), and the second in the *Bote der Russischen Revolution* (November 3) the "Organ of the Foreign Delegation of the Central Committee of the Social Democratic Labour Party of Russia," which was printed in Stockholm in German, and was intended to propagate Bolshevik ideas abroad and to deal a blow at German imperialism. In the article in the *Rabochiy Put*, Ulianoff combatted the view of some of his adherents that the Bolsheviks had not a majority in the country :

Facts prove to us most plainly that after the July days the majority of the population began rapidly to join the ranks of the Bolsheviks. This is proved by the elections at Petrograd on September 2, before the Korniloff affair, when the Bolshevik votes rose from 20 per cent. to 33 per cent., as also by the September elections of the district dumas in Moscow, when the percentage of Bolshevik votes rose from 11 per cent. to 49 per cent. This was also proved by the fact that the bulk of the Peasants' Soviets, contrary to the advice of their "Avksentieff's" Central Soviet, declared against a coalition; for to be against a coalition is, in reality, to go with the Bolsheviks. Further, communications from the front with increasing frequency and definiteness show that the mass of the soldiery, in spite of malicious libels and attacks by the leaders of the Mensheviks, the officers, deputies, etc., etc., more and more decisively came over to the side of the Bolsheviks. Finally, the most important fact in the present juncture is the Peasants' Rising. These are the object lessons which prove the passing of the population to the side of the Bolsheviks. The movement of the peasants in the Tamboff Government was a revolution, both in a physical and political sense, which gave such important political results as, in the first place, the consent to transfer the land to the peasants. Not without cause does the whole of the riff-raff Press, up to the *Delo Naroda*, now wail of the need to hand over the land to the peasants. Here you have the proof of the soundness of Bolshevism and of its success. Another splendid political and revolutionary consequence of the Peasants' Rising is the arrival of grain at the railway stations in the Tamboff Government. Here, perplexed comrades, is another argument in favour of a rising as the only means of saving the country from famine, which is already knocking at the door, and from a crisis of unheard-of proportions. Whilst the Menshevik traitors to the people growl, threaten, write resolutions, and hold out the empty convocation of the Constituent Assembly, the people will proceed by Bolshevik tactics with the settlement of the food question by a rising against the landed proprietors, capitalists, and middlemen. No, to doubt now that the bulk of the people is going, and will continue to go, with the Bolsheviks is shamefully to hesitate and tantamount to throwing over all principles of proletarian revolutionism and totally to repudiate Bolshevism.

The article ended with a declaration that it was useless for the Soviets to wait to seize power :

We have no right to wait until the *bourgeoisie* has smothered the Revolution. The famine does not wait. The Peasant Rising did not wait. The war does not wait. History does not repeat itself, but, if we turn our backs on it, what will happen? We must wait for a miracle.



LEON TROTSKY,

The "People's Commissioner" for Foreign Affairs.

The article in the *Bote* was even more insistent, and again displayed Ulianoff's belief that the time was ripe for the Bolsheviks to seize the power and to save the Revolution :

There is no doubt that the revolution in Russia has reached its turning point. In a country of peasants, under a revolutionary Republican Government, supported by the parties of the Revolutionary Socialists and the Mensheviks, parties which until recently had the majority of the *bourgeoisie* behind them, there is rising to-day a peasants' rebellion. This fact has not surprised us—the Bolsheviks. We have always maintained that the policy of the famous "Coalition" with *bourgeoisie* was a policy of an imperialist war, a policy of protecting capitalism and Junkerdom from the people. There exists in Russia, thanks to the treason of the Revolutionary Socialists and Mensheviks, at the same time as the Government of the Soviets, a Government of capitalists and Junkers. Why should we be surprised that in Russia, with all the wretchedness brought by the continuation of the imperialist war upon the nation, a peasants' rebellion should break out and spread?

Ulianoff then quoted an extract from the *Delo Naroda*, a Revolutionary Socialist organ :

Up till now practically nothing has been done to calm the unsettled state of affairs which is especially marked

in the rural districts and in Central Russia. The law for the readjustment of agrarian affairs in the country, which was laid before the Provisional Government long ago, has hopelessly disappeared somewhere in the depths of the Government archives. Are we not right when we assert that our Republican Government is still at times bound down by the old Imperial Governmental red tape, and that Stolypin's methods still exist in the ways of the revolutionary Ministers?

His comment was as follows:

Would it, then, be possible to find a better witness in our opponents' camp to the fact that, not only has the policy of the Coalition broken down, and the Revolu-



THE GUARD AT LENIN'S DOOR.

tionary Socialists, who suffer a Kerensky in their midst, have sunk to the level of a party hostile to the people, hostile to the peasants, to the level of a counter-revolutionary party, but also that the Russian Revolution has reached a turning-point? A peasants' rebellion in a country of peasants against the Government of the Revolutionary Socialist Kerensky, against the Mensheviks Nikitin and Gvozdeff, against the other Ministers—representatives of Capital and Junkerdom!—that is the situation. The crushing of this rebellion by military force at the command of the Republican Government—that is the consequence of this situation! In the face of these facts, is it possible for an honest adherent of the peasants' cause to deny, with indifference, that the crisis has come to a head, and that the victory of the Government over the peasants is the death-knell of the Revolution, and the triumph of the counter-revolution?

The article ended as follows:

Yes, the leaders of the Central Executive Committee are practising a regular policy of protecting the *bourgeoisie* and the Junkers. And there is no doubt that the Bolsheviks who were to let themselves be caught in the snare of constitutional illusions, of "belief" in the elections to the Constituent Assembly, of the "expectation" of the Congress of all the Soviets, and so forth, that such Bolsheviks would be nothing less than miserable traitors to the cause of the proletariat.

The crushing of a peasants' rebellion by a Government, which is compared even by the *Delo Naroda*, to Stolypin, means the destruction of the Revolution. They drivel about anarchy, about the indifference of the masses: the masses cannot be indifferent in the elections if the peasantry is obliged to rebel, and if the revolutionary democracy suffers that rebellion to be quelled. To allow the rebellion to be crushed at this hour means to allow the elections for the Constituent Assembly to be tampered with, and this would be done more barefacedly than was the case at the elections for the Democratic Conference, and for the Preliminary Parliament. The

crisis is approaching its final stage. The whole future of the Russian Revolution is at stake. The whole future of the International Proletarian Socialist Revolution is at stake. The final stage of the crisis is at hand.

Lenin knew, of course, what his henchman, Trotsky, was about to do. On November 5 the Military Revolutionary Committee issued an "order" to the military authorities of Petrograd to place themselves at its disposal. Tremendous consternation was caused thereby among the Government. Efforts at conciliation proving ineffectual, Kerensky decided to take "measures." He suppressed the *Rabochiy Put*, and summoned officer cadets to guard the Winter Palace, his residence. On November 6 the Cadets held the bridges, and all traffic was stopped. Cadets occupied the electric stations, the telephone and telegraph offices, and the railway stations. Next day the Committee was receiving reinforcements of Red Guards and armoured cars at the Smolny Institute, and serving out arms and ammunition. The Central Executive Committee thereupon transferred its quarters thence to the Staff. Troops ordered up from the environs of the capital by the Government refused to obey, and the cruiser *Avrora* declined to leave its anchorage in the Neva whither she had been brought by order of Kerensky at the time of the Korniloff affair. The Committee issued a notice that it was not preparing a *coup d'état* but merely "protecting the interests of the Petrograd garrison and democracy against counter-revolutionary and hooligan attempts." Meanwhile it was multiplying its orders to the troops and making its final arrangements. Kerensky and the Staff appealed to the Cossack regiments, but they decided to remain neutral. That was their reply to the prolonged and vicious campaign that Kerensky and the "democracy" had waged against them. They would not be policemen any more. At five o'clock in the morning of November 7 Kerensky disappeared, leaving Konovaloff at the Winter Palace, with a guard of 1,100 officer cadets and the Women's Battalion, to manage as best he could. The palace was surrounded at 6 p.m. by the troops of the Military Revolutionary Committee, which demanded a surrender within 20 minutes. The Mensheviks attempted a fruitless mediation. At 9 p.m. the guns of the *Avrora* and the fortress fired a few rounds, which was the signal for the troops to open fire. A strong fusillade ensued, lasting a whole hour. The Staff was captured.

Sailors forced an entrance into the palace at 11 p.m., and by midnight it was taken and its inmates arrested. Firing continued all night. Meanwhile the Committee troops had taken possession of the railway stations, effectually cutting off all hope of reinforcements coming into the city. They also took possession of the telegraph agency and the telegraph offices, and occupied the Marie Palace, whence the Members of the Council of the Republic had to save themselves by flight. More warships had arrived from Kronstadt in the morning. The triumph of the Bolsheviks was complete. They had encountered no serious resistance except from the unfortunate lads and women who paid the penalty for Kerensky's faults. Many were killed under circumstances of revolting brutality.

The Petrograd Soviet met late on November 7, when Trotsky announced that within a few hours the Provisional Government had been overthrown and the entire authority had been seized by the Military Revolutionary Committee, practically without the shedding of blood (*sic*).

All measures to that end had been carried out so systematically and so quietly that the average inhabitant did not suspect in his peaceful sleep that at that very moment a great revolution was taking place. All the Ministers were in hiding, and any minute they might get the news that the Winter Palace was in the hands of the revolutionary democracy. The success was

due to the glorious Petrograd Garrison and the revolutionary proletariat. One could say now safely that the authority had passed into the hands of the Soviets, and that an experiment had been started by way of serving exclusively the interests of workers, soldiers, and the poor peasantry. That would be a revolutionary dictatorship of the lower orders over the upper classes. It would be an authority proud of its power and merciless to all enemies, and would at the same time secure in the best manner possible the real interests of the popular masses. Internal discipline of labour and control over production would be required, and every soldier and worker must become conscious that henceforth everyone would have to work, and that there would be no room for parasites and idlers. As the Petrograd Telegraphic Agency and the wireless apparatus were in the hands of the Military Revolutionary Committee, all steps had been taken to announce the revolution in the provinces and abroad, as well as in the trenches, where the soldiers had already been informed that the Military Revolutionary Committee would immediately proclaim an armistice on all fronts, and would announce the transfer of all land to the people and the summoning of a really popular Constituent Assembly.

Trotsky further announced that all political prisoners had been released from prison and that many of them were already discharging the duties of commissioners attached to the Military Revolutionary Committee. He was followed by Ulianoff (Lenin), whose appearance was met with a storm of applause.

He declared that the proletarian Revolution, of which the Bolsheviks had been speaking all the time, had now been accomplished and a new type of Government would emerge, representing the workers, soldiers, and peasants, which would legislate and would administer the country. The workers and soldiers must immediately learn the art of administration, which hitherto



THE WOMEN'S "BATTALION OF DEATH" PARADED AT THE WINTER PALACE, Which they defended for the Provisional Government against the Bolsheviks.

had been exercised exclusively by the ruling classes. A new era had been opened not only for Russia but for the world at large, which would necessarily lead to the triumph of Socialism. Without it, it would be impossible to solve all the problems raised by the war and by the present conditions of life. It was impossible to end the war without a complete rupture with the capitalist classes, and he was sure that the news of the formation of a new Government by the Russian proletariat would evoke enormous sympathy among the oppressed and disinherited of all the world. The Revolution would spread from country to country, and symptoms to that effect were already observable in Italy and even in Great Britain, while it was certain that an echo would also resound among the German soldiers. He then spoke of the necessity of transferring all land to the peasants and of establishing working-class control over industry and banking.

Among the speakers who followed was Zinovyeff, who was likewise greeted with an ovation.

He contrasted his last appearance at the Soviet when the Bolsheviks were still an insignificant minority. He repudiated the rumour that there were differences in the Bolshevik ranks, and said all that had been debated before was the question of time and place, and not of the necessity of the rebellion itself. He was certain that the peasantry would all side with the Bolsheviks, and from that day a Socialist Revolution began in Russia. To-day, he declared, the Russian Socialists were paying back their debt to the German Socialists, from whom they had learned Socialism, and to-day they had inflicted a blow upon the Imperialists of all the world, and also upon Wilhelm, the hangman.

A resolution was then adopted welcoming the success of the Revolution, proclaiming the necessity of a workers' and peasants' Government that would lead the country to Socialism, as the sole means of saving it from the horrors and disasters of the war, pointing out the necessity of a just democratic peace for all belligerent countries, proclaiming the need for internal democratic discipline, and, lastly, expressing its conviction that the working

classes of other countries would help the new rulers of Russia in bringing about the triumph of the Revolution.

The All-Russian Congress of Soviets had foregathered by a remarkable coincidence on the very day after the Bolshevik *coup*, and it was in their name and under their cloak that the usurpers proceeded to assume office. The following manifesto was published in the *Pravda* of November 10:

The All-Russian Congress of the Councils of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies decrees the form of the administration of the country pending the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. The Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government to be called the Council of People's Commissioners. The administration of the individual branches of State life is to be entrusted to Boards, the composition of which is to secure the carrying out of the programme proclaimed by the Congress in close contact with the organizations of workers, sailors, soldiers, peasants, and employees. The Government authority belongs to the Board and chairman of these Commissioners, that is to the People's Commissioners, and the right of systemizing them belongs to the All-Russian Congress of the Council of Workmen's, Peasants', and Soldiers' delegates, and its Central Executive Committee. At the present moment the Council of the People's Commissioners consists of the following persons:

Vladimir Ulianoff (Lerin), President of the Council; Rykoff, Interior; Miliutin, Agriculture; Shliapnikoff, Labour; Ovseienko (Antonoff), Krylenko, and Dybenkoff, War and Marine; Lunarcharsky, Public Instruction; Skvortsoff (Stephanoff), Finance; Bronstein (Trotsky), Foreign Affairs; Oppokoff (Lomoff), Justice; Feodorovitch, Food Supply; Aviloff (Glevoff), Post and Telegraphs; and Djugashvili (Stalin). The post of the People's Commissioner for Railways has not yet been filled.

The new Government proceeded to issue decrees confiscating all lands except those belonging to the non-commissioned ranks, to peasants, and to Cossacks, for the benefit of the workers, and instituting negotiations with the enemy for the conclusion of an armistice.





CHAPTER CCXX.

THE WESTERN OFFENSIVES OF 1917 : ARRAS-VIMY.

THE ALLIED PLANS FOR 1917—MODIFICATIONS AND THEIR CAUSES—HAIG'S PREPARATIONS—IMPROVED TRANSPORT—MINES AND TUNNELS—COOPERATION WITH THE FRENCH—THE GERMAN LINES—GERMAN CONCRETE DEFENCES—COMMAND OF THE AIR—THE BRITISH BOMBARDMENT—BRITISH COMMANDS—THE ATTACK ON APRIL 9—ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE—ALLENBY'S SUCCESS—EXTENT OF THE VICTORY—MONCHY-LE-PREUX—THE SOUTHERN ATTACK—THE CAPTURE OF VIMY RIDGE—LENS—RESULTS OF SIX DAYS' FIGHTING.

THE British operations about to be described in the following pages were the outcome of the conference of the military representatives of the Allied Powers assembled at the French General Headquarters in November 1916.

The programme at first agreed to, which involved simultaneous attacks by all the Allied Powers on the Central Europe forces, was far more extensive than could be ultimately carried out. In France it was intended that the British and French Armies should attack simultaneously on a broad front. But the general conditions which ensued led to this intention being modified.

In the first place, the French proposed that the British should considerably extend their front and also open the attack at a date earlier than the date originally settled. Italy found for her part that she could not be ready to assume the offensive till some time after the date originally fixed. Moreover, the course of the Revolution in Russia soon showed that the cooperation of her armies was no longer to be expected.

But still it was determined to proceed with the spring offensive in the West, notwithstanding these serious drawbacks. Even if the prospects of far-reaching success were

lessened, still the activity of the Allies in France would tend to relieve the Austro-German pressure on Russia while the latter was attempting to organize a new Government. Whether Russia were successful in this endeavour or not, there was nothing to be gained by the Allies in the West delaying their attack on the enemy. As a practical fact Russia ceased to play her part in the world-wide war and thus allowed Germany to bring up some 40 fresh divisions from her Eastern to her Western Front of operations to take the places of tired units worn out in the fighting against the British and French and also to draft fresh and well-trained men from the Russian frontier to replace losses in the armies in Northern France and Belgium.

The arrangement between the French Commander-in-Chief and General Haig had provided for the British offensive being directed against the enemy's troops occupying the salient between the Scarpe and the Ancre into which they had been driven back as the result of the Battle of the Somme.

The British attack was to have been carried out by the Fifth Army on the Ancre side, while the Third Army advanced from the north-west about Arras.

The new state of affairs made it necessary to modify these plans; still, the changes made

were not great and chiefly concerned the Fifth Army. Instead of attacking from the line of the Ancre simultaneously with the advance of the Third Army from the north-west, it had now to follow up the retiring enemy and establish itself in front of the Hindenburg line, to which the enemy had withdrawn. This line, chosen with great care, had been very strongly

we in our turn had a clear field of observation up to Douai and beyond, and the left flank of any operations on the south side of the Scarpe was secured. But south of this river any prolonged offensive offered no prospect of strategic success. To penetrate the German lines in this direction could lead to no great result, as the position was too centrally situated, and an irrupting force would be liable to be crushed by the large masses which could be brought against it.

It was for this reason that the British Commander determined, when the Vimy heights had been captured and the position south of them rendered secure from the danger of German counter-attack by the advance of the British and French troops to positions which rendered them reasonably safe, to transfer his main offensive to Flanders and to continue it so far as the force available would permit. Sir Douglas Haig hoped to be able to strike hard in a northerly direction before the enemy realized that the more southerly attacks were not to be pressed farther.

In one other point Sir Douglas Haig's General Idea for the operations had to be somewhat changed. The greater importance now attributed to the advance of the British right restricted the amount of attention which could be given to the preparations needed for the Flanders attack.

The British situation in the pronounced salient in front of Ypres had always been a source of anxiety. Our works were completely over-looked by those of the Germans, and they would have been difficult to hold against a determined attack in force. It was therefore determined to improve our position by the capture of the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge and of the high ground which extends thence north-eastwards for some seven miles and then slants north through Broodseinde and Passchendaele. This operation formed, therefore, a necessary preliminary to the Flanders offensive.

Operations of the character now to be undertaken required very special preparations to ensure their being carried out smoothly.

When transport requirements on the front in question were first considered, reliance had been largely placed in motor lorries, and the neighbourhood was served by two single lines of railway, the combined capacity of which was less than half the estimated requirements. Considerable constructional work, therefore, both of standard and narrow gauge railway was now



THE ALLIED FRONT
From the Sea to Reims.

fortified, to deny all advantages of position to any force attempting to attack it.

The voluntary retirement of the Germans on the Arras-Soissons Front (see Chap. CXC.) removed the salient which was to have been the first objective of the British troops, but still left the advantage to be gained by the advance north of Arras. Here the capture of the Vimy heights was of the highest importance, and the First Army was designated for this duty. These heights dominated the lower ground both on the eastern and western sides and their position close to the British trenches was a perpetual source of danger to them. For while the Germans held them they had a good view over the land across which a frontal attack must pass. Once they fell into our hands

undertaken to give us a rail service more adequate to our needs. Roads also had to be improved and adapted to the circumstances for which they were required, and preparations made to carry them forward rapidly as our troops advanced.

For this latter purpose considerable use was made both in this and in the later offensives of plank roads. These were built chiefly of heavy beech slabs laid side by side, and were found of great utility, being capable of rapid construction over ground of almost any nature.

By these means the accumulation of the vast stocks of munitions and stores of all kinds required for our offensive, and their distribution to the troops, were made possible. The numberless other preparatory measures taken for the Somme offensive were again repeated, with such improvements and additions as previous experience dictated. Hutting and other accommodation for the troops concentrated in the area had to be provided in great quantity. An adequate water supply had to be guaranteed, necessitating the erection of numerous pumping installations, the laying of many miles of pipe lines, and the construction of reservoirs. The successful manner in which the difficult problem of water supply during

operations was overcome reflects great credit upon the Royal Engineers. Thanks were also due to the War Office Staff concerned, and the manufacturers and their employees, for the special efforts made by them to meet the demands of the Army in respect of the necessary machinery and plant.

Very extensive mining and tunnelling operations were carried out. In particular, advantage was taken of the existence of a large system of underground quarries and cellars in Arras, and its suburbs to provide safe quarters for a great number of troops. Electric light was installed in these caves and cellars, which were linked together by tunnels, and the whole connected by long subways with our trench system east of the town, the work being done admirably and expeditiously by New Zealand troops.

A problem peculiar to the launching of a great offensive from a town arose from the difficulty of ensuring the punctual debouching of troops and the avoidance of confusion and congestion in the streets both before the assault and during the progress of the battle. This problem was met by the most careful and complete organization of routes, reflecting the highest credit on the staffs concerned.



A PLANK ROAD AND ITS MAKERS.

Chapter CXC. described the circumstances which attended the enforced retreat of the Germans to the Hindenburg line and the movements of the British and French in pursuit.

The enemy's withdrawal from the elaborately fortified lines constructed since September 1914 between the southern environs of Arras and the northern bank of the Aisne west of Soissons had created for him a somewhat pronounced salient at the Arras end and another at the southern end of the evacuated territory. These may be designated the Arras salient and the Craonne salient. Of the former the southern face ran south-eastwards from the suburbs of Arras to the region of Cambrai; the other side of the salient went from the northern suburbs of Arras to the Vimy ridge and thence to Lens and La Bassée. The distance as the crow flies from La Bassée to Arras is some 18 miles, from Arras to Cambrai over 20 miles. The Craonne salient curved round La Fère, past Laon towards Craonne.

By the end of the first week of April, 1917, the French had cleared the enemy out of most of the devastated area in the angle made by the confluence of the Oise and Aisne. They had crossed at places the Ailette, a tributary of the Oise, and were entering the densely wooded

region—Basse Forêt de Coucy and the Forêt de Gobain—which lay between the Ailette and the important railway centres of Laon to the east and La Fère on the Oise to the north.*


If the French could expel the Germans from the Craonne heights north of the Aisne and hold them, their position would threaten the communications of the enemy in rear of the entrenchments between the eastern outskirts of Reims and the western outskirts of Verdun. Our Ally's attack, therefore, formed an important part of the general advance. It would hold the Germans and make them think that it was the main line of attack and divert their attention from the left of the allied line, just as our attack of April 9 would probably serve to draw the enemy's reserve towards our advance. The British attack was, therefore, in the first instance to be preparatory to a more decisive operation by the French, to be begun a little later on, and in the subsequent stages of which the British forces were to cooperate to the fullest extent possible.

The second Battle of the Aisne—which might

* Laon-La Fère had formed part of the second line of fortresses intended to protect the north-eastern frontier. But the defences of this part of the French borderland were antiquated when war broke out, and proved but small hindrance to the Germans.



AN EXTEMPORIZED BRIDGE.



[Official photograph.]

WORKING PARTIES IN A MINE CRATER.

better be called the Battle of Craonne—Reims—has already been narrated in Chapter CCIX. It began on April 16, 1917, and marked the commencement of the French share in the general movement against the enemy, which was to be combined with the more decisive stroke eventually to be dealt by the British in Flanders. It was arranged, therefore, that, if the combined offensive of the British and French did not produce the full effects hoped for within a reasonable time, the British main attack should be transferred to Flanders as originally intended and that the French should help the British Commander-in-Chief by taking over as much as possible of the front held by his troops, and also by carrying out in combination with the Flanders project such offensives on their own front as they might be able to undertake.

From La Fère on the Oise to St. Quentin on the Somme and from St. Quentin to Cambrai the new German barrier in the first fortnight of April, 1917, was in no immediate danger. The systematic devastation ordered by Hindenburg, and carried out with the characteristic ruthlessness of his subordinate leaders and their troops, had been successful to this extent: that it rendered it difficult to fight a decisive battle on the line La Fère—St. Quentin—Cambrai. For while the roads, railroads and bridges hastily

constructed or reconstructed by the French and British in the devastated area over which they had advanced could always be destroyed in the event of Hindenburg endeavouring to recover the Noyon, Roye, Péronne, Bapaume regions, he himself would be compelled to reconstruct the communications which he had destroyed before he could move with any rapidity over the wilderness he had created. The retirement of the Germans from the Roye region up the Oise and Somme on La Fère and St. Quentin, and through Péronne and Bapaume to Cambrai, made the left wing of the Allies, as far as Arras, fairly secure from an enemy offensive on a large scale. Sir Douglas Haig had therefore arranged that the first of his blows should be struck against the enemy forces in the neighbourhood of the Arras salient.

Just as the Craonne heights north of the Aisne had been exposed by Hindenburg's retreat, so were the German positions east of Arras. The British in the Croisilles region were by April 6, 1917, astride the Arras—Cambrai railway. North-west of Croisilles they held the Arras—Bapaume chaussée and the village of Henin on the Cojeul. This position threatened the heights south of the Scarpe which could be attacked from the south and west. North of the Scarpe the German lines connecting the Scarpe with the Vimy Ridge, and the ridge

itself on the edge of the plain of the Scheldt, invited attack from the west. Once the Germans were dislodged from the Scarpe and Vimy heights the British position was secure while the more northern attacks were carried out.

The importance of defending the Cambrai and Douai positions, which connect many of the railway lines back through Belgium, had naturally not been overlooked by the German Staff. They anticipated an offensive north and south of Arras towards both these towns and they had made all preparations to stop it.

The German defensive lines about to be attacked ran in a general north-westerly

from a little north of the village of Croisilles, south-east of Arras, to just south of Givenchy-en-Gohelle at the northern foot of Vimy Ridge, a distance of nearly 15 miles. It included between four and five miles of the northern end of the Hindenburg Line, which had been built to receive the German troops when compelled to retreat after the Battle of the Somme.

North of the River Scarpe the original German defences were still occupied. They were arranged on the same principle as those which had been already captured farther south. They comprised three separate trench systems, formed a highly organized defensive belt some two to five miles in depth, reaching back to



MINE CRATER IN CROSS ROADS BETWEEN HENIN AND MERCATEL.

direction from St. Quentin to the village of Tilloy-lez-Mofflaines, immediately south-east of Arras. From this point the original German trenches continued northwards across the valley of the Scarpe River to the Vimy Ridge, which, rising to a height of some 475 feet, commanded a wide view to the south-west, west and north. The opponent's lines now left the high ground, and, skirting the western suburbs of Lens, stretched northwards to the Channel across a flat country of rivers, dykes and canals, the dead level of which is only broken by the line of hills stretching from Wyttschaete north-eastwards to Passchendaele and Staden.

The front attacked by the Third and First Armies on the morning of April 9 extended


what was known as the Oppy-Méricourt line, running north from the Scarpe, by Gavrelle, Oppy and Méricourt, to the outer lines of Lens.

In addition to the front line Hindenburg had constructed, from three to six miles back, farther east, a new line of resistance which was just approaching completion. This system, known as the Drocourt-Quéant Line, branched off from the main Hindenburg line from Quéant, and, running thence nearly due north in rear of the more advanced German position, served as a powerful support to it. This line covered the railways which ran from Boisieux-au-Mont eastwards to Cambrai, from Arras to Douai and that which proceeds from Lens south-eastward to the Arras-Douai line and Cambrai.

Between Guémappe and Monchy-le-Preux went the high road from Arras to Cambrai. From the north bank of the Scarpe the southern part of the Oppy—Méricourt line traversed the plain, crossing the Arras-Douai railroad near Rœux, and the Arras-Douai chaussée at Gavrelle. Leaving Gavrelle it passed by the villages of Oppy and Arleux-en-Gohelle to Méricourt, west of Drocourt on the Lens-Douai railroad.

and Sensée past Fontaines-les-Croisilles. An advance down the valley of the Cojeul was also barred by the fortified villages of Heninel and Wancourt and would be exposed to fire from Guémappe and Monchy-le-Preux and other places on the Scarpe Heights and from Chérisy on the Sensée. The culminating point of the Scarpe Heights was the plateau of Monchy-le-Preux.

Some of the redoubts in this huge fortified area deserve special notice. North of the



[Official photograph.]

PREPARING FOR THE OFFENSIVE: BRINGING UP STORES AND MATERIAL.

The German lines constituted a formidable mass of redoubts, trenches and wire entanglements through which flowed the marshy Scarpe. The system protected the railways from Arras to Lens and Douai and covered the Arras-Douai highroad. It embraced St. Laurent-Blangy and Athies on the north bank, Blangy and Feuchy on the south bank of the Scarpe—all villages in the eastern suburbs or environs of Arras. South of Blangy the network of redoubts, trenches and wire extended across the Arras-Cambrai highway, enclosing the ruins of the village of Tilloy-les-Mofflaines and the ridges east of it. Thence the system ran parallel with the Arras-Bapaume road, through Neuville Vitasse to Hénin-sur-Cojeul when it turned eastwards between the Cojeul

Scarpe were two works, the Point du Jour and Hyderabad Redoubt.* South of the Scarpe and just east of Blangy where the Arras-Lens left the Arras-Douai railroad were the Railway Triangle defences. A branch line on the east linked the two communications, forming the third side of the Triangle. Along the base of the embankment on the inner side of the triangle and some 40 feet below the level of the railroad the Germans had made a labyrinth of trenches and dug-outs. In the centre of the Triangle was a redoubt

The Railway Triangle defences were but a

* The name Hyderabad was, like many others, given to the German works by the British to enable them to distinguish them on the maps with which the troops were supplied.

sample of the obstacles placed in the path of the British if they attempted to storm the Scarpe Heights from the west. In Feuchy behind it the church and chapel had been con-



[Official photograph.]


A GERMAN CONCRETE DUG-OUT.

verted into strong works armed with numerous machine-guns. South of Tilloy was an irregular labyrinth of trenches called "The Harp" which had been dug out in the eminence east of Beaurains. Near Neuville Vitasse was a maze of wire known to our troops as "the Egg." It was a strong work armed with machine guns. Between these was Telegraph Hill, on which also there was a powerful redoubt.

The network of redoubts, trenches and wire entanglements was attached near Thelus and Bailleul-sir-Berthoult to a similar network covering the Vimy Ridge, the highest point of which was Hill 145, north-west of Petit Vimy. The villages of Bailleul-sir-Berthoult, Farbus, Petit Vimy all just below the eastern crest of the ridge, Vimy below Petit Vimy, the whole of the plateau and the woods on it and the eastern slopes of the heights, were strongly defended. A hill known as "the Pimple" to the north of and below Hill 145, the ground north of this where it descended to the valley of the Souchez, and the village of Givenchy-en-Gohelle had also been elaborately fortified. Two huge tunnels, the Prinz Arnauld and Völker, which could not be reached by artillery fire, had been driven bodily through the Ridge itself and enabled reserves and reinforcements to be passed safely from the eastern to the western defences of the Ridge.

This barrier from Givenchy-en-Gohelle over the Vimy Ridge to the Scarpe and from the Scarpe over the western end of the Scarpe Heights to the banks of the Cojeul derived additional strength from numerous forts of

varying shape but of a general type, which was to assume continually greater importance throughout the summer's fighting; they were often hidden among the foundations of demolished buildings. They were of two kinds, the one being built of large concrete blocks, the other constructed of reinforced concrete, *i.e.*, of a strong iron construction usually of the nature of network, but often with iron girders too, covered with the quick-drying concrete of which the Germans made so much use. In both kinds there were horizontal loopholes for the machine guns, giving them a wide range, some placed for action to the front, others to flank the approaches to the German trenches. These structures were secure against light artillery. They were usually inconspicuous and so hidden as not to form an easy target for the heavy guns and howitzers which could as a rule destroy them. They all had one feature in common, *viz.*, one or more entrances by which the garrisons obtained access to them and which served as "bolt-holes" for them when hard pressed. They were usually only closed by light wooden doors to keep out the weather and even these were not found in many instances. In some instances steel cupolas, each enclosing a light quick-firing gun, were made use of. They



[Official photograph.]

A GERMAN GUN POSITION NEAR BLANGY.

A concrete platform for the gun and protected stores for munitions.

were embedded in earth or concrete. These had been suggested many years before by the Grüsen Company. They do not seem to have been extensively employed in this war. When our men came to attack them at close quarters the front could be held by rifle-fire and bombs, while a few bold spirits passed round their

flanks and threw bombs in through the doorways, after, if these were closed, beating in the doors. Between the effects of the intensive bombardment preceding an assault, which often disposed of the concrete mass altogether or reduced the few uninjured members of the garrison to a helpless state of shattered nerves, rendering them incapable of resistance to our infantry attacks, the additional strength given to the German defence by the use of these structures was far less than their inventors had hoped for.

Twenty or thirty yards or so in front of the trenches and elaborate barbed wire entanglements which bound together these innumerable subterranean or quasi-subterranean strongholds, there were often machine-gun posts scarcely visible and connected with the trenches by tunnels ending in dug-outs. These flanking works had to be disposed of before a secure footing in the German trenches could be secured.

Nine months had elapsed since the opening of the Battle of the Somme, and in the interval the German artillerymen had besides made

every effort which experience could suggest to render the wide barrier between the British and the plains of the Scheldt impregnable. Naval guns—the 24 c.m. with a range of 28,000 yards (or nearly 16 miles), had been brought up with a view to impede by long range fire the concentration of our troops for the coming battle. The range of the field guns had been increased to 9,000 yards. An improved machine-gun—the 08/15—had been served out lavishly, and an anti-tank gun, resembling a short barrelled 77 cm. field gun mounted on low wheels with a narrow track, had been introduced.

Hindenburg and his assistants had taken every precaution to prevent the British and French from repeating their successes on the Somme. But Haig and the French leaders had also not failed to digest the lessons of the year before. It was universally recognized that in modern battles infantry frontal attack is impossible against intact entrenchments.*

* Major, afterwards Colonel, Hume, an eye-witness of the Manchurian campaigns of 1904-5, had long before the war imparted to the British Government similar



[Canadian official photograph.]

GERMAN CONCRETE STRONGHOLDS IN LENS DESTROYED BY CANADIAN ARTILLERY.

and that every advance had now become an affair of superior artillery, the infantry being employed for the expulsion of the demoralized garrisons after the guns had prepared the way. This superiority was only to be gained by very large concentrations of guns and enormous



[New Zealand official photograph.]


A STEEL CUPOLA WITH MACHINE GUN.

supplies of ammunition. "Don't talk to me about your hussars," said Blücher, himself a hussar, when discussing the tactics appropriate to defeat Napoleon. "Against that rascal it is guns we want, and plenty of them."

The problem set before Haig was similar to that set the Allies in 1813, and it was to be solved in the same way. Guns, in numbers which, before the war, would have seemed fantastic, had been accumulated on the front of operations—howitzers, heavy guns, field guns to destroy batteries, bomb-proof cover trenches and their covering wire entanglements. Trench mortars had been concentrated in hundreds to blast a way for the infantry. Liquid fire shells had been provided, and thanks to the most ingenious "camouflage" and to the wonderful courage of the airmen, which kept off the German

ideas. "The greatest impression made on me, and on which I cannot insist too strongly," he wrote, "is that of the preponderating effect of modern artillery; it does not seem to me exaggerated to say that in the actual conditions, artillery is the decisive arm, and that the others are no more than its auxiliaries." Napoleon at St. Helena had said much the same. "In siege-warfare, as in the open field," he observed, "it is the gun which plays the chief part; it has effected a complete revolution: it is with artillery that war is made." Frederick the Great, after his experience in the Seven Years' War, greatly increased his artillery, especially his shell-firing weapons, the howitzers.

aviators, the positions of the pieces were mostly hidden from enemy observation. Aerial and direct observation had enabled the Vimy heights and their neighbourhood to be represented on a plasticine model. On this model the ridges, spurs, gullies and plateaux, trenches, roads, tracks, redoubts, craters and wire entanglements were reproduced with amazing fidelity. The Mayor of Vimy, who had an intimate knowledge of the ground, had assisted the modeller, and it was to no small extent due to his efforts in elucidating doubtful points in the aerial photographs that the constructors of the model were enabled to make it so vivid and accurate a reproduction of the ground over which the British attacks were to be made. Similar meticulous observation had been bestowed on other parts of the enemy's position, and it may fairly be said that no strong points of importance had escaped the attentions of our gunners. If by chance there were any, the tanks had been moved up to complete the work of the artillery. Lastly, the edges of the enemy's exterior lines had been mined in places on a scale up to now unheard of, and only surpassed by the immense mining operations then being com-



[Official photograph.]

GERMAN OBSERVATION POST, Built of steel, in use by the British.


pleted under the German entrenchments on the Wytschaete-Messines ridge, south of Ypres.

The vital necessity of obtaining the command of the air during a modern battle had not been overlooked by our air leader, General Trenchard. Since the Battle of the Somme the Germans had made great efforts to regain the ascendancy in the air. The Fokker had virtually dis-

appeared before the superior machines we had used against it, and had been replaced by the Albatross and Halberstädter, the latter having a speed of over a hundred miles per hour. Among others now employed by the enemy were that of the Luft-Verkehrs Gesellschaft, known as the L.V.G., the Otto, the Aviatik, and the big Gotha biplane, with its powerful armament. This machine, which had two engines, was a "pusher" biplane. It was based on the British Handley-Page. Unfortunately the second Handley-Page had by the mistake of the pilot been landed behind the German lines instead of in rear of the British, and thus served as a model for the enemy.

The result of these changes was that the fight for supremacy in the air had once more to be renewed by the British, and, as a preliminary to the battle fixed for the 9th, our air squadrons on April 5 and 6 crossed the enemy's lines and sought out the enemy's fighting machines. Combats—veritable battles—between large formations occurred, and at a loss of 28 machines we put out of action 46, and two hostile balloons. Seventeen successful bomb raids were carried out on aerodromes, ammunition depôts and railways and over 1,700 photographs were taken. On Saturday, April 7, there were renewed bombings of aerodromes. Hostile trains, too, were attacked

gradually grew in intensity. It reached its climax on the early morning of April 9, when the concentration of shell-fire was probably the greatest which had as yet been seen. The contrast to the days of the South African war, when a few "Long Toms" and Creusot guns



[From "Flight."]

GOTHA BIPLANE.

Its machine-gun could be fired directly back at a pursuer.

represented the heavy artillery of the belligerents, must have struck General Smuts, who was on a visit to the South African troops on the western front and observed the artillery preparation for the assault of the Vimy heights.

The weather was at first better, though patches of snow still lay about; but became bad again before the day of attack. Under a warm sun and a blue sky streams of shells hurtled through the air and burst on the Vimy ridges, in the eastern environs of Arras, and on the high ground south and east of the city. The German batteries replied chiefly by bombarding Arras itself, where they rightly suspected a large part of the British infantry were hidden.

Mention has already been made of the ancient caves and tunnels under the city and of the extensions which had been made of them. There and in similar constructions out of reach of the German artillery, British infantry were assembled in security. On the roads leading to Arras columns of men, guns, transport mules, ambulances and stretcher bearers were drawing nearer. The finishing touches were being put to the preparations for the battle.

During the night of April 6-7, British troops, far away to the south-west, had gained a number of points between Selency and Jeancourt two and six miles respectively north-west of St. Quentin and nearer to Arras. During that of April 7-8, our troops had progressed on a front of 3,000 yards north of the village of Louverval on the Bapaume-Cambrai road. The result of these operations showed Haig that there was no likelihood of disturbance from any counter-attack by Hindenburg over



[Official Photograph.]

A CONCRETE FORT IN THE HINDENBURG LINE.

by machine-gun fire, and a German kite balloon destroyed.

Three weeks before the attack the cutting of the enemy's wire entanglements was commenced while his billets behind the front and his communications were systematically searched by big guns. The general bombardment of the German positions began some few days before the date fixed for the assault and

the devastated region, and they served to divert the attention of the latter from the real point of attack.

The blow timed for the next day was to be struck by the Third Army under General Allenby, who had four Army Corps at his disposal and an additional Army Corps Headquarters to be used as occasion might demand, and by General Horne's First Army, which latter included a corps of Canadians under Sir Julian Byng, in which a Division of home troops was incorporated. Allenby's four Army Corps were commanded respectively by Lt.-Gen. Sir Charles Fergusson, Lt.-Gen. James A. L. Haldane, Lt.-Gen. Sir Thomas D'O. Snow, and Lt.-Gen. Sir Frederick I. Maxse. Cavalry was also brought up into the Third Army, in case the development of the battle might allow the employment of this arm on a considerable scale.

The greater part of the divisions employed came from the English counties; to them were added Scottish, Canadian and South African troops. They were to storm a front measuring from north to south some 15 miles.

The attack of the First Army on the Vimy Ridge was the task of the Canadian Corps. When the northern and central part of these heights had been secured, the troops on the left of the Canadians were to extend the attack to the north as far as the left bank of the Souchez River. General Allenby, with the Third Army, was to carry the southern part of the Vimy Ridge, the German positions east of Arras and as far south as Hénin-sur-Cojeul.

The Fourth Army under General Sir Henry Rawlinson and the Fifth under Sir H. Gough were instructed to cooperate with the main attack as soon as its progress permitted effective action.

The Third and First Armies' attack was to be carried out by a succession of comparatively short advances arranged to correspond approximately with the enemy's successive systems of defence. As each stage was reached a short pause was to take place, to enable the troops detailed for the attack on the next objective to form up for the assault.

Tanks, which since their first introduction in September 1917 had often done excellent service, were attached to each Corps and again did admirable work. Their assistance was particularly valuable in the capture of hostile strong points, such as Telegraph Hill and the Harp.

What proportion of the troops forming the 68 German Divisions disposed between the Oise and the North Sea garrisoned the enemy's lines was uncertain, but, from the prisoners captured, it would appear that, among others, the German 11th Active Division, the 17th, 18th and 79th Reserve Divisions, the 16th Bavarian Division and the 1st Bavarian Reserve Division were present. Divisions of the



[Official portrait by William Orpen, A.R.A.]

MAJOR-GENERAL H. M. TRENCHARD, C.B.

Commanding British Air Services in France.

Prussian Guard later came on the scene at Vimy, at Monchy-le-Preux, Bullecourt and Quéant. Some prisoners stated that it had been intended to evacuate the positions on April 15, but this is improbable. Hindenburg was not short of men,* and the positions lost by him were of extraordinary strength and importance.

On Sunday night the wind shifted to the west and at 3 a.m. on Easter Monday, April 9, the sky was full of driving clouds. A bitter wind was blowing, and shortly after 4 a.m. a light drizzle began to fall, and the wind increased in force. It was obviously going to be

* According to the Military Correspondent of *The Times*, the Germans about this date had 155 divisions in the west, not less than 4,500,000 men on both fronts, 500,000 on the lines of communication, and 1,000,000 in the depôts of Germany. In addition Hindenburg could at a pinch draw on the Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian and Turkish Armies.



[Official photograph.]

WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS IN FRONT OF THE HINDENBURG LINE.

a bad day for aerial observation. Before 6 a.m. the drizzle became a storm, later a snow storm, but as it was blowing in the enemy's faces, the weather was not altogether unfavourable for Haig's plans.

Over a year and a half had passed since the last great struggle for the rim dominating the plains of the Scheldt had taken place. The Germans had then managed to retain their hold on it. It was soon to be seen whether they would be able to resist the thrust of better trained troops inspired by the memories of the Somme, attacking a narrower front, and supported by tanks and an incalculably more powerful artillery.

The concentration of men and munitions had begun when Bapaume fell; at the end of March the bombardment had opened. Easter Monday, when at home civilians were enjoying their holiday, was to witness the gigantic effort of our troops against the formidable German fortress.

For a brief interval the bombardment by the British guns ceased; there was some speculation as to what was going to happen. Suddenly all doubts were set at rest. The amphitheatre of hills and the fields behind Arras,

the chalky heights captured by the French in the Battles of Artois and Vimy, burst into flames. Myriads of shells swept overhead, and some seconds later the ears of the onlookers were deafened by the wave of sound set up by the discharges of the guns from behind and the explosions of the shells descending on the German lines. The final bombardment had commenced. To all this was added the explosion of mines which hurled upwards tons of earth and masonry, mingled with huge spurts of blood-red flame into the air. So violent was the uproar that the rattle of the field guns and the ceaseless rat-a-tat of the machine guns were scarcely audible. The reports of the heavy guns shook the walls of the tunnels and caves below Arras from which our troops were pouring to the assault. Above the flashing turmoil of bursting shells and mines, German rockets shot up, discharging red, white, green and orange coloured stars, telling those in rear that the long expected attack had been begun and asking for supports to meet it and for the protecting barrage to keep back our men. For our part, to add to the deadliness of shell fire, we were hurling our latest death-dealing invention, cylinders of liquid fire, into the German trenches.

The streets of the town and paths across country by which our men were expected to advance were illuminated by searchlights and star shells so that the enemy's machine-gunners should see their target, while far away beyond his front lines flashes of fire from exploding shells showed where our long-range guns were barraging all the roads that led up to his front trenches from their withdrawn back support positions.


The sun rose in a clouded and storm-swept sky and just before 5.30 a.m., the time fixed for the advance, there was a slight comparative lull in the British bombardment, while the German gunners, in expectation of the attack, shelled Arras and its vicinity and both sides of the Arras-Bethune high-road with shrapnel and high-explosives.

A few of our daring airmen ascended and flew with the wind behind them to inspect the results of the final bombardment. They soon returned as they could see nothing through the mist and driving rain. For, as has been related, the drizzle had turned to a heavy storm before 6 a.m.

Meanwhile, officers looked at their wrist-watches waiting for the time fixed to arrive.

"Make a Bank Holiday of it," was a frequent remark among the men. At 5.30 a.m. the bombardment barrage opened and the troops left their trenches and the assault on the German positions began.

In describing the fighting at the Battle of Arras-Vimy it will be convenient to commence with the achievements of the British left wing formed by the First Army, which as we have seen, had been detailed to capture the northern and central portions of the Vimy heights and the ground thereabouts. To the possession of the Vimy Ridge the enemy rightly attached great importance, so that, according to the statements of prisoners, its defenders had orders to resist at all costs to the last man. The German view of the importance of the ridge was right. Not only did it bar our descent into the plains of the Scheldt, but it was the southern outwork of the mining district of Lens, threatened on the West by the British line from Souchez round Angres and Liévin to Loos. On the



RUINED HOUSES AT ARRAS, AND THE APSE OF THE CATHEDRAL.

retention of the Lens district depended largely the German retention of La Bassée and the ridges eastward from La Bassée to Lille. The elaborate care bestowed on the position by the Germans proved their anxiety. By damming the Souchez stream they had flooded a part of the district between Souchez and Lens, and rendered the Bois-en-Hache, a wood between Souchez and Angres at the foot of the plateau of Notre Dame de Lorette, a quagmire. After the capture by the Allies of the Fosse de Calonne pit, 2,000 feet deep, in the Liévin region north of Angres, the enemy had flooded the works of the Liévin Mining Company, to prevent the British miners from driving galleries into the remaining five pits of the Company. All the superstructure of the mine-machines, boilers, pipes, had been removed, and, acting under the advice of Westphalian engineering experts,

positions in the western theatre of war. There, in the words of Sir Douglas Haig to Sir Eric Geddes, "a thousand yards advance meant more than a 15-mile advance" in other places. Bavarians, Wurtembergers, Hamburgers and the other German troops who formed the garrisons of the Bois de Hironnelle and the Pimple* above it, of Hill 145—1,700 yards west and 700 yards north of Petit Vimy, the dominating height of the right—of La Folie Farm, of Petit Vimy, of Thelus (on Friday Thelus had been destroyed by our guns), of Farbus to the east of Thelus, and of Bailleul-sir-Berthoult thoroughly realized their responsibilities. The road from Arras through Petit Vimy pointed straight at the heart of Lens. In the Prinz Arnauld and Völker tunnels, in caves and in the considerable village of Vimy, the railhead from Lens on



[Official photograph.]

SECOND WAVE OF INFANTRY LEAVING THE TRENCHES FOR AN ATTACK.

The first wave can be seen in the advanced trench.

they had destroyed the shaft linings which kept water from filtering into the pits.

The labyrinthine entrenchments along the whole stretch of the Vimy heights and the tunnels beneath them told the same tale. Those heights, some six miles long, and at their broadest two miles across, were one of the key

the eastern slope, the German reserves were hidden.

The condition of the heights, when at 5.30 a.m. on Easter Monday the Canadian Corps

* The "Pimple" was 60 feet lower than "Hill 145" at the northern end of the Vimy Ridge, and separated from it by a valley.

commanded by Sir Julian Byng and the British troops on their left and right advanced to storm them, was a striking example of the devastation of war. The woods had been reduced to splinters, the barbed-wire entanglements had been torn to pieces, and the thin covering of soil on which they stood churned up and blended with the chalk below it. Buildings had been obliterated, dug-outs battered in, while the ground resembled rather frozen earth-waves than the once even surface it had formerly displayed. Nowhere was progress possible in a straight line, so cut up was the earth with shell holes and mine craters filled to the brim with chalky water. An eye-witness (*The Times* War Correspondent), who visited the ridge in May when it had been cleared up by the Salvage Corps, has left a vivid impression of the *débris* there.

Standing at an accidental spot in the open, I took the trouble to note down the articles which lay within a radius of, perhaps, two yards of my feet. They included one of the iron uprights on which the Germans string their wire; some odd bits of the wire itself; a German trench helmet, with a bullet hole in it; a few inches of cloth, presumably uniform; an object which, kicked up with my toe, proved to be a pair of woollen socks rolled up; a buckle with an inch of leather, evidently part of a belt, apparently British, attached; the head of a German entrenching shovel; a splinter of shell some five inches long; an unexploded German hand grenade; a table fork; two sandbags, trodden into the earth and barely visible; and a splinter of squared timber, about three inches square, presumably part of some German defensive work. Most of these things were only half visible, with one end projecting above ground, and all were coated with dust.

So is the whole area. There are unexploded shells of every size, from great 9-inch things down to field-gun shells and hand-bombs; butts or barrels of rifles; larger or smaller pieces of uniform, up to whole but tattered coats; German caps, belts, dented tin cups, broken water bottles, torn playing cards, scraps of paper printed in German, and all manner of unrecognizable bits of wood and cloth and metal. The surface of the earth is no longer soil, but a compost of mixed soil and articles of human use.

And this region, it must be remembered, has now been "cleaned up." Everything that I have mentioned is broken and trodden under foot and useless. All things worth saving have been saved by the Salvage Corps, and the dead have been buried by burial parties. Not all, however; for one finds among the chaos dreadful bits of humanity, and horrid things are floating in the water in some of the larger shell-holes. Also one knows that there were dug-outs everywhere which were broken in by our guns, and from the sickening smell that leaks up through crevices one knows that there were Germans in the dug-outs when the ruin came.

It was as if the contents of some vast rag and bone shop, cemetery and arsenal had been scattered haphazard between Hill 145 and Bailleul-sur-Berthoult. The destruction was terrible, the stench awful; never was the impotence of man in face of modern weapons brought more forcibly home than it was to the

steel-helmeted Canadians and the British as through the drenching rain they followed the barrage up the slippery heights and gained the plateau. So rapid, indeed, was their advance that practically within 40 minutes from its commencement the whole of the German first line, except at the northern end of the Ridge,



[Official portrait by Francis Dodd.]


GENERAL HON. SIR JULIAN BYNG,
K.C.B..

Commanded the Canadian Corps in the Battle of Vimy Ridge.

had been taken, and the troops forming its garrison killed, wounded, or prisoners.

The attack was pivoted on Souchez, from which the British advanced to turn the northern end of the heights. The Canadians, moving in three successive waves, easily mastered the first line of the enemy, but the division on the left was held up and fierce fighting took place on the slopes of Hill 145 at the northern end of the ridge, the fire from the Germans hanging on to the centre of their second line and from the Pimple to the north whence the ground sloped down sharply to the narrow Souchez valley, across which, on the western side, lay the Bois-en-Hache, being particularly effective.

While the fight here was proceeding a tunnel, the entrance of which had been concealed, suddenly disgorged columns of the enemy who retook some of the first-line trenches in this part of the field. A desperate struggle ensued, and it was not till 10 p.m. that the Canadians



(Official photograph.)

A CORNER OF THE BATTLEFIELD NEAR ARRAS.

succeeded in regaining a portion of the lost conquest. Then snow was falling heavily, and it was decided to consolidate the positions won and to leave, for the present, the assault of the Pimple.

Meanwhile the centre and right of the Canadian Corps aided by an English brigade interposed in the middle of the assaulting line had, despite the enemy's barrages, seized the first and second lines of the foe, taking prisoners by the hundred. After a pause, during which our gunners deluged with shells the German third line, they again advanced about 7.30 a.m., and captured La Folie Farm, La Folie Wood, and Thelus. At 10 a.m. snow fell heavily from black clouds sweeping across the ridge. Half an hour later it ceased, the clouds thinned, and the sun shone fitfully. Word was received that the British Divisions attacking the southern end of the heights and pushing eastward between the heights and the Scarpe, had been successful. Cheered by this news, the Canadians rapidly cleared the enemy out of the rest of his third line. By 1 p.m. every point aimed at had been reached and secured, the Vimy Ridge from Commandant's House up to Hill 145 was in our power. For the first time direct observation of the German positions in the eastern slope of the heights and in the plain below was secured. Our troops now dug themselves in on the steep eastern slopes of the ridge west and north-west of Farbus. Cavalry and infantry patrols were then sent out in the direction of Willerval and along the front of line occupied. A concentration of Germans on a road in the new field of vision was promptly reported to our gunners, who immediately flung high explosive and shrapnel at the enemy's masses. A little later columns on other roads and troop trains unloading reinforcements at the Vimy railhead were shelled by field guns which had been brought up on to the plateau. We were also at the southern outskirts of Givenchy-en-Gohelle. More than 3,500 men, nearly 100 officers, and 12 guns had been captured. Many fugitives—Bavarians and Prussians—had been found in the Prinz Arnauld tunnel. Some of them had been without food for four days.

The following conversation between a war correspondent and some captured officers is worth repeating:—

"When do you think the war will end?" he asked.

"When the English are in Berlin," was the scornful answer.

"What about America?" came the retort.

"It is bad for us, very bad, but, after all, America can't send an army across the ocean."

At this some Canadians standing by burst out laughing.

"Don't you believe it, old sport," said one of them; "we have come along to fight you, and the Yankees will do the same."

The Völker tunnel, it may be added, had been mined by the Germans, but fortunately the leads were cut before the charges could be exploded.

In the afternoon of the 10th, about 4 o'clock, the Canadians dislodged the Germans from the redoubt on "Hill 145," after sharp fighting, capturing 200 prisoners and a number of trench mortars and machine-guns. Canadian patrols pushed during a snowstorm into the Bois de Ville, towards Petit Vimy and through the Farbus Wood, reached the Arras-Lens railway embankment. The weather had now definitely broken, and for many days continued stormy, with heavy falls of snow and squalls of wind and rain. The operations therefore were much impeded and the troops suffered great hardships. The difficulties of the advance were much added to by the impossibility of bringing up rapidly the guns required to prepare the way of further progress.

In two days' fighting the rim of the plain of the Scheldt and the outworks of Lens had passed into British hands. The news filled Canada with pride, and was a happy augury for the United States. It crowned the achievements of the Canadians in the second Battle of Ypres and at Courcellette, and when we remember the long-drawn contest of the year before on the similar Thiepval Ridge and contrast it with the swiftness with which the Vimy Ridge had been carried, the technical and tactical progress since the Battle of the Somme becomes apparent. "Vimy," observed a Senator who in July, 1914, had warned France of her unpreparedness, "is a symbol of the whole war, the symbol of heavy artillery smashing trenches and giving the infantry freedom of movement. Now, after two years, British and French artillery are beginning to ring Easter joy bells for the liberation of the territory."

To return to the fighting along the rest of the line. While the Canadians in the early morning of April 9 were attacking Vimy Ridge, Scottish and North Country troops were engaged against the slopes beyond Roelincourt and the German entrenchments between Bailleul-sir-Berthoult, at the southern end of the Vimy



[Canadian official photograph.]

CANADIAN LIGHT HORSE GOING INTO ACTION.

Ridge, and the Scarpe. Here, again, the front trenches were quickly reached, but the left was delayed—but not stopped—by machine-gun fire from positions south-west of Bailleul. Still the centre and right broke through, capturing the Point-du-Jour, a clump of farm buildings on a slight hill, the "Pump," the suburb of St. Laurent, and the Hyderabad Redoubt, where a Brigade-General and his staff were secured. The Brigadier wept at the shame of his capture (he seems to have been completely surprised by the rapidity of the advance). His men had suffered heavily, but had inflicted no casualties to speak of on their opponents. Besides 3,550 prisoners, who included a whole battalion of the 162nd German Regiment, 25 guns (including two 5.93 howitzers), a battery of trench mortars, and an anti-tank gun were taken.

Meanwhile, the guns were being brought up to support the British assault on the German third line. But the batteries coming up along the Scarpe were at first kept back by the German gun fire from Observation Ridge, and it was not till this point was taken by Eastern Counties troops (about noon) that they could be used at decisive ranges. This therefore involved the cutting of the wire entanglements at this part of the field being carried out at long-range, and therefore not effectively. Nevertheless, by noon the whole of the second line of the German defences from south of Neuville Vitasse (which fell to London Territorials) up to a point north of La Folie Farm had been taken. Further progress was made when the advance was resumed shortly after midday,

and many of the German batteries were taken with a large number of guns. The next day, in the forenoon, the left overcame the resistance south-west of Bailleul, and the line was established from Givenchy-en-Gohelle across the Arras-Lens railway to Athies on the banks of the Scarpe, the Germans having been driven back in places to a depth of three miles, and their first three lines captured.

In the afternoon cavalry had come up to the east of Arras, in readiness for action should our infantry succeed in widening this breach sufficiently for the operations of mounted troops. South of Feuchy, however, the unbroken wire of the German third line completely prevented a cavalry attack, while the commanding positions held by the enemy on Monchy-le-Preux Hill blocked the way of advance along the Scarpe. The main body of our mounted troops were consequently withdrawn in the evening to positions just west of the town. But smaller bodies of cavalry were employed effectively during the afternoon on the right bank of the Scarpe to maintain touch with our troops north of the river, and they captured a number of prisoners and guns.

South of the Scarpe, on April 9, General Allenby's Third Army had assaulted the German lines from the south end of the Vimy Ridge and the eastern suburbs of Arras to the region west of Hénin-sur-Cojeul. The difficulties met with by the troops in debouching from Arras were peculiarly great. At one point the trenches were not five yards apart, the foundation walls of a house alone separating them; at others 200 yards of ground swept by machine-

gun fire had to be crossed. All the exits from, and open spaces before, the city were commanded by these weapons. Marshes, and a maze of wire-entangled ruined factories and dwelling-houses, had to be traversed. On the south bank of the Scarpe our men had to storm Blangy and Blangy Park, then the Railway Triangle and Feuchy. The Observatory Ridge was powerfully fortified. A strong support trench, known as the Hengist trench, extended south from the railway embankment to the road from Arras to Cambrai on which was the fortified village of Tilloy-les-Mofflaines. South of Tilloy the Harp, near Beaurains, the neighbouring Telegraph Hill, the village of Neuville Vitasse, and the line of entrenchments from the latter village to Henin-sur-Cojeul had to be carried before we could hope to secure the high ground on both sides of the Arras-Cambrai causeway.

Punctually at 5.30 a.m. Allenby's men, who had emerged from the tunnels and caves beneath Arras, dashed for Blangy, which was defended by a rearguard of Hamburgers, ensconced in the broken ruins of the houses and behind garden walls strongly barricaded with piled sand bags. With the aid of Tanks a way through Blangy was speedily made. Some


bombing posts stuck to the village, but in an hour's time the garrison was killed, wounded, or captured. Pushing eastward along the marshes by Blangy Park our men broke into the Hengist trench, where there was some local fighting, and by 8.30 a.m. were in front of the Railway Triangle Redoubt. The Tanks had rendered great assistance. In spite of the mud they had crawled up and put out of action numerous machine-gun emplacements.

At the Railway Triangle Redoubt the German resistance stiffened. The Scottish troops had to take cover and wait till our artillery had dealt with its defences. The barrage was brought back and soon the Railway Triangle was deluged with a hurricane of shells. A Tank arrived and aided the artillery, and the Scots completed the work at 2 p.m. From the Railway Triangle they pressed on to Feuchy, where the Chapel Redoubt and the Church Works were obstinately defended. There, again, the Tanks gave the decisive touch, some 2,000 prisoners were taken, and our cavalry patrols the next day secured on the banks of the Scarpe two howitzers, cutting down the gunners and putting the pieces out of action until they could be brought in. An attempt to press onward through the breach made in the



SOME OF THE PRISONERS TAKEN IN THE ARRAS OFFENSIVE.

[Official photograph.]



Official photograph.

BRITISH SOLDIERS EXAMINING A CAPTURED GERMAN GUN.

German lines, which was attempted in the direction of Monchy-le-Preux, was brought to a standstill by the German wire entanglements.

In the meantime Observatory Ridge—the point from which the German guns had been directed when bombarding Arras—had been, as we have seen, rushed about noon, and Tilloy-les-Mofflaines stormed. The Harp and Telegraph Hill did not fall until the Tanks came on the scene and crushed in the concrete machine-gun emplacements. Finally, by nightfall Neuville Vitasse and the entrenchments between the village and Hénin-sur-Cojeul were in British hands.

At 9.55 p.m. Sir Douglas Haig was able to report that our troops "had everywhere stormed the enemy's defences from Hénin-sur-Cojeul to the southern outskirts of Givenchy-en-Gohelle to a depth of from two to three miles," that "up to 2 p.m. 5,815 prisoners, including 119 officers, had passed through the collecting stations," and that "the captured war material included guns and numbers of trench-mortars and machine-guns." The Vimy Ridge was ours, we had burst out of Arras, and we were on the western edge of the high ground south of the Scarpe.

While we were thus moving on from Arras, the advance of the Fourth and Fifth Armies had been continued, by which a number of fortified villages covering the Hindenburg line had been captured with some hundreds of prisoners, and considerable progress made in the direction of St. Quentin and Cambrai. Our troops on Easter Monday captured Boursies on the Bapaume-Cambrai chaussée, and Demicourt south of it. Hermies, on the Bapaume-Cambrai railway, was occupied, and from Hermies our patrols entered the considerable Havrincourt Wood. North-west of St. Quentin we took Fresnoy-le-Petit, and, north of that village, Pontru and Le Verguier. Throughout the month of April our Southern armies kept up their activity by a series of small enterprises which brought them nearer and nearer to the Hindenburg Line. These served to attract the attention of the enemy, who could not divine their limit nor ascertain whether they were merely the beginning of more extensive attempts.

In the battle of April 9-10, the most successful yet fought on the British front, we had smashed in the western front of the Arras salient.

Troops from the Old Country, aided by those from the Oversea Dominions, from South Africa and Canada, had contributed to the victory.

On April 10 King George sent to Sir Douglas Haig the following telegram:

"The whole Empire will rejoice at the news of yesterday's successful operations.

"Canada will be proud that the taking of the coveted Vimy Ridge has fallen to the lot of her troops.

"I heartily congratulate you and all who have taken part in this splendid achievement.

"GEORGE R.I."

The King received the same day the felicitations of President Poincaré:

I have great pleasure in congratulating your Majesty on the splendid success won by your valiant troops. I do not doubt that it is the prelude of fresh victories.

I beg your Majesty to believe in my devoted friendship.

The King replied as follows:

My people will share with me the heartfelt gratitude with which I have received the friendly congratulations



[Official portrait by Francis Dodd.]

GENERAL SIR HENRY S. HORNE, K.C.B.,
Commanded the British First Army in the Battle of Vimy Ridge.

so kindly expressed by you, M. le Président, on the successful attack of my troops.

Sir Douglas Haig was congratulated by General Nivelle:

From General Nivelle Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and North-East to Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig.

10.4.17.—It is with very great pleasure that I send you my warmest congratulations on the splendid success of the important operations carried out yesterday by the First and Third Armies.

From Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig to General Nivelle:

10.4.17.—I am most grateful to you for the kind wire you have been good enough to send me. The First and Third Armies are much gratified at the generous appreciation which you have expressed regarding the results of yesterday's battle.



[Official portrait by Francis Dodd.]

GENERAL SIR EDMUND H. ALLENBY, K.C.B.,

Commanded the British Third Army in the Battle of Vimy Ridge.

Sir Julian Byng received this message from Sir Robert Borden, the Prime Minister of Canada:

My colleagues and I send warmest congratulations on the splendid success achieved yesterday by the Canadians.


With deepest interest and pride I read this morning the stirring story of their advance, and learn that they have captured and occupied the strongly fortified positions which I saw on my recent visit to France.

I hope you will convey to the forces under your command the intense appreciation of the Canadian people, whose pride in the record of their forces will be greatly intensified by this new and glorious achievement.

Even the Germans were somewhat sobered, as the following newspaper extracts show:

The *Tageblatt* in a very brief comment says that Sir Douglas Haig has won a tactical success which ought not to be denied and will bring him rich praise in London. Strategically, however, he has not got one small step farther.

The *Vossische Zeitung's* military correspondent says that Germans knew from experiences in the Somme battle, especially during the first days, that there is no remedy against material superiority in the mechanical means of waging war. The long period of this world war, he continues, has produced no satisfactory antidote to the frightful effectiveness of large-calibre guns and mine-throwers. We must accept such rebuffs as the present one at Arras as part of the bargain. Such occurrences are a kind of



[Official photograph.]

CROSSING THE SCARPE.

tactical rebuff. If the strategical effect, namely, a break through by the attacker, does not follow the tactical rebuff, the whole operation of the battle remains nothing but a weakening of the attacked in men and material. Those at home can rest assured that all precautions have been taken to prevent a break through by the English at that point of the great battle-front where they have now advanced.

The following comments are also interesting:

The *Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten* vaunts the Crown Prince Rupprecht's leadership, declaring that he has taken all precautions to ensure that this new English surf shall break impotently against the German granite wall.

The *Frankfurter Zeitung* says that the German Command certainly counted on this Arras battle, which it neither avoided nor feared, adding that it is perhaps not too much to say that it has lain directly in the plan of the German Command.

The newspaper further adds that:—

Unhappily, the defence of the West front will this year cost Germany a heavy sacrifice.

The ominous words "the loss of guns must be reckoned with" occur in several reports.

The *Cologne Gazette* and the *Kölnische Volkszeitung* attempt to soften them by saying that the guns must have been rendered useless by explosives before capture. The former journal's comment on the loss of men is that the toughness with which German troops resist the enemy prevents them from giving up the struggle always at the right time, especially as communication with the Higher Command is broken and barrage fire dominates the ground behind.

The *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung*, quoting the Kaiser's words in a recent decree about "a new time," says that the conflict at Arras and Soissons will decide

whether a new time is dawning for the German people or not. If, says the newspaper, victory be granted to German arms, a new time will dawn for a greater Germany, but otherwise a new time will indeed dawn, but not a better, and the construction of German social and economic life, of which the Imperial message speaks, will retire into misty remoteness.

The military correspondent of the *Vossische Zeitung*, in an article headed "Beginning of the Decisive Battle," says:—

"Our enemies must recognize from the manner of our resistance that the Germans are resolved again on the most stubborn resistance. This moment must bring the decision of the English and French General Staffs to ripeness; it is time for action. In these days begins a great action, which we, indeed, regard as the decisive battle of the whole campaign. Not in vain have the hardest battles of the whole war been fought near Arras. Arras can be described as the most important strategical point of the whole line. We can contemplate the events of the next days and weeks with the fullest calm."

That the first stage of the battle of Arras-Vimy had no strategic consequences was an entirely erroneous German assumption. For, as we have seen, the operations on the 9th-10th had resulted in the transference to the Allies of a considerable stretch of country which gave them important strategic advantages, as it rendered much easier a further advance eastward.

Tuesday, April 10, apart from the reduction of the redoubt on "Hill 145" and of Farbus Wood and Farbus, was, like the next day, spent

in consolidating under heavy shell fire our hardly-won gains on the ridge. Horne's left and centre marked time, while his right and Allenby's army pursued the enemy in the region south of the ridge over the Scarpe towards the Cojeul.

The collapse of the German defences between Thelus and Athies permitted Allenby's left to move along the northern bank of the Scarpe and to turn from the north the high ground south of that river. The Germans who had been expelled from Blangy, Feuchy, Tilloy-les-Mofflaines, Neuville-Vitasse and Henin-sur-Cojeul, and were retreating up the heights, were now in a dangerous salient, the width of which—from the Scarpe to the district of Croisilles already occupied by the British—was only some seven miles. The head of this salient, the approaches to which, however, from the south were, owing to the devastations, still difficult, was on the line Athies-Henin-sur-Cojeul but five miles in breadth. Allenby's left was already in Athies, his right in Henin-sur-Cojeul.

Farther to the south-east Australian and British troops of the Fifth Army were pre-

paring to assault Bullecourt. These troops were already in Ecoust St. Mein, Longatte and Noreuil, facing the southern end of the Drocourt-Quéant line. South of and well east of Quéant the British had occupied Louverval, Doignies, Boursies and Demicourt and were halfway between Bapaume and Cambrai, while from Demicourt to the environs of St. Quentin they were everywhere driving back the enemy.

It was clear that the battle of Arras-Vimy had greatly changed for the worse the position of the Germans in one of the two great salients created by Hindenburg's enforced retreat to the line Cambrai-St. Quentin-La Fère.

On April 10 the battle was resumed, and about noon the whole of the German third line system south of the Scarpe was taken. But further progress in this part of the field was checked by machine-gun fire from the villages of Héninel, Wancourt and Guémappe, which our artillery was unable to silence.

The key to the position on the heights south of the Scarpe was the village of Monchy-le-Preux. On Monday it had been the headquarters of a German division. It was now



[Official photograph.]

BRITISH SOLDIERS AT ATHIES AND THEIR GERMAN SPOILS.

the headquarters of a brigade, for a large part of the foe had been driven back. Monchy and Guémappe stood upon the edge of a little plateau 90 feet above the average level for a considerable distance around, and 25 feet higher than the summit of Orange Hill nearer Arras. Monchy was approached by sunken roads, and it and the château north-west of it had been hastily put in a state of defence by the enemy. Machine guns lined the roads, and were ensconced in Sart Wood, north-east, and in the Bois du Vert, south-east, of the village. As our cavalry, who were well out in front, and our airmen reported that Monchy was strongly held, it was decided to envelop the village. In a snowstorm Allenby's left from Athies attacked the enemy in Fampoux, on the north bank of the Scarpe, a village three miles to the north-west of Monchy, crossed the Scarpe between Fampoux and Roeux, and attacked the German outposts. Meanwhile a considerable force of Allenby's cavalry and infantry, hidden by the snowstorm, pushed eastwards along the valley south of the Scarpe, and occupied the northern slopes of Orange Hill, south-east of Feuchy. By nightfall British bombers were at the outskirts of Monchy. The tanks came up, and preparations for the assault the next day were made. We had met with no check, and Sir Douglas Haig by 9.27 p.m. was able to report that the

number of prisoners taken in the battle now exceeded 11,000, including 235 officers, that we had captured over 100 guns (among them a number of heavy pieces up to 8 in. calibre), 60 trench mortars and 163 machine guns, while south of the battlefield we had extended our position north of Louverval in the direction of Cambrai, and driven the enemy from high ground in the neighbourhood of St Quentin between Hargicourt and Le Verquier.

It was still snowing heavily when at 5 a.m. on Wednesday, April 11, Monchy-le-Preux and the heights were attacked. On the south, Monchy was assaulted by two English infantry brigades assisted by a tank. The enemy had many machine-guns and from the windows and roofs fired down on our men. After a house-to-house hunt the garrison of the village and château were killed or wounded. Some escaped to a trench in the valley below. A couple of hundred prisoners were taken. The tank, after traversing the village, described a circle round it, knocking out one machine-gun post after another.

The cavalry, with Hotchkiss and machine-guns, swept out of a dip in the ground and bore down on Monchy from the north, driving the enemy before them. "We went full tilt," said a begrimed subaltern, "full tilt with a cheer for a good half mile into the funny old town." The troopers,



A TRENCH ORDERLY-ROOM.

[Official photograph]



CAVALRY IN A RUINED VILLAGE.

with their three days' beards, unwashed faces, rusty steel helmets, bore little resemblance to the smart Lancers, Dragoons or Hussars of other days, but they were the same good troops as of yore. Debouching from Monchy, dismounted cavalry and infantrymen worked down the eastern slope and with Hotchkiss and Lewis guns attacked the trench and machine-gun emplacements to which the fugitives had fled, drove them out into the open, and inflicted much loss on them.

By 9 a.m. the position was completely taken, and a little later the German guns beyond Sart Wood commenced to bombard Monchy, which was practically intact, and gradually reduced the village to ruins. Before noon and on the afternoon and evening desperate attempts were made to recover this important point of the German line. They were all repulsed with heavy loss. The cavalry, dismounted and fighting as infantry, rendered most valuable service in helping to hold the village.

While the struggle for Monchy and its environs was proceeding the southern end of the Hindenburg line was assaulted at dawn by the Australians and English from the Fifth Army. The German positions were defended by enormous wire entanglements and the ground in front was quite open, but, with the help of tanks, the Australians forced their way through,


seized two lines of trenches, and penetrated the German positions as far as Rieneourt-lez-Cagnicourt, driving back troops of the 2nd Prussian Guard Division. They were now between the Oppy-Méricourt and Drocourt-Quéant lines. Simultaneously English troops penetrated into Bullecourt, defended by detachments of the 3rd Prussian Guard Division. The obstinacy of the enemy's resistance in Héninel and Wancourt held back the advance of the Third Army. At midday the enemy counter-attacked, drove the English from Bullecourt, and outflanked the Australians, who were forced back to their original line, leaving, it would seem, over 1,000 prisoners and 27 machine-guns behind them. Nine tanks, it was stated by Professor Wegener, had also been destroyed. The British artillery somewhat counterbalanced our losses by inflicting heavy casualties among the pursuing enemy.

The action in the Bullecourt region had shown the formidable character of the Hindenburg line in that direction. Sir Douglas Haig, therefore, decided to rest content with the wedge we had thrust into the German line at Monchy-le-Preux and directed General Allenby to swing his right northward down the valley of the Cojeul in the direction of Guémappe and Monchy, and General Horne to commence his movement northwards from the Vimy heights on Lens.

Below Guémappe the enemy's trenches ran in a south-westerly direction in front of Héninel, where they crossed the Cojeul, and then bent back towards Fontaines-les-Croisilles on the Sensée. Between Héninel and Guémappe, on the southern slope of the Guémappe-Monchy heights, was the village of Wancourt. West of Héninel, near Neuville-Vitasse, the large oval fort known as "The Egg," in a mass of wire, defended the right of the Germans. The wire

in places was 40 feet wide and the entanglements and trenches had been cleverly concealed.

In wet and stormy weather on April 12 the withdrawal from the front line of a number of Divisions which had been most heavily engaged was begun. It being fairly clear also that the cavalry could not be employed as had been hoped, it was brought back behind the west of Arras. At the same time every effort was made to bring up the heavy artillery necessary for the



CAPTURE OF GUNS EAST OF ARRAS.

proper preparation of further attacks. In the afternoon a further advance was undertaken, a number of tanks accompanying the assaulting infantry.


The Egg and Héninel were attacked by bombers from the north-west, while Héninel was also stormed from the south by tanks and infantry. The tanks crashed through the wire and moved up the main street firing into the houses. After opening the way for the infantry, they moved off in the direction of Wancourt, where they smashed in defences and drove the garrison up the heights towards Guémappe. Having reduced Wancourt, they returned and completed their work in Héninel. The Egg, with 200 prisoners, had been already captured and our bombers had joined up with the troops who had followed the tanks into Héninel. By sunset Héninel, Wancourt and the heights on the western bank of the Cojeul were in our possession. Altogether 2,000 yards of the Hindenburg line south of the river were taken. North of the Scarpe the village of Roeux and the chemical works near Roeux station were attacked. We obtained but little success and round these points fierce fighting went on for many days.

Away to the south-west that night we also carried the enemy's positions on a front of nine miles from Metz-en-Couture, south of the Havrincourt Wood, to Hargicourt, which is 10 miles north-north-west of St. Quentin. Sart Farm, Gouzeaucourt, the wood of that name, and Gauche Wood, south-east of Gouzeaucourt, were cleared of the Germans. We were approaching the junction of the main roads which lead from Péronne and St. Quentin respectively to Cambrai.

The action on the afternoon of April 12 at the southern end of the Arras-Vimy battlefield had virtually given General Allenby complete possession of the Scarpe heights. With the British in Monchy-le-Preux on the one side and in Wancourt on the other end of the Monchy-Guémappe elevation, the Germans clearly held Guémappe and any other points on the dominating ridge of those heights only so long as the British chose to let them.

Earlier in the same day, at the northern end of the 15-mile-long field of battle, Prince Rupprecht's army had met with another reverse. It will be remembered that on Easter Monday and Tuesday the Canadians had secured "Hill 145" on Vimy ridge, but the Pimple and Givenchy-en-Gohelle, the Bois

de Hirondelle, the Bois-en-Hache to Lens, with Angres, Liévin and the western suburbs of Lens, were still garrisoned by the enemy. On the eastern slopes of the Vimy ridge he had not yet been dislodged from Vimy, Petit Vimy or east of Farbus, from Willerval and Bailleul-sir-Berthoult. He could, therefore, from these vantage points, counter-attack the ridge from the north and east.




[Official photograph.]

GERMAN BARBED WIRE IN THE ARRAS SECTOR.

General Horne decided to capture the Pimple and Givenchy-en-Gohelle, clear the Bavarians, who had been reinforced by the 5th Grenadiers from the Bois de Hirondelle, and to take the Bois-en-Hache. The 5th Grenadiers formed part of the 4th Guards Division which had been sent from Douai to support the exhausted 21st Bavarian Division and 18th Reserve Division. Simultaneously the British were to descend the eastern slopes of the ridge and storm Petit Vimy, Vimy, Willerval and Bailleul-sir-Berthoult, and establish themselves everywhere on the Arras-Lens railway to the north of Vimy.

English troops were deputed the task of assaulting the small elevation north of the Souchez known as Bois-en-Hache, which barred the advance on Angres from the ruins of Souchez, while the Canadians were directed against the Pimple.

At 5 a.m., in a tempest of rain, sleet, and snow, with the wind blowing at times 60 miles an hour, the English at dawn pressed through the Bois-en-Hache under fire from the Pimple and stormed the enemy's trenches. Some of our men were up to their armpits in mud, others disappeared in snowdrifts. Still they pressed on, while the fire from the Pimple, which was being attacked by the Canadians, became feebler and feebler. Suddenly a burst



BRINGING UP HEAVY HOWITZERS.

[Official photograph.]

of cheering proclaimed that it was ours and that the Canadians were entering Givenchy-en-Gohelle and the Bois de Hironnelle. They had climbed up the slippery sides of the Pimple and, after a strenuous encounter with the Prussian Guards, had secured the redoubt on its summit. Steps were at once taken to hold on to the hardly won positions, and patrols were sent forward to keep in touch with the retreating enemy. Meanwhile British troops (following a barrage of shells) had moved on Petit Vimy, Vimy, Willerval and Bailleul-sir-Berthoult and completed the occupation of Givenchy-en-Gohelle and the German lines to the east of it. English patrols north of the Souchez river crossed No Man's Land and seized Angres. The enemy, disputing every yard of the ground, was thrust back between the villages to and across the embankment of the Arras-Lens railway.

The results of the fighting were to be seen the next day, Friday, April 13, when in less abominable weather Bailleul-sir-Berthoult, Willerval, Vimy and Petit Vimy finally fell into our hands. Before these last successes, there had been many signs that the Germans were preparing to counter-attack in force from the direction of the Givenchy and Hironnelle Woods to recover their lost trenches on the Vimy ridge. But the positions now held by the British troops commanded these points and rendered it impossible for the enemy to debouch from them. His attitude therefore became at first purely passive, but was quickly changed into a movement of retreat.

The Vimy ridge, with its western, northern, eastern and southern slopes, was now securely within the British lines. At 7.45 p.m. Sir

Douglas Haig telegraphed the good news and also announced that the number of prisoners taken since the morning of April 9 exceeded 13,000 (among them 285 officers), that the guns captured amounted to 166, and included eight 8-in. howitzers, twenty-eight 5.9 howitzers and 130 field guns and light howitzers, with 84 minenwerfer and 250 machine-guns, besides a large amount of stores and materials of every kind which were abandoned in the hasty retreat. These figures give but a faint idea of the decisive victory gained by the British. Numerous guns, trench mortars, and machine-guns, and tens of thousands of men lay smashed and buried on the field of battle.

On the 14th our advance continued, our patrols keeping constantly in touch with the retreating enemy, but avoiding heavy fighting. By noon the general line of our advance ran from a point about 1,000 yards east of Bailleul through Mont Forêt quarries and the Farbus-Méricourt road to the eastern end of Hironnelle Wood. North of the Souchez, Riaumont Wood and the southern outskirts of Liévin had been reached, and by the evening the whole of this town was won. The line ran from this point to our old front line north of the Double Crassier. South of the river a Northumberland brigade advancing in open order carried the high ground east of Héninel and captured Wancourt tower on the spur east of Wancourt village. Three furious counter-attacks against this position were driven off and further ground taken on the ridge south-east of Héninel.

Other attempts were made against other parts of our line, the most serious of which was against Monchy-le-Preux. The Germans concentrated a large mass of artillery fire against this point, and fighting was exceedingly

stiff. Some of their infantry reached the eastern defences of the village, but on the flanks our men held their own. Finally the enemy was driven back with heavy loss. Our troops had also pushed their way eastwards down the Hindenburg line till they had reached a point opposite Fontaine-les-Croisilles, about seven miles south-east of Arras.

During the night of the 13th, or the morning of the next day, Vimy Station, La Chaudière,

Fosse No. 6, and Buquet Mill, between Givenchy-en-Gohelle and Angres, were secured, and four 8-in. howitzers taken. The Double Crassier at the southern end of the Loos battlefield was finally cleared of the Germans, and south of the Scarpe we progressed towards Quéant, and south of this point captured Ascencion Farm and Grand Priel Farm on the high ground east of Le Verguier. In the environs of St. Quentin, the village of Fayet, only a



BRITISH SENTRY IN FEUCHY.

mile from the city, was stormed on Friday night.


On the 14th the wind had shifted to the south, the sky was blue; the sun was shining and the snow had melted, which favoured the British advance. Throughout the preceding night spurts of flame and violent explosions in Liévin and the mining villages which fringe Lens on the south, west, and north had given the impression that Lens was about to be evacuated. The enemy had boasted that it was his intention, if forced to retreat, to leave the coal country of Northern France a desert. In Liévin the 83rd Pioneer Battalion had received orders to blow up the Great Crassier and to demolish the mining works. On Friday they had laid over a ton of explosive (ammonal). Down one shaft alone, 20,000 hand grenades had been flung.

All through the morning of the 14th explosion followed explosion, while our gunners shelled a semicircle of positions round Lens from "Hill 70," one of the storm centres of the Battle of Loos, to Avion, south of Lens on the Arras-Lens railroad, and Méricourt. The square blocks of streets of red-brick cottages north of Lens—Cité St. Auguste-

Cité St. Laurent, Cité St. Edouard. Cité St. Pierre; those west of Lens, Cité Jeanné d'Arc and Cité St. Théodore; and those south of the mining capital, Cité du Moulin, and nearer Givenchy-en-Gohelle, Cité de Riaumont stood out clearly under the morning sun. The plain was punctuated with tall chimneys and slag heaps, power stations and spidery networks of iron girders. To the west of Lens the tower of the great waterworks was crowned with a white dome, still intact, and the tower of Lens Cathedral rose sharp and white through the clouds of smoke vomited by the blazing buildings in its vicinity. As the hours passed and our troops drew nearer, explosive charges were fired. Houses crumbled away, walls and roofs fell in, slag heaps burst asunder, and the bridges across the flooded Souchez and the Lens canal went up. Before noon the British were in the centre of Liévin, they held the roads north and south of it, and were pushing through the shattered trees of Riaumont Wood into the streets of Riaumont village. Meanwhile British troops had advanced from Loos and seized trenches near the Loos Crassier. Held up by machine-gun fire from Cité St. Laurent, the movement had been suspended.



IN A FRONT LINE TRENCH BEFORE ST. QUENTIN.



[Official photograph.]

SETTING TIME-FUSES ON SHELLS.

In the afternoon Cité St. Pierre, north-west of Lens, was taken.

Simultaneously from the Vimy ridge the British descended into the plain, crossed the Arras-Lens railway, and reached at points places three miles east of the ridge. All this time, at frequent intervals, great fountains of flame and heavy smoke spurted high above the red roofs of the northern suburbs of Lens. The enemy was blowing up the mines. "I have never," said an eye-witness, "seen anything to equal the gigantic volcanoes suddenly released by the lighting of a fuse." Most of the remaining population of Lens had been withdrawn by the Germans into another area where their labour could be utilized, under duress, but here and there strings of bedraggled French—men, women and children—could be seen threading their way to the Allied lines.

South of the Scarpe, south and east of Fayet, we had got to within a few hundred yards of St. Quentin, and carried the village of Gricourt at the point of the bayonet. Four hundred prisoners were taken, and attempted counter-attacks broken up by our gunners.

Saturday night passed uneventfully. There

were occasional machine-gun duels and a few prisoners were taken in the western suburbs of Lens, and south of the Scarpe our line was advanced slightly east of Héninel.

On Sunday, April 15, the push towards Lens continued. Riaumont Wood was gained and several points between it and the eastern corner of Cité St. Pierre. By nightfall the enemy had been driven back into the northern and western outskirts of Lens itself, and into Avion. We were approaching Méricourt and Achéville and Fresnoy, south of that important pivot. The weather was once more bad—rainy and misty; but the resistance of the Germans was sensibly stiffening. During Saturday and the preceding days the 3rd Division of the Prussian Guard had been brought into the area between Bullecourt and Quéant, and at dawn on Sunday, supported by troops of two other Guard Divisions and of an active or reserve Division of the line, it was launched against our new positions from Noreuil to Hermies. Preceded by a violent bombardment, the enemy captured the village of Lagnicourt, garrisoned by Australians, pushed through it, and reached some of the field guns, the breach-blocks of which had to be removed. Without

waiting for orders, the Australians (mostly Queensland and New South Wales troops) counter-attacked with the bayonet. The German Guardsmen fled, and by 8 a.m. were in full retreat. In the confusion of their flight they failed to find the openings in their own wire, and were shot down in hundreds. By noon the guns had been retaken. Four had been badly damaged, and the wheel of a fifth destroyed. Three hundred prisoners had been captured and over 1,000 dead Germans lay in

Berliner Tageblatt of April 14, might attempt to minimize the results and the danger run by Hindenburg. He wrote :

An indentation has been made in the German front on both sides of the road to Douai, which means an inconvenient gap in the otherwise smooth German defence front. While this is not a break-through, every loosening of a defensive line includes a standing still of the advanced front, part of which is exposed to envelopment by the enemy. Standing still in the enemy drum-fire if one's own artillery is not in a position to requite like with like signifies useless sacrifice of valuable forces.

The commander of a defensive battle is confronted



GETTING A FIELD GUN INTO POSITION.

[Official photograph.]

and in front of the wire entanglement. The same day we had progressed in the neighbourhood of Havrincourt Wood and in the night we took the village of Villaret, south-east of Hargicourt.

It was on Sunday, April 15, that the French bombardment, preparatory to the battle of Craonne-Reims, neared its climax. The moment had come to drive the Germans from the heights north of the Aisne as the British had driven them from the ridge of Vimy, and to extend the French line east of Reims, as the British had extended theirs east of Arras. The results of the battle of Arras-Vimy had been a happy augury for Nivelle.

Lieut.-General Baron von Ardenne, in the

with the grave question whether he should attempt to obtain final success by a stubborn holding on to individual endangered parts of the former front line. As in so doing he would surrender his own initiative, he will generally answer this question in the negative. To retain his initiative must remain his gravest task. What he has to do is by appropriate troop movements to convert the enemy's original success into the opposite, and indeed, without disproportionate losses, render it innocuous. It remains for the clear-sightedness and power of resolve of the commander to decide whether the production of favourable conditions for fighting is to be obtained by counter-attacks or by withdrawing his own front. The recent evacuation of the battle regions on the Somme, Ancre, and Oise has convincingly shown how much the giving up of even wide tracts of land to the enemy can be of incalculable tactical advantage. The conductor of a defensive battle, therefore, has to test whether the enticement of the enemy into a freer country which does not bristle with his guns can be made a surprising factor of victory.

In the present case these considerations obtain enhanced significance through the cooperation of the French Army of Soissons and Reims. The French and British evidently are again attempting their old game of threatening both hostile flanks. They have always repeated it hitherto, resembling a chess player who always opens his game with the same move. The German Army Council, however, hold the inner lines with a powerful general reserve of which the significance has already been specially emphasized by Hindenburg. He will know how to employ it at the right time.

The Baron might allege that "the evacuation of the battle regions on the Somme,

at the gates of Lens, at another at the gates of St. Quentin.

The British advance had now reached a time at which the obstacles offered by the weather and the nature of the country had made the maintenance of communications very difficult, especially for the guns. The infantry began to feel seriously the want of artillery support, without which frontal attacks under modern conditions are impossible. Moreover, the enemy had had time to bring up



Official photograph.

UTILISING A FLOODED SHELL-HOLE NEAR BLANGY.

Ancre and Oise" had "convincingly shown how much the giving up of even wide tracts of land to the enemy" could be "of incalculable tactical advantage." Doubtless it is a sound maxim to withdraw one's head from a position in which it is being soundly punched. But it can hardly be recommended as a method of winning a war. Since Monday, April 9, the Germans had been bloodily defeated in every action with the exception of that of Bullecourt. Their counter-attacks, except at Bullecourt, had hopelessly failed and they had been driven headlong from some of the strongest positions on the Western front. At one end of the long battlefield the British were

reserves and had recovered to a great extent from the temporary disorganization caused by our first attacks. Both the increasing strength of his resistance and the weight and promptness of his counter-attacks made it evident that, except at excessive cost, our success could not be developed further without a return to more deliberate methods.

The success, whether measured by our captures in territory, prisoners and guns, or judged by the number of German Divisions attracted to the front of our attack, had been remarkable.

At the end of six days' fighting our front had progressed four miles forward, and all the

dominating features, which were considered desirable to hold before transferring the bulk of our resources to the north, had been captured. It would, therefore, have been possible to stop the Arras offensive and to divert forthwith to the northern theatre of operations the troops, labour and material required to complete the preparations for an operative policy there, while holding the enemy fast by a sufficient show of activity in the area just won.

But the advance of the French was on the point of being launched, and it was important that the full pressure of the British offensive should be maintained in order to assist them and seize any opportunity which might arise from their success. Accordingly, active preparations were undertaken to renew the offensive, but for the reasons set forth above, it was necessary to postpone operations until all was ready. The following week, therefore, saw little change in the front, although the troops continued incessantly to labour at these requirements under conditions demand-

ing the highest qualities of courage and endurance.

The withdrawal of the enemy's reserves from the front of the French attack had already been largely accomplished. In addition to the losses inflicted on them in men and material, a wide gap had been driven through the German defences. To stop this gap they found it needful to bring up heavy reserves of men and guns while they worked without ceasing to complete the Drocourt-Quéant line. Ten days after the opening of the offensive on April 9 the number of German infantry engaged against the British front had been nearly doubled, in spite of the casualties their troops had sustained. Massing together such large forces had exposed them to heavy losses, and they had also suffered from their frequent and futile counter-attacks.

Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig might well be content with the result of the six days' fighting, and if an unavoidable pause now took place it was only the calm which precluded the coming storm.





CHAPTER CCXXI.

THE ITALIAN OFFENSIVE OF MAY-JUNE, 1917.

ALLIED CONFERENCE AT ROME—PLANS FOR 1917—CHOICE OF FRONTS—THE PART ASSIGNED TO ITALY—THE MUNITIONS PROBLEM—MAY 12: OFFENSIVE ON THE ISONZO—INITIAL SUCCESSES—THE FIGHTING ON KUK AND VODICE—THE ALPINI—END OF THE FIRST PHASE—NOT ENOUGH GUNS—MAY 23: THE SOUTHERN OFFENSIVE—ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATIONS—A LIMITED VICTORY—THE AREZZO BRIGADE—AUSTRIAN SUCCESS AT HERMADA—A "REGRETTABLE INCIDENT"—RESULTS FROM MAY 12 TO JUNE 8.

ON the morning of January 6, 1917, there took place in Rome the first session of a political and military conference between representatives of the four chief European Allies against the Central Empires. Great Britain was represented by Mr. Lloyd George, Lord Milner, Sir Rennell Rodd (British Ambassador at Rome), General Sir William Robertson (Chief of the General Staff), General Sir Henry Wilson, and General Milne (commanding the British forces at Salonika); France by MM. Briand and Albert Thomas, M. Barrère (Ambassador in Rome), General Lyautey (Minister of War), and General Sarraill (Commander of the Allied Forces at Salonika); Russia by General Galitzin and M. de Giers (Ambassador in Rome); Italy by Signor Boselli (Prime Minister), Baron Sonnino (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Signor Scialoja (Minister without portfolio), General Cadorna, General Morrone (Minister of War), Admiral Corsi (Minister of Marine), and General Dall'Olio (Under-Secretary of State for the Munitions Department of the War Office).

It was the first time that an Allied Conference had met in Rome, and the moment was of unusual gravity. On December 12 Germany and her allies had taken the first open step in

the "political offensive" with which they had resolved to reinforce their military efforts. The Imperial Chancellor had announced in the Reichstag that Germany and her allies were disposed to discuss the question of peace. Formal Notes had been sent by Germany and Austria to the opposing Powers; the neutral Powers and the Pope had been informed of the step. A week later Mr. Wilson had addressed a Note to the belligerents suggesting that they should define the conditions they thought necessary to the conclusion of peace, and answers had been quickly returned by Germany and Austria, evading the American suggestion, but proposing an immediate conference of belligerents on neutral ground. The Pope's Christmas Allocution had urged peace upon the world, the peace that was announced "to men of good will," and M. Caillaux's visit to Italy—which was to become famous—had coincided with all these manifestations.

Baron Sonnino had been quick to point out that the German and Austrian Notes gave no indication of the basis upon which it was proposed to negotiate. M. Briand had spoken still more clearly: "This is a trick; it is an attempt to sow disunion between the Allies."

"I have the right, and it is my duty, to struggle

against a possible poisoning of my country." Mr. Bonar Law had repeated the words used earlier by Mr. Asquith: "The Allies claim reparation for the past and guarantees for the future," and Mr. Lloyd George, in his first important declaration as Prime Minister, had struck the same firm note. M. Rodzianko, the President of the Duma, had rejected the possibility of entering upon peace negotiations "until the enemy is definitely beaten," and the

One speaks under his breath of the Trentino, another of Belgium wholly restored and independent, a third of Alsace-Lorraine, a fourth of Trieste or Poland or Lithuania, or a Balkan Confederation, and so on. . . . All this would mean very little if it did not recall exactly what happened here in Rome in April and May of 1915, that is to say in the period before our denunciation of the Triple Alliance and our entry into the war. At that time, too, there circulated written leaflets which came directly or indirectly from the representatives of those who are now our enemies, or from other mysterious sources—leaflets which gave lists of concessions which, it was asserted, were offered by Austria-Hungary as the price of our neutrality. Yet of these concessions,



GENERAL CADORNA IN HIS OFFICIAL HEADQUARTERS.

Duma had unanimously confirmed his attitude. On December 18 Baron Sonnino had emphasized and amplified his first brief declaration in a short speech which aroused the greatest enthusiasm in the Chamber of Deputies. Various deputies had assumed that the Government had before it definite, concrete proposals from the enemy which might furnish a basis for the discussion of peace terms. In pointing out that this was not the case, Baron Sonnino said:—

On different sides one hears it repeated with an air of mystery that so-and-so, who is in touch with diplomatic circles, or so-and-so, who knows the cousin of a person who frequents the Vatican, or some well-informed politician who conceals the source of his news, all affirm that the conditions which are to form the basis for agreement are already known and in our hands.

many were absolutely unknown at the Consulta, others were notably distorted, and others were in direct contradiction to the truth. M. Tisza, in his speeches to the Hungarian Chamber, revealed to us later the aim of all those mysterious revelations and clandestine leaflets.

Baron Sonnino exposed the enemy manoeuvre very clearly, and was warmly applauded when he asked:

In the circumstances, is it not the duty of the Allied Governments to avoid the creation for their peoples, by the false mirage of vain negotiations, of an enormous deception, that would be followed fatally by a cruel disappointment?

There were other matters to be resolved by the Conference, notably the attitude to be adopted in regard to the situation in Greece, but the main problem was that of the answer to the movement in favour of a peace which the

Allies could not accept, or even discuss. They were in no doubt or hesitation as to what their political answer should be, but all knew that the only effective answer to the enemy must be expressed in terms of military effort.

The definite political answer was given by the joint Note consigned by M. Briand, on January 10, to the American Ambassador in Paris.* This Note represented the unanimous conviction of the signatory Powers; politically the Allies had already come close to the ideal of "the single front." There was not the same agreement as to the exact framing of the still more important military reply. Unity of aim was there; it was natural that there should be a diversity of opinion as to method. Nor would it be fair to assume that this diversity was due to a reluctance to accept the fact of the single front in the literal, as well as in the metaphorical, sense. It is obvious that an admission of the single-front theory is fully compatible with a failure to make the best choice of time and place, strategically speaking. If there was such a failure, and events would seem to show that there was, the fact is grave enough in itself, without the attempt to exaggerate its import, or to represent an error of judgment as due to wilful blindness or international prejudice. A single general, directing the armies of a single Power, may all too easily choose the wrong time or place for his main operation. The commander of an army may all too readily mistime his thrust or his *riposte*. It was infinitely more easy for an Allied Conference, where each military representative knew his own problem and relatively little of his neighbour's, to fail to weigh the just claims of the various sectors of the single front. There was no one man who was in a position to review conflicting claims and decide between them. Perhaps there could not be. There was not even a body of men whose constant duty it was to examine and weigh the opportunities that seemed to present themselves in Flanders, in France, on the western marches of Austria or elsewhere.

The Rome Conference lasted only two days, and a very considerable amount of time was taken up by a discussion of the military situation at Salonika and in Macedonia, and of the problem of transport to Salonika. It is self-evident that there was no exhaustive debate as to a suggested change in the general plan of the Allies' campaign. Cards were put

upon the table for further consideration, and certain contingent possibilities were brought forward and provided for. These possibilities were concerned with defence, not with offence. It is, however, the case that the meeting of the Allied statesmen and military representatives in Rome gave the occasion for conversations regarding a suggestion which was now for the first time a serious object of discussion: that the principal effort of the Allies in 1917 should be made upon the Italian front.

The advantages of such a plan were obvious, and it has already been put on record that they commended themselves to Mr. Lloyd George and Signor Bissolati. Signor Bissolati, indeed, was one of the first to take up the idea and press it, even before the Rome Conference. Italian military opinion was, on the whole, favourable to the idea, though it was not unanimous. French and British military opinion were opposed to the main effort being made elsewhere than in what was generally considered the main theatre of war, or against any but the main enemy—the main enemy, that is, in the view of France and England. Two sound military maxims were apparently placed in opposition by the peculiarities of the situation, the first being that the real objective of war is the enemy's main force, the second being that it is the aim of the attack to find the enemy's weak point. Perhaps, if the ultimate conviction had been rooted in every mind that Germany and Austria were essentially one for the purposes of the war, and that the enemy's main force practically extended from the Channel to the Adriatic, the apparent contradiction might have disappeared. On the other hand, there were serious practical difficulties in the way of an adoption of what has been called "Cadorna's plan." The right wing of the western front, the Italian sector of the enormous line, lay very far from the main Allied bases, and from the main Allied munition factories, and the communications to this sector were not good; they were very markedly inferior to those at the disposal of the enemy, who had the additional advantage of interior lines.

Still, the idea which was launched at Rome undoubtedly merited, and did receive, the serious consideration of the Allies during the months which followed. At the time of the Rome Conference no high British or French military authority had been on the Italian front since the visits of Marshal Joffre and

* For the text of this Note see Vol. XI., p. 491.

Lord Kitchener in the autumn of 1915. That omission was repaired in the spring of 1917. In February General Nivelle paid a short visit to the Italian front, where he was followed, some weeks later, by Sir William Robertson. These visits gave rise to a widespread belief in Italy, where the question of a joint Allied



GENERAL NIVELLE AT THE ITALIAN FRONT

Decorating an Italian officer.

General Cadorna, reading the Order of the Day.

offensive against Austria was now an object of general discussion, that "Cadorna's plan" had been adopted, and the fact that various rest camps were being constructed in Italy for British troops on their way to and from the East, seemed for a time to confirm the rumour.

In view of the fact that the whole question became the subject of keen controversy, it may be well to examine the general position of the European conflict as it appeared in the spring of 1917. Three main facts seem to stand out: (1) The German retreat to the "Hindenburg Line"; (2) the alarmingly successful beginning of the "unrestricted" submarine campaign; (3) the apparent increase in the military strength of Russia.

The German retreat affected British plans, which had been based on the hope of dealing a very heavy blow against the relatively weak position in which the German line had been left owing to the Allied successes of the previous year on the Somme and the Ancre.

On the other hand, it appeared a confession of weakness, an admission that the British hammer-strokes were irresistible. Success of the kind hoped for seemed to be only delayed. The opening of the military year promised well for Allied operations on the French front, and this fact must in itself have prejudiced the acceptance of an idea that broke new ground. There can be little doubt, moreover, that to France, and to England, whose close cooperation with France on French soil had extended over two years and a half, the task of driving back the invader from French, and, if possible, from Belgian territory, seemed to have the first call upon their united effort. And this natural preference was almost inevitably clinched by the submarine threat. The submarine bases of the Belgian coast presented an objective whose importance, in the view of many, outweighed all others, and these bases were held to be well within reach of a prolonged and determined offensive, carried through with all the immense weight of preparation that was now available. In these circumstances the importance of "knocking out" Austria might well have presented less attraction than a successful advance on what was then universally known as the Western Front, even if it had not seemed, at that time, as though Austria could hardly escape that fate in any event. For, thanks to the efforts of her Allies, Russia was at last adequately if not abundantly equipped. Some of those who had helped to paralyse previous effort had fallen from power. Even if the lines could only hold in the north, Brusiloff and Cadorna between them seemed to have a first-class chance of crushing the hardly pressed armies of the Dual Monarchy. It was realized, of course, that Cadorna was weak in guns and munitions, relatively to the immense demands made by a modern offensive on the grand scale. But he had hit very hard the previous year, great efforts had been made during the winter to increase Italy's artillery strength, and it was hoped that what he had would "do." Russia had seemed in worse case, and the Russian front had had a prior claim upon the British and French munition factories. It was not possible for these to supply guns for everyone, and General Cadorna's requests, in view of the conditions here outlined, in view also of the commitments in the East, could not be fully met. A certain number of medium-calibre guns, and a few big guns, were sent by


France, but were manned by Italian gunners. In April England sent an artillery detachment consisting of 10 batteries of 6-inch howitzers, some 2,000 men in all, including auxiliary services. These French and British guns formed a very useful addition to General Cadorna's artillery force, though the total number sent fell far short of what he had indicated as his requirements.

Meanwhile the Russian Revolution had broken out. The future seemed uncertain on the Russian front, but for the moment the considerations which had determined the Allied plan of campaign still held good. There was some apprehension in Italy during the late spring regarding the possibility of an Austro-German offensive, either from the Trentino or on the Isonzo front, and provision was made for Allied cooperation in the event of such a move on the part of the enemy. But the theory held that, in the first instance at least, the best way of preventing this offensive was to keep the enemy fully employed elsewhere, and, so long as this was possible, the retention of this theory was fully justified. As events

were to show, Germany was too busy throughout the summer to detach troops or guns for the Italian front.


Austria, on the other hand, who was notably stronger on the Isonzo front, and especially on the Carso, than she had been the previous year, was getting ready to strike; not with any ambitious aim such as that which inspired the Trentino offensive of the previous year, but in the hope of retaking some of the Carso positions which had been lost the previous autumn, and so forestalling and handicapping the Italian attacks which were clearly an essential part of the Allied programme. By the middle of April it was apparent that the Russian Revolution had caused at least a temporary disorganization. And the Eastern front was still winter-bound. There was time for Austria to attack, as she did in 1916, before the Russian Armies could move. By the beginning of May there were evident indications that General Boroevic was on the point of striking at the Italian line from Gorizia to the sea. But General Cadorna struck first.

During the first 10 days of May the Austrian




(Italian official photograph.)

A BRITISH HOWITZER AND GUNNERS ON THE ITALIAN FRONT.



[Official photograph.]

THE VALLEY OF THE ISONZO AND THE MOUNTAINS ON THE EASTERN SIDE FROM MONTE KUK TO MONTE SAN GABRIELE.




THE ITALIAN LINE ON THE UPPER ISONZO.

artillery, especially on the Carso, showed considerable activity. The heavy guns in particular were registering on positions which had long remained all but undisturbed, and the roads behind the lines were frequently searched both by shrapnel and high explosive. The Italians replied very effectively, and all information went to show that our Allies had a definite superiority in artillery strength, though the margin was less than might have been desired. There was probably a sufficient number of guns, but it must always be remembered that in order to attain this numerical superiority, General Cadorna had to keep in line obsolete mortars and modern guns which were already suffering from overmuch use. Italy had made great strides in the way of munitions, but she suffered always from lack of coal and metals. This lack had imposed limits upon the tremendous effort which she had made to develop war industries. The problem with her was largely different, not only in degree, but in kind, from that which France and England had to face. It was much more than a question of transferring industrial energy to war purposes. It was, mainly, a question of creating industrial energy. Her pre-war industrial population, compared with that of her Western Allies, was small. She had to begin at the beginning. Nor was it easy to supplement her deficiencies from the outside. Great Britain, France and Russia

had obtained the first call upon neutral resources, and Italy could only secure, so to speak, the leavings. By efforts which were slow to be appreciated, she succeeded in industrializing herself to an undreamed-of extent, but there was always the difficulty of the coal and metal supply to contend against. Not once, but many times, a munition factory would have to slacken output for lack of fuel or material.

Yet guns and munitions had piled up during the winter, and the warm, clear weather of May found the Army full of confidence.

no close labyrinth of trenches, support trenches and machine-gun posts—line after line linked up by numerous communication trenches, and interspersed with many small caverns like those blasted in the live rock of the Carso or dug in the deep earth of the Gorizia plain and its low hills. The terrain did not lend itself to similar defence works, and perhaps they hardly appeared necessary to the enemy, whose main pre-occupation was certainly the southern sector of the line. The positions on the middle Isonzo were naturally so formidable that art seemed to have less to do. Not that the work



RUINED HOUSES AT ZAGORA.

[Official photograph.]



At dawn on May 12 the Italian guns, from opposite Tolmino to the sea, all spoke together. The bombardment continued for 56 hours before the infantry attack was launched, and during that time it was specially interesting to note the different artillery tactics in the different sectors. From Monte San Gabriele to the sea the entire Austrian line seemed overwhelmed by a whirlwind of fire. The complicated network of defences which had been perfected throughout the winter was subjected to a storm of shells that seemed to devastate whole zones. In the region of the middle Isonzo, where the first main attack was to come, the methods employed were in sharp contradiction. In this sector the Austrian defences were differently planned. There was

of defence had been neglected. Here too, the Austrians had dug and drilled and blasted till they could hide their men underground, and they had abundance of wire. But the general system of defence was different. The trench-lines were relatively wide apart, and less well-linked together; and greater reliance was placed upon comparatively isolated strongholds, prepared where it was clear that the line of an attack must develop.

The enemy were very well placed along the line of the middle Isonzo. Except at two points the swift-rushing river, now swollen by the melting snows, divided the opposing armies, and on each side high hills rose steeply from its banks. Opposite Tolmino the Austrians still held the strong bridgehead whose chief

defences were the hills of Santa Maria and Santa Lucia. At Plava the Italians had established themselves on the eastern bank in June 1915, and had entrenched themselves firmly just under the summit of Hill 383, a lower spur that juts out from the main ridge Kuk-Vodice-Santo, and fills the angle made by the bend of the river. They had extended their occupation nearly a mile to the southward, to the ruined hamlet of Zagora, where the out-post lines had once touched in a single house, one room being occupied by the Italians and one by the Austrians. Between Plava and Tolmino the enemy front line lay along the river bank, and in places it was very strong. A second line ran, roughly, half-way up the steep wooded slopes that rose nearly 2,000 feet above the river. A third line ran along the crest. To back the river line and the

crest line in particular there were large caverns blasted in the solid rock. South of Plava the main line left the river a little below Zagora, and slanted upwards till it joined the crest lines at the saddle known as Point 503, between the main peak of Vodice (Hill 652) and Monte Santo. Backing it, between Kuk and Vodice, where a wide bluff projects and breaks the regularity of the hillside about halfway to the crest line, there was a group of three redoubts, caverned and tunnelled and full of machine guns. On the lower slopes of Monte Santo there was no trench line. But the word slope, even with a qualifying adjective, hardly applies to Monte Santo. The abruptness of the drop may be imagined from the fact that the distance across the gorge from Sabotino to Santo (the one 1,996 feet, the other 250 feet higher), is less than a mile as the crow flies. The summit of Santo, on the other hand, was a fortress. There were lines of trenches and galleries and masses of wire, and, on the reverse or sheltered side, there were caverns that afforded protection to large bodies of troops. Santo was the most valuable of all the many observation posts which dominated the Italian positions. Kuk, Santo and San Gabriele between them gave eyes upon almost all the approaches to the Italian lines, and to the greater part of the lines themselves, but Santo,



MONTE SANTO DURING THE BOMBARDMENT.

Inset: The Convent on the Summit.

[Official photographs.]

from its height and central position, commanded the widest view.

The Italians, too, had admirable observation of the Austrian lines from the corresponding ridge that ran above the west bank of the Isonzo—S. Jakob, Korada, Planina, Verhovlje, Sabotino, and it will be seen from the above indications that they had very clearly defined targets upon which to concentrate their artillery fire. The first day's bombardment did not satisfy General Capello, the commander of the Italian Second Army, and the general in charge of the Second Corps, which was to make the main attack; the officers commanding the artillery of the sector were relieved of their commands on the evening of May 12. The command of the Second Corps was entrusted to Major-General Badoglio, the captor of



MAJOR-GENERAL BADOGLIO,

Took over the command of the Second Corps during the bombardment of Kuk and Vodice.

Sabotino, who had been acting as Chief of Staff to General Capello. The destruction wrought by the first day's bombardment was very considerable, but General Capello judged that there was a lack of accuracy and method in the fire. The second day satisfied him, and the extraordinary precision of the fire was evident to any onlooker. The word that suggests itself as descriptive is "embroidery." The line of the Austrian positions on Kuk and Vodice was traced on the wooded hillside in a perfectly distinct pattern, with



GENERAL LUIGI CAPELLO,

Commanded the Italian Second Army in the Offensive of May-June, 1917.

relentless accuracy, by a steady succession of perfectly placed shells. To change the simile, it seemed as though the guns of our Allies were driving nails along given lines, and the hammer-strokes were delivered with unflinching skill.*

On the north of the battle the Italian bombardment gave an impression of cold, methodical punishment, and the impression was heightened by the fact that there was practically no reply from the Austrian side. To the south, from Monte Santo to the sea, it seemed as though the whole field of battle were rent by some fierce convulsion of nature. In this sector the Austrian had abandoned his policy of reserving his artillery fire until the infantry attack developed. Thousands of guns, Austrian and Italian, hammered the lines where men lay hidden, waiting for the swift onset that was to follow the long torment of the bombardment. The summit of Monte Santo flamed and smoked. "Monte San Gabriele disappeared in a brown and hideous fog. The bare, red hills of San Marco, that once were clothed with trees, became a mass of rusty volcano spouts. The Carso was overlaid with an even pall of dust

* *The Times*, May 19, 1917.



PROJECTILES FOR THE "BOMBARDE."

(Official photograph.)

and shell smoke, through which the fresh bursts of shrapnel, the arrival of great shells, or the explosion of small ammunition dumps, showed but faintly."*

On the morning of May 14 the Isonzo was bridged below Plava, almost opposite Zagora, where an overhanging bluff gave some shelter, and at 11.15 the infantry began to cross. At the same time, an attack was launched from the old bridgehead against Hill 383 and the north-western slopes of Kuk. The Austrian front lines were already in ruins, and were for the most part quickly occupied, while the Italian trench-mortars put over a very destructive fire upon the second line, and especially upon the three redoubts already mentioned. The enemy directed a heavy shrapnel fire upon the bridges, and big shells began to fall, but the stream of infantry never ceased, though often it slackened, and for the moment almost failed, under the iron shower. High explosives fell all about the crossing places, but by some miracle the bridges escaped damage until a strong force of infantry had crossed.

The first lines occupied in great part, and emptied of the stunned and hungry prisoners who had been isolated during the whole of the bombardment, the attack swept on and up.


* *The Times*, May 18, 1917.

It was checked on the right by the line of the three redoubts, and in the centre, just above Zagora, a strong section of the Austrian front line still held stubbornly. Even the devastating *bombarde* shells had failed to break up all the enemy strong places. There was a pause for an hour or two, while the attacking troops took breath, and the metallic clang of the *bombarde* again dominated the battle chorus. There was a check at the points indicated, but on the left the Florence Brigade was working up and round till patrols had reached the northern shoulder of Kuk, and the right of the Avellino brigade was enveloping the redoubts from the south. Farther south, again, the left wing of the Sixth Corps was attacking Santo, climbing the precipitous western face of the ridge under a heavy fire. The steepness of the ground gave shelter from the enemy on the summit, but the attack was exposed on both flanks, on the left from Vodice and the saddle known as Point 503 and on the right from San Gabriele. In spite of heavy loss one column reached the summit of Santo, driving the Austrians from their trenches, but the rest of the attacking force was held up. The successful column penetrated to the ruins of the convent, where one tall cypress still stood above a waste of shattered stumps and wrecked

masonry. Word came that the goal was reached; prisoners came down, and then the Austrian counter-attack was launched. The caverns on the eastern slope poured out men and machine-guns and a very heavy artillery fire was concentrated upon the summit. The small detachment that had reached the convent could not hold against these heavy odds, handicapped as it was by the fact that the enemy reserves were largely sheltered from the Italian gun fire. They put up a very gallant fight, but they were altogether overweighed. Most were killed or taken prisoners after being wounded; a few fell back, hours later, and rejoined those who had held on under the crest, where a steep terrace gave shelter against the worst of the enemy fire.

Meanwhile there was hard fighting of a different kind east and south of Gorizia. There were no ambitious objectives set before the attacking troops among the low hills of the Gorizia plain, and the stony ridges of the Carso. Their task was to keep the enemy's attention fully occupied by heavy gunfire and by raids, and so prevent a strong reinforcement of the threatened positions on the middle

Isonzo. At one point only was a real thrust made, and this was not in the given scheme of attack, but was undertaken on the responsibility of the general commanding the Eleventh Corps, who took what seemed to be a favourable opportunity but failed to carry out his aim, in spite of the extraordinary gallantry of his men, who made a truly heroic attempt to do the impossible. This was to the north-east of Fauti Hrib, where an Italian brigade was sent in to attack a projection on the northern rim of the Carso known as the Tamburo. They stormed the first enemy positions with the utmost gallantry, and sent back a number of prisoners, but they were immediately subjected to a converging fire of appalling intensity. There was little cover on the rocky hillside or among the ruined trenches they had seized, but they never flinched. Again and again they attempted to push forward, and between their vain efforts they held firm under a fire from every calibre of gun that, in the opinion of a British artillery colonel who had seen much fighting in France, was the heaviest he had ever known. At last they were brought back, what was left of them, for they had lost far



A FERRY ON THE ISONZO.

more than half their number. The general who had sent them to the attack was relieved of his command next day, but all who saw that glorious though unsuccessful fight will bare their heads to the infantry of Italy.

The pause in the fighting on the middle Isonzo did not last for long. The infantry attack was renewed later in the afternoon, and one of the three redoubts was stormed, but the other two still held out, though they were now nearly surrounded. It was necessary to keep back the left and right of the attack until these centre positions were taken, though the infantry was eager to press on. The patrols which had gained the northern summit of Kuk were withdrawn, and the Italian line was deployed half-way up the wooded slopes, while the artillery continued its work of destruction. There was some cause for anxiety in the position at nightfall. The crest line which dominated all the valley was still wholly in the possession of the enemy, and his reinforcements were on the move. His main force had been concentrated on the Carso, where he had himself been meditating a blow, and the greater intensity of the Italian bombardment in this sector had undoubtedly led him to expect that the chief effort of the Italians would come here. The first day's infantry fighting had clearly indicated the danger threatening the

Kuk-Vodice-Santo ridge, and he was hurrying supports from the Bainsizza and the Gorizia sector. It was essential to keep him busy both to the south and to the north.

The pressure from Gorizia to the sea was kept up relentlessly, and in the early hours of the morning of May 15 the Italians threw a small force across the Isonzo between the hamlets of Bodrež and Loga, some five miles north of Plava. A very heavy bombardment had smashed up the strong Austrian defences along the river bank—many of them had been cut in the solid rock, but failed to resist the terrific impact of the big *bombarde* shells—but a further demonstration was necessary to bring reinforcements to this point. Two battalions, one of Alpini and one of Bersaglieri, crossed the river. The artillery fire, which had bitten a great half-circle out of the fresh green landscape, kept the enemy close in their caverns. The Italians reached the far side of the river with little loss, and had only to go in and pick up the prisoners, some 600 survivors, out of the front lines. These were sent back at once, and some hundreds more were kept imprisoned in their caverns, for the little force had its hands already full.

The story of this exploit may best be completed now, in disregard of chronology, to leave the way clear for a continuous description of



[Official photograph.]

AN ADVANCED DUG-OUT AT PLAVA.



[Official photograph.]

AUSTRIAN PRISONERS CAPTURED ON MONTE SANTO.

the main operation which it was destined to help. The troops established their bridgehead during the dark hours, but with the early dawn the Austrian artillery concentrated upon the bridges and quickly destroyed them. A counter-attack came, which was easily repulsed, but the position of the two battalions seemed precarious enough. They had the swollen Isonzo behind them, unbridged; many prisoners still remained on their hands, and the enemy was certain to attack strongly as soon as he could collect reinforcements. Their task was to bluff, and they did it magnificently. A cable ferry took back their wounded and little detachments of prisoners, and brought over the most necessary supplies, while they set about the task of increasing the enemy's anxiety. They were not more than 1,500 now all told, but they were picked troops, and were well supplied with machine-guns. They spread out to cover a two-mile front, and sent patrols to scale the heights that faced them. Some of these actually reached the summit of Frata, the outermost bastion of the Bainsizza, south of the Avseck valley, and came in touch with the enemy lines on the ridge. The second day of their occupation passed in comparative quiet—the Austrians were collecting reinforcements—but on the morning of May 17 the expected counter-attack came. The Austrians descended the slopes in force, but the beautifully accurate

shrapnel fire of the Italian field-guns west of the river threw their columns into confusion before they could reach the thin Italian line, and the machine-guns did the rest. More prisoners were taken, and on one of them a brigade-order was found which stated that at all costs the Italians must be driven back into the river. The rest of the day passed quietly, and information showed that the Austrians were collecting further reinforcements. But the task of the Italians had been performed. They had kept the enemy guessing, and made him send to the Bodrez bridgehead troops which were much needed elsewhere. On the night of May 17–18 a new bridge was thrown over the river, and the troops were successfully withdrawn. They were not pleased with the order to retreat. They were convinced that they had paved the way for an important advance, and they were specially regretful because they were compelled to leave behind them the prisoners they had kept penned in their caverns. But an advance at this point was not part of the Italian plan, which had in the meantime met with striking success.

The second day of the infantry battle on the slopes of Monte Kuk saw fighting no less fierce than that of the first. In the early hours of the morning the enemy threw in a successful counter-attack against the redoubt which they had lost the previous afternoon.

Their triumph was only momentary. The Italians succeeded in working round both flanks, and capturing the whole position. Very many Austrians lay dead in the three redoubts, which looked like rubbish heaps, and a large number of prisoners were taken. The attack swept on. A little after midday the summit of Kuk (Hill 611) was captured by the Florence Brigade, and about the same time the Avellino Brigade stormed the northern peak of the Vodice ridge (Hill 592). There was a few hours' breathing space, except for the heavy artillery fire which the enemy immediately concentrated upon the tortured line of the crest, already crumbling to a horrible desolation of shattered rock and tree stump, but at four o'clock exactly a strong counter-attack was launched against Hill 592. The Italian line was immediately withdrawn below the summit, in order to clear the field for the guns. There was exactly 12 minutes' hurricane fire before the range was lengthened, and the crouching infantry, their brigadier leading, dashed up the stony slope again and spread out along the line of the crest.

A firm footing had been won upon the ridge, but the enemy was not yet too unfavourably placed. He still held the highest point of Vodice, Hill 652, and on the far side of Kuk and Hill 592 he lay only just below the crest, well sheltered in caverns. He had roads to


bring up supplies and reserves, and he had water. Moreover, he still held a useful length of the crest between Kuk and Hill 592—a sector of trench, with a couple of small redoubts, that was lined with machine-guns. And it was certain that he would make every effort to regain the ground he had lost. His possession of Hill 652 was closely threatened, and Hill 652 outflanked Santo. From it, moreover, led the wide grassy saddle of Baske, dividing the Rohot and Slatna valleys, and serving as a bridge to the main mass of the Bainsizza plateau from the outlying ridge that ran from Kuk to Santo. A whole system was menaced if the Italians could push their success farther, and the battle practically became a race to bring up reserves.

The Italians had a very stiff task. Those who had gained the crest were almost without shelter against artillery fire, and the bulk of the troops were kept just below the line of the ridge. Ammunition, water, food, and reserves had to come up a steep slope that rose 1,800 feet above the river, and there was not even the semblance of a road. There were only a few mountain tracks, and the wrecked communication-trenches of the Austrians. Shells fell unceasingly on the slopes and on the bridges, and machine-guns still could rake the nearer approaches.

Reinforcements were hurried up the slopes



ITALIAN 149 MM. (5.8 INCH) GUN ON CATERPILLAR WHEELS.



ITALIAN ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN.

of Kuk and Vodice, and they reached the line in time to strengthen it against the expected counter-attacks of the enemy, which were continued throughout the whole of May 16. The day's fighting may be summed up in very few words. Every enemy advance was repulsed with serious loss, and many of those who did succeed in approaching the Italian lines were surrounded and cut off by dashing counter-attacks. The Italian losses were, of course, very heavy. The attacking troops had carried positions that might well have been thought impregnable, and they had paid the price. When the Avellino and Florence Brigades were taken out of line to rest and re-form after three and four days' fighting respectively, the Avellino had lost over 100 officers and nearly 2,700 men, out of 140 officers and 5,000 men; and though the casualties in the Florence Brigade were not quite so heavy they lost nearly 50 per cent. of their strength.

By the morning of May 17 fresh troops were holding the Italian line, and a quiet day was expected, until they should be ready to extend their grip upon the ridge.

But the enemy gave them no peace. His artillery force in this sector was now greatly

strengthened, and under cover of a furious bombardment one attack after another was launched against the ridge, especially against Hill 592. He could not gain an inch of ground, and though he still held the little salient between Kuk and Hill 592 it was now almost isolated. On the morning of the 18th the Italian attack was renewed, and the infantry of the 53rd Division, which had replaced the Florence and Avellino Brigades, were reinforced by two "Groups" of Alpini, the 2nd and 6th, upon whom, as it turned out, the main burden of the next few days' successful advance was to fall. The infantry of the 53rd Division (Teramo and Gorgenti Brigades), and the Elba Brigade which reinforced it later, showed the utmost gallantry and suffered terrible loss, particularly the Teramo Brigade, one of whose battalions was reduced to under 100 men, but they found the confused fighting on the rocky hillside very difficult, and it was here that the special qualities of the Alpini told. For two days the fighting was desperate. By the evening of the 18th the summit of Hill 652 was in Italian hands, captured by two battalions of the 6th Group of Alpini, but the position was very precarious. The little enemy salient between Kuk and Hill 592

had been taken that morning, but the enemy were still counter-attacking furiously. They were in force between Hills 592 and 652, and there seemed to be no end to the reserves that came up from Slatna and Baske to the back of the Vodice ridge. And their artillery fire grew ever more destructive as fresh batteries came into action. A little after midday on May 19 the Monte Granero battalion of Alpini, belonging to the 2nd Group, was sent against the saddle between Hills 592 and 652, but 14 officers were put out of action almost at once, and only 100 men out of the two attacking companies reached the saddle. The two supporting companies pushed out to the right and hung on under the ridge leading up to 652, and the position was maintained until detachments of infantry and of the 5th Bersaglieri regiment, which had been sent in that morning, relieved the enemy pressure. The

all along the line the Val Varaita had to be sent in to support the Moncenisio while the Val Pellice was thrown out to the right of Hill 652 towards the saddle that divides it from Santo, in order to repel a counter-attack from the south-east.

To give more detail would only confuse a reader who does not know the ground. Even to those who fought there and pushed back the enemy almost yard by yard, or rather, giving back 50 yards to gain 100 with the next desperate push, the picture remains confused. The day was won by the staunchness of the soldier, and the coolness of the officers who threw in a company here, and withdrew another there, as the fight swayed, until at last the enemy gave back, beaten. One by one the shattered battalions were withdrawn. The remnants of the Moncenisio were the first to go, on the evening of May 20: the Val Pellice



[Official photograph.]

INFANTRY ATTACK.

Moncenisio battalion had a similar experience, losing most of its officers, but holding on against all efforts to relax its grip on the northern part of the saddle. On Hill 652 the Val d'Aosta and Val Levanna battalions were being sorely tried, and the Val Pellice and Val Varaita battalions were sent up to replace them. Both lost heavily, and as the enemy counter-attacks persisted

was the last, a week later. Each Alpini Group went into action at a strength of about 100 officers and 3,200 men. The Sixth Group lost some 60 officers and exactly half its rank and file. The casualties of the Second Group were 72 officers and 1,791 men, the heaviest losses being sustained by the Moncenisio and Monte Granero battalions, which had the ill-

luck to lose a large proportion of officers very quickly, and were in consequence less skilfully handled. To put against its losses the Second Group had the satisfaction of taking 1,256 prisoners, of whom 27 were officers.

Perhaps an undue emphasis has been laid on the work of the Alpini, but it is not unfair to the infantry to lay this stress upon the achievements of the mountain men. The infantry were no less gallant, and where they went, they held. But it was natural that on this steep and broken ground the Alpini should be better in the attack. The time of the infantry was to come, when the line had been established, and they had to hold against a further series of enemy attacks. No troops could have done better than they did in the days that were to follow the occupation of the whole Vodice ridge.

Meanwhile, furious fighting had been going on to the south. Further efforts to secure and maintain a footing on the summit of Monte Santo had failed, in spite of heavy sacrifices. The mountain was now closely beset, the Italians being strongly entrenched three-quarters of the way up, with advanced lines about 200 yards from the summit, but they could not wrench the ruins of the convent from the enemy. More than once they reached their goal, only to be driven back by crushing artillery fire, followed by fierce counter-attacks. The enemy lay close in their caverns while the Italian guns hammered the heaped ruin of rock and masonry, waited till their own artillery had taken its turn, and then poured out to the attack, with bombs and machine-guns. Gradually the storm wore away. The mountain top became a vast cemetery—a waste of broken rock and broken bodies.

On San Gabriele too, there was stiff hand-to-hand fighting. Here the Italians fought only a containing action, keeping up a heavy fire upon the main Austrian positions, and sending in a succession of trench raids. To the east of Gorizia positive gains were made and held. On May 15 the Messina Brigade stormed Hill 174, to the north of Tivoli, and maintained the position against determined counter-attacks, and a day later a little hill farther to the north was occupied. Here, too, the enemy fought furiously to regain the lost ground, without success. Nor was he idle on the Carso. On May 16 he attacked in force on the northern rim of the plateau, against the Italian lines on

Faiti Hrib and Volkovnjak, but the masses of infantry which were sent to the assault were thrown back with heavy losses before they reached the trenches.

This was the only Austrian attack in the Carso sector, but the counter-pressure in the Gorizia zone continued for several days, and




THE SUMMIT OF MONTE COLBRICON.

the enemy artillery all along the line was more active than it had ever been. Not only were the Italian trenches subjected to a heavy and almost continuous bombardment; the Austrians fired persistently at extreme ranges, throwing numerous shells into villages which had all but grown unused to war. On the morning of May 16 Cervignano was bombarded by 15-inch naval guns, from a distance of 16 miles.

It was clear that the enemy strength in guns was enormously greater than it had ever been before, and ammunition was evidently plentiful. Information showed that between Gorizia and the sea the Austrians had not less than 1,500 guns, with a large proportion of heavy and medium calibres, not enough for a powerful offensive, but sufficient to make the Italian task harder than had been expected. The effects of the Russian uncertainty were beginning to be felt.

Between May 19 and 22 the enemy made various attempts at a diversion on the Trentino front, but he found a firm resistance and met with no success. The chief of these attempts, against lines which the enemy judged would be weakened in order to strengthen the attack on the Isonzo front, was against the Colbricon *massif*. On the night of May 21-22, after a heavy bombardment which completely destroyed the Italian trenches on the Little Colbricon, strong columns of infantry were



THE SOUTHERN SECTOR OF THE
ISONZO VALLEY.

sent up from the Val Travnigolo. The Italians were driven from their positions at this point, but supports were soon on the spot, and stubborn hand-to-hand fighting took place upon the rocky wall of the Colbricon. By the afternoon of May 22 the whole position was recaptured, and the enemy were driven down in disorder. The Italian *communiqué* (and General Cadorna's reports were always notably free from exaggeration) spoke of "the hundreds of dead left on the field." The Austrian bulletin simply stated that "in Tirol fighting activity increased at some points." No further comment is necessary to indicate the completeness of the enemy reverse.

The first phase of the battle on the Julian front was now over, and a very important success had been won. There was a moment's pause, except for the persistent counter-attacks on the Vodice ridge, and then the struggle began afresh.

The second phase of the battle was to

develop in a different sector from that which was the scene of the first; and the question arises, why was there an interval, why did General Cadorna's right not immediately follow his left? And why was it impossible to go on hammering with the left when the right came into play? The answer is very simple: there were not enough guns, and not enough shells. As soon as the Vodice ridge seemed reasonably safe, almost sooner in fact, guns began travelling southward from the middle Isonzo to the Carso. The material at the disposal of the Italian Command did not admit of a two-handed offensive being carried to a completely successful conclusion. The Italian guns could make a brave show along a 20-mile front. They could not, in view of the increased strength of the Austrians, especially in artillery, bring a sufficient weight of fire to prepare for an infantry attack upon more than one reasonably wide sector at a time. There was a short additional delay in opening the second phase of the offensive owing to a furious *bora*, which spoiled the fire of the big trench-mortars, but the determining cause of the plan upon which the battle was conducted is that already indicated.

The preliminary bombardment of the second phase was relatively short—10 hours. The Austrian lines on the Carso had already suffered much damage from the intense fire that began 11 days earlier, and though the Carso had been comparatively quiet for a week, the Italian artillery had been sufficiently active to disturb the work of repair. There was another excellent reason why the bombardment was not further prolonged. The supply of shells did not permit of any expenditure beyond the absolute minimum required. It is doubtful, indeed, whether that minimum was reached.

At dawn on May 23 the insistent hammering of the guns broke into a terrible drum fire along the whole Carso front. All day up to 4 o'clock guns and mortars rained destruction upon the Austrian trenches, while the counter-batteries strove to keep down the enemy's fire. For the Austrians had quite abandoned their old habit of maintaining silence during Italian bombardments, and, while they kept a steady, worrying fire on the Italian front trenches, they threw a large number of shells on the approaches to the lines, and on the various vantage points with which the Carso plateau is studded. At four o'clock the Italian

fire lifted, and the infantry went forward. On the sector north of Kostanjevica the troops of the Eleventh Corps penetrated the enemy lines at various points, explored the shattered trenches, pushed forward patrols, and had many stiff brushes with the enemy before they returned to their own trenches in the evening with several hundred prisoners.

On the southern sector the Italians attacked in earnest and smashed clean through the foremost enemy positions. On the main Carso plateau the Thirteenth Corps occupied a considerable area south of the road that runs from Kostanjevica to Hudi Log, "the Evil Wood." Hudi Log itself was taken on the run, and the line was pushed forward some distance beyond. Lukatic, too, was taken in the Italian stride. Farther south the troops advancing from the famous Hill 208 South rolled up the Austrian line that extended to the edge of the plateau, and occupied some important heights beyond. In the late evening

Division was checked for the time, a check which made the advance of those on the right more difficult. But the difficulties were overcome. After taking Hill 77, a nest of wire and machine-guns which had resisted very many attacks, the Arezzo Brigade swept on nearly a mile to Hill 58, on the northern edge of the Lissert marshes. In the marshes the Tuscany Brigade made excellent progress, though it could not keep up with the splendid impetus of the Arezzo.

The enemy were taken aback by the sudden onfall of the Italian infantry, and perhaps still more by its direction. Throughout the previous 10 days the demonstrative Italian action on the Carso had been almost entirely confined to the sector north of Kostanjevica, though there had been one fierce struggle just south of the road that runs due west from Kostanjevica to Oppacchiasella. It seemed as though the Italians were preparing to push forward on the line of their advance in the



[Official photograph.]


ATTACK BY ITALIANS IN THE JAMIANO SECTOR.

patrols pushed well forward, and returned with a number of prisoners.

On the low ground east of the battered and bloodstained Hill 144, and right down to the sea, progress was no less satisfactory. The strong enemy lines in front of Jamiano were stormed, and the ruins of the hamlet were solidly occupied.

To the south-east of Hill 144 the very important position of Hill 92 was torn from the enemy, but here the progress of the Sixteenth

previous November, when they had smashed through the Austrian trenches on the northern half of the Carso and punched out the great salient which ran east from San Grado di Merna to Fauti Hrib, southward to just in front of Kostanjevica, and thence back towards Nova Vas. On that occasion little progress had been made farther south, in the zone which lay open to direct fire from the massed guns on the terrible Hermada ridge. The troops in this sector had only been able to fight a con-



[Official photograph.]

PANORAMA OF THE CARSO LOOKING TOWARDS JAMIANO AND MOUNT HERMADA.

taining action. It must always be remembered that from Hill 144 right down to the sea the Italians had hitherto not succeeded in penetrating the enormously strong lines that had been prepared at the beginning of the war. They had eaten slowly into parts of these, but on the whole little impression had been made, and the enemy had been tireless in developing his defensive system. His deep trenches were crammed with machine-guns and fronted by wide belts of the strongest wire. He had paid special attention to the lines just south of the Italian salient, and it would seem from the plan of the defences and the disposition of his troops that he had expected an attempt to widen the salient by a push southward. Perhaps he trusted too much to the Hermada and to the multiple lines of trenches and machine-gun redoubts which faced the Italians all the way from Hudi Log to the sea. In any event, he seemed to be nonplussed by the development of the Italian attack, which followed a plan exactly the reverse of that which led to the advance in November. This time, on the northern sector of the Carso, the Italians felt for the enemy, gripped him, and held him, while to the south they crumpled up his lines and made a great stride forward.

The enemy was quick in recovering from his surprise, and towards nightfall he launched desperate counter-attacks against the positions which had been torn from him. In spite of the bravery and persistence of his troops he

met with no success. At the end of the day the Italians were still in possession of all their gains, and they had captured over 9,000 prisoners.

Fighting was no less furious on the second day of the battle. The main advance was between Jamiano and the sea, for in the Hudi Log sector it was necessary to go slowly. The network of enemy trenches was very complicated, and the resistance was most stubborn. South of the village of Kostanjevica, which was the centre point of the enemy's defensive system on the Carso, the main trench line divided into three. Of these three lines one ran westward to Hudi Log, and then turned sharply south by Lukatic to near Hill 208 South. The second line backed this at a distance of about 500 yards, but this second line divided again into three at Pod Koriti, one branch bending upwards and joining the front line near Hudi Log, one reaching the same line a little south of that shattered hamlet, and one running southwest to Hill 235, on the edge of the main Carso plateau just above Jamiano. The third main line ran south-west from Kostanjevica to Selo.

These were the principal lines, but line 1 was further linked to line 2 by a system of trenches which ran from westward of Lukatic down to Hill 235, this line backing the tangle of wire, trenches and caverns which had faced the Italians from Lukatic to Hill 208 South. Apart from these definite systems, moreover, the whole area was riddled with caverns and

machine-gun redoubts, and it would have been difficult to find an uglier position for an attacking force to face. But nothing could stop the men who were sent against this labyrinth. On the first day their rush followed so quickly upon the fire of their guns that they overwhelmed the outer lines, and picked some thousands of prisoners out of their caverns before the attack was fully realized. On the second day they had to fight yard by yard, under a ceaseless artillery and machine-gun fire, and against numerous counter-attacks. There were not many prisoners taken—the struggle was to the death. At the end of the day Hill 235 and Hill 247 (half a mile north-west of Selo) were occupied, and the line was extended to the outlying houses of the hamlet of Versic.

Between Jamiano and the sea the attack swept on till the right faced the mouth of the Timavo, the mysterious subterranean stream that appears suddenly from beneath the rocky hummocks east of Monfalcone, while the centre and left pressed on the foothills of the Hermada and the mouth of the Brestovica valley. The line of the advance was straightened out. The Sixteenth Division were able to come up on the left, the Second Bersaglieri Brigade doing great work, while the Tuscany Brigade drove back the enemy on the right. In this way the pressure on the Arezzo Brigade, which had been

left the previous evening in possession of a dangerous salient, was relieved. But this brigade still kept in the van, and on the night of May 24 it lay under Flondar, the centre point of the first line on the Hermada, which was also the last line of the original defence system prepared in 1915.

Next day the Flondar line was carried, after a heavy preparatory bombardment which lasted till nearly four in the afternoon. The whole network of enemy trenches from the mouth of the Timavo across the Brestovica valley up to the edge of the Carso fell into Italian hands, and on the Carso itself a terrible hand-to-hand struggle resulted in the occupation of practically all the enemy system south of Kostanjevica with the exception of the last line running down to Selo. All the foul nest of trenches, caverns, and machine-gun pits was at last cleaned up. During the first two days' fighting the Italians had overrun most of these positions, but strong bodies of the enemy, with many machine-guns, had remained hidden in caverns and galleries, and when the inevitable counter-attacks were thrown in these came out and played their part to the end. For long the *mêlée* swayed uncertain, but at length the last Austrian was routed from his den, and the last machine-gun was silenced. This bitterest angle of a bitter field may rank perhaps with Devil's Wood for heroism and



[Official photograph.]

SOME OF THE AUSTRIAN PRISONERS TAKEN IN THE JAMIANO DISTRICT.

slaughter, for this was only the final struggle in a long series of bloody and uncertain fights that had raged about "the Evil Wood." During this three days' conflict there was little to choose between the various units who fought in "the Labyrinth," as it came to be called, but there are two brigades that deserve special mention. One was the Mantua, which took Hill 247, and held in spite of terrible loss—its casualties reached over 60 per cent. of the rank and file, and 102 officers. The other was the Grenadier Brigade—*Brigata Sardegna*—first on the list of Italian regiments of foot, and first upon many a hard fought field. It had always answered every call, and it had been remade many times during the war. On this occasion it fought on the extreme southern edge of the main Carso plateau, between Jamiano and Selo, and after taking the stony hummock known as Hill 219, it had stood the shock of the enemy's fiercest counter-attack.

North of the Labyrinth, all along the line from Kostanjevica to the Vipacco, the enemy attempted to lighten the pressure in the south by violent counter-attacks, which came to nothing. The Eleventh Army Corps held firm,

and even gained a trench here and there. Its right-hand brigade, the Barletta, which was in front of Kostanjevica, succeeded in driving the enemy out of his trenches, but the extreme left of the Thirteenth Corps was unable to carry the very strong positions facing it, and as a result the ground gained to the north could not be maintained.

The strain of the three days' fighting had been tremendous, but the attack was still alive. On the fourth and fifth days the Seventh Army Corps, between the Carso and the sea, pressed on still farther. On May 26 the Sixteenth Division and the Arezzo Brigade continued their splendid work on the lower slopes of the Hermada. Beyond the village of Medeazza, before reaching the final rampart of the Hermada, there is a dip in the ground that separates the lower slopes from the last steep ascent. On the right and in the centre the Italians now faced that dip. To the left the line ran farther west, held back deliberately to keep in touch with the troops in the Brestovica valley and on the Carso plateau. A battalion of the Arezzo Brigade had swept through Medeazza towards the last ridge that once was



ITALIAN HEAVY GUN ON THE CARSO.



[Manuel.]

ITALIAN REINFORCEMENTS AND SUPPLIES FOR THE TROOPS ON THE CARSO.

covered thick with woods, but now lay half-stripped, its garment torn by the scourging shell fire till the grey rock showed bare and gaunt. The battalion was brought back, as were other strong detachments which pushed forward and up on the left, until the line could go forward methodically, and in the afternoon the troops lying out on the slopes had to suffer a very heavy bombardment from the enemy's big guns. His light guns were moving backwards. Some had fallen into Italian hands, but the great bulk were got away safely. The whole western face of the Hermada was dismantled of the batteries which had so long poured shells upon the old Italian lines.

That afternoon the battle took on an aspect of movement that seemed inexpressibly strange. For months, for two years, there had been hardly a break in the slow horror of trenches and bombs and giant howitzers. But on that afternoon field batteries were going into action at the gallop, unlimbering where two days before there had been Austrian guns. Horses were galloping, motor lorries were running, along the roads where troglodyte men had faced one another at 30 yards' distance for many weary months, coming out of their lairs at intervals to struggle with bomb and bayonet, and at the end to fall back sullenly—to the same battered trenches.

On the fifth day the fighting was less severe. The last enemy trenches across the mouth of

the Brestovica valley were carried after a brief but effective bombardment, and Bersaglieri patrols pushed up the valley nearly as far as Brestovica. Down by the sea the Timavo was crossed, and a little to the north the village of San Giovanni di Duino was occupied, and the whole vast machinery of preparation was rolling forward. Reinforcements were pouring up to the front to replace the splendid brigades which had paid so dearly for their success. Heavy guns which were no longer within effective range of the enemy (it has been said already that General Cadorna had to keep many obsolete weapons in line) were pulled out of their positions and sent lumbering forwards. Prospects seemed more than favourable. Hopes were running very high.

But that evening came the announcement that the offensive was suspended. The supply of shells was running low. It was not possible to continue the rate of expenditure necessary to prepare for a further advance.

Already the infantry had suffered from the fact that they had not behind them that degree of superiority in gunfire which is essential if losses are to be kept within the limits that allow continuous effort. They had done extraordinary things, but they had not been able to win the full harvest of their valour. The guns and *bombarde* had performed the work of destroying the enemy trenches as well as

could be expected considering the extreme difficulty of breaking up defences cut in the solid rock. Where the weakness had been most felt was in counter-battery work. The Italians were sometimes criticized for their comparative failure to develop an efficient counter-battery system, and it is a fact that they had seemed to neglect this branch of artillery tactics. One reason was that in the mountains and on the Carso the enemy gun positions were particularly difficult to detect and reach. Another reason was that the aeroplane service was not sufficiently developed to ensure the necessary observation and fire-control. But the determining cause was the lack of a sufficient number of guns and shells. A lavish use of guns and shells might have overcome the difficulty of ensuring an accurate fire upon the enemy's gun positions. Such an expenditure was never possible. When guns have to be spared so that they shall not be worn out before they can be replaced, when shells have to be counted grudgingly so that they shall not fail at a critical moment, the development of artillery tactics to meet modern requirements is necessarily



SEEKING A POINT OF VANTAGE.

thwarted. Counter-battery work had to be strictly limited in order to meet the first necessities of trench-destruction and barrage fire.

It was for this reason that the Italians had never been able to keep up that continuous harassing fire upon the enemy guns which gave such excellent results in France and Flanders. It was for this reason that, during the heavy fighting on the Carso which has been described, the guns detailed for counter-battery work were several times switched off to meet the pressing call for a barrage upon an enemy counter-attack. There was never "enough to go round."

Six months earlier the artillery strength at the disposal of the Italians in May, 1917, would have opened a wider and longer road for their gallant infantry. Even in May it might have sufficed if the situation in Russia had been what the early spring had promised. But the Austrian strength in guns was markedly greater than it should have been. Many batteries had been brought from the Eastern front to



[Manuel.

AN ITALIAN TRENCH ON THE CARSO.

augment the natural increase due to the comparative truce of winter. The enemy strength in guns on the Carso was at least double what it had been the previous autumn. This fact, coupled with the unavoidable weakness of the Italian counter-battery work, imposed an immense strain upon the infantry. It was never possible to keep down sufficiently the tremendous high-explosive barrages that immediately followed upon a successful Italian advance. And on the Carso this meant more than on any other field of battle. On this stone tableland there was no digging-in with entrenching tools. Nothing but rock-drills and blasting powder could make an adequate

The necessity of economizing in artillery fire had always been a handicap to the Italians, but even the strict economy imposed had failed to make the supply of shells adequate to a further continuance of the offensive. This does not mean, of course, that shells were actually lacking on the front, though a good many batteries were "milked dry" at a time when their fire was urgently needed. It means that the stock had run very low, so low that prudence forbade trenching further upon the reserves which must always be held against an emergency. The rate of fire which had prevailed for more than a fortnight could no longer be kept up, and a pause was imposed



[Official photograph.]

INFANTRY IN A TRENCH NEAR JAMIANO.

shelter. When the enemy lines were taken there was no refuge save in his battered trenches, which were generally mere heaps of crumbled rocks. There were caverns, of course, and dug-outs, but these were traps to newcomers and it was better to lie behind a heap of stones or in a little hollow and pray against the bad luck of a direct hit or a flying fragment. But on the Carso the area of destruction caused by big shells was very wide indeed. In Flanders or in France a shell fell comparatively dead, but on the Carso each bursting shell seemed to take new life from its contact with the rock, and gathered a thousand allies to go with its fragments on the work of wounding and slaying.

just at the moment when it appeared as though one more great effort would give not only victory, but the fruits of victory. On May 27 it seemed as though the Austrians were very near the end of their tether. A week or 10 days before, in anticipation of an Italian attack on the Carso, they had placed fresh troops in line. When these were broken by the Italian attack, there were no reserves available except the tired men who had just been taken out of the trenches, drafts from the "march battalions" at the rear, and detachments belonging to two divisions which had arrived from the Eastern front, and were still weary with the journey. The line was



[Official photograph.]

TRENCH COMMUNICATING WITH THE FRONT LINE ON THE CARSO.

cracking. A few more hammer-strokes, and it would almost certainly have gone. They could not be given.

The fruits of victory were denied, yet a very important victory had been won. The Kuk-Vodice ridge had been stormed and held against many furious counter-attacks, carried out by fresh troops from the East and backed by a very heavy artillery fire. The Labyrinth had been wrested from the enemy, and the 13th Army Corps was now in touch with the outposts of the main Kostanjevica-Selo line. The Flondar line and the Timavo were passed, and the Seventh Corps was pressing upon the Hermada itself, though the value of the last stage of its advance was largely destroyed by the fact that a halt had to be called. The line formed by the limit of its progress would have made an excellent jumping-off place for a new attack pushed home while the enemy was still shaken. It was not well adapted for defence.


Forty undamaged enemy guns had been captured, and many more were destroyed, some by Italian fire, and some blown up by the enemy as the Italian infantry approached. When Selo seemed to be threatened by the Italian advance the Austrians blew up at least one battery of heavy howitzers after trying in vain to remove them, and the same thing happened at various other places. At some points guns were left in No Man's Land, whence

neither side could remove them. One instance was on the reverse slope of Monte Kuk, where a battery of six-inch howitzers was abandoned just beyond the positions occupied by the Italians. It was impossible to drag them up the steep hill under the enemy's machine-gun fire, but patrols went out by night and surrounded them by barbed wire, earmarking them for future capture. The enemy's practical loss in guns was very far above the official Italian enumeration of guns taken.

From May 14 to the end of the month the Italians took 24,000 prisoners, and the enemy losses in killed and wounded were calculated at not less than 80,000 men. An Innsbruck report, which put the number of guns lost at not less than 100, estimated the losses in men at 85,000. In any event, the enemy suffered very heavily. His system of refuges was so complete that his troops were relatively immune from the Italian bombardment. Casualties mounted up quickly in the hand-to-hand fighting which followed the Italian infantry advance, and the heaviest losses of all were sustained during the repeated counter-attacks. These attacks were almost beyond numbering. There was no lack of skill or bravery in the efforts made by the Austrians to right the balance which had been so rudely upset. They showed the most undaunted persistency, but they were met with a cool steadfastness equal to the hot courage which had animated the Italian attack.

The Italian losses were very heavy—heavier naturally, than those of the enemy. The percentage of killed to wounded was small, and there was a large proportion of slightly wounded men, who came back quickly into line. But by the end of May the total casualty list, killed, wounded and missing, was close upon 130,000. Of these some 6,000 were prisoners. The ill-timed thrust beyond Faltis Hrib on May 14 had left not less than 1,500 men, most of them wounded, in Austrian hands, and all along the line, from Monte Kuk to the sea, parties of men had been cut off

There was a week's comparative quiet on the Carso, but all through this week the enemy renewed his attempts to regain the Vodice ridge. The fighting presented no special features. At one moment the command of the Italian Second Army was put to great anxiety owing to the shortage of shells, and the task of the infantry was made much harder by the necessity of rigorously husbanding the artillery fire. But the infantry was equal to every demand. When the last enemy effort died away at the end of the first week in June the Italians on the Vodice ridge could



[Official photograph.]

CABLE RAILWAY ON THE CARSO,
With carriage suitable for transporting wounded men.


here and there, men who had pushed too far in the heat of the advance, or had been left isolated by the partial and temporary success of an enemy counter-attack. The Austrians claimed double this figure, but their bulletins, apart from the fact that they often reckoned as prisoners the dead left in their lines, consistently made a point of exaggerating the number of prisoners taken.

A very notable victory had been won, and the Italian infantry had shown the very highest qualities. They had done great things, and they had paid the price of their achievements in blood. A still heavier price was to be paid before the battle finally wore itself out.

boast that they had driven back just under 40 counter-attacks in 20 days. The importance of the capture of Vodice is sufficiently indicated by the desperate attempts made by the enemy to drive the Italians back from the ridge. All his efforts could not regain a yard of his lost ground. He suffered very severe loss, in spite of the Italian weakness in artillery, and at the end of the three weeks' fighting he was a little farther down the eastern and southern slopes of the ridge than he had been when he first counter-attacked. The infantry of the Fifty-third Division had shown a tenacity of resistance that was beyond praise.

During the week's pause on the Carso many

of the troops which had been in the front line were withdrawn to rest and to refill their thinned-out ranks. The Arezzo came back and the Toscana, the Barletta, the Mantua and the Grenadiers, and others which had been as hardly tried. Space has not permitted a detailed account that should do justice to the work of those battered brigades. But the story of



AUSTRIAN ALPINE TROOPS.

one of them may be given very briefly, in order to illustrate both the dash and the resisting power of the Italian infantryman. It is not a specially picked instance; other brigades won higher official praise. The choice falls on the Arezzo brigade because some of its best work came directly under the writer's eye, and because the story was filled in for him later by those who played a part in it, or by men who saw what was done.

The Arezzo was an old Monfalcone brigade. It was a veteran of the holding fights to the east of the town, one of those units whose duty it had been to sacrifice themselves for others to whom the main attack was entrusted. On this occasion the Arezzo, and its neighbours to right and left, were to go right through if they could. The Arezzo was faced by Hill 77, a low barren hummock of stone and sand just above where the railway leaves the edge of the Lissert marshes and turns to skirt the foothills

of the Hermada. Hill 77 and the other hummocks écheloned behind it had thwarted many a promising advance, and the enemy strengthened it continually. It was a mass of wire, and when the Arezzo had finally torn it from its stubborn defenders 28 machine-gun were found in one of its deep trenches, and 20 in another. Hill 77 was not taken at the first onslaught. The wire had partially withstood the preliminary bombardment, the bulk of the defenders in their deep dug-outs had suffered no harm, and the moment that the Italians left their trenches a storm of shrapnel and machine-gun fire broke upon them. It was an hour before they found their way across the narrow No Man's Land and through the half-standing wire, and they left over a thousand men in front of Hill 77. From Hill 77 they were able to push on, some of them under cover of the railway embankment, until they reached and occupied Hill 58 nearly a mile farther to the east. They turned the Austrians out at the point of the bayonet and sat down to hold. The Arezzo was by this time well ahead of the troops on its right and left, and the night that followed was an anxious one. The brigade was raked by machine-gun fire from three sides, and heavily pounded by artillery, and two or three times the enemy tried a counter-attack. He met with no success, and next morning the Italian advance was renewed. That day the Arezzo were stopped on the right by two tunnels in the railway, north of San Giovanni di Inino, which had been loop-holed for machine-guns, and were impervious to bombardment. But the left pushed on till it came under Flondar, where again a halt was called. On the third day the tunnels were carried, and it was found that the machine-gunners inside were chained leg and waist to their guns. That night the Arezzo lay just west of Medeazza—it has already been told how a battalion of the brigade went through the village, but was brought back for prudence sake. All night and all next day they were subject to very heavy shell fire, and from time to time enemy aeroplanes swept down and raked them with machine-guns. There were no trenches and little shelter on the rocky hillside, and the strain was very great. On the third night of the struggle the brigade came near the end of its tether. For two days the men had had nothing to eat but their emergency ration; for many hours they had not drunk, and the sun had been very fierce.

They had had little sleep since the night before they swept over Hill 77, and the third night of tension was trying them sorely. But in the small hours hot food and hot coffee came to them by mule train, and they gained new strength for the next day's ordeal. On the fifth day the brigade was brought back. It had lost 87 officers out of 120, and almost exactly 50 per cent. of the rank and file.

One pendant episode may be added. On that third night, two hours after midnight the general of the brigade, like his men, was midway between sleep and waking when the voices of his orderly and his soldier servant, who should have been miles away, broke on his weary ears: "Signor Generale, we have brought dinner." They were roundly scolded, and while they stood silent and content the clatter of the arriving mule train was heard on the stony hillside. These men might have left it to the ordinary transport to bring their general's food, but they had to come themselves—and arrive first—into that hell of fire.

During the pause in the fighting new brigades were brought into line between Gorizia and the sea, and one of these, which had recently been filled with men fresh from the depôts, showed a distinctly mutinous tendency. The men grumbled openly and raised defiant shouts in favour of peace as they marched towards the


front. The fresh drafts had come from a district where pacifist propaganda had been particularly active, and on June 2 General Cadorna addressed a letter to the Government pointing out the danger to the Army that arose from a failure to check the insidious progress of moral *sabotage*.

A day later the relative quiet on the Carso was broken by a renewal of action on the part of the enemy. On the evening of Sunday, June 3, the Austrians opened a terrific bombardment along the whole line from above Gorizia down to the sea. Their artillery had been noticeably more active for two or three days, and they had been specially attentive to the Italian trenches on Falti Hrib, which had indeed been under almost continuous fire for four weeks. But the gunfire which began on June 3 exceeded anything that the Austrians had hitherto revealed upon this front.

On the northern edge of the Carso the infantry followed the shells at quite a short interval. The Italian trenches on Falti had already suffered much during the persistent bombardment of the last month, and each night it had grown more difficult to repair the damage of the day. A few hours' hurricane fire was enough to complete the work of destruction and prepare the way for the enemy *Stosstruppen*. Two thousand picked men, Hun-



AN ITALIAN CAVALRY PATROL.



Official photograph.

15 INCH (381 mm.) GUNS IN AN ITALIAN FACTORY.

garians and *Alpenschtützen*, attacked late on Sunday evening, and after a stiff fight gained a footing in the Italian trenches. The Falti Hrib positions were not favourable to defence, as they formed a weak salient, the trench system which ran due north from opposite Kostanjevica turning westward at a right angle on Falti, and running back on the rim of the Carso towards Volkovnjak. The enemy fire had practically isolated the salient by smashing up the communication trenches, the front line was rushed, and a counter-attack by the immediate supports failed to dislodge the enemy. The Italian artillery got to work promptly, and a tremendous curtain fire, directed especially upon the saddle between Falti Hrib and Hill 464, proved absolutely impenetrable to the Austrian reserves, who suffered very heavily. The storming party was completely cut off, and though they held on for hours against the pressure of the Tiber Brigade, who were detailed to recapture the hill, their fate was settled.

The enemy made many attempts to reinforce the doomed battalions, but the Italian fire swept away the troops who tried to advance, and finally the order was given to retire from the captured position. Only some of the

enemy tried to retreat through the Italian barrage, and very few succeeded. The others preferred to remain to meet the attack of the Tiber Brigade, who had been awaiting the order to advance and had been the target for very heavy artillery fire. As machine-gun and rifle fire from the top of the hill weakened, owing to the retreat of some of the defenders and heavy casualties among the rest, the Italians swept forward, and after a short but violent struggle the hill was cleared of the enemy. By four o'clock on the afternoon of June 4 the Italian line was completely re-established, and the enemy had ceased to attempt its recapture.

Southward the fight still raged furiously. The infantry attack had come later, but before dawn on June 4 battle was joined all along the line from Falti to the sea. As was to be expected the enemy's main efforts were directed against the new Italian lines, on the Carso south of Kostanjevica, and on the lower slopes of Hermada. There had been little time to consolidate these positions. In certain places it had been possible to adapt the old Austrian trenches and caverns; in others the work had to be begun at the beginning, and this was the case below the Hermada. Everywhere


time was required for blasting and drilling, and the enemy had been able to collect reserves before that time had passed.

For three days the Austrians kept up their attack, and the struggle equalled in fierceness any that had gone before. On the southern sector of the Carso the enemy drive was directed in the main against the line that ran from Versic to Hill 219. For three days it was hurricane fighting, and the battle swayed uncertain till the evening of June 6, when the Austrians were finally flung back. On the night of June 7 they attempted another attack, but their storming columns were broken up by artillery fire before they ever came to grips.

During the whole of these three days the southern Carso was only occasionally visible through the smoke of the bursting shells. Hills 219, 241 and 247 changed hands several times. It seemed as though neither side could hold under the appalling fire which swept those stony ridges. The bulk of the fighting was practically in the open. The old lines were smashed to pieces, and such trenches as existed were makeshift affairs that were little more than *sangars*. On the morning of June 6 the enemy made their last big effort.

They attacked in great force, throwing in waves of infantry behind a terrific curtain fire. The Italians were driven back several hundred yards and then the attack died out. Under the crushing weight of the fiercest artillery fire ever seen on the Carso neither side could advance. The Austrians clung desperately to their initial advantage, but in the afternoon, on the arrival of Italian reinforcements, they were driven back, and all the ground lost by the defenders was retaken. Among the reinforcements was the Grenadier Brigade, which had been recalled from its hard-earned rest on the fall of Hill 219. They retook the stony hillock with which, to all who know the Carso battles, their name will always be associated, and held it against one more furious attack that came in the late afternoon. Two days later, when the Austrian effort was completely spent, the Grenadiers were withdrawn. Of the six thousand odd who had gone into action on May 23, little more than a thousand remained.

Meanwhile the enemy had won a considerable success to the south, on the slopes of Herma. He had a great advantage of position here, and the Italian line was not yet in a condition to resist heavy pressure, but the extent



[Official photograph.]

INSPECTING AND TESTING SHELLS IN AN ITALIAN FACTORY.

of the Austrian success was due to the failure of an Italian brigade to show the same spirit as its fellows. It was the brigade already mentioned, which had become contaminated by pacifist propaganda. No doubt it was put to a hard trial for troops fresh to the trenches. The Austrian artillery fire was very heavy, and the infantry attack very determined, but the greater part of one regiment of the brigade surrendered practically at the first onset. In the case of the other regiment the resistance was nearly as feeble, and the conduct of the whole brigade formed an extraordinary contrast to the heroic behaviour of the army as a whole. There was no question of panic. The failure of this brigade to do its duty was the first fruit of the propaganda which urged that the only way to end the war was for the soldiers to cease fighting.

One brigade failed, and the whole line was prejudiced. A magnificent counter-attack nearly regained the lost ground, but the enemy pressure was too heavy, and the effort died away. The failure of the one brigade had left a considerable body of its comrades practically isolated by the enemy attack. The counter-effort seemed as though it would turn the fortunes of the day, and probably prevented the troops in the threatened positions from getting away. They hung on stubbornly, in the hope of the line being restored, but when the counter-attack failed, the tide of the enemy infantry swirled round them and cut them off. They resisted for another day, without food or water, till their ammunition was all gone. It was only a remnant that fell into the hands of the enemy.

By the evening of June 5 the Italian line was down below Flondar, and back across the Timavo. The Austrians had regained the

ground lost on the third day of the Italian offensive (May 25), but all attempts to push farther westward were frustrated, and by the evening of June 7 their bolt was shot. A useful local success had been won, but it bulked very small in comparison with the total result of the four week's fighting. Between May 14 and May 27 the Italians had gained several positions of first-class importance, the possession of which promised to have a favourable effect upon future operations, and the Austrian counter-blows had only loosened their hold upon one of these. The whole of the Kuk-Vodice ridge remained in their possession. Monte Santo was closely invested, and since the occupation of Vodice the Austrian tenure of the summit was very uncertain. The Hudi Log Labyrinth, and all the trench system fronting Selo, had been held in spite of the desperate efforts of the enemy. Only the lower slopes of the Hermada had been lost, and in this sector also substantial gains had been maintained. The final clearing of Hill 144, the occupation of Jamiano, the lower slopes in front of Flondar, and Hill 58, between the railway and the marshes, constituted a very solid gain which in fact surpassed the original hopes of the Italian command. The balance of prisoners, too, remained much in favour of the Italians, in spite of the "regrettable incident" between Hermada and the Timavo. The total number of Austrians taken on the Julian front between May 12 and June 8, was close upon 25,000. The prisoners taken by the enemy numbered about 14,000. On both sides the losses in killed and wounded during the June fighting were very serious. Both Italians and Austrians showed how they could take punishment without flinching.

END OF VOLUME FOURTEEN.

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